CIHM 

l\f1jcrofiche 

Series 

(Monographs) 


ICMH 

Collection  de 

microfiches 

(monographles) 


Canadian  Inatituta  for  Hiatorical  Microraproduetiona  /  Inatitut  Canadian  da  microraproductiona  historiquas 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes 

The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best  original 
copy  available  for  filming.  Features  of  this  copy  which 
may  be  bfeSographicaHy  unique,  WhUh  may  alter  any  of 
the  images  in  the  reproduction,  or  which  may 
significantly  change  the  usual  method  of  filming  are 
checl(0d  below. 

□ Coloured  covers  / 
Couverture  d«  couleur 

□ Covers  damaged  / 
Couverture  endommag^e 

□ Covers  restored  and'or  laminated  / 
Couverture  restaur^*  et/bu  pelScuMe 

I .  Cover  title  missing  /  Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 


Coloured  maps  /  Cartes  gtegraphiques  en  couleur 

□ Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)  / 
Encre  de  couleur  (Le.  autre  que  bleue  ou  mrire) 

□ Cotoured  plates  andAir  IBustrations  / 
Planches  et/bu  iiiustraltons  en  couleur 

□ Bound  with  other  material  / 
ReM  avec  d'autres  documents 

□ Only  edition  availaMe  / 
Seide  MHIon  tteponible 

□ Tight  binding  may  cause  shadows  or  distortion  along 
intertor  margin  /  La  reliure  serr^e  peut  causer  de 
I'ombre  ou  de  la  distorsion  le  long  de  la  marge 
Int^rieure. 

□ Blank  leaves  added  during  restorations  may  appear 
within  the  text.  Whenever  possMe,  these  have  been 
onyited from  filming  /  Use  peut  que  cerlaines  pages 
blanches  ajout^es  lors  d'une  restauration 
apparaissent  dans  la  texle,  mais.  lorsque  cela  itait 
possMe.  cat  pages  rfwA  pas  M  filmiet. 

□ AddHtonal  comments  / 
Commentaires  suppMmenlalres: 


Notes  techniques  et  bibiiographiques 

L'lnstitut  a  mk:rofilm6  le  meilleur  exemplaire  qu'il  lui  a 
M  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details  de  cet  exem- 
jMn  qui  son!  peut-6tre  uniques  du  point  de  vue  bibli- 
ographlque,  qui  peuvent  modifier  une  image  reproduite, 
ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  una  modHicatton  dans  la  mMto- 
da  nonnaii  da  fflmaga  smt  incflqute  d-dassous. 

I    I  Coloured  pages  /  Pages  de  couleur 

I    I  Pages  damaged/ Pages  endommagies 

□ Pages  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
Pages  rastaurtes  et/ou  pelficuldes 

Pages  discolotred,  stained  or  foxed  / 
Pages  dtedortea,  tachettes  ou  pk)utfes 

I    I  Pages  detached /Pagaaditachtea 

Showthrough  /  Transparence 

□ Quality  of  print  varies  / 
Quality  in^gale  de  I'impression 

□ Includes  supplementary  material  / 
Comprend  du  materiel  suppl^mentaire 

□ Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata  slip 
tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refilmed  to  ensure  :he  be'^i 
possible  image  /  Les  pages  totalement  ol 
partiellement  obscurcies  par  un  feuiilet  d'errats,  une 
pelure.  etc.,  ont  6\6  filmies  k  nouveau  de  fa9on  k 
obteiyr  la  malNaura  fanaga  posaiUa. 

□ Opposing  pages  with  varying  colouration  or 
discotourations  are  filmed  twice  to  ensure  the  best 
possible  image  /  Les  pages  s'opposant  ayant  des 
colorations  variables  ou  des  decolorations  sont 
filmies  deux  fois  alin  d'obtanir  la  nrteiHeura  ^g« 
pM8S}ta. 


Thli  Htm  It  film»d  »t  the  reduction  ratio  checked  below/ 

Co  documint  tit  film<  ou  taux  do  riduction  indiqui  cl*dttsoM. 


lOx 


14x 


18x 


22x 


26x 


30x 


I   I   I   I  I 


12x 


16x 


20x 


24x 


28x 


□ 


32x 


Tha  copy  filmed  h«r«  has  bMn  raproduead  ttianka 
to  ttia  ganaroaity  of: 

Stauffer  Library 
gHMii's  Uhlvmf^ 

Tha  imagaa  appaaring  hara  ara  ttia  bast  quality 
poMibIa  considaring  tha  condition  and  lagibility 
of  tha  original  copy  and  in  kaaping  with  tha 
filming  contract  apacif ieatiens. 


Original  copias  in  printad  papar  eovars  ara  fllniod 
baginning  with  tha  front  eovar  and  anding  on 
tha  laat  paga  with  a  printad  or  illustratod  impraa- 
sion,  or  tha  back  covar  whan  appropriata.  All 
othar  original  copias  ara  filmad  baginning  on  tha 
f  .<-st  paga  with  a  printad  or  illuatrstad  impras- 
aion.  and  anding  on  tha  laat  paga  witti  a  printad 
or  Uhiatratad  impraasion. 


Tha  last  racordad  frama  on  aach  microficha 
shall  contain  tha  symbol        (moaning  "CON- 
TINUED"!, or  tha  symbol  ▼  (maaning  "END"), 
«vhietiavar  applias. 

Mapa.  plataa.  charts,  ate.  may  ba  filmad  at 
diffarant  raduction  ratios.  Thosa  too  larga  to  ba 
antiraly  includad  <n  ona  axposura  ara  filmad 
baginning  in  tha  uppar  laft  hand  cornar,  laft  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  framaa  aa 
raquirad.  Tha  following  diagrama  illuatrata  tha 
mathod: 


L'oxamplaira  film*  fut  raproduit  griea  i  la 
ginirosit*  da: 

Stauffer  Library 
Qmmi's  ttifvarsl^ 

Las  Imagas  suivantas  on:  *t*  rsproduitas  avoc  la 
plus  grand  soin,  compta  tanu  da  la  condition  at 
da  la  nanatO  da  I'axamplaira  film*,  at  an 
eonf  ermit*  avoc  iaa  cenditiona  du  eontrat  da 
filmaga. 

Laa  namplairaa  originaux  dont  la  eouvartura  on 
papiar  ast  imprimOa  sont  filmAs  an  commanpant 
par  la  pramiar  plat  at  an  tarminant  soit  par  la 
darniira  paga  qui  comporta  una  amprainta 
d'impraaaion  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  la  second 
plat,  aalon  la  eaa.  Tous  loa  autras  axampiaires 
originaux  sont  filmOs  en  commenpant  par  la 
pramiOra  paga  qui  comporta  una  empreinte 
d'imprassion  ou  d'illustration  at  an  tarminant  par 
la  darni*ra  paga  qui  comporta  una  taila 
amprainta. 

Un  daa  symbolos  suivants  apparaitra  sur  la 
damiAra  imaga  da  ctiaqua  microficha,  salon  la 
cas:  la  symbols        signifia  "A  SUIVRE la 
symbolo  V  signifia  "FIN". 

Las  cartas,  planchas,  tablaaux.  etc..  peuvont  itra 
filmte  A  das  taux  da  rOduction  diff*rents. 
Lorsqua  la  document  est  trop  grand  pour  fttre 
raproduit  an  un  saul  clichi,  il  aat  filmi  A  partir 
da  I'angia  supAriaur  gaueha.  da  gaucha  *  droita. 
at  da  haut  an  bas,  an  pranant  la  nombre 
d'imagaa  n^cassaira.  Las  diagrammas  suivants 
iliuatrant  ia  withoda. 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

MiatOCOn  RESOUITION  TIST  CHART 

(AKjI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  3) 


THE  FOUh.DATIONS  OF  NORMAL  AND 
ABNORMAL  PSYCHOLOGY 


WORKS  BY  BORIS  SIDIS 

The  Pkychology  of  Saggetdon. 
Mold]^  Penoiiality. 

Psychopathological  Researdies. 

The  .Psychology  of  Laughter. 

Philistine  and  Genius. 

An  Experimental  Stady  of  Sleep. 

Hie  Foundations  of  Normal  and 
Almomial  Psychology. 

Symptomatology,  Psydiognoris, 

and  Diagnous  of  Pqrdioptdiic  Maladiei. 

The  Cauiati<m  and  Tmtmoit 
of  Psydiopaduc  IXaeates. 


THE  FOUNDATIONS  OF 
NORMAL  AND  ABNORMAL 

PSYCHOLOGY 


BOSTON:  RICHARD  G.  BADGER 
TORONTO:  'Hit T^TT H       m ,  IiImi w 


To  the  Memory  of  My  Master  and  Friend 


WILUAM  JAMES 

Who,  being  the  foremost  pioneer  in  the  vast  domain  of 
the  hmmam  mimd,  hot  feugromsiy  emomra§e4  others 
in  their  eforts  at  tUarim§  fresh  trails,  leading 
to  an  ever  more  comprehensive  view  of 
the  rich  varieties  of  mentai  life. 


S0699 


PREFACE 

In  thn  vohmie  I  made  an  attempt  to  fomulate  die 
foB^unartal  ammptioM  and  main  principles  dut  un* 
derlie  normal  and  abnormal  psychology.  Every  tfiffift^ 
mathematical,  physical  or  biological,  has  its  poitdaottt 
as  the  foundation  of  its  structure.  Psychology  as  a 
science  has  also  its  own  assumptions  which  have  to  be 
dearly  formnlated.  Tlie  object  of  the  first  part  of  diia 
volume  it  the  mmvellhig  of  the  {nrindptl  rtt^ffpit  and 
hypodieses  which  fmrm  lh&  bana  of  die  atndy  <d  men- 
tal phenomena. 

All  through  the  domain  of  the  sciences  there  is  a  v:  it 
movement  for  the  search  of  fundamental  concepts  and 
for  the  dote  investtgadon  of  mdi  concepts.  Even 
such  an  exact  science  as  mathematici  haa  f^  thb  apirit 
of  examination  of  its  fundamental  assumptions,  «^^T^^tif[) 
and  postulates.  Men  like  Lobatchcvsky,  Bolyai,  Rie- 
man  and  others  have  given  the  start  and  a  number  * 
mathemaddans  have  recendy  followed  in  their  fo^ 
steps,  with  the  result  of  getting  a  wider  horizon  and  of 
opening  unknown  regions.  The  same  we  dud  In  the 
case  of  physical  sciences,  such  as  phy  i  .  mecha  ucs  and 
chemistry.  Mach,  Poincarc,  OstwaiG,  Pearson  and 
others  have  contributed  to  this  spirit  of  investigation  in 
the  domain  of  physical  sciences.  This  spirit  of  mquiry 
has  become  of  late  specially  intensified  bf  die  i«volii> 
tionary  discoveries  of  radio-active  bodies. 

We  arc  acquainted  with  the  great  movement  whidi 
has  swept  all  over  biological,  sociological,  and  eco- 
nomical sdencea  dae  to  tlM  influence  of  the  theory  of 

(0 


Prefaet 


evfrfndon.  The  spirit  of  free  inquiry  into  fandameotal 
concepts  has  seized  on  all  sciences.  Throu^umt  this 
whole  domain  of  human  thought  there  is  felt  diis  re- 
juvenating and  invigorat)ng  breath  of  the  new  revolu- 
tionary spirit.  Philosophy,  ethics,  aesthetics,  history, 
law,  economia  all  have  been  awakened  out  of  their 
long  sleep  of  centuries.  Every  sdenoe  has  been  shaken 
by  thb  mighty  movement  to  its  very  foundation.  Even 
such  a  dry  study  as  logic  has  left  the  vital  breeze  of 
the  inquiring  spirit  of  modem  times. 

I  make  an  attempt  in  this  volume  to  examine  in  an 
elonentary  way  the  foundations  of  normal  and  abnor* 
mal  psychology.  This  is  all  the  more  necessary  as  phf* 
siologists,  biologists,  biological  chemists,  and  recently 
students  of  comparative  psychology,  a  science  which  lies 
on  the  borderland  of  psychology  and  biology,  have  a 
tendency  to  make  incursions  into  psychology  proper, 
and  favor  nwdianical  or  fmrely  physiolo^cal  oonoepta 
to  die  detriment  and  even  total  occhirion  of  mental  pa^ 
cesses. 

This  tendency  towards  elimination  of  psychic  life 
by  mechanical  processes  or  by  "The  Unconscious" 
is  also  observed  in  die  writings  of  sonw  workers  in  die 
domain  of  psychopatluilc^.  Hiey  think  it  b  in  the  in- 
terest of  strict  science  to  express  wherever  possible  men- 
tal states  in  terms  of  physical  changes.  Finally  a  stage 
is  reached  in  which  all  consciousness  is  completely  dis- 
posed with  in  favor  of  phjrsiological  processes  or  "The 
Unconscious".  Psychology  is  thus  made  a  branch  of 
I^ysiology  and  biology. 

Again,  philosophers  and  metaphysicians  are  apt  to 
make  intrusions  into  the  domain  of  psychology,  because 
the  latter  is  regarded  by  them  from  time  immemorial 


Pr§ftie€ 


t«  Intimate  prey,  inMmiidi  M  dieir  own  domain  lies 
on  the  outskirts  of  mental  life.  In  dw  i^rest  of  neca- 
physical  systems  philosophers  attempt  to  sobject  ptf> 

chology  to  their  own  speculative  purposes. 

The  popular  mind  has  a  tendency  of  regarding  psy- 
chology as  something  mystical  and  of  identifying  psy- 
diolc^  with  all  kinds  of  faidi  cures,  mind  cures,  spirit- 
ism, telepathy,  telaetthesia,  and  table  rajqwig.  It  is 
unfortunate  that  even  medical  men  of  note,  on  account 
of  lack  of  acquaintance  with  psychological  subjects  and 
inquiries,  are  apt  to  look  a^ance  at  psychology  and 
identify  it  with  religious  beliefs,  mental  cures  as  well 
as  with  the  more  shady  side  of  spiritistic  manifestaitioni. 

Still  more  complicated  is  the  plight  in  which  die  psy- 
chologist finds  himself  in  regard  to  the  recent  claims 
put  forth  by  some  psychologists  in  having  achieved  re- 
sults of  importance  to  law,  industry,  and  to  the  reforma- 
tion of  social  ills.  The  denumd  for  pracdcal  mults  in 
psychology  is  due  to  the  industrial  spirit  of  our  times,  a 
spirit  which  requires  immediate  results  that  can  be 
cashed  or  expressed  in  dollars  and  cents.  The  earnest 
psychologist  should  repudiate  such  industrial  business 
pqrdiology,  for  the  nmple  reason  that  such  a  psycholo- 
gy is  imagtaary;  in  other  words,  such  a  psychdogy  does 
not  exirt.  An  experienced  saiennan,  an  intelligent  busi- 
ness man  knows  infinitely  more  about  business  and  how 
to  obtain  the  best  results  out  of  certain  combinations 
-than  all  the  psychologists  with  their  laboratory  experi- 
ments, their  ardictal  ttadidci,  and  puerile  trivial  t» 
perimental  arranfoaenti,  giving  mdtt  iu>  lest  trivial 
and  meaningless. 

The  claims  made  by  psychologists  as  to  industrial  ef- 
ficiency which  psychology  can  give  is  ludicrous  in  the 


iv 


Prefsce 


extreme.  We  may  as  well  expect  the  astronomer  to 
claim  that  astronomy  can  give  pcmits  how  to  conduct 

successfully  a  political  campaign.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
the  psychologist  has  nothing  to  say  on  the  subject  of 
advertisements,  industry,  and  business,  but  common- 
place trivialities  expressed  with  all  the  pomposity  of 
sdiolastic  authority.  Induttrial  efficiency  does  not  be- 
long to  the  dcmiain  of  psychology.  We  may  as  well  ex- 
pect the  comparat've  psychologist  to  offer  practical 
points  on  the  efficiency  of  cows  to  give  milk  or  on  the 
efficiency  of  hens  to  lay  eggs.  The  success  of  ad- 
vertisement is  a  matter  of  experienced  business  men  and 
not  of  academic  psychologists  who  have  to  oier  nothing 
but  the  merest  platitudes. 

We  must  once  for  all  enter  a  protest  against  those 
psychologists  who  claim  that  they  have  some  great  psy- 
chological truths  to  reveal  to  business  men,  manufactur- 
er and  workingmen.  I  trust  tiitt  both  die  businessmaa 
and  the  workingman  will  have  enough  common  sense 
to  take  such  psychological  truths  for  what  they  are 
actually  worth.  The  ordinary  psychologist  under- 
stands little  of  business  life,  knows  almost  nothing  of 
the  life  of  the  laborer,  and  is  woefully  ignorant  of  the 
economical  questions  of  the  times.  Phycholi^cal  buu- 
ness  claims  are  illusory.  The  sooner  the  practical  busi- 
ness man  learns  this  fact  the  better  for  him,  and  idso  for 
the  earnest  psychological  investigator. 

Psychology  is  just  emerging  from  its  metaphysical 
and  theological  stages  as  Auguste  Comte  would  put  it. 
Psychology  is  just  entering  the  circle  of  her  sister 
sciences.  At  present  it  is  in  a  state  similar  to  the  phy- 
sics of  the  sixteenth  century.  The  psychologist  should 
declare  frankly  and  openly  that  he  can  no  more  assist 


▼ 


the  businessman  and  the  manufacturer  than  the  mathe- 
mfttidaii  with  hit  non-Eucfidean  geometry  or  tike  logi- 
cian with  his  algebra  of  logic  can  help  ti^  M^tfkm  of 
the  great  problems  of  capital  and  labor. 

We  can  obtain  some  help  from  abnormal  psychology 
in  its  application  to  the  medical  treatment  of  nervous 
and  moital  maladies.  This  b  quite  natural  as  abnor- 
mal psychok^  is  essentially  based  on  dinical  and  ex- 
perimental of  mental  diseases.  The  claim,  however, 
that  psychology  can  give  directions  for  vocations  of  life 
or  for  business  and  industry  is  entirely  unfounded. 

The  same  holds  true  of  the  practical  pseudo-psychol- 
ogy that  has  invaded  die  school,  die  court,  die  pristm 
and  the  immigration  bureau.  The  intdligenra  tests 
are  silly,  pedantic,  absurd,  and  grossly  misleading. 

I  have  not  discussed  in  this  volume  the  practical 
aspect  of  recent  quasi-business  psychology  for  the  reason 
that  such  claims  are  nothing  but  a  snare  and  delusion. 
Of  course  I  do  not  expect  that  diis  wamtflv  of  mine  as 
to  the  misleading  character  of  applied  psychology  will 
be  taken  graciously.  There  is  at  present  an  epidemic  of 
practical  or  applied  psychology.  People  however  will 
wake  up  from  their  psychological  dreams  and  will  real- 
ise diat  applied  psychology  is  nodimg  but  a  nightmare. 
I  am  fulty  aware  of  the  fact  diat  my  imseirt  protest  will 
draw  on  me  the  ire  and  severe  attadu  of  many  a  psy- 
chologist, but  I  sincerely  hope  that  some  of  the  more 
earnest  psychologists  will  sustain  me  in  my  present  con- 
tendon. 

So  much  for  the  pracdcal  limitadons  of  psychology. 
In  discussing  the  theoretical  aspects  of  psychology  and 
attempdttg  to  point  out  its  limitations  I  have  had  to 
toiM^  on  problems  ultra-psycholopcal,  but  diis  was  un> 


vi 


avoidable.  It  had  to  be  done  in  order  to  dear  the  path 
and  see  the  lay  of  ^  huuL  I  have  no  doubt  diat  thete 

will  be  found  a  great  number  of  shortcomings  in  the 
foundations  as  well  as  vagueness  in  the  delineation  of 
the  main  postulates  and  psychological  principles.  I 
ahall  be  fully  satisfied,  if  this  volume  will  stimulate 
others  to  better  work  in  the  mow  direcdmL 

The  second  part  of  this  work  deab  widi  my  theory 
of  "moment-consciousness."  This  theory  was  advanced 
by  me  some  sixteen  years  ago  in  my  "Psychology  of  Sug- 
gestion." It  was  further  touched  upon  in  my  "Multi- 
ple Personality,"  but  I  had  not  stated  the  theory  at  dit- 
tincdy  as  I  did  in  this  volume.  I  may  add  that  whoi 
James  read  the  theory  in  "The  Psychdogy  of  Sugges- 
tion" he  told  me  he  found  it  vahiablei  and  urged  me  to 
develop  it  more  in  detail. 

The  theory  of  moment-consdmiiness  presents  a  gen- 
eral view  of  die  nato!  w  and  develc^nnent  of  ctmtdoat- 
ness,  from  reflex  consdousnets  to  compound  reflex  and 
instinctive  consciousness  reaching  the  highest  form 
of  consciousness,  that  of  self-consciousness.  Con- 
sciousness and  the  adaptation  of  the  psychic  in- 
dividuality or  of  the  organism  to  die  external  «i* 
vironment  is  looked  at  not  cmly  from  a  ptydudi^ctlt 
but  also  from  a  biological  standpoint.  Consdouraeaa 
in  the  course  of  its  development  is  presented  in  a  series 
of  stages  and  types,  each  lower  stage  leading  to  the  next 
higher  and  more  complicated  stage  and  type.  This  does 
not  mean  that  the  higher  type  is  induded  in  the  lowtr 
We  must  assume  spontaneous  mental  variations,  or 
psychic  mutations,  so  that  while  the  stages  and  types  are 
arranged  in  a  progressive  scries  of  their  development 
and  complication,  they  at  the  same  time  differ  qualitth 


PrefMt 


lively  in  type  of  mental  life. 

I  may  add  that  most  of  the  ideas  devekqied  in  this 
volume  have  been  formulated  by  me  some  fourteen 
years  ago,  and  then  retouched  from  time  to  time.  A 
few  of  the  chapters  with  some  modifications  have  been 
published  by  me  in  various  psychological  and  medical 
journals. 

Bous  Sum. 

Sidii  PsyehotheraptuHe  Iiutitut*, 
Portsmouth, 
New  Hampshin, 
January,  1914. 


CONTENTS 


PART  I 

FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS  AND 
PRINCIPLES 

CHAPTER  PACR 

I.    Psychology  as  a  Science   n 

II.   Physical  and  Psychic  Facts   i8 

III.  The  Definiti(m  of  the  Pvychic  I^ticest.  26 

IV.  Psychic  States  as  Objects   31 

V.    The  Scope  of  Psychology   36 

VI.    The  Sources  of  Psychology   40 

VII.    I^ycfaology  and  Psychopathology. . ..  45* 
VIII.   The  Spiritualistic  and  Materiaiistic 

Hypotheses   

IX.    The  Transmission  Hypothesis   59 

X.    The  Metaphysical  Hypotheses  of  Par- 
allelism   54 

XI.   The  Unitary  Experience  of  Voluntar- 
ism     5^ 

XII.    The  Inductive  Basis  of  the  Pontive 

Psychological  Hypothesis    73 

XIII.  The  Deductive  Basis  of  the  Positive 

Psychological  Hypothesis    82 

XIV.  Life  and  the  Fkychic  Proceit   87 

XV.    The  Chance  Aspect  of  Life  and  Mind.  93 

XVI.    Activity  of  Mental  Life   loi 

XVII.    The  Postulates  of  Psychdogy   106  - 

XVIII.    Mental  Synthesis   113 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTBK 

IS:  Srsi^   m 

XXI.   Primary  and  Sccoi^^'i^^  "« 

ments  ,.  ' 

XXII.   Seccmdary  Seiuory  Elements  and  H-i. 

XXIII.    TheAttributetofSattorvEl«^J.;.  **  f 

XXV.  The  Subconsciou.  «Ki  vZmnk^  ^ 
YYT7T         Cerebration  ....  ««« 

sciousnen 

XXIX.  Ti«  subco^,^  co«Kk«  '* 

conscious  ... 

PART  II 

^^sS^K^---- CON. 

I.    The  Moment  Consciousness   ..^ 

^ThrelhT""-^ 
HI.    Modifications  of  M;«„««,V-i,  ii^:  ^39 

fv        ^^".'""^  Aggregate  

IV.    Mental  Organization  . . 
V.    The  Gx»th  and  Function  of  the  Mo^ 

  260 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTEK 

VI.   The  Relation  of  the  Moment  to  the'^ 

EnvinMunent  .  * 
VII.  Thc  A,.™ihti«.of-  .i.  M.;„^  V-«i 

Normal  States  . 
VIII.    Abnormal  Moments  .V. *Z* 

IX.  Mental  Continuity  and  the ^' 

Gap   

X.  The  Momem-Threahoid :::::::::: 

XII.    Reproduction  and  the  Refl«  ^ 
YiS*    £f  ^"^^"'y  Consciousness   J 'J 

XIV.  The  Synthetic  Moment  and  its  Repro^ 

duction   

XV.  The  Accumulative  *  oiiiier  *  of '  ife 
Yvr    -r  ^y""*''*^  Momer't  

AVI.    The  Simple  and  Compound  Synthetic 
Moment   

XIX.    Representations  and  the  L«wt  of  their 

Combinations  . 

X^*    ^T"*"'^^^  '".^  Recognidon  .V.V  3^? 
AXI.    The  Recognitive  Moment  and  its  Re- 

production  ....  ^ 

XXm*    'T!;'  t^'t'"  'foment: 384 

AXIII.    The  Synthetic  Moment  of  Self-Cdn- 

sciousness  ....  -.^ 
  388 

Appendix    I.  Consciousness 

  407 


PARTI 

FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTS 
AND  PRINCIPLES 


The  Foundations  of  Normal  and 
Abnormal  Psychology 


CHAPTER  I 

PSYCHOLOGY  AS  A  SCI£NC£ 

WE  aarame  that  the  reader  regards  psychoi- 
ogy  as  a  science.  It  is  however  one  thing 
to  label  a  subject  as  a  science  and  another 
thing  to  understand  clearly  in  what  sense 
the  term  science  is  used  in  the  case  of  psychology.  A 
ctear  underttandiiig  of  the  nature  of  science  is  here  of 
special  importance  on  account  of  the  peculiar  posttioii 
psychology  occupies  in  the  hierarchy  of  human  knowl- 
edge. It  is  dierefore  desirable  to  define  the  meaning 
of  saence  before  we  proceed  to  discuss  the  subject  mat- 
ter of  psydiol<^. 

Science  is  the  description  of  phenomena  and  the 
formulation  of  their  relations.  Science  describes  fads 
and  formulates  their  relations  in  laws.  The  task  of 
science  is  first  to  formulate  facts  belonging  to  the  same 
type,  and  then  to  genera '-re  them,  that  is  to  express 
their  general  reladooshif  /  one  comprehensive  for- 
mula,  m  spite  of  the  man,  individual  variadons  m  the 
phenomena.  Thus  in  geometry,  possibly  die  most  an- 
cient  of  all  sciences,  many  isolated  and  important  facts 
were  already  known  to  die  semi^ivilized  narions  of 
antiquity,  but  it  required  die  radonaliziag  spirit  of  die 

II 


12         Normal  Mid  Ahnormd  Psychology 


Greek  mind  to  classify  and  genei-alize  the  facts  into 
dKOfcntt,  die  laws  of  space.  Many  important  propei^ 
^  of  die  rig^'angled  triangle,  for  iiMance,  were  al- 
ready known  to  the  ancient  Chaldeans  and  Egyptians. 
They  knew  that  if  in  a  right-angled  triangle  the  two 
sides  are  respectively  three  and  four,  the  hypothenuse 
must  be  five  and  so  on;  that  is,  they  knew  only  con- 
crete facts,  but  what  they  ladced  was  just  the  scientific 
side.  It  required  a  Pythagoras  to  discover  that  in  all 
right-angled  triangles  the  sum  of  the  squares  of  the 
two  sides  is  equal  to  the  square  of  the  third.  No  mat- 
ter what  the  size  of  the  triangle  be,  no  matter  how  dif- 
ferent in  lengdi  its  sides  are,  once  die  trian^e  be  of  dM 
same  type,  namely  right-angular,  the  same  general  re- 
lationship must  obtain. 

To  take  an  illustration  from  physics.  Falling 
bodies  form  one  type  of  movement.  Now  the  bod- 
ies diennelves  may  be  different  in  lund,  in  nature, 
may  be  of  various  material,  may  differ  widely  in 
structure,  weight,  and  shape,  and  still,  since  they 
all  belong  to  the  same  type  of  motion,  they  are,  in 
spite  of  their  manifold  diversity,  expressed  in  one  gen- 
eral formula,  in  one  law,  namely,  that  the  spaces  tra- 
versed are  proportional  to  the  square  of  times. 

In  other  less  exact  sciences  the  facts  are  exhaustively 
described  and  a  general  statement  is  formulated  as  to 
their  relationship.  In  physiology,  for  instance,  we  find 
:nainly  descriptions  of  facts  classified  into  types,  the 
relationships  of  which  are  expreued  in  general  for- 
mulae, or  laws.  Thus  in  the  cerebro-spinal  nervous  sys- 
tem, each  part  and  its  functions  are  described  as  fully  at 
possible,  and  then  all  the  facts  are  brought  under  one 
comprehensive  formula  such  as  the  reflex  arc.   In  cm- 


Psfekahiy  ^  «  Scknct  13 

biyology  the  different  change*  of  the  embryo  are 
wkatOf  deKribed,  daMtiied  into  types,  into  a  certain 
nmnber  of  definite  stages,  and  then  att  the  dumges,  in 
the  infinite  wealth  of  their  variety,  are  exprested  in  the 
general  proposition  that  the  embryo  in  the  short  period 
of  its  development  traverses  in  an  abbreviated  form  aU 
the  stages  that  the  species  has  passed  through  in  the 
many  ages  of  iti  enMeace;  all  the  changes  are  general- 
ized m  the  formula  that  the  ontogenetic  serice  ti  an  epi- 
tome of  phylogenetic  evolution.  We  may,  therefore,  say 
that  science  is  a  description  of  types  of  facis,  the  rela- 
tjonthips  of  which  are  expressed  in  general  comprehen- 
sive formulae,  or  laws.  It  is  in  diis  sense  that  we  un- 
derstand psychology  to  be  a  science;  it  dassifies  phe- 
nomena into  types  and  searches  for  the  general  exptcs> 
sion  of  their  relations,  or  for  what  is  tenned  psydio- 
logical  laws. 

We  most  come  to  something  more  precise  and  defi- 
nite. We  said  that  peydiology  deals  widi  dassification 
and  generalizations  of  phenomena;  but  what  are  thftff 
phenomena?   In  the  different  branches  of  science,  we 
find  that  each  one  has  a  determinate  order  of  phenom- 
ena to  deal  with,  a  definite  subject  matter.   Thus  ge- 
^tey  deak  with  spatial  facts,  mechanics  with  motion, 
physics  with  changes  of  molecular  aggregations,  chem- 
istry with  atomic  combinations  and  dieir  mutations, 
physiology  with  processes  going  to  make  the  etjuilib- 
rium  of  organic  life,  sociology  with  phenon.cna  of  so- 
oal  hfc,  and  so  it  is  in  the  case  of  all  other  sciences. 
Noiw  what  is  the  subject  matt^  of  psychology?  What 
are  the  facts,  the  phenomena  with  which  psychology 
dtzh?— -Psychology  deals  with  facts  of  consekmtuis. 

On  the  very  threshold  of  our  discussion,  we  may  be 


14         Normal  mid  Abnormal  Psychology 


stopped  by  the  pertinent  question:  "You  say  that 
psychology  dealt  widi  facts  of  consdomiien,  bitt  i^t 
it  GoasdeiitiieM?" — Comdooiiwtt  it  tubjective  toi, 

such  as  the  elements  of  sensation,  feelings,  pains, 
thoughts,  acts  of  willing  and  the  like.  Positive  science 
must  have  given  facts,  data  to  work  upon;  these  data 
it  analyzed,  (kscribes,  classifies  into  types  and  seeks  to 
find  formulae  of  their  relatioMhipt.  Psydidogy 
can  accomplish  no  rn'^'  z  than  any  other  science.  The 
data  of  psychology  are  facts  o{  consciousness,  these  facts 
are  aralyzed  into  their  simplest  elements,  and  the  laws 
of  their  relations  are  searched  for.  But  psychology  does 
not,  and  legitimately  cannot  pMsibly  go  beyond  con- 
sciousness. Consdottsness  is  ^  ultimate  datum  which 
psychology  must  assume  as  given  and  which  is  from 
a  psychological  standpoint  unanalyzable.  Conscious- 
ness must  be  postulated,  if  we  wish  to  enter  the  temple 
of  psychology. 

In  this  relaticm  psydiology  is  as  poutive  as  the  rest 
of  her  sister  sciences.  Geometry,  t  science  to  which 
no  one  will  deny  exactness^  deals  as  we  know  with  the 
laws  of  space-relations.  Should  we  ask  the  geometrician 
the  same  question  just  put  to  the  psychologist:  You 
say  t^hat  your  science,  geometry,  deals  with  facts  of 
space  and  dieir  relati(ms,  but  what  is  vpnoti  Tht  geo- 
metridan  will  smile  at  us.  He  will  tell  us  that  by  space 
he  means  such  forms  as  lines,  angles,  triangles,  quadri- 
laterals, circles,  cubes,  cylinders,  pyrrmids,  etc.  Should 
we  persist  and  ask  further,  "Yes  thai  is  true,  but  all 
dttse  are  so  many  forms  of  space,  what  is  the  space  it- 
self with  which  you  deal?"  The  geometrician  will  no 
doubt  answer:  "My  dear  sir,  geometry  deals  with  facts 
of  space,  space  i^lf  is  taken  as  an  ultimate  datum.  The 


Psfehology  m  s  Scknce 


work  of  geometry  is  not  to  ask  what  space  is  in  itself, 
but  what  the  rdttioiu  are  of  spatial  forms,  space  itself 
being  postulated." 

Mechanics  deals  with  the  laws  of  energy  and  motion, 
physics  with  molecular  changes  of  matter,  but  neither 
physics  nor  mechanics  would  have  gone  far,  had  they 
stopped  to  answer  the  questions  as  to  what  motion, 
energy,  matter  are  in  thenuelves.  These  are  nmply  post- 
dated, taken  for  granted,  they  are  the  ultimate  dtta  of 
these  sciences.  In  this  respect  psychology  does  not 
differ  from  other  sciences,  it  takes  its  subject  matter  as 
given  and  does  not  inquire  as  to  what  the  nature  of  the 
material  n  in  itself.  The  reader  must  remember  that 
the  question  as  to  what  things  are  in  then»etves  is  not 
at  all  a  question  of  positive  sciences,  but  of  metaphysics. 
I  (*o  not  mean  in  any  way  to  detract  from  the  dignity 
of  meiaphysics,  what  I  wish  is  simply  to  point  out  the 
limits  of  positive  science.  The  problem  as  to  what  things 
are  in  themselves  does  not  fall  within  the  province  of 
Kioice,  but  within  tht  domain  of  metaj^ysical  re- 
search. 

The  question  as  to  the  nature  of  consciousness),  what 
it  is  in  itself,  may  be  a  very  important  one,  but  .t  lies 
outude  the  ken  of  psychology,  just  as  the  laws  of  aes- 
tltttics  do  not  OMcem  tht  d^nntst,  aldiough  the  kttar 
may  be  a  great  lover  of  beauty.  In  the  contemplation 
and  enjoyment  of  a  beautiful  picture  he  will  not  intro- 
duce a  chemical  formula,  and  in  his  chemical  experi- 
ments he  will  not  introduce  aesthetic  considerations.  The 
sanw  hd<fa  true  in  the  case  of  psychology.  The  psy- 
chologist may  be  a  metaphysician,  but  in  his  psycholog- 
ical work  he  must  keep  clear  of  metaphysics.  Conscious- 
ness therefore  is  a  presupposition,  4  postulate  of  psy- 


1 6         Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 
chology. 

There  is  one  more  important  assumption  which  psy- 
chology must  start  with  in  order  to  be  a  positive  sci- 
ence at  all,  namely,  uniformity.    Under  similar  condi- 
tions like  results  follow.  Suppose  a  geometrician  should 
prove  to  you  that  the  ram  of  the  three  angles  of  a  tri- 
angle is  equal  to  two  right  angles,  suppose  diat  tome 
sceptic  should  come  in  and  say,  "Yes,  that  is  all  right  in 
relation  to  the  triangles  in  this  particular  space,  in 
another  portion  of  space,  on  somp  other  star,  or  planet 
the  theorem  will  not  hold  good."  The  only  answer  the 
geometrician  could  give  is  that  we  must  assume  that 
space  is  uniform,  so  that  wherever  we  form  our  tri- 
angles we  obtain  the  same  results.    The  same  is  true 
in  mechanics.    The  laws  of  motion  and  inertia  hold 
good  of  the  pebble  on  the  roadside,  of  the  dust  grains 
dancing  in  the  sunbeam,  and  of  distant  stars  in  the  milky 
way.   Uniformity  of  relations  among  phenomena  must 
be  postulated,  if  science  is  to  be  at  all.   If  under  the 
same  conditions  different  results  follow,  science  would 
have  been  an  impossibility.    Uniformity  of  nature  is 
one  of  the  most  fundamental  postulates  of  science.  Psy- 
chology assumes  uniformity;  it  assumes  that  there  exist 
constant  uniform  types  of  mental  activity  with  definite 
elations  that  can  be  formulated  into  psychological  lam. 
Thus  psychology  at  the  very  outset  postulates  consdoM- 
ness  and  uniformity  of  mental  phenomena. 

We  can  now  see  in  what  relation  psychology  which 
deals  with  phenomena  of  consciousness  differs  from 
philosophy  whose  subject  matter  is  also  consciousness. 
Philosophy  has  no  postulates,  psychology,  like  all  other 
sciences,  must  have  its  postulates  which  it  cannot  tran- 
scend.  Philcraophy  deals  with  the  ultimate  in  conscious- 


CHAPTER  II 


PHYSICAL  AND  PSYCHIC  FACTS 

PSYCHOLOGY  we  said  deals  with  facts  of  con. 
sciousness,  but  this  is  too  broad  a  statement, 
for  there  are  other  sciences  that  also  deal  with 
facts  of  consciousness,  such  as  ethics,  aesthet- 
ics, logic.   In  what  respect  does  psychology  differ  from 
these  sciences?   It  differs  in  this  that  ethics,  aesthetics 
and  logic  are  normative  regulative  sciences;  psychology 
is  a  positive  natural  science.   Ethics  deals  with  ideals 
of  moral  life,  aesthetics  with  ideals  of  beauty,  and  logic 
with  ideal  ways  of  correct  reasoning.  All  these  sciences 
deal  with  ideals,  with  norms  to  which  the  matter  of  fact 
consciousness  ought  to  conform,  if  it  is  to  act  rightly. 
They  put  a  value  on  the  phenomena.  Psychology,  how- 
ever, like  all  other  natural  sciences  has  no  other  ideal 
than  fact,  it  admits  of  no  "ought."    From  a  strictly 
psychological  standpoint,  the  ugly  and  the  beautiful,  the 
good  and  the  evil,  the  true  and  the  false  are  of  equal 
value.    Psychologically  they  are  all  facts  of  conscious- 
ness and  must  be  studied  as  such;  just  as  the  serpent 
and  the  dove  are  of  equal  interest  and  value  to  the  nat- 
uralist. The  ravings  of  a  maniac  are  of  the  sune  psycho- 
logical interest  and  value  as  the  subtle  reasoning   i  a 
Newton.  Psychology  is  a  positive  natural  science,  it  does 
not  deal  with  the  subjective  evaluation  of  facts  of  con- 
sciousness, but  with  their  objective  natural  existence. 

Having  shown  in  what  p'ly^ology  agjccs  with  other 
positive  naturftl  Kiences,  we  must  now  poiitt  out  in  what 


Physical  and  Psychic  Facts 


19 


it  differs  from  them.  Psychology  deal*  with  phenomcni 
of  consciousness  as  facts  of  objective  natural  existence. 
Are  these  facts  of  tbe  same  order  with  those  of  the 
physical  world,  the  subject  matter  of  the  natural  phys- 
ical tdencet?  We  mint  answer  t«  the  negative.  The 
objects  of  the  natural  sciences  of  the  physical  worM  wtt 
of  a  material  and  spatial  nature.  A  physical  body  has 
weight,  occupies  a  certain  portion  of  space,  so  has  the 
molecule,  the  atom.  Can  we  say  the  same  of  psy- 
chdogical  facts?  By  no  means.  They  are  different 
in  kind,  and  this  I  wnh  oqpedally  to  impress  <mi  the 
mind  of  the  reader.  To  realize  this  truth,  I  think  it 
a  good  preliminary  psychological  exercise  for  the  reader 
to  try  to  find  how  many  grams,  or  grains  his  idea 
of  beauty  weighs,  how  many  millimeters  long,  wide  and 
high  his  feelings  of  love  are;  let  him  mdulge  in  the 
fancy  of  conceiving  an  engineer  building  a  brieve  wM 
mathematical  formulae  as  links,  and  his  feelings  of  vir- 
tue and  patriotism  as  supports.  On  the  other  hand  let 
him  think  of  a  logician  trying  to  fill  up  the  defects  of 
his  train  of  reasoning  with  solid  bricks,  and  using  as 
connecting  links  bars  of  pig  iron.  In  diort,  psychol- 
ogy differs  from  phyncal  admces  in  this,  that  its  facts, 
the  facts  of  consciousness  are  not  of  a  material  nature. 

"Do  not  physical  sciences"  it  may  be  asked  "deal  with 
such  phenomena  as  sound  and  light?"  Certainly  they 
do,  but  these  sciences  regard  these  phenomena  from 
a  standpoint  radically  different  from  that  of  psydwlf^. 
Sound  in  physics  is  not  the  sensadon  sou^,  but  t^ 
external,  material  vibration  of  air,  which  may  or  may 
not  give  rise  to  a  sensation  of  hearing.  The  same  holds 
true  in  the  case  of  light.  What  physics  investigates  is 
not  light  at  sensation,  hot  vibntiont  of  ether  which 


20  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


may  or  may  not  give  rise  to  a  sensation  of  sight  It  is, 
however,  just  such  facts  as  sensations,  facts  not  spatial 
in  their  nature  which  constitute  the  subject  matter  of 
psychology. 

"May  not  facts  of  consciousnen  be  some  kind  of  mat- 
ter, some  form  of  material  substance  the  constitution  of 
which  we  do  not  as  yet  know?"  Such  was  the  question 
put  by  a  medical  man,  when  he  heard  me  expounding 
the  difference  in  kind  between  physical  and  psychical 
facts.  "That  might  be**  I  answered,  "but  then  that 
substance,  if  it  ever  be  discovered,  will  not  have  the 
properties  of  matter;  it  will  be  a  "matter"  totally 
different  in  kind  from  that  studied  by  the  physicist.  For 
the  "matter"  of  physical  sciences  is  essentially  one  of 
extension;  a  matter  however  that  occupies  no  space  is 
an  existence  altogether  different  in  kuid  from  that  of 
extended  things,  and  is  certainly  no  "matter"  for  the 
physicist. 

The  persistent  antagonist  may  raise  here  a  further 
objection.  ''Are  not  the  phenomena  of  consciousness" 
he  may  ask  "facts  of  activity?  And  is  not  activity, 
kinetic  energy?  And  if  this  be  the  case  must  not  the 
facts  of  consciousness  be  ranged  along  with  physical 
phenomena,  be  reduced  to  the  manifestations  and  trans- 
formations of  kinetic  energy  and  thus  really  and  ulti- 
mately fall  within  the  domain  of  the  mechanical  sci- 
ences?" 

Change  certainly  is  manifested  in  the  mutations  of 
states  of  consciousness,  but  this  change  is  not  the  phys- 
ical change  of  translocation.  Change  in  the  states  of  con- 
sciousness may  no  doubt,  be  regarded  as  activity,  and 
if  you  please  as  energy,  but  this  activity  is  not  the  en- 
ergy of  medianics.  Activity  in  mechanical  or  physical 


Physical  and  Psychic  Facts 


SI 


sciences  means  molar,  molecular,  or  atomic  movement 
of  matter  through  space,  while  psychic  activity  is  not  a 
translation  of  matter  through  space,  a  thought  is  not  a 
material  mass  having  extension,  weight  and  locomotion. 
This  truth,  simple  as  it  may  appear,  cannot  be  too 
often  repeated  and  too  strongly  emphasised,  since  one 
frequently  meets  with  this  fallacy  of  "thought-materiali- 
zation" in  the  world  of  psychiatry.  Words  are  often  mit- 
leading  and  the  metaphorical  expression  "mental  en- 
ergy" is  taken  in  its  literal  meaning  of  mechanical  en- 
ergy.  While  I  am  writing  these  lines  I  find  in  one  of 
the  number  of  the  Russian  "Archivet  of  Fkychiatry  and 
Neurology"  edited  by  Prof.  Kowaleviky,  an  article, 
in  which  an  attempt  is  made  to  express  mental  activity 
in  terms  of  mechanical  energy.   The  writer  might  as 
well  attempt  to  change  inches  into  pounds.   He  who 
undertakes  the  examination  and  study  of  mental  phe* 
n'^ena  must  bear  in  mind  the  simple  and  important, 
'requently  forgotten  truth,  that  facts  of  conaciou»> 
.    a  are  not  of  a  physical,  mechanical  character. 

Against  our  view  may  be  urged  the  fact  that  in 
proportion  as  a  science  tends  to  become  exact,  it  takes 
on  more  a  quantitative  aspect,  its  phenomena  are  re- 
duced to  molecular  or  atomic  changes.  If  now  p^- 
chology  is  a  science  at  all,  it  will  reach  its  exactness, 
when  it  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  matter  and  motion, 
so  that  the  phenomena  presented  by  consciousness,  al- 
though at  present  impenetrable  to  our  imperfect  instru- 
ments and  methods  of  investigation,  must  ultimately 
be  reduced,  in  some  way  or  other,  to  mechanical  terms. 
Psychology  has  not  yet  had  its  Galileo. 

This  objection  may  be  easily  disposed  of  by  the  simple 
answer  that  the  exactness  of  science  is  not  at  all  in  pro- 


22         NornuU  mti  AhmonuA  Psychology 


portion  to  its  degree  of  reduction  to  terms  of  matter 
and  motion.  No  one  will  deny  that  mathematics  is  an 
exact  ideiice,  but  it  it  exact  becttne  it  if  reduced  to  me- 
dhanical  terms?  Whik  ineduuiict  most  be  lo^cal,  loipc 

is  not  mechanical. 

Within  certain  limits  this  generalization  of  the  re- 
lation  of  scientific  exactness  to  mechanical  formulae 
may  be  fully  granted,  if  it  be  restricted  to  the  concrete 
physical  sciences,  but  it  caniK>t  poisibly  hxM  good  in 
case  of  psychology,  as  the  latter  does  not  fall  within 
the  circle  of  the  physical  sciences. 

The  weakness  of  this  last  objection  from  scientific 
exactness  becomes  clearly  disclosed,  if  we  get  a  little 
deeper  into  die  matter.  The  reason  why  diore  is  ndi 
a  persistent  tendency  to  reduce  science  to  meduuucal 
terms  is  based  on  the  tacit  understanding  that  atoms 
and  motion  are  the  only  ultimate  realities.  We  see  at 
a  glance  that  this  consideration  is  at  bottom  purely 
metaphysical;  it  is  a  consideration  which  science  has 
not  to  take  into  accora^t  Nothing  it  so  dogmatically 
metaphysical  as  just  the  common  seme  that  has  an  ab- 
horrence of  metaphysics.  That  atoms  and  their  motions 
are  the  only  ultimate  realities  is  certainly  metaphysics 
and  bad  metaphysics  too,  as  it  is  unguarded  by  reflective 
critical  thou^t.  Since  this  nnreflecdve  metaphysics  of 
atomism  is  widely  spread  in  the  medical  world,  and  is 
considered  scientific,  one  cannot  help  discussing  it,  point- 
ing out  its  deficiencies,  showing  up  the  obstacles  it  puts 
in  the  way  of  positive  science.  Metaphysics  is  a  branch 
of  philosophy  which  deals  with  the  nature  of  reality. 
As  philosophy  it  accepts  no  tmanalyzed  cmicepts;  un- 
like science  it  has  no  p<»tolate8  taken  blindly  on  faith. 
The  propontimi  now  before  us,  namely  that  atcnns  and 


PhytiaU  m4  PsycMe  Psets  23 

their  motion  are  ultimate  realities,  is  bad  metaphysics, 
becsuse  it  is  a  blind  unanalyzed  postulate.  How  do  we 
know  that  atoms  and  their  motions  are  ultimate  rcali- 
ties?  Why  not  ask  what  is  reality?  Once  we  are  on 
metaphysical  ground,  why  not  take  it  in  real  earnest? 
Why  stop  on  atoms  and  motions?  Atoms  themselvet 
are  not  ultimate  simple  units,  they  have  shape,  size, 

all  ?  They  are  so  many  resultants  of  masses  of  tactual, 
visual  and  muscular  sensations,  which  are  as  little  ulti- 
mate ar  are  the  sensations  of  color  or  of  pain.  It  it 
out  of  sensations,  percepts  and  ideas  that  the  concept 
atom"  is  framed.  Subtract  from  the  atom  its  sensa- 
tional, perceptual  and  ideational  elements,  abstract  from 
It  its  shape,  size,  weight  and  the  ultimate  reality  of  the 
atoms  will  become  a  bare  nothing.  The  atom  there- 
fore  is  ultimately  resolved  into  terms  of  consciousness. 
The  same  holds  true  in  case  of  notion.  Motion  is  a 
mental  fnoduct  of  what  is  known  as  muscular  and  retin- 
al sensations.  What  is  most  ultimately  known  is  only 
consciousness  and  its  facts.  The  atom  and  its  motions 
are  after  all  nothing  else  but  constructs  of  consciousness. 
From  the  standpoint  of  epistemology,  or  what  the  Ger- 
mans call  "Erkenntnisstheorie,"  we  have  only  a 
*»Afcserics  of  mental  phenomena,  one  standing  for 
the  internal  and  the  other  for  the  ortemal  world,  and 
not  atoms,  but  mental  life  may  be  regarded  as  the  ulti- 
mate reality. 

From  a  strictly  scientific  standpoint,  however,  we 
have  no  right  to  resolve  matter  into  mind  or  still  less 
mmd  into  matter,  because  the  two  arc  presented  to  con- 
sciousness as  different  in  kind,  even  tho^  they  both 
may  *  Oong  to  a  general  contctoiaiMM.  Between  the 


14         Normal  and  Abnomud  Psychology 


two  warn  of  facts,  the  pfaytical  and  the  psychical,  there 
exittt  a  fyndameiital  difference.  Tlie  door  yonder  b 
covered  with  white  paint,  the  inkstand  before  me  is 
made  of  glass,  is  round,  is  heavy,  is  black,  but  my  idea 
of  the  door  is  not  covered  with  white  paint,  my  idea 
of  the  inkstand  is  neither  made  of  glass,  nor  round,  nor 
heavy,  nor  blade.  In  short,  the  facts  of  consaousness 
are  not  spatial. 

A  fallacy  prevalent  among  the  medical  profession  and 
now  also  extant  among  the  populace  is  the  placing  of 
psychic  life  in  the  brain.  The  neurologist,  the  patholo- 
gist ridicule  the  old  Greek  belief  that  the  place  of  the 
mind  is  in  the  heart.  Modem  science  has  discoverd  tihat 
the  heart  is  nothing  but  a  hollow  muscle,  a  blood  pump 
at  best,  the  place  of  mental  processes  is  in  the  brain. 
This  medical  belief  now  circulating  in  the  popular  and 
semi-scientific  literature  of  to-day  differs  but  little 
from  the  ancient  Greek  belief,  it  is  just  as  faliaci- 
otts  and  superstitious.  It  is  true  that  psydiic  life  is 
a  concomitant  variable  function  of  nervous  processes 
and  brain  activity,  but  neurosis  is  not  the  cause  of 
psychosis.  The  brain  does  not  secrete  though"-  as  the 
liver  secrets  bile.  The  mind  is  not  in  the  brain,  nor 
in  fact  is  die  mind  anywhere  in  die  universe  of  space; 
for  psychosis  is  not  at  all  a  physical  spatial  process. 

As  fallacious  and  superst'tious  is  the  recent  tendency 
of  medical  investigation  to  localize  psychic  processes,  to 
place  different  psychic  processes  in  different  seats  or 
localities  of  die  brain,  thus  implying  that  each  psychic 
process  respectively  is  placed  inside  some  cerebral  cen- 
tre or  nerve  cells.  Psychic  life  is  no  doubt  the  conco^ 
mitant  of  nervous  brain  activity,  and  certain  psychic 
processes  may  depend  on  definite  local  brain  processes, 


Phyaiaa  mU  PsycKc  Facts  25 

but  the  given  psychic  process  is  not  situated  in  a  definite 
brain  centre,  nor  for  that  matter  is  it  situated  anywhere 
m  fpaoe. 


CHAPTER  III 


THE  DEFINITION  OF  THE  PSYCHIC  PROCESS 

THE  definition  thus  far  given  of  psychic  life 
is  rather  of  a  negative  character.  We  de- 
fined the  psychic  phenomenon  in  opposition 
to  the  physical  phenomenon.  Physical  phe- 
nomena are  in  space,  psychic  phenomena  arc  not  spatial. 
Now  a  negative  definition  may  to  many  prove  rather 
unsatisfactory.  It  is,  therefore,  desirable  to  define 
psychic  phenomena  in  more  positive  terms. 

It  is  now  the  tendency  to  define  the  physical  process 
in  social  terms  and  the  psychic  process  in  terms  of  indi- 
vidual cognition.  A  physical  phenomenon  is  defined  as 
one  common  to  many  minds,  while  a  psychic  phenomenon 
is  an  object  of  an  individual  ccmsciousnen.  I  diink 
that  such  a  view  of  die  external  physical  object,  as  that 
which  is  common  to  many  minds  in  contrast  to  the 
psychic  or  that  belonging  to  an  ind'vidual  mind  only 
is  incorrect  from  a  purely  psychological  standpoint. 
Psychologically  amsidered  diaracteristic  trait  of  a 
physical  object  is  not  that  it  is  common,  but  that  it  is 
external.  The  tree  yonder  is  to  me  a  physical  object, 
not  because  it  is  common  to  many  minds,  but  because  T 
perceive  it  as  external,  the  sensory  elements  of  the  per- 
ception carry  with  them  external  objectivity. 

The  social  perception  of  an  object  may  be  mie  of  the 
criteria  of  external  reality,  but  certainly  not  the  only  one, 
and  surely  not  the  chief  one.  In  perceiving  an  object  I 
do  not  consider  it  as  a  physical  object,  because  I  know 

a6 


The  Definition  of  t/u  a  syckic  Proceu  27 

that  it  is  common  to  my  fellow-beings,  but  because  the 
very  psychic  process  of  perception  gives  the  immediate 
knowledge  of  externalif.    An  object  is  considered  as 
physical,  not  because  oi      socis!  aspect,  but  because  of 
its  perceived  externa'  aspect.  Had  my  perception  of  the 
house  yonder  been  .1  hallucination,  I  would  have  still 
seen  it  as  external  ana  tuercici--  regarded  as  a  physical 
object;  and  should  this  hallucination  furthermore  be 
confirmed  by  the  testimony  of  ail  my  other  senses, 
should  I  be  able  to  touch  it,  press  against  it  and  feel  re- 
sistance, knock  myself  on  it  and  feel  concussion  and  pain, 
and  have  a  series  of  tactual  and  muscular  sensations  by 
walking  into  it  and  around  it,  and  should  I  further  have 
this  hallucination  of  all  the  senses  every  time  I  come 
to  this  identical  spot,  the  object  would  be  to  me  an 
external  physical  object,  and  no  amount  of  social  con- 
tradiction could  and  would  make  it  different.  Regarded 
from  a  psychical  standpoint  an  object  is  considered  as 
physical,  not  because  it  is  common  to  other  minds,  but 
because  it  is  projected  as  extensive  and  external  to  mind. 
Not  community,  but  extension,  externality  is  the  psy- 
chological criterion  of  the  physical  object. 

It  is  true  that  community  of  object  is  one  of  the  cri- 
teria of  external  reality,  but  it  is  certainly  not  true  that 
the  community  of  the  object  gives  rise  to  the  perception 
of  externality.  It  may,  on  the  contrary,  be  claimed,  and 
possibly  with  far  better  reason,  that  it  is  the  object's 
externality  that  gives  rite  to  its  communtty. 

The  child  in  its  growth  learns  to  discriminate  be- 
tween things  and  persons.  Persons  move,  act,  make 
adaptations,  while  things  are  moved,  acted  upon,  adapt- 
ed to;  persons  initiate  movements,  things  do  not;  per- 
sons  are  prime  moven  and  tt  is  to  them  that  one  has  to 


28  Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


look  up  in  the  satisfaction  of  needs  and  in  the  acquisi- 
tion and  use  of  things.  As  against  persons  things  are 
contrasted  as  impersonal.  Gradually  the  child  learns 
to  include  himself  within  the  diss  of  persoro, — ^his 
hopes,  wishes  and  desires  come  in  contact,  as  well  as  in 
conflict  with  those  of  other  persons,  and  he  learns  more 
and  more  of  inner  life  and  activity  with  which  he  finally 
identifies  all  personality.  Personality  is  more  and  more 
stripped  of  the  thing  aspect  until  the  inner  mental  life, 
especially  in  its  will  aspect,  remains  as  its  sole  charac- 
teristic. Persons  are  millers,  and  it  is  these  wills  which 
are  of  the  utmost  importance  for  the  child  to  learn  as 
the  fulfillment  of  his  will  depends  on  them.  He  then 
learns  to  class  himself  within  the  category  of  willers; 
he  himself  is  a  wilier.  Impersonal  things,  falling  out- 
side and  being  contrasted  with  the  class  of  willers,  arc 
conceived  as  independent  of  persons 

Moreover,  while  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case 
each  wilier  bears  to  things  a  direct  relation,  his  relation 
to  other  willers  is  only  to  be  established  through  things. 
Wills  come  in  contact  not  through  the  mere  fact  of  will* 
ing,  but  through  their  relations  to  things.  Coming  in 
direct  relation  with  things,  things  alone  give  direct  ex- 
perience, experience  in  its  first  intention.  In  other  words, 
only  things  give  rise  to  sensation  or  rather  perception; 
hence  sensory  life  with  its  time  and  space  experience  giv- 
ing rise  to  externality  is  the  criterion  of  the  universe  of 
things,  conceived  as  independent  of  will.  Only  thing  is 
external,  will  is  not.  Wills,  however,  can  come  in  rela- 
tion through  things,  and  only  through  the  same  things ; 
the  universe  of  things  must  be  a  common  one  to  all  the 
wills,  if  these  wills  are  to  come  into  relation  at  all.  In 
other  words,  tht  physical  univm,  gentHcMy  riimrdtd^ 


The  Definition  of  the  Psychic  Process  29 

is  external  n  t  because  it  is  common,  but  it  is  common 

because  it  is  external.  * 
The  definition  of  the  physical  object  as  that  which  is 
common  to  many  mirds  and  of  the  psychic  object  as  that 
which  18  present  to  one  mind  only  is  not  acceptable, 
since  It  postulates  the  result  of  complicated  epit- 
temological  reflection  and  psychological  research,  sdll 
very  doubtful  in  themselves,  at  the  very  outset  of  the 
science  of  psychology.  It  may  be  that  the  world  is  noth- 
mg  but  consciousness  and  that  the  physical  universe  is 
nothing  but  the  social  object  of  many  minds;  still  all  this 
belongs  to  the  domain  of  epistemology  and  metaphyaici. 
The  psychologist  deals  with  phenomena  and  not  with 
the  "really  existent."    Standing  on  the  ground  of  psy- 
chology the  psychologist  has  no  right  to  reduce  the 
physical  world  to  psychic  terms;  in  fact,  such  a  pro- 
cedure  would  undermine  his  scie-ce,  aa  all  diidnctioa 
between  psychic  and  physical  facts  would  become  oblit- 
erated.  For  if  by  an  "object"  common  to  many  minds 
we  mean  an  object  external  to  those  minds,  then  we  gain 
nothing  at  all  by  introducing  the  "many,"  it  is  just  this 
•external"  that  has  to  be  defined;  if  by  the  "common 
object '  we  mean  an  object  psychic  in  its  character,  hot 
only  of  a  social  nature,  then  we  reduce  the  physical  uni- 
verse to  consciousness  and  thus  identify  ohysical  and 
psychic  processes.   Such  identification  is  an  obliteration 
of  the  opposition  between  the  psychic  and  physical  facts, 
an  opposition  with  which  the  psychologist  must  set  out, 
if  he  IS  to  place  psychology  in  the  hierarchy  of  natunl 
sciences.  The  psychologist  must  postulate  the  existence 
of  an  external  physical  world,  just  as  the  geometrician 
postulates  space  or  the  mechanician  matter  and  mo- 
tion. 


30         Normal  and  Ahnormai  Psychology 

It  is  the  task  of  the  epistemologist  and  metaphy- 
sician to  Inquire  into  the  nature  of  that  physical  world 
whether  it  really  exists  independent  of  consciousness. 
Without,  therefore,  going  into  metaph3rtical  o(mndenip 
tions,  I  think  it  is  best  to  (tefine  the  physical  phenomenon 
as  the  object  or  process  conceived  as  being  independent 
of  consciousness,  while  the  psychic  object  or  process  is 
one  that  is  conceived  as  being  directly  dependent  on 
consciousness.  It  seems  to  me  that  this  definition  has 
the  merits  of  being  positive  at  the  one  ^ven  by  the 
representatives  of  the  idealistic  sdiool;  it  has  not  the 
defects  of  bringing  in  irrelevant  metaphysical  and  epis- 
temological  considerations;  and  it  has  furthermore  the 
advantage  of  being  fully  in  accord  with  the  data  and 
pottulatet  of  psychology. 


CHAPTER  IV 


PSYCHIC  STATES  AS  OBJECTS 

THE  attadu  may  now  be  renewed  from  quite 
a  different  direction.  We  asserted  that  psy- 
chology deals  with  facts  of  objective,  natural 
existence,  the  subject  matter  of  science  in  gen- 
eral. How  does  it  rhyme,  it  may  be  asked,  with  the  con- 
clusion just  arrived  at,  namely,  that  the  facts  of  psychol- 
ogy  are  different  from  those  with  which  other  natural 
sciences  deal?  To  diis  may  be  answered  that  facts  may 
agree  in  being  objective,  and  still  differ  widely  as  to 
kind, — ^a  square  and  a  man,  a  pound  and  a  mile,  are  all 
objective,  and  still  their  difference  is  certainly  a  funda- 
mental <Mie. 

An  objection  may  be  raised  that  may  to  some  appear 

as  a  very  grave  one.  Is  psychology  a  science  at  all? 
Does  it  actually  deal  with  objective  natural  existence? 
Physics,  chemistry  and  other  concrete  sciences  treat  of 
objects,  of  facts,  in  the  external  world.  Any  one  can 
go  and  verify  those  phenomena  and  their  relations.  This, 
however,  is  not  the  case  with  facts  of  consciousness,  they 
are  essentially  subjective.  Psychology,  therefore,  prop- 
erly speaking,  is  not  a  science  in  the  same  sense  as  other 
sciences  are.  This  objection  may  be  easily  obviated  by 
the  very  simple  consideration  that  the  facts  of  any  indi- 
vidual consciousness  are  as  madi  objective  to  odier  pn^- 
pie,  as  the  chair,  the  table,  the  molecule,  the  atom.  My 
individual  consciousness  is  considered  by  others  as  ex- 
ternal, as  objective,  as  existing  outside  of  their  con- 

3« 


3*         Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

sciousness,  and,  in  fact,  were  it  not  so,  there  would  have 
been  no  individuality. 

After  this  lengthy  discussion  we  at  last  arrive  at  the 
conclusion,  that  although  the  facts  which  psychology 
treats  of  are  not  of  a  material,  physical  nature,  they  are 
none  the  less  objective  in  character.  Objective  however, 
as  the  facts  are,  they  are  not  independent  of  conscious- 
ness in  the  same  way  as  the  objects  of  the  external  world 
arc  regarded,  they  are  essentially  facts  of  consciousness. 

"What  is  the  relation,"  it  may  be  asked,  "of  psychol- 
ogy to  the  physical  and  biological  sciences?"  The 
physical  and  biological  sciences  constitute  a  system  of 
knowledge  of  the  material  world.  Psychology  investi- 
gates the  genesis  of  this  knowledge.  Mechanics,  for 
example,  treats  of  motion  and  space.  Psychology  in- 
vestigates  not  what  motion  and  space  are  in  themselves, 
but  what  the  elementary  acts  of  consciousness  are  out 
of  which  the  space  and  time  perceptions  are  developed. 

The  different  objects  which  other  sciences  treat  of 
may  be  regarded  psychologically,  and  studied  from  the 
standpoint  of  their  rise  and  development  in  conscious- 
ness. For  objects  to  be  known  at  all  must  first  be  per- 
ceived  or  conceived  by  consciousness.  Psychology  im- 
plies knowledge  of  the  physical  world  as  the  content 
of  consciousness.  In  order  to  know  how  perception  and 
conception  of  objects  originate,  those  objects  must  first 
of  all  be  given.  A  thing  that  is  not  yet  in  existence  can- 
not possibly  be  analyzed.  It  is  only  when  knowledge 
of  objects  is  already  formed  that  one  can  begin  to  think 
about  knowledge  itself,  how  it  originated  and  how  it 
came  to  be  in  the  shape  possessed  by  the  knowing  mind. 
Physical  sciences  are  in  that  relation  independent  of 
paychology,  the  former  can  be  carried  on  to  a  high 


Psychic  States  as  Objects  33 

degree  of  perfection  without  any  knowledge  of  psychol- 
ogy, while  psychology  without  knowledge  of  the  physic- 
al world  would  simply  lack  subject  matter. 

Apart,  however,  from  the  fact  that  psychology 
has  as  its  subject  matter  the  objects  of  physical  sciences 
as  perceived  by  and  developed  in  consciousness,  it  also 
studies  the  forms,  the  character,  the  way  of  working  of 
consciousness,  it  formulates  the  laws  of  how  conscious- 
ness works,  and  analyzes  into  simplest  elements  and 
their  combinations,  the  rich  material  that  goes  to  make 
up  the  mental  life  of  individual  existence,  or  what  is 
known  as  mind. 

The  postulated  objective  reality  acts  upon  the  given 
individual  consciousness  and  gives  rise  to  mental  states 
which  along  with  the  objective  representation  of  that 
reality  has  also  its  own  coloring,  its  own  subjective  side. 
The  represented  object  floats  so  to  say  in  a  stream  of 
consciousness.  The  subject  matter  which  the  psycholo- 
gist investigates  is  not  the  objective  reality  itself,  hut 
objective  states  of  consciousness. 

We  may  represent  the  relation  of  the  psychologist  to 
his  object  of  study  by  the  following  series: 

'  *  3 

The  objective     The  represented    The  subjective 
reality.  object.  stream. 

4  5 
The  objective   The  psychobgist. 
state  of  con- 
sciousness. 


We  must  be  on  our  guard  and  not  confuse  objective 


34         Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

thought,  the  thought  of  the  object,  and  the  object  of 
thought.    The  three  differ  fundamentally,  and  the 
staadpoiiits  from  which  the  matter  is  regarded  must  be 
constantly  kept  in  view.  The  thought  contempktes  and 
holds  the  object  by  the  function  of  knowledge  it  pos- 
sesses, but  the  knowledge  constituting  the  thought  and 
the  object  of  that  thought  are  totally  different  in  their 
nature.  The  object  in  the  external  world  may  undergo 
change,  but  the  thought  that  got  hold  of  the  object  may 
still  persist,  or  on  the  other  hand,  the  thought  may 
change  and  the  object  still  remain  the  same;  or  again 
tile  thoughts  and  the  object  may  both  change.  As  I  am 
writing  these  lines  a  red  book  lying  on  my  table  strongly 
attracts  my  attention,  and  for  the  time  being  consti- 
tutes the  object  of  my  thought.  I  can  close  my  eyes  and 
continue  to  represent  to  myself  the  red  book,  its  color, 
its  size,  its  content,  in  short  all  about  the  red  book,  the 
red  book  constituting  so  to  say  the  "focal-object"  of  my 
thought  constantly  renewing  itself  by  the  fresh  material 
which  it  draws  from  the  .surrounding  marghial  stream. 
Meanwhile  the  book  may  be  changed,  the  cover  may  be 
torn,  the  pages  may  be  mutilated,  the  book  may  be  burnt 
or  substituted  by  another  body  or  by  a  totally  different 
object,  say  an  ink-stand;  or  on  the  other  hand,  the 
book  may  remain  lying  on  my  desk  undisturbed,  but  my 
thought  may  change.    I  may  begin  to  think  of  some- 
thing else,  say  of  the  coming  election  or  the  Spanish  war; 
or  both  the  book  and  thoughts  may  change,  the  book 
may  be  taken  away  and  I  at  the  same  tim*;  may  think 
of  something  else,  say  of  the  watch  and  '.s  mechanism. 
The  cognizant  thought  that  possesses  the  object  and 
the  object  of  that  thought  arc  from  a  purely  scientific 
psychological  standpoint,  independent  mftblct. 


Psychic  States  as  Objects 


35 


Thought  itself  with  its  object  may  in  its  turn  become 
an  object  of  thought,  and  here  once  more  the  same  rela- 
tions obtain.  The  contemplations  or  psychological  an- 
alysis of  a  thought  must  be  dtscrimiiuited  from  the 
thought  as  the  material  or  object  of  tibat  analysb.  From 
the  confusion  of  these  different  aspects  many  a  fallacy 
results.  Thus  the  schematic  incessant  change  in  the  flow 
of  objective  time  is  confused  with  the  state  of  conscious- 
ness having  time  as  its  object,  and  the  attributes  of  one 
are  fallaciously  ascribed  as  undergoing  continuom 
change.  Another  fallacy  often  committed  by  the  so- 
called  "new  psychology"  is  the  substitution  of  die 
attributes  of  the  object  for  those  of  the  funcdoning 
thought. 


r 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  SCOPE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

PSYCHOLOGY,  we  said,  deals  with  states  of 
consciousness,  but  these  states  are  not  indepen- 
dent,  floating  in  the  air  so  to  say.   They  are  in 
connection  with  some  material  existence,  and 
not  with  physical  reality  as  a  whole,  but  with  some 
definite  mdividual  body.    We  must  keep  in  mind  that 
psychology  is  first  of  all  a  natural  science,  and  the  only 
thmg  It  has  to  take  into  consideration  is  experience. 
Now  as  a  matter  of  fact  we  never  find  a  thought,  an 
idea,  a  sensation  setting  up  on  its  own  hook  and  having 
complete  indc   ndence  of  all  physical  reality.  Were 
even  such  a  t.  ig  possible,  we  could  not  know  of  it, 
because  the  only  way  we  come  to  know  of  other  thoughts 
IS  through  their  physical  activities  perceived  by  our  sense 
organs.   We  know  of  the  existence  of  other  individual 
hate,  love,  anger,  friendship,  kindness  by  the  physical 
expressions  of  ii  se  feelings,  by  the  acts  that  accom- 
pany  them.   We  know  of  the  thoughts,  of  the  emotions, 
of  our  companions,  by  the  muscular  expressions  of  the 
face,  by  the  changes  in  the  brilliancy  of  the  eye,  by  the 
^neral  bodily  state,  such  as  quietness  or  restlessness,  by 
their  gestures,  by  many  other  physical  expressions,  but 
principally  by  means  of  those  physical  manifestations 
known  as  speech.   Were  all  those  concomitant  physical 
processes  absent,  there  would  have  been  no  means  what- 
ever of  knowing  of  the  very  existence  of  external  states 
of  consciousness.   As  an  empirical  science  psychology 

36 


The  Scope  of  Psychology  37 

studies  only  such  states  of  consciousness  as  are  connected 
with  physical  reality,  or  truer  to  say  with  some  indi- 
vidualized physical  being.  In  short,  psychology  treats 
of  states  of  conadoosness  as  dependent  on  or  connected 
with  the  corporeal  individual. 

The  meaning  of  the  concept  "corporeal  individual** 
must  not  be  left  in  a  vague  state.    From  a  purely  me- 
chanical  standpoint  we  may  say,  that  a  corporeal  indi- 
vidual is  a  closely  interrelated  system  of  material  parts 
forming  a  more  or  less  stable  equilibrium.  This  equilib- 
rium  is  constantly  being  interfered  with,  by  the  forces  of 
the  external  environment,  but  as  long  as  that  equilibrium 
maintains  itself  in  resisting  the  disaggregating  influences 
of  external  forces,  it  may  practically  be  considered  as  a 
corporeal  individual.  In  other  words,  a  corporeal  indi- 
vidual is  a  system  of  material  parts  organically  inter- 
connected, and  functioning  as  one  determinate  whole. 
Any  living  being  will  answer  our  definition.    From  the 
lowest  stage  to  the  highest;   from  the  monocellular 
amoeba  to  the  highest,  most  complicated  multicellular 
organlon,  we  meet  with  the  same  fundamental  traits, 
characteristic  of  what  we  term  the  "corporeal  individ- 
ual."  Now  it  is  the  mental  states  of  the  corporeal  in- 
dividual that  psychology  investigates  and  studies. 

In  our  last  discussion  we  have  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  consciousness  depends  on  the  corporeal  individual 
and  can  only  be  known  from  physical,  bodily  manifes- 
tations. Each  living  being  manifests  some  activity  in  its 
reactions  to  the  stimuli  of  the  external  environment. 
Now  what  are  the  reactions  characteristic  of  conscious- 
ness?  Where  are  the  distinctive  marks  that  stamp  a 
physical  manifestation  with  the  impress  of  psychic 
states?  The  only  tore  way  to  tell  is  by  purponve  ao- 


3S         Normd  md  JhuonuU  Psychology 

tvntf.  We  know  that  our  neighbor  is  conscious,  because 
of  hit  active  parpoiive  life.  When  a  fly  it  on  hit  now, 

he  raises  his  hand  and  brushes  it  away;  he  knowt  Im>w 
to  walk  and  preserve  equilibrium ;  avoids  obstacles;  lives 
in  a  house  for  protection  from  the  changes  of  weather 
and  from  harmful  intruders;  seeks  shelter  from  rain; 
drettet  himtelf  warmly  on  a  frotty  winter  day;  a  thou- 
tand  other  movements  all  of  them  expretstve  of  pur- 
posive activity  tell  us  of  our  neighbor's  consciousness, 
intelligence.  The  stone  on  the  road  changes  its  place 
according  to  the  influences  of  Incident  forces;  the  grain 
of  dutt  it  blown  hither  and  thither  by  the  wind;  they 
do  not  thow  a  more  or  lett  definite  purpotive  activity 
under  changing  circumstances.  The  ditturbance  of  their 
equilibrium  does  not  stimulate  them  to  induce  changes 
in  the  external  environment,  changes  that  would  tend  to 
restore  that  lost  equilibrium.  They,  therefore,  have  no 
purpose.  For  a  purpose  it  the  tendency  to  realize 
some  external  action  which  it  uteful  or  inditpentallie  to 
the  lifc^xistence  of  the  particular  individual  being.  The 
tendency  to  the  maintenance  of  a  definite  activity  in  op. 
position  to  the  onset  of  disturbing  f  .ces  of  the  environ- 
ment in  order  to  restore  the  lost  equilibrium,  may  be 
considered  at  the  universal  formula  for  purposive  life 
in  general. 

This  formula  holds  true  of  all  animal  life.  The 
man  in  running  after  the  car  has  purpose,  so  has 
the  cat  in  chasing  the  mouse,  so  has  the  deer  in  flee- 
ing  frmn  die  hunter.  The  very  amoeba,  that  lump  of 
protoplasm,  in  «>*«ending  itt  pteudofiodta  to  draw  in  the 
bit  of  nutrimen  possesses  the  gmm  of  purposive  activ- 
ity, and  some  primitive  psychic  state  must  therefore  be 
ascribed  to  it.   Life  is  esseuHaUy  purposhe  im  Ut  mh 


Tkg  Scope  of  Psychology  39 

ture.  Wherever,  therefore,  we  meet  with  life,  there 
some  form  of  psychic  state,  however  primitive  and  ele- 
mentMy,  mwt  be  present.  Psychic  states  stand  in  the 
mort  mtmttte  reUtioiMhip  to  life  activity.  The  two  in 
fact  cannot  be  separated.  Psychoris  k  comeomkmt  with 
btosts.  Psychologists  as  well  as  physiologist.  aU  1^ 
thus  far,  that  there  is  no  psychosis  without  neorosit: 
some  go  further  and  affirm  that  there  is  no  neurosis 
without  psychosis;  I  think,  we  are  closer  to  the  truth. 
If  we  advance  sdU  farther  and  assnne,  that  there  is  no 
btosts  unthout  psychosis.  Pifchic  states  must  be  pre- 
dicated  not  only  of  highly  organized  animals,  possessed 
of  a  nervous  systc but  also  of  the  mo^t  elemettary 
monocelliilar  organisms. 

The  evohidonist  especially  must  accept  out  last  con- 
elusion,  for  he  will  agree  that  coascipuwess  did  not 
come  mto  existence  per  saltum,  he  will  acknowledge  that 
the  germs  of  conscious  life  characteristic  of  the  highert 
orgamzed  being  must  already  be  present  in  the  lowest 
types  of  hfe,  out  of  which  developed  the  higher,  the 
more  complex  organisnn. 

We  are  now  i«  a  posicieii  to  define  the  scope  of  psy^ 

chology. 

Psychology  is  the  science  of  psychic  states  both  as  to 
content  and  form,  regarded  from  an  objecthe  stand- 
pomt,  and  krongkt  in  relaHan  to  the  living  corporeal  in- 
dtvidnai. 


CHAPTER  VI 

I 
I 

THE  SOURCES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

FACTS  of  consciousness,  we  pointed  out,  are  the 
subject  matter  of  psychology.  The  question 
arises  as  to  the  sources  of  the  facts.  The  botan- 
ist,  when  he  wishes  to  carry  out  a  series  of  ex- 
periments,  goes  into  the  herbarium  or  into  the  field  to 
gather  the  material  for  his  study.  The  entomologist 
collects  his  specimens  on  the  street,  field,  and  forest.  The 
same  holds  true  in  the  case  of  all  other  sciences.  The 
external  world  is  infinitely  rich,  it  is  an  inexhaustible 
mine  from  which  (Aysicai  sdoice  draws  its  hm.  Now 
what  are  the  sources  of  die  psychologist? .  The  psychol- 
ogist cannot  possibly  go  out  into  the  forest,  catch  his 
specimens,  dry  them,  and  pin  them  for  his  observation 
and  study. 

This  question  as  to  die  sources  of  psychology 
comes  to  us  with  greater  force,  when  we  realize, 
that  psychological  facts  are  not  of  the  same  order  with 
those  of  the  rest  of  natural  physical  sciences.  It  is,  of 
course,  evident  that  we  must  draw  our  material  from 
consciousness,  but  where  shall  we  turn  to  find  the  facts? 
Where  are  the  particular  localities  frmn  n^idi  we  can 
work  out  and  bring  to  light  mental  facts?  Such  is  the 
difficult  question  that  arises  before  the  mind  of  the 
scientist,  who  has  been  trained  in  the  school  of  concrete 
natural  science.  He  finds  himself  helpless.  The  neurol- 
ogic to  whom  a  psychological  training  is  truly  invalu- 
able, finds  hunself  ill  at  ease  when  in  his  tnvcttigatiom 

40 


Tie  Soyrea  af  Ptychohxy  41 

from  a  wchoIog,caI  point  of  view.  A  piece  of 

axon,  on  be  named,  mounted,  obsen-ed,  and  exoer- 
.niented  upon,  but  who  am  get  hold  of  a  fa«  oj^. 

«o„,  of  a  feelmg,  of  an  idea,  «,in  them,  put  them  un- 
4>r  die  m,cr«cope  for  scientific  investigation?  The 
U^f^nTT^-^  r  »°  P«™«".  «  different  in 

'wCls^;:rf:^  . .« wh.™  ^  uk*  for 

Some  even  go  so  far  as  to  doubt  whether  facts  of 
r^T"!"/"  «  Frequ«?y  I 

rion'.^"".  'r  P^f*  "i*  •  good  medical  edL' 
t.on,  people  who  were  far  from  being  uniMelligent  tbt 
hey  doubted  the  reaKty  of  psychic  facts^^^^^t^ 
anydungl  nothmg  substantial  I"  Comical  as  thi,  hit 
awrtion  may  appear,  one  can  understand  it.  reason- 

Thirj'hff'T'f*  «~.tion  and  bewildeZ^ 
of  h.m  who  for  die  fir.t  time  pot.  hi,  foot  on  the  thredi- 
old  of  psycho  ogy.  What  they  meant  to  exmwwiX 
orange  experience  of  having  been  conf,o3wi™a«! 
of  .  miture  totally  different  from  the  ones  wTwS 

^,  a«       r^S*  T"'  ^  *'        °'  "„«ious. 
ness  are  not  tangible,  they  ctmnot  be  Men,  nor  tasted 
nor  smc^led,  nor  weighed  by  pounds  .ni 
measured  by  rulers  and  compasses.    In  shoTwT^ 
N^cal  h«.  cannot  be  reached  by  any  of  the 's^ 
«•«!  that  1.  why  they  an  nich  a  pujzle,  that  is  whv 


42         Normal  and  AhnornuA  Psychology 


ness  can  hardly  be  considered  as  facts,  that  they  are  not 
anything  substantial.  Still  on  further  reflection  any  of 
these  sceptics  will  admit  that  the  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness exist,  and  as  such  they  must  be  facts. 

In  fact,  if  one  wants  to  be  a  borough  sceptic,  he  may 
doubt  the  reality  of  the  external  material  world.  All 
that  might  be  nothing  but  a  dream,  nothing  but  an  illu- 
sion, a  hallucination.  We  have  no  sure  criterion  of  the 
truth  of  the  octemal  material  reality,  but  ont  thing  re- 
mains perfectly  dear  in  all  this  destructive  scepticism 
and  that  is  the  reality  of  the  doubting  thought,  the  ex- 
istence of  the  sceptic  consciousness.  That  is  why  Des- 
cartes, the  father  of  modern  philosophy,  beginning  with 
profound  scepticisrri  as  to  the  reality  of  things  finally 
found  his  criterion  of  tiie  truth  of  real  existence  in  hit 
very  doubting  thmight,  and  he  expressed  it  in  his  fa- 
mous "Cogito  er^o  sunt."  Thought,  therefore,  is  even 
more  real  than  the  objects  of  the  material  world, 
we  know  of  the  latter  only  through  thought,  through 
consciousness.  In  short,  consdoumess  is  a  stem  reality, 
and  the  phenomena  of  consdousness  are  real  facts. 

We  may  refer  here  to  the  behavior  hypothesis  recently 
advanced  by  Watson.  The  psychological  knowledge  of 
animals  can  only  be  obtained  from  the  observation  of 
their  action,  of  their  behavior,  or  of  their  adaptations  to 
their  environment.  The  same  holds  true  in  the  case  of 
human  psychology.  Man  does  not  differ  from  other 
animals  and  should  be  studied  in  the  same  way.  This, 
if  I  understand  Watson  aright,  is  essentially  his  posi- 
tion. Watson  goes  to  the  extent  of  denying  the  very 
existence  of  "centrally  initiated  processes,"  he  reduces 
all  fuychologf  to  perif^rally  induced  {Hroeetiet,  ■en* 
•ory  and  motor.  He  contests  the  presmce  or  the  very 

mvUtmmtm  of  jmiilft  and  dMUM  dlt  DfMtnOt  <^  UKf  ftf* 


The  Sources  of  Psychology  43 

fective  elements.  Pcriuipi  it  may  be  bert  to  quote  W«^ 

son's  own  words: 

"Having  thus  summarily  dismissed  the  image  and  the 
affective  elements,  I  crave  permission  to  restate  the  es- 
sential contention  of  the  behaviorist.    It  is  this:  the 
world  of  the  physicttt,  the  biologitt,  and  the  psycholo- 
gist  is  the  same,  a  world  consisting  of  object»--their 
interests  center  around  different  objects,  to  be  sure,  but 
the  method  of  observation  of  these  objects  is  not  essen- 
tiaUy  different  in  the  three  branches  of  science.  Given 
increased  accuracy  and  scope  of  technique,  and  the  be- 
haviorist  will  be  able  to  give  a  complete  account  of  a 
subject's  behavior  both  as  regards  immediate  response 
to  stimulation,  which  is  effected  through  the  .^rger  mus- 
cles; delayed  response,  which  is  effected  through  the 
Mme  mutdes  (totalled  action  after  deliberation)— 
these  two  forms  compriting  what  I  have  called  expUcU 
behavior;  and  the  more  elusive  types,  such  as  the  move- 
ments  of  the  larynx,  which  go  on  in  cases  where  action 
upon  stimulation  is  delayed  (so-called  thought  pro- 
ce»M).  This  latter  form  of  behavior,  which  manifests 
Itself  chiefly  m  movements  of  the  larynx,  but  which  may 
go  on  m  (to  the  eye)  imperceptible  form,  in  the  fingers, 
hands,  and  body  as  a  whole,  I  should  caU  impUcit  be- 
havior.    For  years  to  come,  possibly  always,  we  shall 
have  to  content  ourselves  with  experimental  observation 
and  control  of  explicit  behavior.  I  have  a  very  decided 
conviction,  though,  that  not  many  years  will  pass  before 
implicit  behavior  wtU  likewise  yield  to  experimental 
treatment. 

"Possibly  the  most  immediate  result  of  the  acceptance 
of  the  behaviorist's  view  will  be  the  elimination  of  self- 
tnd  of  tile  introspective  reports  resulting 


44         Normal  and  Abnormal  Psycholoiy 

from  such  a  method." 

The  view  taken  by  Watson  is  physico-biological. 
While  one  can  sympathise  with  his  views  in  making 
psychology  more  of  a  biological  study,  still  one  can- 
not help  realizmg  the  fact  that  he  takes  an  extreme  view 
when  he  wishes  to  reduce  all  mental  processes  to  be- 
havior. His  view  of  affection  as  being  essentially  sense 
processes  seems  to  be  sound.  He  should  not,  however, 
involve  his  view  of  affection  with  the  more  narrow  sec- 
tarian view  of  sex  analysis  forced  gratuitously  on  clin- 
ical facts.  Affection  and  emotion  are  no  doubt  peri- 
pherally induced  and  are  probably  due  to  the  action 
of  the  central  nervous  system  and  glandular  secre- 
tions of  internal  organs.  In  this  respect  one  may 
fully  agree  with  the  behavior  hypothesis.  There  is  no 
need  of  invoking  sex  to  that  effett  as  Watson  hunself 
states  it:  "It  is  not  essential  to  my  contention  that  the 
above  vague  suggestion  should  be  true.  //  is  essential 
to  our  position  to  have  afection  reducible  to  sense  pro- 
cesses. It  is  even  more  probable  that  the  mechanism  is 
glandular;  that  very  diglit  increase  in  the  secretioa 
products  gives  us  the  one  group;  checkmg  or  decreas- 
ing the  secretion,  probably  the  other." 

What,  however,  one  cannot  accept  is  the  extreme 
view  of  the  denial  of  introspection.  Introspection 
will  ever  remain  the  fundamental  method  in  normal  and 
abnormal  psychology.  The  very  problem  of  senstttons, 
ideas,  images,  thoughts,  affects,  emotions,  has  no  mean- 
ing vv.thout  introspection.  fVe  must  know  the  psychic 
states  or  mental  processes  from  our  own  experiences. 
Pain,  pleasure,  feelings,  anger,  fear,  love,  acquire  their 
meaning  only  from  tlw  introspective  attitude  of  the 

obMfWfSi 


CHAPTER  VU 


FnrcHOi.OG]r  and  PtYcaoPATHOioGr 

THE  popular  scientific  literature  of  to-day  of- 
ten  anerts  dogmatically  the  belief  that  the 
investigation  of  die  normal  precedes  thst  of 
the  abnormal.  This  belief  is  erroneoui  and  b 
only  given  credence  to  by  people  who  had  not  tiiought 
muA  on  the  subject,  and  especially  by  diose  who  belong 
to  die  so-called  "new  pqrchology"  tchooL  A.  a  matter 
of  fact  die  abnormal  in  ideiitilic  research  precedei  tluit 
of  die  normal.   The  investigation  of  die  abnormal  it 
one  of  die  most  potent  instruments  for  new  discoveries. 
The  mcdiod  of  experimentation,  die  most  powerful  tool 
of  modem  science,  is  in  fact  die  creation  of  artificial  con- 
ditions.  m  odier  words,  die  effecting  of  abnormal  sutes. 
Where  die  compound  is  highly  compkx,  whm  the  coa- 
stituent  factors  :.nd  dieir  relations  are  imperfecdy  or  aU 
but  unknown  and  are  not  dierefore  under  control,  die 
spontaneous  occurrence  of  some  anomaly  ought  to  be 
greeted  cndiusiasticaUy,  as  it  discloses  die  role  played  by 
the  modified  or  excfaided  ftetor.  This  is  specially  true 
m  the  case  of  mental  life,  where  die  phenomena  under 
mvestigation  are  die  most  complex  in  the  whole  domain 
of  science,  where  a  direct  modification  of  die  functioning 
mental  activity  is  as  a  rule  impossible  widiout  die  pro. 
dtictioii  of  some  anomaly. 

In  die  case  of  psychic  life  experimcalatioa  may  be 
conducted  on  two  different  lines  of  research.  The  one 
is  the  modification  of  die  objective  coatu^  hf  rrimt  of 

41 


46         NornkU  ami  Ahnomd  Psychology 

changing  the  objective  stimulus;  the  othci  msthod,  and 
by  far  the  most  efficient  and  fruitful,  is  the  modificatiofc 
of  the  very  function  on  which  the  peychic  omitent  de* 
pendi. 

Memory,  for  instance,  may  be  ttadied  by  giving  the 
subject  a  series  of  auditory  or  visual  impressions  at  giv- 
en intervals,  and  then  seeing  how  many  of  the  series  the 
subject  can  remember  after  a  given  interval.  We  can 
thus  determine  die  role  played  by  mdi  factors  as  time, 
number  of  impresnoos,  number  of  repetitioiis,  etc  The 
function  of  memory  remains  the  same,  and  cmly  the 
stimuli  of  the  psychic  content  are  modified.  We  may, 
however,  study  memory  from  a  totally  different  stand- 
point, and  that  is  by  the  disturbance  of  its  function.  Dis- 
turbance of  functi<Mi  may  be  studied  in  artifieiftl  states 
produced  by  drugs,  or  induced  by  hypnosis;  or  by  in- 
vestigating cases  In  which  the  function  is  accidentally 
disturbed,  such,  for  instance,  as  are  to  be  found  in  dif- 
ferent forms  of  amnesia  and  aphasia. 

The  second  naethod  is. by  far  the  more  important 
of  the  two,  and  is  extremely  valuable.  For  it  is  only  by 
disturbances  in  the  function  of  thought  that  we  can 
learn  something  about  the  factors  and  nature  of  mental 
life.  We  cannot  possibly  learn  about  the  nature  of  a 
inrocess,  unless  we  disturb  it  artificially,  or  unless  we  try 
to  study  cases  in  which  we  can  find  the  process  in  diier> 
oit  stages  or  degrees  of  perturbttim;  here  om  hxxm  u 
missing,  there  another  is  exaggerated,  and  so  on.  Frmn 
such  cases  it  is  easy  to  analyze  the  constituent  factors  and 
their  interrelations.  In  mechanics,  for  instance,  the  law 
of  inertia  would  have  never  been  discovered,  if  not  for 
the  imagining  of  sudi  a  case  as  the  absence  of  all  fric- 
tioo,  or  its  approxunate  fwiovaL    TIm  andflaH  who 


Psychology  and  Psychopathology 


looked  to  the  ordinary  phenomena  of  common  life,  that 
is  to  the  normal,  considered  that  bodies  are  bound 
to  stop.  The  ancient  physicists,  relying  on  their  obser- 
vations of  the  normal,  believed  that  bodiet »  £a£^ 
verse  space  in  proportion  to  their  weight;  it  reqniftd 
a  Galileo  to  detect  the  fallacy  and  show  that  bod- 
ies, no  matter  what  their  size  and  weight  be,  fall- 
ing from  a  high  pkce  or  in  a  vacuum,  fall  to  the  ground 
at  the  same  time.  The  same  holds  true  in  the  case  of 
chemistry;  no  observer  of  water  in  its  "nomial**  state 
would  have  detected  the  presence  of  hydrogen  and  (ay- 
gen.  Only  under  highly  artificial  or  abnormal  condi- 
tions was  it  possible  to  discover  the  constituents  that  go 
to  make  up  the  compound  water. 

If  we  turn  to  the  sciences  dealing  with  more  com- 
plex phenomena,  we  find  illustrated  the  tame  truth.  We 
know  how  highly  instructive  Darwin  found  it  to  folkvw 
closely  for  a  period  of  many  years  experiments  of  breeds 
in  artificial  selection,  and  to  what  capital  account  he 
turned  his  highly  valuable  observations  of  all  forms  of 
curiositiet  and  monstroitties.  We  all  know  how  vaba- 
ble  the  observation  and  study  of  all  fomu  of  anomalies 
or  variations  from  the  normal  type  or  species  proved  to 
the  final  establishment  of  the  theory  of  evolution.  The 
pre-Darwinian  zoologist  ignored  variation  regarding 
it  simply  at  an  exception  to  the  normal,  as  a  mere  ab- 
normality, as  a  pathological  manifestation  which  is  of 
little  value  to  the  scientist,  who  is  only  occupied  with 
the  discovery  of  general  laws,  laws  of  the  normal.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  it  was  just  these  neglected  variations, 
deviadiMM  from  the  normal  that  turned  out  to  be  at  the 
very  fbundatioa  of  bioiofy,  reveaUng  the  nature  and 
nwxNniim  of  the  evehicion  of  speciei. 


4S         Norm€i  tmd  dhnorma  Psychohzy 


The  same  truth  wc  find  illustrated  in  the  investiga- 
tions of  the  funrtions  of  the  different  parts  of  the  organ- 
am.  Esqiwrimeiitt  on  animals  such  as  vivisection,  in- 
jecting of  toxin  matter,  etc,  experimeott  that  actually 
mean  the  putting  of  animals  in  pathological  stetn,  as 
well  as  the  invesdgation  of  pathological  cases  in  man, 
have  given  physiology  its  most  valuable  treasures. 
Knowledge  of  the  normal  arises  out  of  knowledge  of 
the  abnormaL  In  fact  we  may  even  say  that  the  nor- 
mal itself  originates  in  the  abnormaL  It  it  in  vari»- 
tions,  in  anomalies,  that  the  normal  species  *fi^ft  itt 
origin. 

Strictly  speaking  the  normal  is  not  at  all  a  scientific 
concept,  it  is  purely  provisional  in  its  nature,  and  holds 
only  good  from  a  restricted  point  of  view  in  transitional 
stages  of  science.  The  normal  is  that  which  is  common ; 
the  normal  is  the  usual;  and  it  is  not  the  laual,  but  the 
unusual  that  gives  birth  to  new  life  in  science.  The  un- 
usual attracts  our  attention  and  reveals  to  us  the  function 
and  role  played  by  the  particular  affected  product  in  the 
total  compound. 

Taking  all  this  into  consideration,  I  think  that  they 
are  wrong  who  insist  that  the  abnormal  can  be  known 
only  from  the  normal.  We  can  realize  now  how  super- 
ficial are  those  who  tell  us  "we  learn  but  little  from  the 
abnormal,  for  first  of  all  comet  the  normal"  We  real- 
ize now  how  detrimental  to  tdentific  investigation  such 
a  contention  is.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  progress  of 
science  is  not  from  the  normal  to  the  abnormal,  but  the 
very  reverse,  from  the  abnormal  to  the  normal;  the 
normal  is  but  an  arbitrary  temporary  concept,  modified, 
and  determined  by  the  ahtormal  or  unusual. 

TIm  mpnme  imp(»teiet  of  ptthologioa  mttidi 


Psfekoloiy  ^  PsyckofMihohgy  49 

holds  especially  true  in  the  case  ^  psychology,  wlmt 
the  phenomena  and  the  conditions  on  which  these  de- 
pend are  so  highly  complex  and  so  intricate,  appearing 
at  the  tame  time  so  simple  and  taken  as  a  matter  of 
course  in  ordinary  lile. 

As  we  have  pointed  out  in  the  investigation  of  mental 

life  we  may  either  change  the  psychic  or  objective 
content,  or  effect  changes  in  the  mental  function  it- 
self. In  the  study  of  vision,  for  instance,  we  may  effect 
changes  in  the  conditions  of  external  objects,  leaving 
the  eye  itself  undisturbed.  We  may  keep  the  object  at 
different  distances  and  study  its  appearances,  {mt  the  ob- 
ject in  water  and  have  it  refracted  at  diferent  angles; 
we  may  look  at  it  through  different  prisms,  colored 
glasses  or  contrast  its  color  when  appearing  in  combina- 
tion with  other  colors,  whether  it  be  successive  or  simul- 
taneously. !nstead,however,  of  effecting  changes  in  the 
objects  taken  in  by  the  eye,  we  may  study  the  miiij»«..^fn 
of  vision  by  investigating  the  disturbances  of  the 
function  of  sight  itself  under  the  influence  of  drugs  in- 
jected into  the  eye,  or  in  different  ocular  diseases.  The 
latter  method  is  by  far  the  more  vahnhle  for  revealing 
the  real  mechanism  of  the  visual  ajyaratus. 

Similarly  in  the  study  of  memory  we  may  follow  the 
method  of  the  Gennan  school,  such  for  instance  as  that 
of  Ebbinghaus  and  others,  and  investigate  the  laws  of 
memory  by  analyzing  the  changes  effected  in  its  contents; 
or  we  may  study  the  UMchaninn  of  monory  by  studying 
its  disturbances  in  different  forms  of  amnena  and  mental 
diseases.  Since  psychology  primarily  deals  with  the  laws 
of  psycho-physiological  functions,  It  will  be  admitted 
that  the  more  important  and  valuable  method  is  the  one 
thtt  hM  Ibr  its  subject  matter  the  changes  going  on  di- 


50        Sorwkd  mi  Aknormd  Psyehohiy 


reedy  in  the  material  under  investigation.  The  invest!- 
gatiooa,  however,  of  changes  or  disturbances  of  mental 
fnactioii  itself  are  really  a  study  of  the  abnormal,  re- 
searches into  the  domain  of  mental  pathology.  In  psy- 
chology, as  in  many  other  sciences,  especially  those  of 
the  biological  order  to  which  psychology  naturally  be- 
longs, the  pathological  method  is  by  far  the  most  im- 
portant 

We  can  realize  now  the  reason  why  it  would  be  well 
for  psychology  to  follow  closely  not  the  methods  of 
physical  sciences,  but  those  of  the  biological  sciences. 
The  material  with  which  physics  deak  lacks  the 
pathological  element,  it  can  be  introduced  only  fig- 
uratively,  not  so  is  it  m  the  order  of  phenomena  with 
which  biology  deals.  In  biology  variations,  abnormali- 
ties, pathological  elements  stand  out  in  the  foregromd, 
and  no  step  can  be  made  without  taking  them  into  con- 
sideration. The  psychologist  in  order  to  succeed  and  ob- 
tain more  efficient  and  valuable  results  must  keep  in 
mind  clearly  the  fact  that  the  psychic  process  is  a  form 
of  life  in  general,  its  phenomena  are  naturally  related 
to  the  province  of  biology,  and  that  of  the  highest  part 
of  it.  The  methods  of  psychological  investigation  must 
follow  the  line  not  of  the  physical,  but  of  the  biological 
sciences. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


THE  SPISirVAUaTIC  AND  MATBUAUSTIC  HYPOTHBtIS 

IF  we  scrutinize  more  closely  the  science  of  psy- 
chology, we  find  that  it  is  essentimBy  dymunictl  in 
character.  Cmsciousness  b  the  subject  matter 
of  psychology;  but  consciousness  is  dynamic,  it  is 
first  of  all  an  activity,  a  process.  Now  all  sciences  that 
deal  with  processes  cannot  possibly  help  forming  some 
workbg  hypothesis  that  should  unify  the  facts  dealt 
miii,  and  should  above  all  be  a  guide  for  further  re- 
search. Mechanics  has  its  hypothesis  of  masses,  foroea, 
energy,  inertia,  conservation  of  matter  and  energy; 
thermotics  its  molecular  energy;  electricity  its  ether  vi- 
brations and  currents;  chemistry  the  affinity  of  atoms; 
dynamic  i^ystology  Ims  its  reflex  processes;  what  it 
the  fundamental  hypothesis  of  ptychotogy? 
We  find  the  following  hypotheses : 

(I)  The  Spiritualistic,  or  soul  hypothesis, 

(II)  The  Materialistic  hypothesis, 

(III)  The  Faculty  hypothesis, 

(IV)  The  Trannnission  hypothesis, 

(V)  The  Psycho-physiological  hypodieris. 

(a)  The  Metaphysical, 

(b)  The  P)s-:ive. 

We  give  here  a  brief  review  beginning  with  the  spirit- 
ualistic hypothesis.   At  the  very  ootaet  I  most  caution 
the  reader  against  the  grave  error  of  confounding  spirit 
ualism  with  spiritism.  The  latter  is  a  religious  doctrine 
of  life  after  death,  and  of  the  influences  of  natural  or 

51 


5t        Nprma  md  Jkmrwul  Pff^jf 


remmt^  ipinti;  the  former  is  a  pulosophical  theory, 
hMTTiH*  «fe.  thit  attenqM  to  eqftim  the  phenomena 
of  consaousness.  Such  men  as  Low  and  Ladd  are  ardmt 

advocates  of  spiritualism.  According  to  this  hypothesis 
^1^^  a  spiritual  substance,  a  soul,  that  acts  in  all 
tte  processes  of  consaousness.  The  soul  is  the  imrr  ita- 
Me  prrndple  that  uni/ies  afl  the  phenomena  of  conscious- 
ness; in  other  word?,  all  mental  yrtiwiis  are  but  mm. 
ifestations  of  the  soul's  activity. 

The  medical  mm  trained  in  the  school  of  concrete 
physical  sciences  may  smile,  it  not  sneer,  at  the  -nention- 
ing  of  the  "tOBL-  Such  a  hypothesis  is  in  his  opinion 
nothmg  but  an  anadNwim   He  nutf  condder  it  at 
a  theory  long  exploded  by  sconce  aad  mm  eoly  fin^. 
mg  among  the  lower  ignore    classes,  a  theory  which  aa 
intelligent  scientist  should  bt  ashamed      introduce  into 
hia  work  even  for  the  sake  of  discussion,  an  i  elucida- 
tum  of  hia  subject,— the  "aorf"  is  nothing  but  supersti 
tion.   To  call  a  theory  smptmlltmt  does  not  refute  it 
The  significant  fact  that  Prof.  T  add  in  his  volume  on 
physiological  psychology  defends  it     aliantlv,  that 
Sigwart  in  his  "Logic"  take<=  up  arms  for  it,  and 
abo  that  such  a  great  thinker  as  Lotze,  himscl-'  a 
medical  man,  takes  it  onder  km  protection  and  find 
:  erfecdy  rational,  and  in  fact  file  only  tenable  hy|K 
thesis,  seems  to  show  that  there  must  be  something 
the  "soul,"  and  if  superstition  it  be,  it  s  one  that  has 
be  redconed  with,  and  not  dismissed  w'  h  contempt.  We 
nwit,  Aerefore,  eamhit  ikt  reasons  ^nd  facts  that  urge 
some  thinkers  md  sdentnts  to  aceapt  Ae  aou!  as  ^ 
working  hypothesis  for  the  phenomer  i  of  aomcioiianeas 
There  are  two  weighty  coitaidCTBdM*  thi^  are  sinaigfji 
in  favor  of  spirkualtsm. 


53 

W«  have  already  pointed  out  in  a  previous  discos- 
^OB  Alt  mental  phrnniiMM  mxt  different  in  kind  from 
Aott  of  the  materU  wmM.   A  fcdmg,  an  Mea,  aa 

image  a  thought  ha'  'thcr  length,  aor  httaSk,  aor 
heighth,  nor  weight  n  psychic  phenomenon  can  be  oc- 
pressed  in  teirns  ot  mntcrial  magnitude.  Hence,  con- 
cIiiAb  the  spiritualists,  on.  ciousness  is  different  in  kind 
hem  fiMtter,  it  is  a  dMkmm  wA&Mmee^  a  sooL 


Anothc 

IS  me  itai 


grcf"^ 
nthesis 


sations,  id<  is,  tho  ghts, 
as  are  the  \  articles  of  ^©r 

^^MftW         *  MBIU  *  •  JIM 

■■K7»  m  SJFVUtlMS.  llic 

noMeruw  Hspresst& 

do  n<rt  appes  -  in  c 
nc     hut  Tntf' 
various  t.gtntno- 
tfa^r  mdWtadiM} 
«ad  are  anifad, 
ness,f  "^yntal! 
re  'sor   ae  <^ni- " 
remain  in  al 
a  unity,  un 


wUch  spirttuafim  feMt 
hat  m  consciousness,  mb- 

'infr    are  not  juxtaposct 
al  be  ^y,  but  are  in 
a  yon    r  consists  of 
and  ideak,  bnt  all  tiieae 
tw^ieat  in  their  bare  separate- 
?cd  in  one  percept,  a  chair.  The 
reach  the  mind,  in  spite  of  all 
iness  are  still  brou^t  into  relation- 
vnHli tiled  mio  die  unity  of  consdo 
^encdaa  tile  same  personality. 
ist?  many  different  phenomena  mi. 
nanifoldness  and  will  not  give  rise  to 
ere  is  a  medium  throu^  which  they 
a  residtant  is  to  be  formed  there  must 


m  wiiich  the  forces  that  are  to  form  the 
mpiHge.  If  then  we  do  not  assume  die  hypo- 
tl  ^  ^iritual  substance,  mental  synchedi  k  moeiii- 
^nsib'  not  impossible. 
¥ic  ?r  iv  ^  point  out  the  weakness  of  the  soul  hy- 
PO<*»«^-  he  argummt  of  spiritualism,  diat  because 
mental  fade  diier  m  kind  from  material  fads,  a  spirit, 
ual  substance  must  be  assumed  to  exist  is  certainly  fal- 
ladous.  Fhenmaoia  may  (£ier  fnadanuxita^  and  itSI 


54        Normd  mi  JkHormd  PsjMogy 


we  have  no  right  whatever  to  conclude  that  diey  require 
two  dilbrent  substancef.  Twat  n  Aferent  from  space, 
but  are  they  two  different  ndMtancet?  GmtdoniBeM 
may  differ  widely  from  matter  and  still  require  no  one 
simple  substance  for  its  existence  and  activity. 

The  only  solid  argument  that  remains  for  the  soul 
hypothesis  is  that  of  menul  synthesis.  The  very  con- 
si^radon,  however,  cm  which  die  tiHritiitlnt  lays  to 
mudi  stren  serves  as  his  best  refutation.  That  phe* 
nomena  of  consciousness  differ  radically  from  material 
ones  is  a  fundamental  proposition  with  the  psychologist 
•n  general,  and  with  the  spiritualist  in  particular,  but 
Ais  is  far  fnrni  supporting  spiritualism.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  overthrows  his  hat  rtrong^ld.  For  if  meittal 
facts  differ  in  kind  from  physical  material  facta,  tt  b 
poor  reasoning  to  raise  difficulties  pertaining  to  one  re- 
gion, and  carry  them  over  into  a  totally  different  one. 
It  would  be  senseless  to  raise  aesthetic  difficulties  in 
chemistry  or  mechanics,  but  it  is  no  better  to  reaaon 
that  becaote  a  nwdhan  it  required  for  physical  ob^cti, 
movements,  forces  to  combine  their  effects  in  one 
resultant,  therefore,  a  medium,  a  substance,  a  soul,  is 
also  required  for  a  synthesis  of  a  totally  different  order 
of  i^enomena,  dioae  of  consciousness.  The  two  orders 
differ  in  kind,  and  what  is  found  nfceMaiy  in  one,  is  not 
for  that  reason  also  proven  to  be  indispensable  to  the 
other.  It  must  first  be  proven  that  the  conditions  of 
unification  are  the  same  in  both  before  the  argument 
from  mental  synthesis  may  be  accepted  as  valid.  States 
of  consciousness  may  become  syndietiud,  without  any 
meditmi,  without  any  tertium  qidd,  without  any  souL 

The  spiritualist  by  his  "sorl"  hypothesis  really 
underminea  his  own  position.   For  if  it  bt  gran^ 


The  SpMhuUstie  md  Materialistic  Hypotheses  55 

ed  that  the  conditions  of  unification  are  the  same  in 
mental  as  in  physical  activity;  that  a  medium  is  required 

'"k  1  "  °m''  '°  *  ""''y*  *  resultant,  then  the 
whole  rtnicture   tumbles   to   the  ground. 

Material  and  mental  phenoment  oumot  posubW 
belong  to  two  radically  different  substanas,  if  the  eo». 
ditions  of  their  activity  are  exactly  of  the  same  natnte. 
Itwould  have  been  perfectly  logical  had  the  difference 
between  consaoutness  and  the  physical  world  been  as- 
serted and  emphasized,  and  had  the  medium,  the  soul, 
been  totally  left  out. 

The  greatest  difficulty,  however,  which  the  spiritualist 
encounters  is  the  interaction  of  the  two  substances.  If 
matter  and  soul  are  different  in  nature  how  can  they 
mterart,  how  can  they  come  into  any  relation?  Hours 
m  so  far  as  they  are  different  from  pounds,  or  mUes, 
have  nothing  in  common,  and  as  such  do  not  interact;  an 
hour  cannot  modify  a  pound,  nor  can  pounds  chanoe 
hours,  and  if  this  holds  true  of  phenomena  of  the  extern- 
al world  where  the  difference  after  all  is  not  so  very 
great,  it  muM  with  special  force  recoil  on  the  spiritualist 
where  the  soul  and  body  are  so  totally  <fiffeicnt  b  all  re- 
spects.  The  only  way  out  of  the  difficnky,  if  one  is  con- 
sistent  and  is  not  afraid  to  take  the  consequences,  is  to 
introduce  the  miraculous  and  say  that  the  interaction  is 
diie  to  the  inter^wtkm  of  the  deity.  This  view  was  in 
fact  taken  by  the  followers  of  DeMartes.  The  spiritualist, 
however,  with  a  philosophical  and  scientific  trahhig  wiU 
rather  be  inconsistent  and  support  hi>  view  bv  all  kinds 
of  props  than  to  accept  such  a  conclusion,  because  he 
know*  t^t  it  practicaUy  means  defeat,  it  means  that  the 
nypotiieMt  St  not  workii^,  and  that  the  soul  must  take 
•W«»r  t»dtr  the  whig  of  tbt  dittr,  the  nfogt  of  i«. 


$6         Normal  tmd  Jbuormsl  Psyehohgf 


norance. 

From  a  purely  sdentific  standpoint  we  most  reject  dm 
soul-hypothesis.  The  first  requirenwnt  of  a  scientific 
hypothesis  is  that  its  hypothetical  cause  should  be  of 
such  a  nature  as  to  be  verifiable  by  experiment  and  ob- 
servation. Now  in  the  case  of  the  soul,  this  condition  is 
not  fulfilled.  The  soul  is  something  that  lies  outside 
the  nmge  of  experienn,  and  could  never  be  tmw^t 
within  the  limits  of  empiricism,  the  basis  of  science.  The 
spiritualist,  in  fact,  has  not  evrn  a  positive  notion  of  his 
"soul,"  he  either  frames  it  in  wholly  negative  terms, 
that  it  is  not  changeable,  that  it  is  not  material;  or,  if 
pressed  hard,  he  faUt  bade  on  the  phenomena  of  con> 
sclousnetst  the  very  phenomena  die  aonl  is  called  for  to 
explain. 

Furthermore,  a  scientific  hypothesis  is  justified  and 
found  useful,  if  shown  that  it  makes  the  facts  more 
easily  understood.  This  cannot  be  shown  in  the  case  of 
die  soul.  At  a  hypoAeut  die  soul  it  um^ss  and  a^i* 
tifically  unjustifiable.  The  acceptance  of  the  "t|Mrit,** 
of  the  soul,  does  not  make  it  a  bit  easier  for  us  to  com- 
prehend the  modus  operapdi  of  the  states  of  conscious- 
ness. The  soul  is  an  immutable,  indefinite,  indescriba- 
l^,  incomprdHiittble  hemg^  tad  die  insuperable  <fifi- 
odty  of  how  it  pvet  rise  to  consdous  a^vity  requires 
another  hypothesis.  If  mental  phenomena  present  dif- 
ficulties, spiritualism  doubles  them.  The  soul  in  fact,  is 
the  "double,"  the  ghost  of  consciousness.  The  soul  is 
an  unverifiable  superfluous  entity,  it  is  not  a  vera  causa 
in  mtim;  it  espittm  nollM^,  and  widioiit  rcmovtiig 
difficult  b  only  introduced  as  an  additioml  ImrdMU 

Before  we  dismiss  the  soul  hypothesis,  we  may  point 
out  that  it  mint  be  rejected  on  quite  different  gnnrndi* — 


The  SpbihuUisHe  mid  Materialistic  Hypotheses  57 

it  is  at  bottom  unscientific,  it  is  metaphysical,  it  goes  into 
the  ultimate  nature  of  things,  an  investigation  that  does 
not  faU  within  the  province  of  science.  The  soul-hypo- 
thwis  assumes  the  existence  of  an  abiding  unchangeable 
entity  behind  the  veil  of  mental  phenomena,  an  entity 
which  m  the  flow  and  change  of  the  phenomena  ranains 
die  same  and  is  the  really  real,  the  ultimate  nature  of  the 
facts  of  consciousness.   This  belongs  to  the  ontological 
part  of  metaphysics,  but  should  not  be  introduced  into 
science.     The  reader  wiU  realize  now,  why  the 
whole  complicated  "soul  discuiiioa"  b  taken  op  here. 
It  IS  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  psychology  has  nothing 
to  do  with  substances,  noumena,  entities,  and  quiddities, 
that  psychology  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  "inner  na- 
ture" of  consdooinen.   Psychology,  like  all  other  sci- 
enot,  deKribes,  daauiiet,  and  iavcidgatet  by  meani  of 
observation  and  experimentation  facts  of  '■'WWfinmnfio 
and  their  relations,  and  endeavors  to  express  these  rela- 
tions in  general  formulae  or  laws;  all  attempts  to  make 
of  psychology  more  than  this  can  only  result  in  bad  met- 
aphysics. 

The  materialistic  hypothesis  is  even  wone  metaphys- 
ICS  than  is  the  spiritualistic  one.  It  is  a  hypothesis  which 
in  spite  of  its  evident  absurdity  is  none  the  less  in  favor 
with  some  representatives  of  the  medical  profession. 
Matter  and  foree,  at  Buchner  puts  it,  give  rise  to,  or  pro- 
dace  consciousness,  or  at  Cabanb  and  Mobtciiott  ex- 
press it  "the  brain  produces  thought  as  the  liver  Metetei 
bile."  This  hypothesis  is  unscientific  and  metaphytical, 
bec$y  .  :t  attempts  to  penetrate  into  the  inner  nature 
fiLl  '  ;f"""^  claims  to  have  it  resolved  into 
nMtt*'***  It  it  bad  metaphysics,  because  it  takes  its 
'Wtin**oiitnit,witiMMtaBycritietIfflietioa.  Mon. 


58         Normal  attd  Jbnomud  Psychology 

over  it  is  more  crude  and  worse  metaphysics  than  is  the 
soul  hypothesis,  because  it  lacks  even  the  recognition  of 
the  most  elementary,  psychological  pn^xmtimi,  namely 
the  knowledge  of  fundamoital  difference  between  mentel 
and  material  phenomena. 

Turning  now  to  the  faculty-hypothesis,  we  find  that 
it  is  nothing  else  than  spiritualism  under  a  somewhat 
different  form.  Tht  faculty-hypothesis  diops  the  mind 
into  many  different  parts,  termed  faculties,  one  is  for 
reading,  another  for  speaking,  another  for  remember- 
ing, another  still  for  willing,  and  so  on.  Sometimes 
they  are  limited  to  a  few,  and  sometimes  they  are  mul- 
tiplied to  infinity. 

The  faculty-hypothesis  is  a  dbeap  editicm  of  siHritual* 
ism,  it  is  spiritualism  many  times  over.  Instead  of  one 
soul  it  has  many  of  them.  Spiritualism  has  but  one  dif- 
ficulty and  that  is  the  soul  which,  like  an  omnipotent 
deity,  presides  in  some  mysterious  way  over  mental  and 
organic  activities.  The  faculty-hypothesis  has  an  infinite 
number  of  them,  inasmuch*  as  it  multiplies  die  deity  «to 
an  endless  number  of  gods  and  spirits  that  take  ^ai^ 
of  different  psychic  and  psychomotor  departments. 

One  can  see  the  reason  of  the  faculty  hypothesis.  It 
originated  with  people  who  as  a  rule  are  inclined  to  ac- 
cept uncritically  words  for  realities.  Thus,  will,  mem* 
ory,  words  that  are  only  collective  terms  for  many  dBf> 
ferent  states  of  mind,  names  furnished  by  the  language 
of  unreflective  common  sense,  are  naively  taken  as  indi- 
cating some  substantial  entities,  or  litde  spirits  existing 
somewhere  in  the  brain. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  TRANSMISSION  HYPOTHESIS 

THE   transmission  hypothesis   advanced  by 
James  is  a  modification  of  the  soul  hypothesis. 
The  transm.^Mon  hypothesis  postulates  the 
oittence  of  a  physical  world  and  of  an  inde- 
pendent univem  of  coMciou«»c«.  Conwiousness,  how- 
ever  cannot  manifest  itself  in  this  sublunar  worid  with- 
out  the  occurrence  of  definite  physical  changes.  That 
level  of  physical  changes  which  makes  the  manifestations 
of  conscousness  possible  is  termed  the  physical  thresh- 
old.  Now  die  ocean  of  consciousness  pours  forth  its  psy- 
chic  waves  mto  the  material  worid  with  the  rise  and  fall 
of  the  physical  threshold.  The  threshold  is  to  be  pictand 
as  a  sort  of  flood  gate  regulating  the  volume  and  inten- 
sity of  the  ^smitted  current.  The  rising  of  the  thresh- 
o^d  dim»ishes  the  psychic  stream,  while  the  lowering  of 
the  thrasbold  permits  a  greater  vdume  of  consciousness 
to  pour  over  into  our  physical  worid. 

The  transmission  hypothesis  has  certain  advantans 
over  the  previous  ones  discussed  by  us.  While  this  hy- 
pothesis postulates  the  independence  of  consciousness,  it 
!•  tbo  in  accord  with  the  scientific  proposition  now  gen- 
eraUy  accepted,  namely  that  mental  Uh  h  somehow  con- 
nected  with  or  is  a  function  of  brain  activity,  only  sped- 
fying  that  this  function  is  one  of  transmission.  It  claims 
to  fall  in  line  with  the  threshold  concept  of  psycho- 
physics  as  worked  out  by  Fechncr,  and  further  harrowed 

59 


6o        Normd  mid  AhnormtH  Psyekohgy 


by  the  "new  psychology"  movement;  moreover,  it  is 
comprehensive  enough  to  embrace  all  the  facts  and 
speculatioiM  brought  out  by  tteemt  iBvestigati<»s  in  tiw 
domain  of  mental  padmlogy. 

The  transmission  hypothesis,  however,  has  also 
disadvantages  which  are  of  such  a  grave  nature  as  to 
make  one  hesitate  to  accept  it.  The  transmission  hypo- 
thesis from  its  very  nature  is  unverifiable.  For,  if,  by 
hypothesis,  contdouncai  muufettt  itaelf  in  tiut  MdAnuur 
world  (the  only  one  we  know)  oatf  vadet  phyncal 
conditions,  how  can  we  ever  come  to  know  and  verify  a 
postulated  world  of  pure  consciousness?  Being  outside 
the  domain  of  our  psychophysical  world,  the  universe  of 
disembodied  coosctouaness  cannot,  by  hypothesis,  fumith 
us  ^  meant  for  its  verification.  In  pAkmu  mxAd 
we  can  know  of  the  existence  of  consciousne*"  through 
its  physical  expressions,  through  its  being  embodied. 
How  then,  can  we  ever  reach  a  imiverse  of  disembodied 
consciousness  ?  But  a  hypothesis  which  from  its  very  na- 
ture b  not  verifiaUe  camiot  possibly  be  •ccepted. 

The  tranmniuon  hypothesis  is  aU  dbe  man  WMocepta- 
ble  as  the  terms  in  which  it  is  expressed  are  contradic- 
tory, and  the  analogy  on  which  it  is  based  is  essentially 
illegitimate.  Consciousness  is  supposed  to  be  different 
in  nature  from  the  f^yMtl  wiM  and  eaidng  ind^ 
pendently,  the  payehophytical  threaMd  akne  regnlsting 
the  voltmM  of  the  stream  of  consciousness  to  be  poured 
over  into  the  material  world.  The  threshold  then  which 
is  physical  in  character  limits  consciousness,  but  how  can 
the  two  be  limited  by  each  other  when  they  are  totally 
diiernit  in  nature?  Inaamningtwo^ierentanhreftN, 
we  aiMrt  that  the  two  onnot  limit  each  other,  but  in 
examining  tim  the  ooMtpt  of  thMthold  we  latke  • 


Tkg  Trmumissum  Hypothesis  6x 

contradictory  MMrtioa  that  tfae  two  en  tad  do  «wtt 
each  odier. 

.  ^^^fT"^  Mwlojy  on  which  the  concept  of  "tranamis- 
tton  hmetkMi"  it  Umd  k  Okgitiiiitte  when  applied  to 
consciousness  in  its  relation  to  the  phynctl  worid.  The 

concept  of  "transmission  function"  can  only  be  applied 
to  a  case  where  the  transmitter  and  the  thing  transmitted 

are  enefitiaUy  heterogeneous.  A  stream  of  liquid  can 
be  transmitted  thiooi^  «  pipe,  a  beam  of  light  through 
stamed  glass,  or  a  Runtges  ray  through  soft  or  more  or 
less  rarified  cellular  tissue.  Both  the  trammitter 
and  the  material  transmitted  are  physical  in  their 
nature,  but  how  can  an  idea  or  feeling  such  as  our 
idea  of  eternity,  or  of  tnfintty,  or  aesthetic,  or  moral 
seme  be  transnutted  through  a  tube?  How  tlita  can 
we  apply  the  concept  of  transmission-function  to  cen- 
sciousness  and  the  physical  world  where  the  two  are 
totally  different  in  nature?  The  analogy  it  figurative 
and  tcitttttfeally  illegitimate. 

The  tran«nlttionhypothet»  tint  further  by  reaton  of 
Its  transcending  the  legitimate  gronadt  of  p^chdogy. 
It  assumes  an  independent  world  of  consctOMatM  winch 
cannot  be  brought  widiin  the  range  of  experience.  Now 
even  if  it  be  granted  that  such  a  world  does  exist,  it  still 
faUt  OBtttde  the  tobJccNaatter  of  psychology.  Forpty- 
chology  as  we  pointed  oet  deab  wkk  fmts  of  coatcioae> 
ness,  with  experiences  and  their  rekttona.  If  it  be  ob> 
jected  that  every  hypothesis  is  extra-experiential,  it  may 
be  pointed  out  that  a  hypothesis  must  be  framed  in 
termt  that  can  be  chrawn  within  the  circle  of  experience, 

itraiit  «j  a  wr»  an  agiBt  that  it  obtervaWe  in 
attwe.  Bai^  M  wt  hcvt  afaet^  dtotm,  the 


6i         Normd  md  Ahnormd  Psyekohgy 


sion  hypothesis  lacks  this  essential  requirement.  Its 
agent,  disembodied  consciousness,  is  not  a  vera  causa, 
nor  can  it  ever  be  drawn  into  the  drde  of  ocperience.  A 
good  hypothesis  must  be  framed  with  a  view  of  becom- 
ing a  possible  fact,  but  this  hypothetb  from  ita  very  na^ 
ture  disclaims  this  possibility,  since  its  agent  is  in  ft 
region  that  lies  outside  our  world  of  experience. 

For  this  very  last  reason,  namely,  for  speculating  in 
thing!  estoi-mundane,  the  hypotherii  may  alto  be 
charged  with  c(»nmitting  traittgreisions  in  metaphysics. 
Such  a  hypothesis  is  the  more  metaphysical  as  die  phe- 
nomena under  consideration  are  dealt  with  as  if  they 
were  entities. 

Furthermore,  the  hypothesis  <mly  seemingly  holds  to 
the  empirical  law  that  coosdousoess  is  a  fmedoa  of  the 
brain.   For  if  consciousness  is  in  a  separate  world  aU 

the  psychic  phenomena  are  in  existence  from  all  eternity, 
ready  made,  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  have  really 
nothmg  to  do  with  the  brain,  inasmuch  as  they  exist  f  r<»n 
all  eternity,  in  a  region  outside  and  totally  independent 
of  the  brain.  Thus  the  hypothesis  by  its  very  character, 
even  if  the  matter  be  regarded  from  a  purely  logical 
standpoint  undermines  the  proposition  which  it  under- 
took to  explain,  and  as  such  can  hardly  be  considered  as 
valid. 

Finally,  it  may  be  urged,  that  the  invocation  of  an 
extra-mundane  world  Iwlps  matters  little,  as  it  does  not 
show  the  modus  operandi  of  the  interdependence  of 
mental  and  physical  phenomena,  inasmuch  as  the  rwhi^ 
or  falling  of  a  physical  threshold  does  not  in  the  least 
exf^in  OF  show  how  a  straun  of  oontdoosaess  b  made 
possible  to  vary  in  volume  and  intensity.  Without  tx- 
pUining  the  propositioa  that  mtntftl  prnrmii  w$rf  u 


Tkg  TnmsmisdM  Hypothttb  63 


physical  processes,  the  transmission  hypothesis  only  as- 
sumes an  additional  world  of  disembodied  consctousneas 
and  thns  gratuitously  multiplies  entities. 


CHAPTER  X 


THE  METAPHYSICAL  HYPOTHESES  OF  PASALLEUSM 

THESpinozisdc  doctrine  of  parallelism  claims 
that  the  mental  and  physical  orders  run  par- 
allel to  each  other,  taking  its  stand  on  purely 
meuphyticai  grounds,  naunely,  on  the  ex- 
istence of  one  substance  with  an  infinite  number  of  at> 
tributes,  all  expressing  the  nature  of  this  substance.  Two 
of  these  attributes,  being  mind  and  matter  which  in  an 
infinite  number  of  parallel  running  modes  or  phenomena 
express  the  mtan  of  this  one  subsunce.  A  modification 
of  the  unitary  substiuice  regarded  under  the  attribute 
of  mind  is  a  mental  mode  or  phenomenon.  The  same  re- 
garded under  the  attribute  of  matter  or  extension  is  a 
material  mode  or  physical  phenomenon.  Mental  and 
physical  phenomena  are  both  manifesutions  of  one  uni- 
tary sidMtance.  There  is  no  need  for  me  to  point  out 
that  this  double  aspect  of  one  unitary  fwhttantg  belongs 
to  metaphysical  dogmatism,  of  substandalism,  and  as 
such  cannot  possibly  be  admitted  'mto  the  province  of 
psychology  as  a  natural  science. 
.  The  wdrntariMic  school  does  not  acknowledge  a  strict 
parallelism  in  the  sense  of  a  double  aspect  of  the  same 
unknowable  or  of  two  infinite  attributes  of  the  eternal 
nature  of  the  same  substance,  but  it  does  teach  a  psycho- 
physiological parallelism,  grounding  it  on  the  double 
aspect,  subjective  and  objective,  of  one  "unitary"  ex- 
perience. This  differs  hat  littk  from  the  substantialistic 
doputtkm.  Instead  of  one  unitary  sidMtanoe  the  vofam- 

<4 


The  Meiaphysical  Hypjtktses  of  PwslMism  65 

ttrist  substitutes  t  no  km  aKt^kfiial  oM^ofy  ol 

'Smitary  experience." 

Another  metaphysical  view  of  the  new  associati<Miist 
or  sentarionaiist  school  grounds  parallelism  on  epit- 
temologicai  and  metapiiyirical  gRModi.  F!qrcho>phyaio- 
logiad  pafaOdkm  is  partly  a  matter  of  pure  defiaitica, 
partly  a  matter  of  philosophical  considerations.  This 
school  defines  a  psychic  object  as  one  belonging  to  a 
single  subject,  one  individual  only,  while  a  physical  ob- 
ject b  one  belonging  to  many  subjects.  Now,  reasons 
thb  school,  if  psychology  b  to  be  a  tCMiiee  at  1^  it 
must  surely  be  of  such  a  nature  as  to  bt  eanmnnkated 
to  other  subjects,  that  is,  it  must  become  common  prop- 
erty, and  since  by  definition,  only  a  physical  object  is  an 
object  of  many  and  is  communicable,  hence  a  psychic 
chjtet  to  beoone  eommunicable  mmt  be  r^rrtHBij  ia 
phyncal  terais. 

This  excursion  into  the  region  of  metaphysics  and 
epistemology  of  the  otherwise  matter  of  fact  and  com- 
mon sense  school  is  the  result  of  good  intention  of  being 
tiK>rough-going,  hence,  this  metaphysical  definition  of 
menlai  and  plifiicd  phenomena  of  tlw  **mm?*  wad  tin 
many. 

Another  argument  adduced  by  the  same  school  seems 
to  be  somewhat  more  sound.  Physical  facts  it  is  alleged 
have  a  necessary  causal  connection,  while  psychic  facts 
are  only  connccfeed  by  associirtioii,  wUch  b  not  one  of 
necessity.  An  idea  a  b  sometimes  followed  by  tdet  k 
and  sometimes  by  idea  c  and  so  on.  There  is  no  invari- 
able connection  in  psychic  life,  such  as  is  to  be  found 
in  physical  facte.  The  soundness  of  this  argument,  how- 
ever, b  rather  qoetdonable.  For  it  may  be  contended 
tittt  ao  faneaiag  hosdi  ase  crsr  obwmd  ia  physiad 


66 


Nmmsl  md  Ahmrmd  Ptfehohgy 


pbtaemena,  the  only  thing  observed  is  a  relation  of  se- 
qamoe  of  ■iWffCiidfm  and  consequent,  and  in  case  of 
causation  an  mvwiaUe  leqiieiice  of  a  definite  •■♦^THfnt 
and  definite  conse<pient.  Now  psychic  fa^  alto  mani- 
fest relations  of  sequence,  we  oUerve  antecedents  fol- 
lowed by  consequents. 

The  argument  that  an  idea  is  sometimes  followed  by 
one  and  tometniei  hy  another  idea  showing  the  absence 
of  mmabk  sequence  is,  if  looked  at  closer,  of  a  rather 
dubious  character.  An  idea  a  or  idea  b  is  only  ob- 
jectively the  same,  by  having  the    same  object, 
but  the  thought,  mental  stream,  or  moment  consciousness 
that  possess  that  idea  may  not  be  the  same,  but  it  is 
just  this  mental  stream,  the  moment-consdowaess 
that  determines  the  content  of  the  succeeding  idea. 
The  thought  of  a  is  different  according  to  the  cfif- 
ference  of  the  mental  stream  or  moment  conscious- 
ness.   It  is  one  of  the  psychologist's  fallacies  to 
consider  that  if  the  object  is  the  same  then  the  thought 
that  possesses  the  object  must  also  be  the  same.  Now 
ideas  of  the  same  a  are  totally  different  in  different  ment- 
al  streams,  just  as  two  different  minds  regarding  the 
same  object  have  absolutely  different  psychic  states.  It  is 
therefore  dear  that  an  idea  a  may  be  sometimes  fol- 
lowed by  b  and  sometimes  by  another  idea.   An  idea 
a  followed  by  b  is  altogether  diierent  from  idea  «  fol- 
lowed  by  c.  It  is  only  the  recurrence  of  the  same  mental 
stream  or  moment  consciousness  that  would  give  the 
same  sequence.   This  is  dearly  observed  in  hypnoidic 
states  where  the  same  moment  consdousness  recurs,  the 
same  sensations,  ideas,  feefinp,  and  actions  follow  b 
invariabk  sucocssimi. 


CHAPTER  XI 


THE  UNITARY  EXPERIENCE  OF  VOLUNTARISM 

IN  the  course  of  our  discussion,  we  had  again  and 
again  to  refer  to  the  data  and  postulates  of  psychol- 
ogy. It  would  be  well  to  give  now  a  short  review 
of  them  so  as  to  bring  them  detrly  before  the 
mind  of  the  reader.  The  fact  diat  the  pffttnlatw  ut 
not  kept  dearly  in  view  leads  oae  to  ooiiirait  nuof  t  fal- 
lacy. 

Psychol  assumes  the  validity  of  unanalyzed  crite- 
ria of  reality  taken  at  valid  by  common  sense.  The 
verification  of  Uluaiont,  htUodnationi,  and  defaukiai  k 

finally  based  on  the  (ficton  of  conmion  sense.  Thm 
work  of  science  may  after  all  be  nothing  bat  an 
illusion,  an  hallucination,  or  a  <^f1usion  of  consciousness. 
What  Keeps  up  the  scientist  in  iiis  i'  ork  is  his  firm  belief 
that  nunridnd  bdieve  in  it,  and  tlt\t  whnn  other  people 
are  put  under  the  tame  conditions  tbjtf  will  verify  hii 
experiences. 

Science  assumes  the  postulates  on  which  all  experience 
of  common  sense  is  based.  Science  furnishes  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  external  world,  but  science  is  essentially  not 
8elf<onadmi8,  and  it  cannot  AeKKore  on  its  bwn 
grounds  answer  the  question  as  tc  iht  vafi<fify 
knowledge  Is  there  something  independent  in  Jiat  ex- 
ternally perceived  object,  the  house,  for  instance,  or  is 
the  psychic  account  all  there  is  to  it?  This  is  a  problem 
not  to  be  antwered  on  psychological  grounds.  Knowl- 
edfs,  its  ponibi%,  iti  natnrci       itt  ftmr^  Mpect 


68        Nomd  md  Akuormd  PsyMogy 

mmt  be  taken  for  gmted.  Psychological  knowledge, 
general  for  all  tub jectt  must  be  assoned,  as  wdl  as  gen- 
eral  knowledge  of  the  objective  world.  The  psydiologist, 

like  other  scientists,  must  assume  that  his  experienoea 
arc  so  conditioned,  that  though  they  may  be  unique, 
still  if  odiers  were  to  be  put  under  the  same  conditions 
and  confronted  with  die  same  external  realities,  they 
woulJ  pass  through  similar  experiences.  In  short,  psy- 
chology assumes  the  validity  of  its  knowledge,  its  gen- 
eral validity  for  all  knowing  subjects,  also  knowledge 
of  an  externally  existing  object,  analyzed  from  the  sub- 
jective standpoint  into  its  psychological  elements.  P*y- 
chology,  therefore,  has  really  far  more  assumptions  at  its 
basis  than  any  other  natural  science,  for  in  addition  to 
the  assumption  of  the  existence  of  an  external  world  it 
must  assume  a  knowing  or  sensitive  subject,  and  also  the 
interrelation  of  the  two. 

It  is  true  that  die  so^aDed  "Voluntaristic  school" 
claims  diat  psychology  is  the  only  science  diat  has  no 
assumption  at  its  basis-  The  representative  of  that 
school  claims  that  there  is  but  one  "unitary  ex- 
perience." From  this  "unitary  experience  natural  sd- 
eiwe  abstracts  the  knowing  subject  and  as  such  deals 
with  abstract  ra^ate  apericMsa  requiring  amdliary 
usnmptkms,  not  so  is  psychology  whiA  dealt  wteh  ex- 
perience as  it  is  immediately  presented  to  the  experienc- 
ing subject."  According  to  the  voluntarist  natural  sci- 
ence deals  with  mediate  experience,  while  psychology 
deals  with  immediate  experience  requiring  no  assump- 
tions. 

This  argument  is  questionable  on  the  very  ha  of  it. 
For  the  existence  of  that  "unitary  experience"  is  itself 
an  assumption;  it  implies  that  the  experitnce  and  tht 


Tke  Vmkiry  Eupmncg  of  FolmttHm  69 

object  given  by  the  experience  are  one.  Such  a  unifica- 
tion  of  experience  and  external  object  implied  in  "uni- 
taiy  experience**  b  a  roetaphyiical  aMamptton  wfakh 
idealistic  philosofriiy  may  prove  as  being  true,  birt  iHikh 
the  psychologist  can  not  possibly  accept  as  given  direcdy 
by  experience  itself.  Furthermore,  the  concept  "experi- 
ence" cannot  stand  by  itself,  it  implies  assumptions;  an 
expemnce  must  be  of  somethmg  that  lies  outside  that 
experience.  I  have  an  eiqperienoe  of  a  house  yonder,  but 
the  house  yonder  is  not  an  experience  unless  regarded 
from  a  metaphysical  or  epistemological  standpoint,  but 
then  we  overstep  the  boundaries  of  psychology  which 
dealt  with  experiences  of  individual  organisms  and  en- 
ter the  field  of  philoaophy  that  deab  with  experience  m 
gmeral. 

In  taking  the  most  simple  psychological  element, 
namely  sensation,  we  have  its  correlative  in  the  external 
stimulus;  there  can  be  no  sensations  without  a  stimulus, 
but  tiiat  ttimiihii  is  no  longer  a  sensation  nor  is  it  any 
other  psychic  process,  such  for  tnstiaoe  M  an  idea.  Pkf- 
chologically  considered  the  identification  of  the  stifBahis 
with  psychic  state  or  process  is  incorrect,  because  it 
would  mean  that  all  sensory  processes  tire  initiated  only 
by  sensations  or  ideas. 

Again,  if  we  come  to  ask  b  what  sense  we  undetw 
staad  die  concept  "immediate  experience,**  we  find  for^ 
er  difficulties.  For  if  the  consciousness  be  of  the  anoetic 
type,  to  borrow  the  term  from  Stout,  there  is  neither 
mediate,  nor  immediate  experience;  if  the  consciousness 
is  of  die  noc^  type  it  is  questionable  as  to  what  we 
mean  by  "imme^ate.**  For  it  may  be  contended  with 
the  modem  realist  that  the  knowledge  of  the  object  as 
giTea  la  seiMtioQ  b  i«Be£iite,  whtb  the  kMiritdp  ^ 


TO        Nuntd  mid  Ahmmd  ¥*ftM»o 


•OMBtkm  itself  with  which  psychology  deals  is  not 
inme^aiely  givca;  it  reqnim  %  ki^  tnining  before 
this  is  sepwted  and  iiftid  from  experience;  the  pty: 
chological  aspect  of  eaq>arienoe  it  really  seonidary,  and 
as  such  mediate. 

If  by  "immediate"  we  mean  to  indicate  the  fact  that 
the  psychic  protest  nrast  antedate  the  knowledge  of  the 
external  objective  world,  the  propotttioii  can  be  cotttetted 
once  more;  for  along  with  the  ptychk  process  the  ob> 
jcct  also  is  given;  especially  is  this  true  of  the  idealistic 
metaphysical  presupposition  of  the  voluntaristic  school 
that  identifies  the  objective  world  with  the  given 
primary  experience.  The  objectiire  uA  tubjecrivg  at- 
pects  of  the  "unitary  experience"  are  bodi  mqppoted 
to  be  given  together  and,  as  such,  are  both  inunedi- 
ate.  Natural  science  abstracts  the  subjective  aspect  and 
psychology  abstracts  the  objective  aspect  the  "mediate 
experience."  We  should,  however,  question  the  term 
**mediate  experience."  What  may  *'iiiidia(t  exptrianee" 
mean?  If  experience  has  any  meaning,  it  means  some- 
thing gone  or  lived  through  directly,  immediately;  but 
then  all  experience  is  immediate,  otherwise  it  cannot  be 
experience.  A  mediate  experience  as  contrasted  with  im- 
mediate experience  can  only  mean  experience  ialtfnd, 
expuncma  not  experienced,  a  concept  coatrtAdOfy  is  ili 
very  nature  and  definition,  and  must  be  therefore  ityttL 
ed  as  a  meaningless  term.  The  fact  is,  that  "mediate  ex- 
perience*' is  an  inappropriate  and  misleading  term 
for  physical  proceatet  which  as  such  are  neither  experi- 
ence nor  mediate. 

The  very  statement  of  tlw  vohmtafittic  psychofegiik 
discloses  the  hidden  assumption.  There  is  a  unitary  ex- 
perience which  falls  atimder  into  mediate  gxptiituci  of 


iThe  Unitary  Experience  of  Voluntarism  71 

natural  science  and  immediate  experience,  the  subject 
matter  of  the  psychologist.  If  this  be  so,  then  the  pty. 
Aolognt  does  not  deal  with  the  totaUty  ot  experience. 
Siaec  the  medmtt  «xperieiice--part  of  the  "unitary  ex- 
pencace**  falb  ootaide  its  domain^  it  deab  wMi 
experience  in  so  far  at  it  b  regarded  as  i«i»»Hittit 
Evidently  psychology  requires  presuppositions  to  tappfe- 
ment  the  abstracted  mediate  aspect  of  the  unitary  ex- 
penence.  For  the  voluntaritdc  school  will  surely  admit 
that  mittary  experience  it  givm  a^dier  m  the  mediate 
aspect  nor  m  the  immecfote  aspect  alone,  and  m  adeace 
deals  either  with  the  one,  or  with  the  other,  premppo. 
sitiont  are  ipso  facto  also  indispensable  in  psychology. 

Moreover,  psychology  even  from  the  standpoint  of 
me  ▼ohinturiatic  school  requires  more  presuppositions 
thta  the  nfttiml  sciences.  For  experience,  even  if  it  be 
immediate,  must  still  be  of  something  other  than  itself. 
The  sensation  white  is  of  something  white,  the  touch 
sensation  hard  is  of  something  hard,  the  pain  sensation 
pnckiii  of  something  sharp,  and  so  on.   Now  if  this 
•owewing.  if  that  other  of  which  there  is  immediate 
fxpenence  be  the  khsAiI  "me^ate  expericaet"  m  tliit 
IS  the  supplementary  part  of  the  unitary  experience,  of 
the  total  reality,  then  "immediate  experience"  is  experi- 
ence  of  "mediate  experience."    The  science  dien  that 
inmcdtele  experience  must  postulate  mediate 
ey^^mm  w  one  of  in  fundamental  preMmpofitions. 
Thus  m  ooBM  mot  more  to  the  crnidmlon,  wmil§4im 
from  quite  a  different  standpoint,  that  psychology  as  sci- 
ence in  general  has  its  presuppositions,  and  that  it  furth- 
emwre  pretupposea  all  die  presuppotitiont  ^ 


miMm  fit  mk^  and  objeet  in  coo^ 


7*         Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


•doomess,  and  that  only  in  relation  to  the  question  of 
"how," — how  we  come  to  know  this  or  tibat  object,  but 
whether  there  is  an  object  or  subject  independent  of  the 
experiencing  thought;  what  the  nature  of  that  object  or 
•object  it,  whedior  of  mental  experience  stuff  or  of  some 
extra-mental  material,  is  a  question  tluit  does  not  belong 
to  the  domain  of  psychology.  The  answer  is  differently 
pven  by  the  idealist,  materialist,  realist,  monist.  In 
short,  the  problem  of  "what"  belongs  not  to  psychology, 
bnt  to  the  province  of  metaphysics.  The  VofamCurittic 
•chod  in  daaying  all  ;w«suppoMtioas  in  psychology  starts 
wtdi  a  purely  metaphysical  speculation  of  the  idealistic 
stamp,  namely,  in  postulating  that  the  external  object  of 
psychic  experience  is  identical  with  that  same  experience. 
Psychology  or  any  other  science  must  reject  unhesitat- 
ingly su^  metaphyncal  sp^idalioM. 


CHAPTER  XII 


THE  INDUCnVB  BASIS  OF  THE  POSITIVE  PSYCHOLOGICAL 

HYPOTHESIS 

IT  now  remains  for  us  to  examine  the  psycho-physio- 
logical hypothesb.  This  last  hypothesis  fully  ac- 
cepts the  difference  between  the  two  sertet  of  facts, 
the  material  and  the  mental,  but  instead  of  going 
to  look  for  "the  other  side,"  instead  of  going  into  mets- 
physics,  it  takes  the  two  different  scries  as  its  data,  and 
considers  them  as  cth4trdinate.  It  does  not  trouble  itself 
as  to  whether  there  is  «  soul  behind  the  scenes,  all  it  has 
to  consider  is  facts,  phenoment  that  can  be  obeerved 
and  experimented  upon.  The  co-ordination  it  assumes 
is  not  an  assumption  based  on  abstract  philosophical 
speculations,  on  subtle  hair-splitting,  but  is  based  on  ex- 
penenos* 

Numerous  facts  from  psthology  and  experimentil 

physiology  go  to  prove  that  mental  states  hifc 
their  physiological  correlatives.  It  is  enough  to  men- 
tion the  fact  of  the  influence  of  toxic  matters  on  the 
brain  and  the  effected  mental  disturbances.  In  alcoholic 
iBtntcttioB,  lor  instame,  we  lost  inset  with  an  unloos- 
ening  of  higher  psychic  inhtbitioas;  in  the  tnittnl  stnge 
of  intoxication  there  is  an  apparent  heightening  of 
mental  and  motor  activity,  and  then  as  the  quantity  of 
the  poison  absorbed  by  the  blood  and  conveyed  to  the 
carrfMWiimial  nervous  system  is  increased,  a  progressive 
paralyws  of  psychomotor  life  sets  in.  At  first  the  high- 
est psychic  fonctians,  the  moral  and  atteUedwa  prncissii 

7d 


74        NonKsl  Mi  Ahnomd  Psyehohgy 


are  <&tiiilMd  and  finally  paraljrzed;  and  this  paralysis 
•lowly  descends  to  the  lower  and  more  stable  functions, 
such  as  speech  and  writing,  dim  affecting  die  coordina- 
tion of  grosser  movements,  such  as  running,  walking, 
standing,  sitting;  and  as  the  action  of  the  poison  in- 
creases, the  organic,  respiratory  functions  become  affect- 
ed, finally  ending  in  death.  Different  drugs  and  poisons 
that  act  on  the  cerebro-spinal  nervous  syttem  produce 
different  symptoms,  but  all  of  them,  while  influencing 
the  physiological  nervous  processes,  at  the  same  time  have 
their  action  manifested  by  a  parallel  modification  of 
psychic  processes.  Illusions,  hallucinations,  and  delu- 
siom,  dianges  in  rr  ning  and  willing,  changes  in  mem- 
ory, amnesia  and  pa...mnesia,  all  these  can  be  induced  by 
the  influence  of  poisons.  Thus  we  find  that  the  two 
series  of  phenomena,  the  psychic  and  the  phj^ological 
or  physical  are  intimately  related. 

Pathology  and  psychiatry  with  their  vast  stores  of 
facts  go  to  confirm  the  psydio-physiological  hypothesis. 
In  general  paralysis,  for  instance,  we  meet  conditions 
somewhat  similar  to  those  of  alcoholic  intoxication.  At 
first  inhibitions  are  removed,  the  psychomotor  pro- 
cesses become  deranged  and  slightly  stimulated,  sooner 
or  kter  to  be  followed  by  gradual  paralyns.  The  pro- 
cess of  dissolution  progresses  from  ^  h«^hftt|  most 
complex,  least  stable  functions,  memory,  intelligence, 
will  and  so  on,  to  the  lower,  less  complex  and  more  sta- 
ble functions,  reading,  writing,  playing,  etc.,  finally 
retdung  to  die  very  bwest,  to  die  simplest  co-ordination 
of  movements,  masdcadon,  swallowing,  etc.  >|^^eal> ' 
mortem  examination  of  the  brain  wn^f^g^^ttiiih  a 
profound  degeneration  of  the  bra^Bjjy^  In  titt  vari- 
ous forms  of  epilepsy  and  Inj^flBw  of  diroiuc  in- 


/ ndmelw  Bssit  of  Psytkohgkml  Hypatktsu  75 

sanity,  ending  in  dementia,  we  find  on  examinatioii  m  a 
nile,  MMae  defeaendoa  of  the  brain  cells. 

In  cues  of  the  many  fonn  of  aphasia,  science  tri- 
umphed in  discovering  the  brain  kttoii.    la  molor 
aphasia  the  third  frontal  convolutkm,  or  that  of 
Broca  is  found  to  be  degenerated,  in  sensory  aphasia 
the  degeneration  is  in  the  first  temporo-sphenoidal  con- 
vohitiofi,  or  that  of  Wernicke.  In  many  other  nervous 
diaeases  where  there  is  a  profcnmd  «*««ffr  m  the  ftntftri- 
motor  functions,  such  as  posterior  spinal  sdefwit  or  loeo> 
motor  ataxia,  acute  ascending  paralysis,  acute  poleomy* 
elitis  anterior,  syringomyelia,  etc.,  we  also  find  degener- 
ation in  acmie  one  part  of  the  cerebro-spinal  nervous  sys- 
tem. Thoi  in  tabes  we  find  a  degeneration  of  the  pos- 
terior root  zones  often  associated  with  similar  letiMt  in 
the  intrameduUory  continuation  of  the  several  cranial 
nerves.   In  poliomyelitis  anterior  we  find  an  inflamma- 
tion of  the  anterior  comua  (sometimes  extendmg  in  the 
antero-lateral  cofamms)  ;  the  multipolar  cells  with  their 
<lendrooi  and  neuraxom  are  destroyed.    In  syringo- 
myelia we  find  the  formation  of  one  or  more  cavitMt 
within  the  substance  of  the  spinal  cord,  usually  within 
the  horns  of  the  gray  matter  the  cavities  being  filled 
with  a  fluid  which  is  either  liquid  or  gelatinous.  We 
find  in  these  diaeaact  definite  organic  changes  concomi- 
tant with  definite  sentorimiotor  nMKS&attOM. 

In  the  functional  diseases  belonging  to  die  province  of 
psycho-pathology,  diseases  such  as  are  known  under  the 
23^2^°^  *»y»*«ria  in  all  iti  protean  manifestations, 
«tf  iSwmtt  forms  of  anaesdieata  and  «Bi^i|i|,,tibuUa, 
piyaoiMiie  chmea,  attatta-aMa  and 
era,  where  no  organic  lesion  in  the  cifibf#4p|||I^P  - 
vom  tyftem  can  po«ibly  be  dttcovtftd*  m  km 


76         Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


reasons  for  suspecting  some  functicmal  derangement  in 
the  psysiological  processes  of  the  nervous  system.  My 
own  psycho  physiological  investigations  in  this  line  tend 
•trongly  to  confirm  the  theory  that  all  functional  dis- 
eaaet  are  ditassoeiaiums  of  fnnctionii^  brain  ceU-ay»> 
tems,  and  that  the  gravity  of  the  disease  depends  on  the 
extension  of  such  functional  dissociations.  Thus  we 
find  that  neuro-pathology  and  the  recent  science  of  psy- 
cho-pathology with  all  the  wealth  of  facts  and  discover- 
ies at  their  disposal  give  evidence  of  the  truth  of  the 
psycho-physiological  hypothesis;  in  fact,  this  is  their  only 
working  hypothesis  sine  qm  non  the  very  existence  of 
these  sciences. 

The  psycho-physiological  hypothesis  finds  special  sup- 
port in  the  brilliant  investigations  of  experimental  phjrsi- 
ology.  The  experiments  of  Monk,  Ferrier,  Hitzig, 
Brown-Sequard,  Goltz,  Schiff,  and  others  clearly  show 
the  correlation  of  brain  functions  with  psychic  activity. 
They  show,  for  instance,  in  animals  that  Ae  physiolog- 
ical processes  in  the  occipital  lobes  are  correlated  with 
vision,  that  those  of  the  temporal  lobe,  especially  of  the 
superior  temporo-sphenoidal  convoIuti(m  are  correlated 
with  hearing,  that  sensations  of  smell  are  conocmiitant 
with  the  function  of  the  median  descending  part  of  the 
temporal  lobes,  that  taste  is  probably  correlated  with  the 
proceisei  of  the  lower  temporal  regions,  that  tactual 
sensibility  is  intimately  connected  with  the  physiological 
processes  of  the  motor  zone;  and  the  recent  researches 
of  Bianchi  and  Flechsig  tend  to  correlate  the  highest 
psychic  activity  of  man  with  the  function  of  definite 
areas  in  the  cortex. 

^ould  we  aire  to  look  for  more  proofs  as  to  die 
▼afidtty  of  corrdattoQ  of  ptyehic  with  Monl,  or  phyi^ 


induetht  Basis  of  Psycholopcal  Hypotlusis  77 

processes,  we  can  also  find  it  in  another  branch  of  ex- 
perimental physiology,  namely,  physiobgical  psychol- 
ogy. Thus  Doctor  Lombard  by  placing  sensitive  ther- 
mometers and  electric  (hIcs  against  the  scalp  noted  a 
rise  in  temperature  during  intellcctnal  effort,  Mch  m 
calculation,  recitation,  composition.    The  temperatuic 
showed  a  marked  rise  exceeding  i  F.  during  an  intense 
emotion.    When  intellectual  activity  rose  in  intensity 
there  was  also  a  parallel  rise  in  temperature,  thus  the 
tonperature  was  found  to  be  higgler,  when  poetry  was 
recited  silently  than  when  the  same  was  done  doad. 
Similar  results  were  arrived  at  by  Schiff  in  his  experi- 
ments on  dogs.   He  placed  thermo-electric  needles  on 
the  scalps  of  dogs;  the  sensations  of  the  animals  were 
then  tested  with  different  kinds  of  stimuli.  It  was  found 
that  whenever  die  itmiulus  was  ^ven  and  the  senMtioa 
experienced,  that  a  chanfe  was  at  once  manifested  in  the 
cerebral  and  motor  processes  which  was  indicated  by  the 
deflection  of  the  galvanometer.  When  the  dog  was  lying 
motionless  and  a  rolled  up  piece  of  paper  was  given  to 
him,  the  galvanic  detection  was  small,  when,  however,  a 
piece  of  meat  was  brought  near  the  dog,  the  defftrtwn 
became  considerable.    Galvanometric  deflections  oott> 
comitant  with  psychomotor  activities  htem  alto  bMtt 
shown  in  the  case  of  human  subjects. 

The  ponograph  is  well  adapted  to  demonstrate 
in  a  striking  way  to  tiM  doubting  layman  the  in- 
timate rdarioo  of  pliyacal  aad  mntal  phenom- 
ena. The  subject  is  put  on  table,  whidi  is  so 
delicately  balanced  that  at  the  slightest  alteration  in  the 
distribution  of  the  weight  of  the  subject,  it  tilts.  Now 
it  ii  found  that  when  the  subject  is  spoken  to,  or  when 
making  tome  intrikctual  effort,  tht  taUe  at  oMt  tiito, 


7i        Nmrmd  md  dhmmd  Pt^Mogf 


pombly  becMMe  of  die  inert  wed  blood  supply  to  the 
brain  and  more  etpeciilly  on  ucamA  of  ciM  mofior  im> 

tioiu.  Pneumographic,  pletfaysmc^praphiCt  ctratido* 
graphic,  cardiograpliic,  automatographic,  ponograirfiic, 
and  ergographic  tracings  show  physiological  changes 
"wmmtttnt  with  the  slightest  modification  of  psychic 
proccMN.  As  simfde  an  TT'niiiniir  as  the  sphygmo* 
graph  can  demomtrate  the  same  truth.  A  sphygmugram 
taken  under  mental  activity  diieit  ffom  dH  one  tf^fit 
under  mental  repose. 

All  these  facts,  and  many  more  could  be  adduced 
to  establish  on  a  firm  ba^  the  psycho-physiological 
hypothesis  that  psychic  pheoomena  are  aecompanied 
with  physiological  or  physical  processes.  The  whole  of 
recent  psycho-physiological  research  work  is  based  on 
the  hypothesis  that  there  is  no  psychosis  without  neu- 
rosM.  The  two  tnre  concomitant.  Psycluc  and  physical 
phenomena  go  hand  m  hand,  the  two  processes  rum 
parallel  to  each  other.  Thus  we  find  that  psycho*phys^ 
ological  parallelism  is  a  strictly  scientific  hypothesis. 

The  psychic  and  physiological  series  of  changes 
are  concomitant,  parallel,  but  they  do  not  stand  to  each 
other  in  relarifm  of  antecedent  and  consequent,  they  are 
not  causally  related.  I  take  here  the  opportunity  of 
emphasizing  the  non-causal  relation  of  mental  and  phys> 
iological  processes.  It  is  usually  taken  for  granted  by 
many  medical  men,  and  even  by  some  scientists,  neurol- 
ogists, physiologists,  biologists,  wito  do  not  happen  to 
think  out  clearly  the  more  theoretiod  aspects  of  their 
investigations,  that  brain  processes  are  die  dirett  cause 
of  mental  phenomena  and  that  psychology  therefore  is 
nothing  but  a  chapter  in  physiology.  Study  ths  brain 
and  you  wiU  know  all  about  psychic  life.  This  view  is 


certainlj  falladoot.  A  pf^chic  f act  ••  we  have  pointed 
OBt «  fMiiei%  diinwtt,  dUhiwk  k  UmI  from  •  phft. 
ical,  nwriiamwl  iMt  Okw  caMMt,  tlierefofe,  girt  me 

to  the  odier. 

The  reason  why  it  is  thought  that  physical  processes 
give  rise  to  mental,  lies  in  the  fallacious  analc^  taken 
ftttt  tht  kw  of  convertibility  and  equivalence  of  energy 
m  tlie  acthrity  of  plijfHcd  pRNBiMi.  HMt^ 
can  be  converted  into  electricity,  electricity  kto  lnagne^ 
ism,  magnetism  into  motion,  motion  into  sound  or  Hg^, 
and  the  same  may  be  done  in  reverse  order;  the  energy 
of  physiological  processes  therefore  is  converted  into 
mental,  or  psychic  energy.  The  whole  reasoning  is 
wrong.  We  must  remember  tkrt  wkit  wnifriitt  all'^  * 
these  different  physical  phenomena  is  varioM  forms  of 
molecular  and  molar  motion,  and  when  one  order  of 
physical  phenomena  passes  into  another,  it  is  after  all 
cmly  the  transformation  of  one  form  of  motion  into 
aaodier  fbim.  Quite  diiennt  b  it  k  the  case  of  the 
phenomena  of  conedousneas.  The  activity  of  comooim- 
ness  is  not  a  form  of  motion,  and  the  two  dierefore, 
cannot  be  converted  into  each  other.  Mental  activity 
is  but  figuratively  termed  energy,  just  as  a  well  reasoned 
argmaent  may  be  characterized  as  clear  and  lucid,  but 
it  does  not  mean  tkit  om  can  see  a  candle  diking 
through  it.  The  energy  of  mental  phenomena  is  as 
much  the  energy  of  physical  and  physiological  sciences 
as  the  idea  of  a  brick  is  a  brick  itself  and  made  of 
day. 

Fiiftheiiuoie,  were  it  poi^^  that  a  physioloipcal 
process  should  be  converted  into  a  mental  prooese,  the 
law  of  conservation  of  energy  would  have  to  be  given 
up,  and  along  with  it  the  whole  edifice  of  modem  acieaoe 


MICROCOPY  RESOLUTION  TEST  CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


A   APPUEU  IIVHGE  he 


16S}  East  Main  Strxt 

Rochester.  Ne«  rork      14609  USA 

(716)  482  -  0300  -  Ffion* 

(716)  288  -  5989  -  Fo« 


8o 


Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


would  tumble  to  the  ground.  For  according  to  the  hw 
of  conservation  of  energy  no  physical  energy  can  pos- 
sibly be  lost.  One  form  of  energy  may  pass  into  another, 
but  the  physical  energy  which  is  some  fonn  of  motion, 
molar,  molecular,  atomic,  ionic  or  electronic  aumot  be 
lost,  that  is,  there  must  always  be  so  much  motion,  no 
matter  under  what  form  it  may  appear.  Now  on  the 
one  hand,  were  it  possible  that  a  physiological  process, 
which  is  nothing  but  a  form  of  physical  energy,  could 
pass  into  a  psychic  state,  which  is  no  motion  at  all,  we 
would  really  have  a  loss  of  energy.  Were  it  on  the 
other  hand  possible  that  a  menul  or  psychic  process 
should  pass  into  a  physiological  process,  we  would  have 
had  new  energy  generated,  energy  that  is  not  a  trans- 
formation of  some  previous  existing  energy,  or  physical 
activity. 

If  mental  and  physiological  processes  were  to 
stand  to  each  other  in  relation  of  antecedent  and  conse- 
quent, in  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  we  would  have  had 
with  each  beat  of  consciousness  a  new  creation  of  physi- 
cal energy  and  a  Iom  of  it  with  eachoerebral process.  This 
would  be  sufficient  to  undermme  the  bttit  of  science,  and 
practically  we  might  have  had  good  hopes  that  m  the 
near  future  our  steam  engines  would  be  run  by  good 
intentions  and  windmills  by  aesthetic  feelings. 

Psychic  and  physiological  series  are  no  doubt  inti- 
mttely  related,  but  their  relation  it  not  causal,  they  do 
not  stand  to  each  other  in  reltdon  of  mvaritlile  mh- 
cession  characteristic  of  cause  and  effect,  but  ta  that 
of  co-existence.  The  two  series  of  processes  are 
concomitant,  they  run  parallel  to  each  other,  but 
neither  is  the  cause  of  the  other.  A  change  in 
the  one  means  also  a  simultaneous,  concomitant  mod- 


Imdiuiive  Basis  of  Psychohpcd  HyfoiMt    S I 

ification  m  the  other.  In  other  ironb,  every  pcyduc 
change  must  have  its  physiological  coocoinitant,  and 

vice  versa,  every  physiological  process  may  have  its 
psychic  accompaniment.  This  hypothesis  of  psycho- 
physical parallelism  is  at  the  basis  of  all  modern  psycho* 
physiological,  neurological,  and  psycho-patholo^cal  in- 
vestigaticnM,  inasmudi  as  it  is  taken  for  granted  diat  for 
every  manifested  lensori-motor  or  ideo^notor  "symp- 
tom" there  must  be  present  term  for  term  some  physio- 
logical process.  Psychology  takes  the  same  view  and  ac- 
cepts the  same  hypothesis;  it  does  not  trouble  itself 
in  the  least  widi  the  philosophical  problem  as  to  iHiedier 
the  two  series  of  {rfMsnomoia,  die  mental  and  die  frftya* 
ical,  have  behind  them  separate  substances,  or  whedier 
they  are  but  two  different  aspects  of  the  same 
thing.  This  belongs  to  metaphysics.  The  psycho-phys- 
iological theory  like  all  other  scientific  hypotheses  has 
nodung  to  do  widi  metaphysical  tubttrata,  Imt  dealt 
only  with  facts  and  dieu:  reladom. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


THE  DEDUCTIVE  BASIS  OF  THE  POSITIVE  PSYCHOLOGICAL 

HYPOTHESIS 

THE  concept  of  causality  cannot  be  worked  in 
psychology  in  the  same  way  as  it  car  be  done 
in  the  physical  science.  The  circle  of  physical 
processct  is  complete  in  ittelf.  A  physical 
process  without  ceuing  to  be  physical  can  be  traced 
endlessly  in  the  past  or  future,  all  the  links  of  the  endless 
process  must  all  be  physical  in  their  nature.  For  if  we 
permit  in  the  endless  chain  of  links  of  the  physical  pro- 
CMS  any  other  but  physical  links  to  be  interpolated,  all 
the  physical  sdencet  must  fall  to  the  ground,  since  at  any 
stage  we  may  get  hold  of  a  process  of  which  the  antece- 
dent  link  is  not  of  a  physical  nature.  In  short,  the  postu- 
late that  forms  the  basis  of  physical  science  is  that  the 
antecedent  and  consequent  of  a  physical  process  taken 
at  any  stage  of  the  process  are  physical  in  their  nature. 
This  is  the  principle  of  continuity.  The  whole  edifice 
of  the  physical  sciences  is  based  on  this  principle. 

If  we  now  turn  to  psychology,  we  find  that  it  cannot 
be  based  on  a  postulate  of  similar  character.  Psychol- 
ogy cannot  possibly  work  on  the  assumption  that  the 
processes  it  deak  with  can  be  traced  endlessly  in  either 
direction,  past,  or  future.  UnlUce  the  physical,  the 
psychic  process  is  finite  and  final,--it  hat  a  begimiing  and 
an  end,  it  begins  with  a  purpose,  conscious,  subconscious, 
or  unconscious,  and  ends  with  an  adjustment.  The 
psychic  process  begins  as  a  sensation,  and  its  complete 


Deductive  Basis  of  Psycholopcal  Hypothesis  83 

cycle  runs  its  course  as  an  idea  and  then  ends  in  a  voli< 
tion  to  act.  The  stimulus  marking  the  be^nning  of  the 
psychic  process  and  the  act  marking  the  end  of  the  pro- 
cess are  physical  links  of  a  continuous  physical  process, 
the  links  of  which  can  be  traced  endlessly  in  physical 
terms. 

Taking  the  psychic  process  from  the  ontogenetic 
standpoint,  we  find  again  the  same  thing.  If  the  psychic 
life  of  the  individual  is  taken  as  a  whole  and  traced  back- 
ward, la  the  past,  we  arrive  at  some  point,  when  the 
stream  of  amscioumess  begim,  and  on  fdlowing  it 
forward,  we  finally  arrive  at  a  point  where  the  stream 
of  consciousness  ends.  If  we  view  the  question  phylo- 
genetically,  we  come  once  more  to  the  same  conclusion. 
In  the  history  of  biological  evolution  there  was  a  time 
when  psydiic  life  began,  and  diere  will  cmne  a  time  when 
all  psychic  life  will  disappear  from  our  ^obe.  The 
principle  of  continuity,  the  warp  and  woof  of  physical 
science,  cannot  be  worked  in  psychology,  instead  of  it  we 
can  only  discover  a  principle  of  finiteness  and  finality. 

In  a  physical  process  any  link  taken  at  random  must 
have  a  physical  antecedent  and  ccmsequeut;  not  so  is  it 
in  a  psychic  process,  not  eadi  link  of  the  series  hM  hi 
psychic  antecedent  and  consequent,  the  first  link  has  no 
antecedent  and  the  last  one  has  no  consequent.  The 
phenomena  of  sleep,  of  hypnosis,  of  amnesia,  of  uncon- 
sciousness, o  syncope  show  that  the  psychic  process 
may  be  cut  short  anywhere  in  its  coarse,  and  rnvf  re- 
sume its  flow  from  any  given  link  or  stage.  The  links 
that  go  to  form  the  psychic  process  hang  loosely,  and 
any  link  may  really  be  without  an  antecedent  or  widuMit 
a  consequent. 

In  many  cases   the   seemingly   lost  antecedent 


84        Ncfwtd  Md  dhmtrmd  FsfMogy 


can  m31  be  loand  in  die  tubconsciout,  dissodated 
from  the  active  stream  of  conadonmeai  coatUtuUng  for 

the  time  being  the  conscious  personality  or  the  self-con- 
sciousness of  the  subject,  such  for  instance  is  die  case  in 
the  many  forms  of  functional  psychopathic  diseases  and 
also  in  hypnosis.  In  other  cases,  such  for  instance,  as 
unconsdousnen  of  epilepsy,  the  stream  of  consciousness 
is  interrupted  and  returned  <mly  after  a  certain  period  of 
time,  not  even  the  subconsdon*  can  wpi^  m  die 
missing  link.  In  normal  sleep  we  meet  once  more  with 
an  interruption  of  the  current  of  consdousness,  and  it  is 
rnily  under  certain  conditions,  such  as  dreaming,  that  the 
subconsdout  can  supply  the  missing  states.  Each  psychic 
process  is  like  the  life  process  of  a  given  individual,  it 
has  a  definite  beginning  and  a  definite  end;  while  a 
physical  process  has  neither  beginning  nor  end,  and  can 
be  followed  out  endlessly  in  the  direction  of  the  line  of 
antecedents  or  oomequents.  In  other  words  while  a 
physical  process  is  hfhiitg,  it  psychic  process  is  fhutt. 

Let  P  be  a  physical  process  and  p  represmt  a  fink  in 
that  process,  then  p*,  p",  p»",  etc.,  may  be  represented 
as  its  consequents,  while  p.,  p.,  p.,  p.,  etc.,  may  be  rep- 
resented as  its  antecedents.  P  die  -fore  may  be  repre- 
sented by  the  following  infinite  series  s 

 +p.+prl-pi+p.+  (p)H-pM-piH-pi  M-p»»»H-  

The  series  is  infinite  in  both  directions,  in  direction  of 
p>  antecedents,  and  in  the  direction  of  p*  consequents. 

Let  S  reprssent  a  psychic  process,  s  a  link  in  that  pro* 
cess,  s*  s"  s"*  s""  etc.,  its  consequents  and  Sh  s^  s^  si, 
etc.,  its  antecedents,  then  the  psydiic  procMS  can  be  np> 
refented  b^  the  following  series ; 


Dtiuethg  Emit  of  Psychohgiaa  HfpoiMs  t| 

S=  +84+SW-8H-8.+  (s)  Xs'  I  s"  I      i  +  

Now  this  scries  is  finite,  it  begins  at  some  link  and  ends 
with  tonie  link,  neidier  the  beginning  nor  the  end  is  de- 
fined,— the  series  may  begin  at  any  link  and  end  at  any 
link.  Since  the  procett  may  begin  anywhere  in  the  series, 

there  is  really  no  necessary  connection  between  the  links 
of  the  series.  In  the  physical  process  on  the  contrary, 
the  series  is  infinite,  and  any  link  has  a  determinate 
necessarily  given  preceding  rtnd  succeeding  link.  In 
other  words,  while  the  links  of  the  pfayncal  process  are 
necessarily  causally  connected,  the  lidcs  of  the  psychic 
process  have  no  causal  necessity. 

Since  the  two  processes,  the  physical  and  the  psychic 
are  postulated  to  run  parallel  to  each  other,  their  co-or- 
dination may  be  represented  in  the  following  series: 

S.......  -|-8rHsH-s.+(s)+sN-s^..,..,.. 

II   

P  +prfprf  prf  p.+  (  p)+pM-p"+p"H-p»^»+  

Each  link  of  the  psychic  process  has  some  link  of  the 
physical  process  as  its  concomitant. 

i  has  ^,  •s— IN  s^— p*,  s"— p". 

The  psychic  froctss  not  having  its  links  cmtsMy  con- 
nected, the  causal  necessity  can  only  be  followed  ahng  Us 
concomitant  physical  or  physiological  series.  Hence  we 
can  see  why  the  physiological  series  is  indispensable  to 
the  psychic  series. 

Tin  finitenen  of  the  psydiic  process  makes  it  impos- 
sible to  apply  to  it  the  principle  of  necessity.  For  while 
a  phyuod  process  must  necessarily  have  a  phyrical  an- 


86 


Normsl  md  Jknormsl  Psychology 


tecedent  and  physical  consequent,  a  psychic  process  and 
each  liidc  of  it  does  not  necessarily  have  an  antecedent 
or  comequent,  it  may  hegin  and  end  at  any  link. 

It  is  only  by  means  of  the  physical  or  phymlogical 
scries  that  the  principles  of  continuity  and  necessary 
causal  connection,  the  foundation  of  all  objective  science, 
can  be  worked  in  psychology.  Without  the  help  of  the 
concomitant  physiological  series  the  inv  igator  of  the 
psychic  process  it,  tdcntilically  couiif' t  ^  completely 
helpless,  since  the  psychic  proceat  no  objectively 
necessary  causal  interconnection. 

The  "Voluntaristic"  school  in  attempting  to  make  of 
psychology  a  science  independent  of  all  physiology  is 
futtdamentally  wrong.  Without  the  physiological  set 
psychology  has  no  cement  to  fatten  iti  material  with,  it 
has  no  foundation  to  build  on.  Fsydiology  can  main- 
tain itself  in  the  work  of  objective  natural  sciences  only 
on  condition  of  its  intimate  interdependence  with  physi- 
ologyi  No  psychology  without  physiology.  The  psy- 
cho-physiological hypothetb  is  both  inductively  and  de- 
dncdvdy  the  «m#  ^im  mom  of  the  aaence  of  ptychobgy. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


UFS  AND  THX  PfYCHIC  FB0CB8S 

WE  have  pointed  out  that  the  psychic  process 
is  essentially  finite  and  final,  can  we  find  any 
other  process  that  should  be  characterized 
by  the  same  mark  of  finiteness  and  finality? 
We  find  an  analogous  process  in  life.  The  life  process 
is  one  that  has  the  aspect  of  finiteness.  Ontogenetically, 
the  life-process  of  an  organism  hat  its  be^nning  in  the 
fertilization  or  stimulation  to  life^vity  of  the  ovum, 
and  has  its  end  in  death.  Phylogcnctictlty,  the  fife  w- 
cess  runs  a  determinate  course.  There  was  a  time  w^en 
geological  conditions  did  not  permit  the  presence  of  life, 
and  there  will  come  a  time  when  life  will  be  extinct 
Ontc^pnetically,  die  btolc^cal  process  it  analogous  to 
the  mental  process.  The  biological  fnocest,  mifike  the 
physit-' -  >m  ess,  is  not  endless ;  it  has  a  definite  begummg 
and  i  :ing  any  stage  of  the  process  as  the  start- 

ing po.  ^  /e  find  that  neither  the  chain  of  antecedents, 
nor  that  of  consequents  can  be  followed  endlessly.  Being 
a  finite  process  we  find  in  it  the  tame  rektioa  we  ditwy- 
ered  in  the  psychic  process,— the  first  term  of  the  tenet 
has  no  antecedent  and  the  last  one  has  no  consequent. 
Furthermore,  the  biological  process,  like  the  psycholog- 
ical one,  may  be  cut  short  at  any  stage,— the  organism  or 
the  protoplasm  may  die  or  be  killed.  It  is  only  mechan- 
ically regarded  that  the  biological  proeeat  can  be  woriced 
into  the  definite  texture  of  physical  tenet. 
The  finitenett  of  the  life  procett  it  e^ecially  miatfett- 

87 


88 


Normal  and  Ahuormal  Psychology 


ed  from  die  point  of  fmtfity.  In  examining  the  chtr- 
ECter  of  living  beings,  in  contradistinction  to  physical 
things,  we  find  a  fundamental  difference  between  the 
two.  The  structure  and  function  of  living  beings  can 
be  regarded  under  the  concept  of  purpose  or  diat  of 
final  causation,  the  purpose  being  the  good,  the  ad- 
vantage, the  utility  of  the  orgaiuan.  Inanimate  things 
cannot  be  regarded  under  the  concept  of  final  causation, 
but  under  that  of  efficient  causation.  The  stone  lying 
yonder  has  no  purpose,  it  has  no  special  advantage  for 
its  material  particles  fnwn  its  particular  posidon.  The 
inner  relations  of  its  parts  and  die  relations  of  its  rarfoce- 
ang^  and  prominences  are  not  of  any  ultimate  good  to 
the  stone,  nor  do  we  ask  of  what  use  is  this  particular  vi- 
bration to  the  molecules.  We  do  ask,  however,  this 
question  of  utility  in  regard  to  organisms.  Of  what  use  is 
the  grazing  or  drinking  to  die  cow?  Of  what  use  is 
diis  particular  organ  and  its  function  to  this  or  dnt 
organism?  The  problem  of  utility  is  one  that  can  only 
be  raised  in  the  case  of  organic  life,  but  not  in  the  case 
of  inorganic  things.  We  can  see  the  reason  why  it 
should  be  so.  Life  may  be  regarded  as  an  adaptation 
of  inner  and  outer  relatims.  Adaptati<m  and  jfitiUM  are 
important  criteria  widi  biolc^cal  processes.  What  tt 
die  fitness,  or  utility  of  oi^ns  and  their  functions  to  the 
particular  organism,  and  how  have  they  come  to  this 
given  state  of  fimess?  These  problems  cannot  be  ig- 
nored by  biology  as  a  science.  The  whole  of  die  Dar- 
winian theory  aims  to  give  the  key  to  the  way  the  differ- 
ent  forms  of  adaptatiom  have  cmne  about.  Adaptation 
and  utility,  however,  mean  aims.  A  biological  process 
is  not  an  endless  series  of  antecedents  and  consequents, 
but  one  that  has  an  end.  A  life  process  is  a  final  pro- 


Lifg  Md  thg  PsyekU  Frocm  19 

cess  taldng  place  m  dK  organtim  ia  its  tnt^^ 

tial  adjustments. 

The  finality  of  the  life  process  is  clearly  brought  out, 
if  looked  at  from  a  totally  different  point  of  view.  The 
most  characteristic  feature  of  a  living  organism,  is  its 
being  an  organic  whole,  a  unity,  an  individuality.  All 
the  parts  of  the  organiim  bear  relation  to  and  have  their 
significance  with  regard  to  the  organism  as  a  wilole.  The 
fin  of  the  fish,  the  wing  of  the  bird,  and  the  arm  of  the 
man  cease  to  be  what  they  are,  if  separated  from  the 
particular  individual  to  which  they  respectively  belong. 
The  structure  and  function  of  the  part  can  be  under- 
stood only  in  relation  to  the  needs  of  the  organic  whole. 
The  parts  of  the  individual  subserve  the  organic  unity. 
In  the  course  of  evolution,  both  ontogenetic  and  phylo- 
genetic,  parts  may  arise  or  drop  out  for  the  benefit  and 
advantage  of  the  whole.    Mechanically  considered,  an 
organism  is  nothing  but  a  heap  of  vibrating  molecules 
or  atoms;  biologically  regarded,  tUs  kesf  eonsHtutts  a 
whole,  an  individual,  and  each  vibration  is  for  the  good 
of  this  whole,  if  the  individual  is  to  maintaia  itself  in 
existence. 

It  may  be  objected  that  a  machine,  though  purely  me- 
chanical, may  be  simihrly  defined.  A  machine  coniti- 
tues  a  whole,  a  unity,  and  every  part  bears  a  de&iite  re- 
lation  to  the  whole,  and  cannot  in  fact  be  understood 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  machine  as  a  whole.  Who, 
without  knowing  a  watch  as  a  whole,  could  have  guessed 
the  function  of  a  particukr  wheel  or  spring,  if  shown 
by  itself?  Eadi  part  within  a  mechanim  has  tti  dis- 
tlnctive  character  only  in  relation  to  the  other  parts 
forming  an  interrelated  system.  Should  this  be  granted, 
in  what  sense,  then,  it  may  be  asked,  does  an  organiim 


90         Normsl^  and  AbHormsl  Psyekohgy 

<fiier  ftmn  a  medumnm?  Muse  not  then  a  Imdogkal 
process  be,  after  all,  reduced  to  mechanical  terms;  and 
if  this  be  so,  is  not  rather  the  opposite  statement  the  cor- 
rect one,  namely,  that  a  biological  process  does  not 
really  differ  from  a  physical  process?  This,  however, 
is  not  so.  The  diilerrace  between  the  two  is  a  funda- 
mental one.  The  unity  of  the  mechanism  does  not  lie 
in  the  machine  per  se,  but  in  the  needs  and  mind  of  the 
mechanician,  while  the  organic  unity  is  postulated  as  be- 
ing in  the  organism  itself.  The  purpose  of  the  machine 
does  not  lie  in  die  machine  itself,  but  in  needs  outside 
itself;  no  machine  exists,  for  its  own  advantage  and 
good,  from  its  vtry  nature  a  madiine  is  for  somedhmg 
dse. 

An  organism,  on  the  contrary,  constitutes  its  own 
purpcie.  No  organism  in  nature,  not  as  yet  modified 
by  artificial  selection,  exists  entirely  for  the  good  of 
anoAer.  The  structure  and  functions  of  die  parts  of 
an  organism  are  for  the  good  and  advantage  of  that 
particular  individual.  Unlike  a  machine,  the  purpose 
falls  not  outside,  hut  inside  the  organism.  An  organ- 
ism forms  a  closed  circle,  a  microcosm,  to  irf^^  die 
macrocosm  is  made  subsennef^  Eadi  orgaiusm  ts  a 
centre  from  which  rays  radiate  to  all  the  points  of  the 
universe;  in  other  words,  an  organism  is  an  end  for 
which  everything  else  is  nothing  but  a  means.  Darwin 
was  so  much  impressed  with  this  teleological  aspect  of 
organic  life  that  he  frankly  admitted  that,  if  only  one 
example  in  a  natural  rtate  cmild  be  product,  an  cxm- 
ple  of  an  organism  blowing  structure  and  function  use* 
ful  not  to  itself,  but  to  another  organism,  his  whole 
theory  of  evolution  would  fall  to  the  ground.  A  mech- 
anism is  a  means,  never  an  end;  an  organism  is  an  end, 


Lift  4md  tkt  FsydUe  Pntm 


ntvtr  mmtmu, 

A  biological  proceM  b  funte,  it  hat  a  definite  b^in. 
ning  and  end;  it  is  also  final,  inasmuch  as  it  is  mpprnJ 
to  be  of  some  use  to  the  organism  in  which  the  process 
takes  place.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the 
biological  process  cannot  be  looked  at  from  a  purely  ?- 
chanical  standpobt.  Every  object,  every  external  ob- 
jective process  can  b^;  looked  at  from  the  point  of  view 
of  pure  mechanism,  where  the  series  of  antecedents  and 
consequents  is  infinite,  where  only  atoms  and  their  move- 
"I^^J^ve  supreme  sway-  but  while  some  objects  and 
prooesaet  admit  only  of  this  standpoint,  others  admit 
aUo  of  another  point  of  view,  namely  the  teleological 
ui  which  the  leading  principles  are  unity,  tyntfaeait,  and 
porpoie. 

Biological  processes  certainly  admit  of  mechanical 
treatment,  they  can  be  worked  into  the  infinite  series 
of  mechanical  causes  and  effect,  but,  dien,  these 
processes  so  regarded,  are  amply  mechanical  and  ce?-e 
to  be  biological.    Life  b  regarded  under  a  te! 
logical    aspect.    Science   need   not   neccss;'rily  ^c 
entirely  mechanical,   it  may  abo  deal  with  pur- 
poses,  not  self-conscious,  not  evrr.   consci.  hut 
still  with  purposes,  which  on  account  -A  their  noi  being 
conscioua  are  to  be  tre&ted  according  to  the  prtndpk  of 
efficient  causation.    Such  is  the  method  of  Darwin,  in 
opposition  to  that  of  Lamarck.    The  purpoaive  life 
processes  are  treated  by  Darwin  on  the  principle  of 
efficient  causation. 

They  who  want  to  reduce  biology  to  mechanism 
should  refiect  on  the  meaning  of  evohition.  From  a 
mechanical  standpoint,  evolution,~-thc  basis  of  biology, 
is  meaningless.  Mokcuka,  atoma  and  their  vflirationa 


9* 


Normal  and  Ahnormd  Psytkology 


can  have  neither  lower  nor  higher  stages,  they  are  all 
on  the  same  plane,  following  ths  same  laws  from  all 
eternity. 

If  from  our  long  digrejstmi  on  the  nature  of  the  bio- 
logical process,  we  now  return  to  the  subject  under  dis- 
cussion, namely,  the  psychological  process,  we  can  re- 
alize clearly  the  point  of  view  from  which  psychic  life 
should  be  regarded.  The  psychic  process  is  primarily 
a  life  process. 

Since  the  life-process  is  regarded  under  a  teleological 
aspect,  it  follows  that  the  psychic  process  should  be 
treated  in  the  same  way.  The  psychic  process  is  the 
highest  stage  in  the  evolution  of  life,  and  as  such  should 
be  studied  not  by  the  instruments  of  mechanics  and 
chemistry,  but  by  the  methods  of  biology.  In  addition 
to  the  concept  of  efficient  causation,  psychology  even 
more  than  biology,  should  also  work  with  the  concepts 
of  unity,  synthesis,  and  purpose. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  CHANCE  ASPECT  OF  LIFE  AND  MIND 

THE  teleology  of  the  biological  process  should, 
however,  be  somewhat  limited.  We  arc  apt 
to  overestimate  the  utility  of  organs  and 
functioiis  in  the  world  of  living  beings.  There 
may  be  organs  which  are  of  no  use  to  the  organism,  uid 
there  may  be  functions  which  are  indifferent  and  even 
positively  harmful  to  life.  It  is  questionable  whether 
the  thymus  gland,  the  tonsils,  the  appendix  are  of  any 
use  to  man,  and  it  is  quite  certain  that  a  number  of 
physiological  processes  take  place  in  the  organism  which 
are  indifferent  and  even  detrimental  to  the  life  existence 
of  the  individual. 

"In  every  organism"  says  Morgan,  "there  are  parts 
of  the  body  whose  processes  cannot  be  of  vital  import- 
ance to  the  individual.  The  rudimentary  organs,  so 
called,  fumith  many  examples  of  stnicturei  whote 
presence  may  be  of  little  or  of  no  use  to  the  individual; 
in  fact  as  in  the  case  of  the  appendix  of  man  the  or- 
gans may  be  a  source  of  great  danger  to  the  individual. 

.  .  .  Another  example  of  the  same  thing  is 
found  in  the  rudimentary  eyes  of  animals  living  in  die 
dark,  such  as  the  mole  and  several  cave  animals,  fishes, 
amphibia,  and  insects.  There  are  still  other  organs 
which  cannot  be  looked  upon  as  rudimentary,  yet  whose 
presence  can  scarcely  be  considered  as  essential  to  the 
life  of  the  individual.  For  instance,  the  electric  organs 
in  some  of  the  rays  and  fish  can  hardly  protect  the  ani- 

93 


94         Normml  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

mal  from  enemies,  even  when  as  highly  developed  as 
in  the  torpedo;  and  we  do  not  know  of  any  other 
essential  service  they  can  perform.  Whether  the  same 
may  also  be  said  of  the  i^osphorescoit  organs  of 
many  animals  is  perhaps  open  in  some  cases  to  doubt, 
but  there  can  be  little  question  that  the  light  produced 
by  most  of  the  small  marine  organisms,  such  as  noctilica, 
jellyfish,  ctenophores,  copepods,  pyrosoma,  etc.,  can- 
not be  of  use  to  these  animak  in  protecting  diem  from 
attack.  In  the  case  of  certain  bacteria  it  seems  quite 
evident  that  the  production  of  light  can  be  of  no  use 
as  such  to  them.  The  production  of  light  may  be  only 
a  sort  of  by-product  of  changes  going  on  in  the  organ- 
ism, and  has  no  relation  to  outside  conditions.  In  cer- 
tain cases,  as  in  the  ^owwoim,  it  has  been  supposed 
that  the  display  may  serve  to  bring  the  sexes  together; 
but  since  the  phosphorescent  organs  are  also  present  in 
the  larval  stages  of  the  glowworm,  and  since  even  the 
egg  itself  is  said  to  be  phosphorescent,  it  is  improbable, 
in  these  stages  at  least,  that  the  presence  of  the  light  is 
of  service  to  the  organism. 

While  it  is  difficult  to  show  that  the  wonderful  pat- 
terns and  magnificent  coloration  of  many  of  the  larger 
animals  are  not  of  service  to  the  animal,  however  scep- 
tical we  may  be  on  the  subject,  yet  in  the  case  of  many 
microscopic  forms  that  are  equally  brilliantly  ctAond 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  coloration  can  be  of  no 
special  service  to  them.  We  also  see  in  other  cases  that 
the  presence  of  color  need  not  be  connected  with  any 
use  that  it  bears  as  such  to  the  animal.  For  instance,  the 
beautiful  colors  on  the  inside  of  the  shells  of  many 
marine  snails  and  of  bivalve  moUusks,  can  be  of  no  we 
to  the  animal  that  makes  the  shell,  because  as  hug  as 


Tki  Chalice  Aspect  of  Life  and  Mind 


the  animal  it  alive  this  color  cannot  be  seen  from  the 
outside.  .  .  .  The  splendid  coloring  of  the  leaves 
in  autmin  is  certainly  of  no  service  to  the  organism. 

As  an  exampk  of  «  dunge  in  the  organism  that  is  of 
no  use  to  it  may  be  cited  the  case  of  the  taming  white  of 
the  hair  in  old  age  in  man  and  in  several  other  mam- 
mals. The  absorption  of  bone  at  the  angle  of  the  chin 
in  man  is  another  case  of  a  change  of  no  immediate  use 
to  the  individtiaL  We  also  find  in  many  other  changes 
that  accompany  old  age,  processes  going  on  that  are  of 
no  use  to  the  organism,  and  which  may  m  the  end  be 
the  cause  of  its  death." 

We  cannot  help  agreeing  with  Morgan  that  the  tele- 
ology of  the  biological  process  is  not  always  evident. 
A  nnmber  of  processes  in  the  world  of  life  are 
indifferent,  useless,  and  even  detrimental  to  the  life 
existence  of  the  organism.  All  the  biological  pro- 
cesses  that  lead  to  the  decline  of  the  organism  are  cer- 
tainly not  useful  to  the  individual;  neither  are  all 
the  processes  of  a  pathological  character  to  which 
organisms  are  often  subjected  in  their  relations  with 
and  adaptation  to  the  external  emriraamcnt.  There 
is  certainly  no  more  flimsy,  more  superficial,  and  meie 
specious  reasoning  than  the  one  that  ascribes  a  meanmg, 
utility,  and  purpose  to  every  organ,  function,  and  physio- 
logical process  found  in  the  organism.  The  teleological 
specidations  are  often  a  matter  of  ingenious  casuistry. 

The  evolutionitt  who  works  with  the  teleofogical  con- 
cept of  utility  must  assume  spontaneous  variation  as  an 
important  factor  in  the  development  of  life.  In  other 
words,  out  of  a  great  number  of  many  variations,  harm- 
ful, indiferent,  and  useful,  the  ones  that  are  usetul  in 
tfaair  adaptation  to  the  external  •nvironment  survive 


96         Normal  and  AbnonuU  Psychology 

or  are  selected  by  the  i»rocm  of  natnnl  idect^  Thb 
clearly  requires  the   pretence  of   t  gieat  ninnber 

of  variations  which  show  no  adaptations  and  therefore 
are  not  useful.  The  utility  and  adaptation  manifested 
by  the  biological  processes  arc  due  to  the  presence  of 
an  inunoise  number  of  variations  of  biological  processes 
which  are  ineless,  indifferent,  and  even  harmful. 

The  struggle  for  existence  with  its  survival  of  the  fit- 
test and  the  principle  of  spontaneous  variations  clearly 
indicate  the  presence  of  biological  processes  which  are 
essentially  purposeless.  The  theory  of  evolution,  at  least 
from  a  Darwinian  standpoint,  the  most  scientific  of 
evolutionary  hypotheses,  is  based  on  the  empirical  as- 
sumption that  the  unadapted  variations  far  exceed  in 
number  the  adapted  or  useful  variations.  Useful  pur- 
posive biological  processes  are  rare,  few,  and  accidental, 
while  the  indifferent,  the  useless  and  the  purposeless 
biological  processes  are  by  far  the  most  common.  The 
imrposive  processes  are  the  accidental  and  die  excep- 
tional, while  the  purposeless  processes  are  die  rule.  It  it 
out  of  the  purposeless  that  the  purposive  processes  de- 
velop.  The  fully  developed  biological  proceas,  the  fully 
developed  organism  is  purposeful,  because  of  its  selec- 
tion of  the  purposeful  out  of  the  great  mast  of  purpose- 
less biological  processes  and  unadapted  organitmt. 

In  the  psychological  process  a  similar  state  prevails. 
The  general  outcome  may  have  purpose,  but  this  is  ac- 
complished at  the  expense  of  a  great  number  of  pro- 
cettes  which  are  accidental,  meaningless,  and  purpose- 
len.  The  sensatiom,  feelingi,  emodcmt,  and  idett 
that  arise  in  our  consciotunett  are  tpontaneous  or 
accidental  variations.  They  are  the  raw  material  for 
the  guiding  selective  consciousness.   Many  of  the  pty- 


TluCluuugJsputoflJftmdMimd  97 

chic  states  as  they  arise  in  consciousness  are  rejected  by 
the  selective  action  of  attention  and  are  left  to  die  a 
natond  death  at  are  the  rejected  variatioiit  by  the  pro- 
cess of  natural  selection.  Man  would  have  been  a  rav- 
ing maniac,  if  he  were  to  give  expression  to  the  vari  jus 
ideas  that  spring  up  spontaneously  in  his  mind.  The 
great  number  of  ideas  that  throng  in  the  antechamber 
of  consdoumess  are  in  themselves  purposeless.  As 
Galton  well  puts  it  "Although  the  brain  is  able  to  do 
very  fair  work  fluently  in  an  automatic  way,  and  though 
it  will  of  its  own  accord,  strike  out  suuden  and  happy 
ideas,  it  is  questionable  if  it  is  capable  of  workmg  thor- 
oughly and  profoundly  without  past  or  present  effort. 
The  character  of  this  effort  seems  to  me  chiefly  to  lie 
in  bringing  the  contents  of  the  antechamber  more  near- 
ly within  the  ken  of  consciousness,  whidi  then  takes  com- 
prehensive note  of  all  its  contents,  and  compels  the  log- 
ical faculty  to  test  them  seriatim  before  selecting  the 
fittest  for  a  summons  to  the  presence  chamber."  In 
another  phce  he  jusdy  remarks:  "The  thronging  of 
the  antechamber  is,  I  am  oonvinoed,  beyond  my  con<tol; 
if  not,  if  the  ideas  do  not  come,  I  cannot  create  them 
nor  compel  them  to  come."  It  is  certainly  UMt  we 
cannot  call  on  our  ideas  to  come  at  our  bidding.  They 
come  and  go  unasked. 

Mental  activity  in  its  rattontl  aspects  whether  it  be 
logical,  moral,  or  aesthetic,  »  essentially  selective  in 
character.  The  logical  process  can  draw  only  definite 
conclusions  from  given  premises,  the  monX  man  or  the 
ethical  thinker  can  only  regard  definite  relations  and 
bdbavim*  as  right  w  wnmg,  and  the  man  who  creates 
utd  enjoys  the  betntiful  can  only  regurd  etrtiin  d^be 
conbtnatioiis  as  bemitiful.  Even  in  ofdiMry  fife  wlwit 


9^         Normd  and  Ahmrmd  Psychology 

the  process  of  selection  is  not  so  rigid  as  in  the  arts, 
sciences,  and  (rfiilosophy,  still  the  process  of  tttentimi  to 
maintain  rationality  is  a  severe  judge  in  the  rejection  of 
the  unfit  ideas.  In  a  train  of  ideas  few  ideas  that  offer 
themselves  are  accepted  as  fit  and  utilized  by  the  guid- 
ing thought.  The  stream  of  consciousness  as  it  rushes 
along  picks  up  objects  that  are  intended  for  and  help 
to  readi  the  destination  set  out.  Every  idea,  every 
thought  as  it  presents  itself  to  the  guiding  process  is 
selected  with  respect  to  the  purpose  of  the  given  stream 
of  thought. 

The  thoughts  that  present  themselves  at  any  one 
moment  arc  meaninglen  and  purposeless,  they  are 
simply  the  accidental  chance  material  which  the  giv- 
en momentary,  purposive  thought  selects  as  fit  in  order 
to  succeed  best  in  the  achievement  of  its  purpose.  The 
ideas  themselves  as  they  present  themselves  are  mean- 
ingless, purposeless,  chance  creations  of  the  brain,  like 
the  i^enomena  of  acddoital  variation.  When  the  se- 
lective process  of  att«iti<^  is  rigid,  more  of  the  chance 
comers  are  rejected  as  not  adapted  for  the  purpose, 
more  of  the  ideas  rising  to  the  antechamber  of  conscious- 
ness from  the  subconscious  regions  are  found  to  be 
purposeliess.  A  Kepler  rejects  a  number  of  generaliza- 
tions before  he  firn^  the  formulae  of  his  laws  diat  an- 
swer his  purpose  in  the  co-ordination  of  his  facts. 

At  the  same  time  different  minds,  like  different  ani- 
mals, differ  in  the  spontaneous  or  accidental  variations 
to  which  they  can  give  rise.  The  dull  mind  has  but  few 
such  variations,  while  the  man  of  genius,  like  the  en- 
dowed animal,  has  a  mass  of  accidental  variatiom  from 
which  to  select  in  the  adaptation  to  the  purpose  of  the 
thou^t.  The  man  of  genius  whether  as  artist  or  thliUcer 


Tk4  Cksmcs  Asptct  of  Ufg  md  Mmd  99 

requires  «  nam  of  acddental  viriationt  to  select  from 
and  a  rigidly  selective  process  of  attention.   A  great 

wealth  of  chance  variation  of  thoughts  to  select  from 
is  the  special  endowment  of  the  man  of  genius. 

When  the  process  of  attention  relaxes  in  the  rigidity 
of  its  selective  activity,  more  chance  images  and  acci- 
dental variations  of  thoughts  are  presented  to  and  ac- 
cepted by  consciousness;  the  selective  thought  does  not 
hold  on  to  its  purpose,  the  stream  of  thought  becomes 
constituted  of  relatively  purposeless  chance  images  and 
accidental  ideas.  Such  states  occur  in  day-reverit»  or  un- 
der the  influence  of  alcohol  and  various  toxins  as  well  as 
in  the  hypnoidal,   hypnagogic,   and  hypnopagogic 
states.    When  the  process  of  attention  beannes  com- 
pletely relaxed  as  in  sleep,  fever,  or  in  the  acute  forms 
of  mental  maladies,  the  chance  images  and  accidental  va- 
riations of  ideas  come  and  go  without  aim  an.'  purpose. 
Purposeless  thought  is  as  much  the  rule  of  mental  life 
as  purposeless  accidental  variations  are  the  rule  of  or- 
ganic life.  Like  the  fully  developed  biological  process, 
the  fully  developed  mental  state  presents  purpose  in  its 
selective  activity.  Purpose,  however,  arises  out  of  chaos, 
out  of  chance  variations.  Our  dreams,  our  unintentional 
errors  in  speedi,  writing  and  action  arc  due  to  the  many 
chance  thoughts  which  either  intrucfe  timnselves  on 
consciousness  in  spite  of  the  selective  rigid  process  of 
attention,  or  are  due  tc  the  momentary  relaxation  of  the 
selective  process.   Chance-thoughts",  meaningless  images 
and  ideas,  like  accidental  variations,  form  one  of  the 
most  important  factors  in  the  evolution  of  purposive 
mental  activity. 

The  so-called  "psycho-analytic  science"  is  erroneous, 
not  only  because  of  its  fallacious  "psychic  caimti<»ii  but 


icw       Noma  mtd  Aknom^  PsfOohgy 

9ho  becante  it  ts  Inted  on  the  falltcy  of  regarding  each 
and  every  mental  state  at  pnrpoaive  in  dharact^.  Thia 
pseudo-psychology  misses  the  fundamental  fact  that 
many  psychic  occurrences  are  like  many  biological  oc- 
currences, mere  chance  variations.  These  chance  varia- 
tions form  the  matrix  out  of  which  the  purposive  psychic 
proccM  arises.  Not  purpose,  but  chamee  is  at  the  heart 
of  mental  life. 


CHAPTER  XVI 


Acnvmr  of  mbntal  un 

THE  popular  mind  regards  came  aa  a  ttraiii- 
ing  agency  which  acts  in  agony  of  labor  on 
^'^sisting  material,  finally  fashioning  it  and 
giving  rise  to  the  effect;  such  a  relation  is 
considered  as  constituting  the  very  essence  of  activity. 
This  anthropomorphic  or  animistic  view  of  cause  and 
effect  must  be  rejected  by  the  scientist  The  cause  does 
not  beget  the  effect  in  labor,  in  strain.   To  conceive 
causes  as  straining  agencies  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
popular  mind  has  a  tendency  to  mythological  creations, 
to  regard  natural  phenomena  as  products  fashioned  by 
living  agencies.   The  common-sense  man  in  fashioning 
his  material  works  with  his  muscles  and  experiences 
muscular  sensation  of  strain,  of  push  and  puU,  hence  in 
regarding  the  changes  in  the  course  of  natural  pro- 
cesses, he  projects  into  them  his  subjective  muscular  ex- 
periences.  Science,  however,  has  succeeded  in  freeing 
itself  from  all  animism,  and  does  not  mvoke  the  will  and 
labor  of  deities  and  spirits  as  the  causes  of  physical  phe- 
nomena, nor  does  it  regard  causes  themselves  as  little 
deities  and  sprites  with  will  and  strain  in  the  produc- 
tion of  effects. 

Objectively  regarded,  what  nature  presents  is  only 
sequences  of  events,  or  phenomena,  and  the  only 
relationship  observed  between  cause  and.  tSeet  is 
simply  one  of  invariable  sequence.  If  of  two  phe- 
nomena one  antecedent  and  the  other  conseqaent,  the 

lOI 


loa       NornuU  Md  Ahmomd  Psychology 


camtrmA  it  imrariaUy  obiervvd  to  depend  in  itt  yvA- 
ation  on  the  tntecedent,  such  an  antecedent  «  dedand 
to  be  the  cause  of  the  consequent.  To  give  an  illustra- 
tion. If  a  stone  falls  from  a  certain  height  on  a  heap 
of  many  layers  of  thin  glass,  the  stone  in  falling  breaks 
the  glass.  We  dedare  the  stone  to  be  the  cause  of 
the  breaking  of  the  glan,  why?  Because  we  obMm 
the  fall  of  the  stone,  and  on  reproducing  the  tame  con- 
ditions, the  same  results  follow;  fall  of  stone,  then 
breaking  of  glass.  Furthermore,  increasing  the  weight 
of  the  stone,  more  layers  of  glass  are  broken,  on  decreas- 
ing the  weight  of  the  stone  less  hyers  are  broken,  vari- 
ations in  the  omsequent  depend  on  the  variations  of  die 
antecedent.  We  may  similarly  change  the  <fistance  frtwn 
which  the  stone  falls,  and  the  effect  will  vary  once  more. 
On  changing  the  material  of  the  stone  the  amount 
of  breakage  will  vary  once  more.  Furthermore,  on 
changing  the  consistency  of  the  ^ass  hyer  the  effect 
will  again  vary.  In  short,  where  the  phenomma 
are  observed  to  stand  to  each  other  in  functional  rela- 
tion of  invariable  sequence,  the  antecedent  is  declared 
to  be  the  cause  of  the  conseqi.  at,  such,  as  in  our  exam- 
ple, die  fall  of  die  stone  is  regarded  as  the  cause  of  the 
breaking  of  the  glass.  What  is  observed  is  simply 
an  invariable  sequence,  so  much  stone  monwntnm, 
so  much  glass  breakage.  No  strain  or  enforcement 
are  ever  observed  between  causes  and  effects.  No 
strain  is  observed  in  the  falling  stone  to  produce 
the  effect,  nor  is  it  ever  detected  dut  the  glass  re- 
sists and  is  forced  into  the  broken  state  by  the  f  ower 
of  the  stone. 

Strain,  resistance,  enforcement,  power,  are  all  states 
drawn  from  experiences  of  our  psychic  life.   As  Mach 


dMty  of  Mtnua  Lift  ,03 

puttk:  'There  U  but  one  «,rt  of  constancy  which 
«II  fonnt  of  constancy,  constancy  of  con- 
nettion  (or  of  rdatioii).  The  majority  of  the  p^^ 
os.tions  of  nitu«l  sdcnce  expim  «ch  coutudtt 
of  connection:  The  tadpole  is  met«»orpho.«l 
a  frog;  chlorate  of  sodium  make,  it.  .p5«nu.ce  ii. 

Bodi«if«U  with  an  acceleration  of  9.81/  When  these 
~nstanaes  are  expre-ed  in  concept,  we  call  them  Uws. 
Force  (m  the  mechanical  significance)  i.  likewiM  meretr 
a  constancy  of  comiections.  When  I  say  that  a  bodr 
^exem  a  force  on  a  body  B,  I  mean  that  B,  on 
conuy  mto  contraposition  with  A,  is  immediately  af- 
fwted.  by  »  certain  acceleration  with  respect  to  A. 
The  singnlar  ilhwon  that  the  rabrtance  A  is  the  ab- 
solutely  constant  vehicle  of  a  force  which  tdce.  ef- 
feet  immediately  on  B's  being  contraposed  to  A  b 

^^•SL  f«  •  ;  •  '^t  P^'""'  'No  matter 
^T?  1    ^  "°  ^''^^^^  '"^^^r''  which  are 

rnn.^-i**'*?  ^^^^  *  ^HCUrrcd 

contradiction  become  wperlluou.  on  onr  recognizing 
only  constancies  of  connection."  * 
Similarly  Karl  Pearson  regards  the  scientific  law  "a. 
a  brief  description  in  mental  short  hand  of  as  wide  a 
range  a.  ponible  of  the  sequences  of  our  sense-impres- 
sion.  •  or  experience..    "If  the  .tone  from  my  Ld 
break  a  wmdow,  Ae  cause  of  the  broken  window  might 
very  lAely  be  spoken  of  as  the  moving  stone.  Rrt 
though  this  usage  is  an  approach  to  the  scientific  usage 

""""i •  'V^  P0P"I"  esti. 

matioo  an  ,dea  of  enforcement  which  is  not  in  the  lat- 

ter.  That  the  stone  moHng  with  t  certain  speed 
brmg  about  the  deMmctiai  of  the  window  i.,  I  think. 


t04       Normal  tmd  Jbnonmsl  Psfckology 


die  idea  involved  ia  diin  speaking  of  die  moving  ttoM 
at  die  came  of  die  breakage.  But  were  our  percepdve 

organs  sufficiently  powerful,  science  conceives  that  we 
should  see  before  the  impact  particles  of  window  and 
particles  of  stone  moving  in  a  certain  manner,  and  after 
the  impact  the  same  particles  moving  in  a  very  different 
maimer.  We  might  carefully  describe  diete  modons, 
but  we  should  be  unable  to  say  why  one  stage  would  fol- 
low another,  just  as  we  can  describe  how  a  stone  falls  to 
the  earth,  but  not  say  why  it  does.  Thus  scientifically 
the  idea  of  necessity  in  the  stages  of  the  sequence — stone 
in  motion,  broken  window— or  the  idea  of  enforcement 
would  disappear;  we  shmild  have  a  routine  of  experi- 
ence. When  we  speak  however  of  the  stage  of  a  se- 
quence in  ordinary  life  as  causes,  I  do  not  think  it  is  be- 
cause we  are  approaching  the  scientific  standpoint,  but 
I  fear  it  arises  from  our  associating,  through  long 
usage  the  idea  of  force  widi  the  stone.  .  .  .  Force 
as  came  of  motkm  is  xactly  cm  die  same  footing  aa  a 
tree  god  as  came  of  growth — ^both  are  but  names  to  lude 
t  -gnorance  of  the  why  in  the  routine  of  our  percep- 
ti  The  necessity  in  a  law  of  nature  has  not  the 
logical  must  of  a  geometrical  theorem,  nor  the  cate- 
gorical must  of  a  human  law-giver;  it  b  merely  cm  ex- 
penence  of  a  routine  whose  stages  have  netdier  tegjcal 
nor  volitional  order.  In  what  we  hare  termed  second- 
ary causes  (successive  stages  of  the  sequence)  science 
finds  no  element  of  enforcement,  solely  the  routine  of 
experience." 

Within  certain  limits  the  psychic  process,  like  the 
I^ysical  process,  may  be  r^ajrded  as  an  activity,  as  a 

series  of  phenomena,  as  a  sequence  of  antecedents  and 
cotts^uents,  or  as  Pearson  puts  it,  as  a  routine  of  experi- 


J€lMty  of  Mtmtd  Lifg  ,05 

ence.  This  activity  of  course  should  not  be  regtrded 
tt « ineuphysical  agency  in  the  sense  0/  a  supersensuous 
'^.^^^  • ''f'^  of  psychic  tveatB.  From 
«  laentific  s^mdpomt  the  phytical  prmcm  it  regarded 
as  a  series  of  successive  physical  events.  SnnOiiriT  the 
psychic  process  may  be  regarded  as  a  series  of  socces- 
sivc  states  consisting  of  psychic  elementm  prcsentttive 
wid  representative. 

FinsI,  and  finite  as  the  psychic  process  is,  it  has  a 
series  of  antecedents  tnd  consequents.  In  so  far  as  these 
can  be  traced,  one  can  keep  within  the  bounds  of  the 
psychic  process  only.  Furthermore,  in  so  far  as  the 
series  of  psychic  antecedents  and  consequents  persists 
we  are  fuUy  justified  in  speaking  of  the  whole  series  as 
a  process,  a  form  of  activity,  m  short  as  mental  activity. 

If  by  activity  is  understood  the  sequence  of  antece. 
de..ts  and  consequents,  the  position  taken  by  some  psv^ 
chologists  in  declaring  the  mental  stream  as  inactive  is 
unacceptable.  There  is  activity  in  the  psychic  process,  if 
by  activityis  meant  not  the  popular  belief  in  actual  bond<: 
between  cause  and  effect,  but  meie  sequence  of  antect- 
dents  and  consequents.    The  only  difference  we  can 
find  between  them  is  the  finality  and  finiteness  as  weU  as 
lack  of  invariable  or  necessary  sequence  of  antecedents 
and  consequents  characteristi  of  the  psychic  process  in 
contradistinction  to  the  infi       series  and  invariable, 
necessary,  or  causal  sequence,  presented  by  the  physical 
process. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


THE  POSTULATES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

WITH  all  Other  sciences  psychology  must 
postulate  the  existence  of  an  external  ma- 
terial world  of  space,  time,  and  objects. 
Psychology  does  not  inquire  into  die  nature 
of  these  objects,  as  to  what  diey  are  in  diemselves.  Hiis 
as  we  pointed  out  is  the  bininess  of  metaphyncs,  not  of 
science.  Psychology  however  does  ask  how  we  come  to 
know  the  outside  world ;  it  inquires  as  to  the  process  by 
which  external  reality  comes  to  be  presented  in  con- 
sciousness. 

The  fact  that  psychology  postulates  an  external  ma^ 

terial  world  and  studies  it  in  so  far  as  it  comes  to  be 
reflected  in  consciousness,  points  to  another  postulate 
which  psychology  must  assume  in  addition,  namely,  the 
existence  of  an  inner  world  consciousness.  This  postu- 
late is  peculiar  to  psychology,  no  odier  of  tiw  descrip- 
tive and  objective  sciences  have  to  assume  it.  Although 
it  is  quite  clear  that  without  mind  there  can  possibly 
be  no  study,  no  scjence,  still  this  is  but  an  indirect  reflec- 
tion whi.h  none  of  the  concrete  sciences  have  to  take 
into  consideration.  Of  course,  a  chemist  is  required 
for  chemistry,  a  physicist  for  physics,  a  physiologist 
for  physiology,  and  so  on,  but  the  chemist,  the  physicist, 
the  physiologist  do  not  introduce  themselves  into  their 
science.  In  all  concrete  sciences  the  mind  is  entirely 
projected  into  its  object,  it  is  the  external  object 
itself  that  has  to  be  takm  into  cmwderation.  In  eoa> 

10$ 


The  Postulates  of  Psychology  107 

Crete  science  consciomoen  a  drowned  in  the  object,  in 
psychology,  on  the  contrary,  the  object  is  drowned  in 
consciousness.  The  chemist,  the  physicist,  who  wiU  turn 
his  attention  to  consciousness  and  introduce  his  psychic 
sutet,  hit  moods,  dispositions,  and  intentions  as  elements 
mto  his  investigation.  wiH  hardly  be  an  exact  scientist. 
Not  so  with  the  psychologist,  he  must  take  the  inner 
world  mto  account,  he  must  deal  with  consciouweM, 
with  moods,  with  feelings.  It  is  true  that  he  must  treat 
them  as  objects,  but  these  objects,  unlike  those  of  other 
poamve  sciences,  are  after  aU  of  the  inner  subjective 
world  of  consciousness.  For  the  very  essence  of  psy- 
chology  IS  the  taking  accoimt  of  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness. 

In  our  last  statement  that  psychology  deals  with  the 
objettive  external  world  as  reBected  in  consciousness 
another  postulate  it  fanplied.  Besides  the  external  and 
internal  worlds,  ptychology  alto  pottalatet  the  mterre. 
latton  of  the  two. 

This  interrelation  is  not  direct,  it  is  not  one  of  ante- 
cedent,  and  consequent,  but  that  of  coexistence;  for  as 
we  have  already  pointed  out,  the  two  series  of  phe- 
nomena,  the  mental  and  the  physiological,  must  be  as- 
sumed  as  concomitant,  as  running  paraUel  to  each 
other.  If,  however,  by  "the  external  world"  we  un- 
derstand  the  universe  of  objects  exclusive  of  ;hc  func- 
tioning psycho-physiological  processes  then  we  may  say 
that  it  ttandt  to  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  in  re- 
lation both  of  sequence  and  coexistence. 

The  objective  external  world  enters  into  rdation  with 
consciousness  only  through  the  intermediacy  of  physio- 
logical  nervous  processes.  Only  on  this  condition  can 
the  external  world  enter  into  rehtion  with  cooidoai. 


io8       Normal  md  Ahmormd  Psfekoloiy 

new,  and  under  special  conditions  become  its  direct 
object  I  take  a  dose  of  opium,  mescal,  or  cannabis 
Indica,  and  have  different  halludnatioiis  and  illu- 
sions, mental  activity  is  stimulated.  The  mw^d  tyyinf 
with  sensations,  images,  ideas,  feelings,  emotions, 
moods;  rww  the  whole  organism  is  pierced  by  sharp 
pain,  now  it  tingles  with  indescribable  acute  pleas- 
ure; now  a  charming  vision  appears,  a  beautiful 
scenery  unrolls  before  the  mind's  eye,  a  feeling  of  per- 
fect heavenly  bliss  diffuses  itself  all  over  our  conscious 
being;  now  a  disgusting,  ugly  figure  presents  itself,  a 
horrible  scene  is  witnessed  that  plunges  the  mind  into  an 
abyss  of  misery.  The  current  of  consciousness  is  ac- 
celerated and  it  drives  its  waves  with  more  vigor  than 
ever. 

Instead  of  being  accelerated,  the  current  may  be 
depressed  and  retarded  even  to  such  a  degree  as  to 
plunge  the  mind  into  a  deep  sleep.  Such  retardation  we 
find  under  the  influence  of  bromides,  or  of  anaesthetics, 
such  as  ether,  chloroform,-  of  hypnotics,  such  m  sulfonal, 
chloral  and  others.  We  have  here  the  action  of  a  drug, 
of  an  external  objeci  on  the  physiological  nervmis  pro- 
cesses vith  their  psychic  concomitants.  In  this  case, 
however,  the  drug  itself  does  not  become  the  direct  ob- 
ject of  consciousness.  Through  the  mere  absorption  of 
opium,  cannabis  or  belladonna,  we  can  know  nothing  of 
their  constitution,  we  can  know  notliing  of  their  color, 
of  their  size,  of  their  weight,  specific  gravity  and  so 
on,  we  cannot  possibly  perceive  theni  as  objects.  The 
states  of  consciousness  which  cannabis,  for  instance,  gives 
rise  to  affords  no  knowledge  of  the  external  objective 
nature  of  the  drug  itself. 

A  direct  knowledge  of  aa  external  object  la  acfiM 


Thg  PostuUles  of  Psychology  109 

through  the  special  senses.  Yonder  is  an  object,  an 
inkstand.  It  stimulates  the  peripheral  sense  organ,  the 
eye,  the  retina,  the  physiological  processes  aroused  in 
the  rods  and  conet  are  transmitted  by  the  iwrve 
and  by  the  optic  tracts  to  the  visual  centres  of  the  occi- 
pital lobes,  the  functioning  of  which  is  accompanied 
by  sensations  of  sight.  The  wave  of  stimulation 
spreads  from  the  visual  centres  to  other  centres  closely 
associated  with  them.  They  too  begin  to  function  with 
more  or  less  intensity,  acctmipanied  by  images,  ideas, 
thought,  which  constitute  the  perception  of  the  ink- 
stand yonder.  The  combined  activity,  or  function  of  a 
whole  system  of  centres  gives  rise  to  the  percept  ink- 
stand along  with  its  psychic  fringe,  with  the  stream  of 
cotisdoosness  in  which  it  is  bathed.  We  see  and  know 
die  ioKstaad. 

Frou  a  psychological  standpoint  the  mode  of  action 
of  the  inkstand  differs  radically  from  that  of  the  opium. 
The  latter  may  be  characterized  as  psycho-physiological, 
or  even  purely  physiological,  the  former  may  be  termed 
psycho-physical  or  psychological,  perceptual  Tlie  one 
gives  rise  to  perception,  to  knowledge  of  the  external  ob> 
ject,  while  the  other  does  not.  Both,  however,  agree  in 
this  that  they  can  enter  into  relations  with  consciousness 
only  through  the  intermediacy  of  physiological  nervous 
processes.  The  two  modes  of  action  and  their  rela- 
tion to  omsdoiwiess  may  be  represented  by  the  follow- 
ing diagrams: 


I.  Psycho-physical  or  perceptual  reUdon. 

II.  Psycho-physiological  relation. 


t  to       Normal  md  Jbnormal  Psyeholo gy 


I 


Fig.  II 

In  fig.  I,  Ob.  is  the  object  stimulating  S.  the  organ  of 
special  cense,  giving  rise  to  physiological  nervous 
processes  with  their  concomitant  psychic  states  consti- 
toting  the  subjective  object  which  is  objectified  in  the 
object  yonder.  In  Fig.  II,  D.  is  the  drug  acting  directly 
on  the  nervous  centre  the  stimulated  activity  of  which 
gives  ise  to  the  perception  of  an  external  object  Ob. 
Thus  we  find  that  external  physical  and  physiological 
processes  arc  causally  related,  or  stand  to  each  other  in 
relation  of  invariable  or  necessary  sequence  while  the 
physiological  and  psychic  processes  stand  in  relation  of 
coexistence.  What  the  nature  of  this  inter-relation  is 
and  how  it  is  possible  are  problems  for  epistemology 
and  metaphysics.  Psychology  must  assume  this  inters 
relation  as  its  postulate. 

If  psychology  is  to  be  a  science  at  all,  it  must  postu- 
late the  uniformity  of  die  phenomena  with  which  it 


The  Postuiates  of  Psychology  m 

deals.  This  we  have  pointed  oak  in  our  Meead  dhipm 
when  we  discussed  the  subject  matter  of  psychology. 
We  turn  to  it  again  in  order  to  realize  clearly  its  full 
lining  in  psychology.  Psychology,  as  we  know,  m 
addition  to  the  external  world  of  physical  sci- 
ences, also  postulates  conctousaess.  Its  postuhte  of 
uniformity  is,  therefore,  far  more  complex  than  in  other 
positive  sciences.  Widi  physical  science  psychology  must 
postulate  uniformity  of  the  external  world,  because  it 
presupposes  the  physical  sciences,  and  because  the  ex- 
ternal world  formi  the  coateat  and  object  of  consdous- 
nesi.  This,  however,  is  not  sniScieiit  Piydiology  musk 
also  postulate  the  uniformity  in  $hg  inner  worU  of  pty. 
cho-physiological,  or  mental  phenomena.  Were  there 
no  uniformity  m  the  phenomena  of  consciousness,  psy- 
chology, as  a  science  would  have  been  an  impossibility. 

Thi^  however,  it  not  aU.    Psychology  must  also 
postulate  the  uniformity  of  relationship  between  the 
phenomena  of  the  external  and  inner  worlds.  Definite 
physical  processes  must  be  concomitant  voith  certain  well 
defined  psychic  states.    Were  this  otherwise,  the  two 
series,  the  mental  and  the  physical,  would  be  out  of 
joint,  the  reUtiont  of  coexistence  would  no  longer 
be  obtained,  and  the  two  series  would  stand  to 
each  other  in  no  relation  at  all;  thus  noise,  for 
instance,  would  sometimes  be  smelled,  sometimes 
tuted,  and  sometimes  seen.    Psychology  as  a  science 
that  deab  with  general  Uws,  would  ceruinly  have 
been  hnpoisible.  We  would  neither  have  been  able 
to  express  to  others  our  states  of  consciousness  in 
uniform  definite  movements,  nor  would  it  have  been 
possible  for  others  to  understand  us,  nor  would  it  have 
been  possible  to  wall  forth  in  others  certain  desired  sutes 


Ill       NomuU  and  Jhnormsl  Psyeholoxy 


of  oonscioutness;  in  short,  not  only  psychology  would 
have  been  an  impossibility,  but  also  aU  human  inter* 
course.  The  myth  of  the  tower  of  Babel  would  have 
been  fully  realized.  Psychology  must  postulate  uni- 
fonuity  of  interrelation  of  physical,  physiological,  amd 
psychic  processes. 


CHAPTER  XVni 


MENTAL  SYNTHESIS 

ONE  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  piy- 
choiogy  is  mental  synthesis.  Objects  that 
appear  within  the  same  consciousness  are 
synthetized  in  a  unity,  if  they  are  taken  cog- 
nizance of.  An  object «  may  be  presented  to  orasckHis- 
ness,  and  another  object  b  may  be  siiiiUftrty  perceived. 
They  remain  two  and  separate  as  long  as  con- 
sciousness does  not  take  cognizance  of  their  duality, 
of  their  being  two  objects,  but  as  soon  as  the 
two  appear  in  consciousness  together  and  are  perceived 
as  two,  they  are  by  this  very  fact  synthetized  into  a 
unity.  This  is  a  point  which  may  not  poa^y  be  so 
dear,  and  is  also  hard  to  realize  for  those  who  have 
been  used  to  work  in  concrete  sciences.  The  reason  is 
that  the  mind  is  accustomed  to  dwell  on  the  object 
of  thought,  not  on  the  function  of  thought  itself,  and  is 
therefore  med  to  take  the  d>ject  for  die  dioiq^t  The 
confusimi  between  the  dioiight  that  possesses  the  th' 
ject,  and  the  object  of  thought  is  a  fallacy  that  is  as  a 
rule  committed  by  the  intelligence  trained  to  busy  itself 
only  with  external  objects.  Our  reader  sees,  of 
course,  through  this  fallaqr*  he  knows  that  the  thing 
of  At  idba  aikl  die  idea  of  the  dung  are  not  tdsotkaL 
The  paper  on  which  I  write  is  white  and  is  five  tndbes 
wide  and  eight  inches  long,  but  my  idea  of  the  paper  is 
neither  white  iu>r  has  it  so  many  inches  in  width  and 
length. 

113 


1 14       NorwuA  and  AhnomuA  PsyMogy 

The  tame  fallaqr,  however,  it  noe  so  very  obvious 
when  it  appears  under  a  somewhat  different  guiM.  The 
object  of  tliought  has  parts,  therefore  it  is  condoded 
that  the  thought  of  the  object  must  also  be  made  up  of 
corresponding  parts.  Because  the  chain  in  the  external 
world  is  made  up  of  so  many  links,  it  is  concluded  that 
the  idea  of  the  chain  is  made  up  of  so  many  ideas  of 
links,  and  that  the  total  sum  of  the  ideas  of  the  links 
forms  the  idea  of  the  chain.  The  idea  of  the  chain, 
however,  is  not  a  mere  juxtaposition  of  so  many  ideas 
of  links.  The  ideas  of  the  links  would  have  remained 
m  the  juxtaposed  disconnected  condition,  had  they  not 
been  connoted  and  synthetized  in  one  new  idea,  the  idea 
of  the  chain.  The  word  is  made  up  of  to  many  letters, 
but  the  sum  of  the  letters  is  not  the  idea  of  the  word 
The  phrase  is  made  up  of  words,  but  the  mere  sum  of 
the  words  does  not  make  sense,  does  not  form  the  idea 
of  that  sentence. 

It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  fully  and  dearly 
realize  this  principle  of  mental  synthesis.  Many  a  mia- 
understanding  in  psychology  is  cleared  up,  by  keeiring 
this  principle  dearly  before  one's  mind.  We  may  say 
that  it  is  one  of  the  principal  keys  that  gives  us  an  en- 
trance  mto  the  sdence  of  psychology.  A  sum  of  sensa- 
tions, of  ideas,  of  images,  of  feelings,  etc.,  at  once 
brought  in  consciousness  as  a  sum  is  by  this  very  fact 
synthetized  by  thought  into  a  unity.  The  chair  yonder 
is  composed  of  many  parts,  it  has  four  legs,  a  seat,  a 
badt,  and  each  part  in  its  turn  is  again  made  up  of  many 
parte.  Each  part,  if  represented  in  consdousncss  at  all, 
hat  its  corresponding  idea,  but  the  idea  of  these  com- 
ponent  parts,  the  idea  of  the  chair  is  a  whole,  a  imity,  no 
longer  being  a  conglomeration  of  parta.  Objectively 


Mtmd  Synihem 


MS 


consitkred,  that  mil  yondtr  it  made  op  of  many  parts, 
of  many  orgam,  of  many  titraes,  of  mOfiom  of  cells. 
To  my  consdooniesi,  however,  he  it  one,  my  ftrimd 
John. 

An  idea  is  not  made  up  of  parts,  as  is  the  object  of  the 
idea.  Before  me  liet  a  grain  of  wheat,  I  luve  a  percept 
of  it,  I  have  an  idea  of  diat  grain.  The  grain  may  be  (IB- 
vided  into  halves,  or  quarters,  and  I  can  form  an  idea 
of  a  half,  of  a  third,  or  of  a  quarter  of  a  grain.  Is  it 
possible  to  do  the  same  thing  with  the  idea  ?  Can  we  sub- 
divide the  idea  of  the  grain  in  the  same  way  as  we  did 
the  grain  itself?  Can  we  have  a  half,  a  third,  a  quar- 
ter of  an  idea  of  the  grain?  One  realizes  die 
impossibility  and  absurdity  of  subdividmg  an  idea.  We 
can  have  an  idea  of  a  third  of  a  pound,  but  it  is  absurd 
to  talk  of  a  third  of  an  idea  of  a  pound.  A  third  of 
an  idea  is  simply  so  much  nonsense.  But  why  is  it  ab- 
si**  *  to  subdivide  an  idea?  Why  is  it  nooseote  to 
t  of  having  a  half,  a  third,  a  quarter  or  any  frac- 
tk^  ur  part  of  an  idea?  Evidently  because  an  idem  is 
essentially  a  synthesis,  a  unity,  and  has  no  parts. 

This  synthesis,  or  unity  is  more  or  less  clear  when 
the  percept,  or  idea  is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be  syn- 
dietized  into  a  numerical  unity,  and  be  projected  into 
the  external  world,  nch  for  instance,  as  the  chair,  die 
table,  the  house,  or  my  friend  John.  It  is,  however, 
far  less  clear  when  thought  includes  many  ideas,  many 
percepts  and  the  nature  of  the  synthetized  unity  is  mul- 
tiplicity. There  are  in  my  room  four  diairs.  I  per- 
ceive diem  as  being  four.  Have  I  not  four  percepts, 
four  ideas  going  to  make  up  my  idea  of  the  sum  of  die 
chairs?  Certainly  not.  What  we  have  here  is  not  four 
ideas,  but  one  idea  of  there  being  four  duurs.  A  sum 


ii6       Norma  Md  Jhnormd  PsyMoa 

of  ideas^  b  not  the  same  thing  at  the  idea  of  their  sum, 
jutt  as  in  algebra  the  sum  of  tquares  it  not  the  same 

as  the  square  of  the  sum.   I  think  a  sentence  **I  took 

a  stroll  in  the  forest  yesterday  morning."  The  sentence 
forms  a  multiplicity  of  words,  but  in  spite  of  all  that 
multiplicity,  the  phrase  appears  in  consciousness  as  one 
whole,  as  a  synthedzed  unity.  Synthetic  unity  is  the 
essence,  the  backhome  of  tkougla. 

This  synthetic  unity  of  omsdousness  can  be  made 
still  clearer  by  the  following  example.  Let  the  reader 
imagine  a  row  of  men,  each  thinking  one  single  word  of 
the  sentence :  "We  are  standing  here  in  a  row."  There 
is  here  a  completely  isolated  series  of  ideas,  but  the 
words  in  the  series  will  remain  in  their  fall  isolation  and 
as  such  will  make  no  meaning,  no  one  sentence,  as  l<mg 
as  they  will  be  confined  to  different  disconnected 
thoughts,  and  not  unified  in  the  synthesis  of  one  synthetic 
thought  or  of  what  I  term  moment-consciousness. 

To  have  the  idea  of  a  conglomeration,  of  a  mul- 
tiplicity of  objects,  images  or  ideas,  a  synthetizing 
moment  consciousness  is  required,  a  moment-cwi- 
sciousness  that  should  take  cognizance  of  all  these 
objects,  images  or  ideas  and  synthetize  them  into 
a  unity,  the  one  idea  of  the  many.  The  many  words, 
the  many  ideas  must  be  synthetized  in  one  moment-con- 
sciousness before  the  idea  of  the  sentence  can  emerge. 
This  synthesis,  in  fact,  is  that  one  idea.  Ideas,  images, 
thoughts,  feelings  do  not  come  together,  fuse  into  one, 
and  make  one  idea. 

A  bode  is  a  C(»nplex  object,  it  is  a  conglomeration  of 
pages,  letters,  words,  lines,  sentences,  paragraphs,  chap- 
ters.  We  can  have  an  idea  of  half  a  book,  but  it  is 
certainly  abmird  to  |iave  half  «n  idea  of  n  book. 


Mwittd  Syutknit 


117 


It  means  nothing  at  all;  the  idea  itself  has  not 
been  formed,  and  as  such,  as  an  idea,  is  totally 
absent  A  separate  syntlMtta  in  consawMieM  b  reqmttte 
in  order  to  have  an  aggregatkm,  or  anodsdon  of  ideM 

cognized  as  one.  Ideas  do  not  meet,  associate  and  form 
a  unity,  mental  synthesis  is  required.  Such  a  synthesis 
is  always  effected,  whenever  a  moment-consciousness  gets 
cognizance  of  many  objects;  in  other  words,  sensations, 
ideas,  feelings,  images  can  only  get  uiu&d  in  die  ayn> 
thesis  of  a  moment-consciousness.  Mental  synthesis  of 
psychic  content  in  the  unity  of  a  moment-eonsaousneu 
is  a  fundamental  principle  of  psychology. 

It  is  the  great  and  fundamental  error  of  the  asso- 
dationistt  to  overlodc  diis  all  important  element  of 
synthesis  in  amsdonsness.  They  conunit  die  fal- 
lacy of  regarding  a  mechanical  combination,  or  jux- 
taposition of  ideas  as  making  a  "fusion,"  a  synthesis, 
a  unity.  There  is  an  idea  of  A,  ana  there  is  an  idea  of 
B,  therefore,  it  is  tacitly  assumed  that  there  is  the  idea  of 
A  and  B.  This  as  we  have  shown  it  a  faUaqT'  The 
assodadoniMs  regard  the  idea  of  a  sum  as  coiwttifig  of 
as  many  parts,  but  only  "fused,"  as  the  sum  itself.  This 
is  erroneous.  The  neglect  of  the  element  of  mental 
synthesis  and  the  consequent  identification  of  the  idea 
of  the  sum  as  a  whole  with  the  sum  of  ideas  of  the  parts 
going  to  make  up  the  external  sum  falsified  dtt  odier- 
wise  rich  researches  of  the  association  sdiool.  Thit  ng- 
nificance  of  mental  synthesis  in  the  moment-consciousness 
can  hardly  be  overestimated.  We  shall  return  to  the 
theory  of  the  moment-consciousness  and  its  mental  syn- 
thesis further  on. 

Itie  '^esdcm  as  to  the  nature  of  duit  mental  tyii- 
diesis  does  not  ftdl  mdun  titt  province  of  paydicdo^. 


Ii8        Norma  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

Like  all  other  problems  that  refer  to  the  ultimate  na- 
ture of  things  and  how  they  are  possible,  the  problem  of 
the  inner  nature  of  menul  synthesis  does  not  beloBg  to 
•CHsnce,  but  to  epistemology  and  metaphyuct. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


THEORIES  OF  P£IlC£PnON 

THE  theory  of  perception  is  fundamental  both 
in  normal  and  abnormal  psychology.  All 
mental  activities  are  intimately  related  with 
the  process  of  perception.  Our  wills,  our 
tfaougfats  and  our  feelingt  relate  to  our  experience  of  the 
outer  world  of  things.  Biologically  regarded,  tlie  per^ 
cept  is  of  the  most  vital  importance,  inasmuch  at  it 
forms  the  medium  between  the  individual  and  the  outer 
environment.  Psychologically,  the  percept  reflects  the 
external  world  and  mirrors  the  conditions  of  life  to 
which  the  given  organism  has  to  adjust  itself  In  fart, 
the  percept  may  be  regarded  as  the  coin  possessing  the 
value  of  the  external  environment.  In  this  respect  we 
cannot  help  agreeing  with  B?1dwin's  statement: 
"The  theory  of  perception  is  perhips  the  most 
important  as  well  as  the  most  difficult  pioblem  in  psy- 
chology.  The  interpretation  of  the  higher  processes  of 
mind  rests  upon  it  and  it  underlies  the  body  of  our  gen- 
eral philosophy.  The  great  philosophies  of  the  world 
take  their  rise  from  initial  differences  in  the  method  of 
construing  perception." 

In  abnormal  psychology  the  theory  of  perception  is 
of  the  utmost  importance,  both  from  a  theoretical  and 
practical  standpoint.  Illusions,  haUndnations,  dream 
states,  subconscious  states,  many  states  of  dissociation 
depend  for  their  explanation  on  the  analysis  of  the  pro- 
cess of  perception.   I  have  developed  a  theory  of  per- 

1x9 


120        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


cepdon  which  may  be  characterized  at  the  doctrine  of 
primary  and  secondary  sensory  elements.  This  doc- 
trine is  based  on  a  close  analysis  of  the  normal  process 
of  perception  and  is  substantiated  by  observations  and 

experiments  of  abnormal  mental  life. 

Before  however  we  state  our  view  of  perception  it 
may  be  well  to  make  a  review  of  what  the  principal 
psychological  authorities  teach  on  the  subject. 

James  Mill  in  discussing  perception  tells  us:  "The 
colors  upon  a  body  are  different,  according  to  its  figute, 
its  shape,  and  its  size.  But  the  sensations  of  color  and 
the  sensations  of  extension,  of  figure,  of  distance  have 
been  so  often  united,  felt  in  conjunction  that  the  sensa- 
tions  of  the  color  are  never  experienced  without  rais- 
ing the  ideas  of  the  extension,  the  figure,  the  distance  in 
such  intimate  union  with  it,  that  they  not  only  cannot 
be  separated,  but  are  actually  supposed  to  be  seen  (ital- 
ics are  mine).  The  sight,  as  it  is  called  of  figure,  or 
distance,  appearing,  as  it  does  a  simple  sensatim,  it  in 
reality  a  complex  state  pf  consciousness,  a  sequence  in 
which  the  antecedent,  a  sensation  of  color,  and  the  con- 
sequent a  number  of  ideas  are  so  closely  combined  by 
association  that  they  appear  not  one  idea,  but  one  sen- 
sation." 

Sully  defirws  perception  as  a  mental  act  diat  *tttpp!e- 
moits  a  sense  impression  by  an  accompaniment  or  escort 
of  revived  sensations,  the  whole  aggregate  of  actual 
and  revived  sensations  being  solidified  or  integrated  into 
the  form  of  a  percept.'  The  revived  sensations  are 
equivalent  to  James  Mill's  ataodat^  t(kas  and  inuget. 
We  thall  point  out  later  the  confusion  which  generally 
prevails  among  psychologists  and  psychiatrists,  when 
they  talk  indiscriminately  of  revived  sensations  and  ideas 


Theories  of  Perception  m 

regarding  the  two  as  identical. 

Hoffding  describes  the  process  of  perception  "as  the 
ftning  of  a  reproduction  !id  an  actual  sensation.  The 
percept  ig  thus  conoei  ed  as  compounded  out  of  a  rep- 
resentation  and  a  sen-  adon." 

Taine  tells  us  that  Tmr^ges  a»5ociated  with  the  sen- 
sations of  the  different  senses,  especially  with  those  of 
sight  and  touch  constitute  acquired  perceptions." 

Wundt  regards  the  percept  as  a  psychical  compound 
of  Ideas  or  of  revived  sensations  c- images.  In  that 
respect  his  analysis  differs  but  little  from  that  of  other 
psychologists  who  regard  the  ideas,  images,  and  revived 
sensations  as  identical  elements  going  to  form  the  tno- 
ciated  whole  or  psychic  compound,  the  percept. 

Kulpe  speaks  of  'centrally  excited  sensations'  regard- 
ing them  as  the  ideas  and  the  images  of  the  psycholo- 
gists and  psychiat-ists,  and  tells  us  that  he  avoids  the 
use  of  'ideas.'  As  far  as  perception  is  concerned  he 
closely  follows  his  master,  Wundt,  and  talks  of  psychic 
compounds,  of  sensations  and  centrally  excited  sensa- 
tions which  really  are  identical  with  the  old  ideas  and 
images. 

Titchener  follows  closely  Wundt  and  Ku4»e,  and  re- 
gards  the  'percept  as  a  compound,  or  a  complex  of  ten. 
sations,'  of  peripheral  and  of  ce  itrally  initiated  sensa- 
ttons.  In  order  to  be  explicit  he  hastens  to  tell  us  that 
there  it  no  fundamental  difference  between  the  percep- 
tion and  idea.  "It  is  customary  to  speak  of  perception, 
when  the  majority  of  the  simple  procetMt  in  the  com- 
plcx  are  the  result  of  stimulation  of  a  sense  organ,  i.  e., 
arcperipherally  aroused,  and  of  idea  when  the  greate^ 
ninnber  are  the  result  of  an  excitation  within  the  brain 
«>rt«x» ».     we  oratrtttr  mmd  If  I  have  a  table 


122        Normal  and  AbnornuU  Psychology 

before  me  and  my  eyes  open  I  am  said  to  perceive  the 
table;  if  I  close  my  eyes  and  think  of  what  I  saw,  to 
have  an  idea  of  a  table.  But  we  have  seen  that  the  sen- 
sations aroused  centrally  do  not  differ  as  psychological 
processes  from  those  aroused  peripherally."  This  state- 
ment put  in  such  an  explicit  form  brings  out  clearly  what 
may  be  designated  as  the  psychologist's  fallacy.  The 
fallacy  becomes  specially  apparent  in  the  domain  of  ab- 
normal psychology. 

Baldwin  with  his  characteristic  breadth  of  compre- 
hension puts  the  subject  of  perception  on  a  wide  basis: 
"Perception  is  the  apperceptive  or  synthetic  activity  of 
mind  whereby  the  data  of  sensation  take  on  the  forms 
of  representation  in  space  and  time ;  or  it  is  the  process 
of  the  construction  of  our  representation  of  the  external 
worid."  Baldwin  does  not  cmnmit  himself  to  the  or- 
dinary fallacy  current  among  psychologists. 

Similarly  James  with  his  g  nius  for  psychological  in- 
sight tells  us:  "The  consciousness  of  particular  ma- 
terial things  present  to  sense  is  nowadays  called  percep- 
tion." And  again  "Perception  thus  differs  from  sensa- 
ti<m  by  die  conscimisness  of  farther  facts  associated 
with  the  object  of  the  sensation."  He  tells  us  further : 
"We  certainly  ought  not  to  say  what  usually  is  said  by 
psychologists  and  treat  the  perception  as  a  sum  of  dis- 
tinct psychic  entities,  the  present  sensation  namely,  plus 
a  lot  of  images  from  the  past,  all  integrated  together  in 
a  way  impossible  to  describe.  The  perception  is  one 
state  of  mind." 

We  thus  see  that  most  of  the  psychologists  regard  the 
percept  somewhat  in  Spencerian  terms  as  being  made 
up  of  presentations  and  representations,  or  as  ^penoer 
puts  it  as  being  'partly  presentttive  and  partly  repmen- 


Theories  of  Perception  113 

tative.'  In  other  words,  the  percept  b  a  compound  of 
sensations  and  images,  a  synthesis  of  peripherally  in- 
duced sensations  and  of  images,  or  of  ideas  centrally 
excited.  One  principle  u  lerlies  the  current  theory  of 
perception,  variously  phrased  by  different  psychologists, 
and  that  is  the  identification  of  ideational  and  sensory 
processes. 

The  identification  of  ideational  and  sensory  processes 
may  be  traced  to  Spinoza  when  he  tells  us  in  his  Ethics, 
Prop.  XVII.,  note,  "The  modifications  of  the  human 
body,  of  which  the  ideas  represent  external  bodies  as 
present  to  us,  we  will  call  the  images  of  things"  and  then 
in  another  place  of  Part  II.,  Prop.  XLIX.,  note,  "In 
order  to  illustrate  the  point  let  us  suppose  a  boy  imagin- 
ing a  horse  and  perceiving  nothing  else.    Inasmuch  as 
this  imagination  involves  the  existence  of  the  horse,  and 
the  boy  does  not  perceive  anything  which  would  ex- 
clude the  existence  of  the  horse  he  will  necessarily  re- 
gard  the  horse  as  present;  he  will  not  be  able  to  doubt 
its  existence,  although  he  be  not  certain  thereof.  We 
have  daily  experiences  of  such  a  state  of  things  in 
dreams."  The  images,  according  to  Spinoza,  are  equiv- 
alent to  sensations  and  percepts,  unless  counteracted  by 
the  more  intense  peripheral  sefMations  whtcb  thus  be- 
come the  *reductives'  of  the  image,  a  doctrine  afterwards 
fully  developed  by  Taine.    I  may  add  that  Spinoza's 
view  of  dreams  is  repeated  almost  verbatim  by  the  great- 
est psychological  authorities,  all  uncritically  giving  their 
assent  to  the  current  faUacy  that  the  image  is  but  a 
weakened  sensation  and  that  the  tenMition  b  ta  tntcmi. 
fied  image. 

This  theory  of  images  and  perception  is  perpetuated 
through  Hobbes,  Locke,  Hardey,  Hume,  James  MiU 


124       Normal  amd  Jbnormal  Psychology 


dowTf  to  our  times. 

1  obbes  in  his  terse  English  puts  it:  "Imagination 
therefore  is  nothing  but  decaying  sense  and  is  found 
in  men  and  many  other  living  beings,  at  well  in  sleeping 
as  waking." 

Locke  derives  his  'ideas'  from  'aqperience,*  but  hit 
'experience'  is  somewhat  vague  and  broad,  inasmuch  as 
it  flows  from  two  fountain  heads, — sensation  and  re- 
flection. "Let  us  then  suppose  the  mind  to  be  as  we  say 
white  paper  void  of  all  characters  widiout  any  ideat, 
how  comes  it  to  be  furnished?  ...  To  this  I  an- 
swer in  one  word  from  experience.  .  .  .  Our  ob- 
servation employed  either  about  external  sensible  ob- 
jects or  about  the  internal  operations  of  our  minds,  per- 
ceived and  reflected  on  by  ourselves  is  that  which  sup- 
plies our  luukrstanding  with  all  the  materiab  of  dunk- 
ing, '^hese  two  are  the  fountains  of  knowledge  from 
whence  all  the  ideas  we  have  or  can  naturally  have,  do 
spring."  Perception  is  used  by  Locke  in  a  broader  sense 
than  what  it  is  understood  at  present,  as  he  uses  per- 
ception for  soisory  experience  as  well  as  for  the  intro- 
spection of  hi^r  mental  processes.  He  tells  us,  how- 
ever, that  in  either  case  "tlM  mind  has  a  power  to  revive 
perceptions  which  it  has  once  had,  with  this  additional 
perception  annexed  to  them  that  it  has  had  them  be- 
fore." Locke  evidently  entertains  the  view  that  sensa- 
tt(Mtt  can  be  revived  as  original  sensory  experience  aikl 
that  the  revived  ideas  do  not  differ,  except  for  the  adifi^ 
tion  of  pastness,  fnmi  die  original  ideas  derived  from 
the  great  source  of  sensation. 

When  we  pass  to  Hartley  and  Hume  the  identifica- 
tion of  sensation  and  idea  is  set  forth  with  great  ex- 
plicttnist.  In  fact,  it  is  taken  as  the  fnndanieiital 


Theories  of  Perception  125 

ciple  of  their  psychological  tystemt.  Thus  Hartley 
postulates  in  his  eighth  propositiou  that  "Sentadciit  by 

being  often  repeated  leave  certain  vestiges,  types  or 
images  of  themselves  which  may  be  called  simple  ideas 
of  sensation,"  and  correspondingly  we  have  "sen- 
sory vibrations,  by  being  often  repeated,  beget  in  the  me- 
dullary substance  of  the  brain  a  disposition  to  duninu- 
tive  vibrations  which  may  be  called  vibratiuncles  and 
mmiatures  corresponding  to  themselves  respectively." 
The  vibratiuncle  is  the  physical  substratum  of  what  we 
experience  as  an  idee,  and  is  a  copy  of  the  original 
vibration.  The  vibratiuncle  is  a  weakened  vibration, 
and  the  idea  is  a  weakened  sensatiai. 

Hume  does  not  burden  himself  with  Hartley's  vibra- 
tions and  vibratiuncles,  but  still  at  the  basis  of  his  sys- 
tem we  find  the  same  fallacious  psychological  principle. 
"All  our  ideas"  he  says  "are  copies  of  our  lively  percept 
tions  or  impressions."  In  other  words,  our  sensations 
are  lively  impressions,  while  the  ideas  are  only  weakened 
perceptions,— the  idea  differs  from  the  sensation  only 
in  intensity.  There  is  no  qualitative  difference  between 
sensation  and  idea.  Ideas  belong  to  sensory  processes 
and  do  not  differ  as  such  from  sensations.  This  view 
has  since  become  the  heriuge  of  current  psychological 
theories. 


CHAPTER  XX 


THE  STRUCTURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  THE  PERCEPT 

AS  in  many  other  sciences,  espedally  the  ones 
of  the  purely  mental  variety,  a  good  deal  in 
psychology  is  traditional  such  for  instance 
are  the  tripartite  and  bipartite  division  of  the 
mind  or  the  various  classifications  of  the  mental  activi- 
ties. Of  course,  dassificaticms  as  well  as  theories  have 
their  important  function  in  science,  but  they  should  not 
be  permitted  to  become  a  bed  of  Procrustes  to  the 
guests  whom  they  shelter. 

It  may  sometimes  be  well  to  disregard  established 
principles,  dattificatimis  and  timeJumored  tradition 
and  stiKly  the  facts  from  a  somewhat  different  stand- 
point. We  may  then  possibly  see  the  facts  in  a  new 
light  and  realize  aspects  and  connections  which  are  hid- 
den from  the  customary  view  of  the  phenomena. 

Suppose  we  take  a  mental  cross-section  of  a  moment 
of  perceptual  ccmsciousness  in  the  very  act  of  formation 
of  a  percept.  The  whole  percei^ual  moment  may  be 
said  to  be  spread  out  before  our  mental  gaze.  We  find 
sensory  elements  of  a  relatively  intense  character.  Cer- 
tain sensory  elements  stand  out  first  and  foremost  in 
consciousness,  they  are  the  very  first  to  arrest  the  mental 
gaze  and  keep  it  steadily  fixed  on  themselves.  In  the 
same  view,  however,  we  can  also  discern  otlwr  ekmenttt 
not  so  prominent,  though  equally  sensory  which,  on  ac- 
count of  their  lack  of  prominence,  appear  to  be  of  a 
subordinate  character    The  whole  tone  of  the  percept 

126 


The  Structure  and  Function  of  the  Percept  127 

is  given  by  the  qualitative  aspect  of  the  prominent  de> 
ments  which  seem  to  guide  and  fonn  the  Mganizatioo 
of  the  percept. 

The  general  plan  of  the  structure  of  the  percept  may 
becompftredtothatof  theceU.  A  dose  examination  of 
the  cell  reveals  the  pretence  of  a  central  element,  of  a 
nucleus  surrounded  by  cytoplasm  with  its  meshwork,  the 
cyto-reticulum.  The  nucleus  forms  the  central  and  im- 
portant structure  having  the  functions  of  assimilation 
and  reproduction.  The  nucleus  and  cytoplasm,  how- 
ever, are  intimately  related;  the  modification  of  one 
affects  the  other.  Both  nuclear  and  cytoplannic  •true* 
turcs  form  one  organized  whole,  one  living  cell.  Sim- 
ilarly in  the  percept  we  find  a  group  of  sensory  elements 
which  constitute  the  nucleus,  and  a  mass  of  other  sensory 
elemmts,  potnbly  die  main  mass,  forming  the  tissue 
of  the  percept.  The  nticlear  elemeoti  are  more  intense 
and  appear  to  be  predominant  in  the  total  mental  state, 
— both  however  are  intimately  connected  and  go  to 
form  the  living  tissue  of  the  percept. 

The  nuclear  elements  of  the  percept  have  the 
lead  and  seem  to  possess  the  organizing,  the  fer- 
menting power  to  assimilate  die  mass  of  subordin- 
ate elements  and  have  them  transformed  into  one 
unified  organic  whole.  The  slightest  modification 
in  the  structure  and  function  of  the  nuclear  ele- 
ments brings  about  a  change  in  the  total  cytoplasmic 
mass  of  the  percept,  giving  rise  to  a  different  structure, 
to  a  different  percept;  and  again,  modificatioiis  of  the 
cytoplasmic  mass,  so  to  say,  affect  the  formation  of  the 
nuclear  elements  often  resulting  in  a  different  percept. 
It  requires  however  quite  a  considerable  change  In  the 
subordmate  elements  to  bring  about  a  change  in  the  per- 


138        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


cept;  while  the  slightest  modification  of  the  nuclear 
elements,  whether  in  quality  or  intensity,  often  brings 
about  a  fundamental  transformation  of  the  percept. 
Tlie  niidear  ekments  may  be  regarded  as  die  sen- 
sitive, as  die  vital  point  of  the  perceptual  system.  We 
cannot  displace  nor  can  we  modify  the  nudeua  of  tlie 
percept  without  profoundly  modifying  or  even  com- 
pletely destroying  the  life  existence  of  the  percept. 

We  may  point  out  here  an  important  aspect  of  the 
percept  an  aspect  which  hat  been  neglected  by  the 
older  psychologists,  but  which  it  now  being  more  and 
more  emphasized  by  the  younger  psychologists  who  lay 
more  stress  on  the  functional  r.nd  biological  side  of 
mental  life.  Like  the  life  of  all  organized  beings,  the 
life  existence  of  the  psychic  state  is  for  some  reaction, 
for  tome  adjuttments  to  the  conditimit  of  the  external 
enviroiunent.  In  the  struggle  for  existence  die  ammal 
organism  must  on  pain  of  death  be  adjusted  to  the  ob- 
jects of  its  external  world.  Now  the  central,  nuclear, 
sensory  elements  awakened  by  external  excitations  give 
die  cue  for  the  reacdcm;  they  form  the  sensitive  organ- 
ization for  the  release  of  motor  energy  in  definite  diiec* 
tions;  they  signify  a  definite  object  to  which  corretptMid 
definite  motor  tendencies  with  final  reactions  of  adjutt- 
ment.  To  the  mouse  the  cat  is  not  an  object  of  contem- 
plation or  an  object  of  observation,  on  account  of  its 
sensory  effects, — die  cat  it  an  object  to  run  away  from. 
To  the  dog  a  cat  it  not  an  object  of  beauty,  bnt  tome- 
thing  to  be  run  after.  The  innsory  stimuladon'  coming 
from  the  'that,'  which  is  mouse,  is  for  the  cat  something 
to  be  on  the  alert,  to  jump  after  and  to  attack. 

The  lower  we  descend  in  the  scale  of  animal  life,  the 
more  prominent  do  the  motor  reaction  become.  Where 


Th4  Structurt  snd  Fimaiom  of  tht  Pm§p$  119 

life  is  predomiiuuitly  of  the  imdactive  type,  the  motor 
side  of  consciousness  is  more  apfwrent.  The  ly  tt> 
traded  by  the  scent  to  deposit  its  eggs  in  decomposed 
meat;  the  wasp  that  strikes  the  caterpillar  in  definite 
places  paralyzing  its  nervous  system,  thus  preparing 
food  for  the  coming  larva;  the  newborn  infant  starting 
to  suck,  when  put  to  the  breast— tre  good  examplet  of 
motor  reactions  in  response  to  sensory  stimulations  com- 
ing from  external  objects.  A  definite  sensory  stimulus 
is  the  trigger  which  releases  a  definite  set  of  motor 
reactions.  The  fly,  the  bee  is  hardly  conscious  of  the 
sensory  characters  of  the  honey;  it  is  more  likely  that 
the  sensory  stimuktions  of  the  hooey  release  the  ap> 
propriate  reaction  of  flying  towards  it. 

The  bright  colors  of  flowers  developed  in  the  course 
of  natural  selection  for  the  fertilization  of  plants  serve 
the  same  purpose;  they  awaken  definite  responses  use- 
ful both  to  pknt  and  insect,  as  it  is  hardly  probable  that 
the  insects  are  primarily  attracted  by  the  beautiful  color- 
ing of  the  flowers.  The  visual  stimuli  awakening  defi- 
nite sensory  elements  may  be  regarded  as  central  and 
nuclear  which  in  turn  ser  e  as  a  highly  sensitive  trigger 
to  release  definite  systems  of  motor  reactions.  The  effect 
is  somewhat  similar  to  that  of  the  moth  attracted  by  tiie 
flame, — the  flame  acts  as  a  peripheral  stimulus  giving 
rise  to  sensory  elements  which  form  the  sensitive  trigger 
in  the  release  of  the  reaction  of  circling  around  the 
flame,  in  spite  of  the  harmful  results.  The  moth  reacts 
to  bright  (Ejects  in  going  towards  tiiem,  Iwt  this  partic- 
ular bri^t  object,  the  flame,  has  not  been  pronded  for 
in  the  motor  adjustments  of  the  moth,  hence  the  lack  of 
adaptation,  the  going  to  the  danger,  instead  of  flying 
from  it 


I30       Norma  and  Ahnormml  Psychology 

So  apparently  insignificant  is  the  sensory  tide  and  so 
predominant  is  the  motor  side  with  its  almost  mechan- 
ically fttal  reactiont,  that  wamt  physiologists  put  the 
whole  mechanitm  of  excttatioo  and  reaction  in  the  lower 
animab  under  the  category  of  trointms,  which  may  be 
positive  or  negative,  according  as  the  animal  goes  to  or 
from  the  particular  stimulus.  The  sensory  side  is  de- 
nied, the  whole  afiFair  is  regarded  as  a  delicate  chemical 
reaction,  such  as  the  chemotaxis  of  leucocytes  in  the  phe- 
nomena of  phagocytosis  observed  in  inflammations  and 
bacterial  invasions,  or  what  is  still  simpler  as  the  phe- 
nomena of  heliotropism  observed  in  the  case  of  plants. 
This  purely  mechanical  or  chemico-physiological  view 
may  be  crude  and  far  fetched  in  the  case  of  lower  ani- 
mals, but  it  brings  out  strongly  the  predominance  of  the 
motor  reaction  ii     sponse  to  (teiinite  soisory  exdtadons. 

The  motor  aiiitude  of  the  animal  towards  the  exdta- 
tions  of  the  external  environment  constitutes  the  pre- 
dominant part  of  its  objective  world.  The  reactions 
with  their  sensori-motor  effects  are  part  and  parcel  of 
tht:  total  percept.  ^>  isori-motor  life  givet  reality  to  the 
world  of  objects.  The  spatial,  the  resistant,  the  ma- 
terial character  of  objects  depends  on  our  motor  reac- 
tions which  give  content  and  reality  to  the  world  of 
things.  Activity  gives  the  sense  of  'physical'  reality, 
the  sense  of  material  actuality,  or  of  what  is  regarded 
as  'the  really  real.'  In  other  words,  sensori-motor  re- 
actions with  consequait  kinaesthetic  sanations  may  be 
regarded  as  constituting  the  very  essence  of  the  real, 
external,  material  world, — the  world  of  external,  mate- 
rial objects. 

The  percept  as  we  have  pointed  out  forms  one  or- 
ganic whole,  the  constituent  ekments  are  firmly  iate- 


Tkt  Structure  Md  Function  of  the  Percept    1 3 1 

grated  into  one  living  organization.  In  other  worcb, 
just  as  the  organism  is  not  simply  an  integrated  com- 
pound of  cells,  tissues  and  orga but  all  those  lower 
units  go  to  form  the  higher  living  unit,  the  life  of  the 
organirin  ss  a  whole,  so  we  may  ny  thit  the  lemory 
elements  are  not  the  same  as  the  percept,  diey  are  ana- 
tomically found,  on  the  autopsy  of  the  percept, — the  sen- 
sory elements  are  the  lower  units  that  help  to  form  the 
higher  unit,  the  living  percept.  From  a  scientific  stand- 
point, at  the  resolt  of  psychological  dissection,  the  sen- 
sory elements  going  to  make  up  the  psychic  compound, 
the  percept,  may  be  regarded  as  different  from  the  total 
synthesis  with  its  characteristic  living  activity  rad  its 
peculiar  form  of  perceptual  consciousness. 

The  constituent  elements  of  the  percept  are  not  of 
the  same  definiteness  and  intensity.  The  central  nuclear 
elements  stand  out  more  distinct,  more  deftiite,  and  coo- 
sciousness  lights  them  up  with  more  po^  er  and  inten- 
sity. They  are  like  the  mountain  peaks — ^when  glade 
and  valley  and  mountain  side  are  still  immersed  in  dark- 
ness, the  rising  sun  greets  die  mountain  tops  and  plays 
and  caresses  them  with  its  rays;  when  again  the  shades 
of  evening  begin  to  flit  and  gather  over  vale,  rai^e,  mA 
gulch,  the  rays  of  the  setting  sun  long  linger  on  the 
peaks  taking  of  thtm  their  last  farewell.   The  central 

nuclear  elements  are  in  the  focus  of  consciousness,  

they  are  the  first  to  be  met  by  the  glance  of  the  mental 
eye  and  are  the  very  last  to  be  left  by  it.  GxisctousnesB 
plays  with  its  searchlight  on  the  nuclear  sensory  ele- 
ments. The  central  nuclear  elements  are  intense,  dis- 
tinct, and  definite,  while  the  subordinate  elements  are 
of  far  less  intensity,  are  often  quite  indistinct,  arc,  so 
tosay,OBthefrbgeof  coQidoutnesi;  in  f«ct,  may  even 


I3S       Normd  md  Ahmrmtl  PsjeMogf 


be  entirely  subconscious.  And  still  indefinite,  indisdnct, 
and  submerged  as  those  subordinate  elements  are,  they 
form  die  maoi  content  of  tlie  percept,  giving  it  the 
fullness  of  reality. 

The  nuclear  elements  form  the  cue  of  the  total  re- 
action, thus  standing  for  the  particular  object,  forming 
the  reality  of  the  percept  for  the  organism.  No  won- 
der thm  that  the  cue,  though  it  may  be  the  smallest  por- 
tion of  die  percqpt,  none  the  lew  forms  for  die  onan- 
ism the  most  vital,  the  moet  sigiiificant  as  well  at  the 
most  constant  part  of  the  percept.  The  attitude,  the 
total  reaction  of  the  organism  depends  on  the  slightest 
difference  in  the  cue,  on  the  slightest  change  of  the 
inidear  elements,  Mnce  the  apparendy  slight  modifica- 
tion may  often  prove  of  great  significance  to  the  life 
existence  of  the  organism, — it  may  be  a  matter  of  life 
and  death.  The  nuclear  elements  constitute  the  signal, 
the  sensitive  trigger  for  the  release  of  definite  reactions 
towards  the  changes  of  external  objects.  Hence  the 
nuclear  ekments  come  to  signify,  in  fact,  to  constitute 
the  essence  of  the  percept. 

A  change  of  the  subordinate  elements  of  the  percept 
does  not  matter  so  much  as  the  slightest  modification  in 
the  quality  or  even  in  the  intensity  of  the  signal.  This, 
of  coarse,  does  not  mean  that  the  subordinate  sensory 
elements  are  not  psychologically  and  Uologically  of  the 
utmost  consequence  to  the  <Mrganinn,  but  they  are  not  of 
that  immediate  importance  as  the  focal,  nuckar  ele- 
ments appear  to  the  consciousness  of  the  organism.  The 
nuclear  elements,  as  s!  il,  focus  the  interest  of  the  ani- 
mal We  can  well  realize  their  vital  importance,  if  we 
cau&Aat  that  die  midear  demmts  are  At  w^di  m- 
dtcates  friend  or  mmff  war  or  paaee,  file  or  Mk, 


Tkg  Simetmv  md  Ftmetiom  of  tkt  Percept  133 

If  we  regard  the  percept  statically,  we  may  describe 
It  figuratively  as  a  psychic  compound,  the  union  of  the 
eleniaits  luytng  somewhat  the  character  of  a  chemical 
combuifttion.  A  new  compound  is  famed  possessing 
qualities  of  its  own,  diifefent  from  tkese  o#  die  oon- 
stituent  elements.  The  sensory  characteristics  are  pre- 
foundly  modified  in  the  synthesis,  so  much  so  that  they 
cannot  be  directly  discerned  and  can  only  be  discovered 
by  petient  study.  The  elements  do  not  exist  freely, 
they  are  bound  up  in  one  indissohible  anion  of  the  per- 
cept. It  seems,  as  if  different  qualitatiiPt  states  arise  in 
the  union,  the  qualities  of  the  elements  i^pearing,  as  if 
transformed  by  the  effe  t  d  synthesis. 

The  percept  forms  a  new  compound  in       .  the 
component  elements  are  disguised  and  transfom.cd  by 
the  qualitative  aspect  of  the  cmcnrf  rlimitiiis  The 
subordinate  elements  become  askpted  to  the  active 
nucleus,  and  come  out  in  the  compound  with  sensory 
characteristics  foreign  to  their  nature.    In  the  process 
of  synthesb  the  subordinate  elements  become  trans- 
muted and  assume  the  sensory  dttraderitttcs  of  the 
nucleus.    To  isolate  the  various  elements  Mt  of  the 
synthetized  percept,  the  central  elements  must  be  shih- 
ed,--the  subordinate  elements  must  be  made  focal,  giv- 
ing rise  to  new  percepts,  but  at  the  same  time  making  it 
possible  to  pass  in  feview  the  various  elements.  In 
other  words,  the  elements  become  reveM  m  propor- 
tioK     rve  make  of  them  signals,  in  proportion  at  they 
become  significant  of  the  total  percept  with  its  senMri- 
motor  reactions. 

The  nodear  elements  are  the  most  pronounced,  the 
mort  prominent,  as  £sr  as  satani&in  of  sensory  quality 
it  mawiasd.   They  him  to  nmeh  ol  fhe^ 


m 


134       Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


sensory  quality  that  they  diffuse  it  into  the  other  ele- 
ments,— the  subordinate  elements  appear  under  the 
seittory  form  of  die  nudeus;  dicy  becmne  «Nimikited 
by  the  nucleus,  and  are  smtorated  wiA  its  senwMy  cit- 
ing. This  holds  true  not  only  in  regard  to  saturation, 
but  also  in  regard  to  sensory  brightness.  The  central 
elements  possess  a  sensory  brightness  far  in  excess  of 
other  elements,  and  hence  they  shed  their  sensory  light 
on  the  more  obscure,  dioag^  no  less  important  sonory 
elements.  What  however  diey  illumine  is  not  so  much 
the  peculiar  sensory  characteristics  of  those  elements, 
but  their  own  coloring  with  which  they  have  saturated 
the  total  percept. 

The  force  of  the  central  elements  lies  specially  in  the 
emodonal  or  affective  tone  with  whidi  diey  are  pervad- 
ed. They  arouse  an  attitude  towards  the  external  world 
in  general  and  to  the  special  object  in  particular;  Taine 
would  call  it  a  tendency.  The  individual  is  stimulated 
by  those  nuclear  elements ;  his  whole  attention  is  going 
out  in  directim  to  dw  object  that  has  OKited  dwm. 
The  whole  organism  is  invaded  by  the  subtle  infliMnce  of 
the  nucleus  giving  rise  to  definite  sensori-motor  ieac> 
tions,  intensifying  the  affective  state  which  permeates 
the  perceptual  consciousness. 

The  affective  state  of  the  percept  is  not  always 
obvious  in  caMS  of  fleeting  percepts,  but  it  becoRMS 
manifest,  mhen  the  central  elements  beccmie  temporarily 
fixed,  the  stress  and  strain  of  consciousness  tending  in 
one  direction.  The  very  changes  occurring  in  the  flicker- 
ing intensity  of  the  nuclear  elements  tend  to  sharpen  the 
situation,  to  enliven  the  interest,  strain  the  attention,  and 
be  til  agog  so  to  say.  Hie  ctt  getting  •  g^unpse  of  « 
mome,  or  die  dog  catchmg  si|^t  of  the  cat  may  be  talun 


The  Structure  and  FuHcHon  of  the  Ptrupt  135 

as  good  illustnrtkw  of  the  .llbctbe  ttetet  pi««m  in 

perceptual  consaousnc*.  The  nuclear  cIemcnVl«t£ 

of  A-^T  "^S^^r  importance 
of  Ac  central  nodetr  element.,  the  necewity  Vf  their 
standing  out  m  consciousness  as  more  pronrinent  mi 
^ZlnlT  of     ^nsory  element..  Coo. 

ZT^f^  signal,  they  come  to  be  the  most  signifiamt 
^rt  of  the  percept,  for  they  announce  what  'that'  is 
tfcey  pment  dje  object,  friend  or  foe,  something  to  weU 
come  or  «,«ethmg  to  fee  from.  The  central  nudear  ele- 
mente  thus  come  to  prewnt  objective  reality,  they  safe. 
Piard  the  mdividual.  they  a«  the  safety  as  weU^.,  ,i 
dangersignal.  The  more  delicately  differentiated  those 
•tfetjNhnger  signal,  are,  the  more  protected  the  indi- 

site  tieTn^.'^^' The  more 
sitive  the  individual  become,  to  the  kaM  <fifcfence  of 
the  nuclear  elements,  the  better  adjiiMed  wiO  he  be  to 

^15  i^ir  u  cnviromnent,  and  the  bet- 

tei^iU  be  his  chance,  m  the  proce*  of  nrvival  of  the 

OnT^f  Ae^Purporfvene..  of  the  percept. 

One  of  the  important  characterirtic.  of  the  biological 
process  IS  the  final  cause,  the  purpoae  formed  by  naS 
selection  out  of  chance  variations,  and  leading  to  the 

SJS'"  X^L^rii  P'^rvation  of  the 

uidiTKhial.  We  dioold  therefore  expect  that  in  the 
m^ic  procett  which  i.  the  mo*  highly  developed  bio- 
ogical  procew,  purpoMvene*.  formed  oot  of  p.ychic 
chance  variations,  will  be  one  of  the  most  in^l^ 
toaits^^  In  the  course  of  phylogenetic  and  ontogenetic 
evolution  Mme  Mnrary  element.,  the  one.  to  which 


136       Normal  mtd  AbnonmA  Psychology 

the  organism  is  more  sensitive,  will  be  selected  and 
become  the  indicators  of  the  total  percept,  they  will 
become  the  index,  or  better  to  wy  the  pain-pkMute  lag, 
the  safety-danger  signal.  The  central  ekments  will 
dtut  be  die  most  prominent,  the  most  intense  for  that 
particular  state  of  perceptual  consciousness.  The  na- 
ture and  character  of  the  elements  will  vary  with  the 
organization  of  the  species  and  the  individuaL  The 
dog  will  become  more  sensitive  to  variatioitt  of  his  ol- 
^ctory  sensations,  while  man  will  show  mariced  sensi- 
tivity towards  delicate  differences  of  hit  visual  tensory 
elements. 

The  great  sensitivity  of  the  nuclear  elements  is  sig- 
nificant, in  so  far  as  the  •  lead  to  better  adaptation  and  to 
more  tuecesaful  reactimis.  It  is  not  of  any  cooseqnenee 
for  the  cow  to  gaze  at  the  stars,  for  the  pig  to  observe 
the  phases  of  the  moon,  but  it  is  a  matter  of  importance 
for  them  to  perceive  any  signs  of  food,  or  the  approach 
of  a  beasc  of  prey.  The  heavenly  bodies  are  non-exis- 
tent for  the  brutes,  beoraae  of  lack  of  all  resedont  of 
adaptation,  while  food  and  predatory  beasts  are  easily 
detected,  because  of  the  vital  reactions  bound  up  in 
the  elements  of  the  percept  of  which  the  nuclear  ele- 
ments form  the  signal.  It  is  on  account  of  the  vital 
reactions  that  the  perceptual  nucleus  plays  such  a  pn»n- 
inent  part  and  takes  ike  lead  of  all  odier  ekmentt. 
As  I  have  pointed  out  in  a  former  work:  *The 
payduc  state  is  for  some  reaction  and  that  sensory  ele- 
ment which  gives  the  cue  for  the  formation  of  the  psy- 
chomotor elements,  leading  to  some  given  reaction  is, 
for  the  time  being,  the  center,  the  nucleus  of  the  total 
•tate." 


CHAPTER  XXI 

PWMAIY  AND  SECONDARY  SENSORY  ELEMENTS 

IF  we  inspect  the  percept  more  closely,  we  find  that 
ttcfe  »  umt  important  difference  in  the  character 
^LfZ  "^^t  «n«,ry  elements.  The 

centnU  element,  forming  the  nucleus  of  the  per- 
cept  are  g,ven  directly  by  the  sense^rgan  iiL.^ 
appropriate  sensory  stimuli,  while  the  nS^S 

^^.n  Z::!!  '•«''-'^^//^,-^hey  cannot  ^ 

to  .ppropmte  •en«,ry  stimuli  exciting  tho..  par! 

J^rlatrr'^".^  ^  '^''^'^  which  those  sub- 
ordinate  elements  depend  for  their  ii»iiif»tttioii  h 

^nZ     A  the  transparency,  the  dis^ 

1  CM  see  directly  it  only  the  color,  transparency,  size 
as  given  immed  ately  by  the  stinmhted  seL'r^  by 
he  visual  sensations  and  image  oo  the 

w  Zt?  "1"°'  "^^"""^  elements,-the; 

t^^^JTJZT  ''Tf "  "  element;!!^ 
that  on  ««n*cK,rgans.   It  is  not 

mlZTJ^  object  we  re- 

member  its  volume,  ,ts  distance,  its  smoothness  its  re- 
si.tan«,  we  perceive  all  that  in  sensorTterT 
.«^t  .mages,  ideas  or  representations-they  are  seS^ 
«fa«BS.   The  central  sensory  elements  may  be  termed 

tT^^""''  elements  may 

be  termed  uidtreGt  or  i.««rf.ry.  The  percept  then  may 


138        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

be  regarded  as  amntdng  of  two  classes  of  elements  of 
sensations,  the  {vinuiry  and  seccmdary  sensory  ele- 
ments.* 

The  secondary  sensory  elements  are  not  images,  nor 
ideas,  nor  representations,  (Afferent  terms  employed  for 
the  same  state  by  various  writers,  the  secondary  ele- 
ments of  the  percept  are  essentially  sensations.  Now 
sensations  are  qualitatively  different  from  images,  ideas 
or  representations.    The  image  of  a  light  does  not 
shine,  the  idea  of  a  voice  does  not  soimd,  and  the  rep- 
mentation  of  a  perfume  ibes  not  nndl.  A  sensation, 
or  presentation  as  it  is  sometimes  termed,  differs  from 
an  image  or  representation  qualitatively,  fundamentally. 
The  sensation  or  presentation  is  given  as  immediate  ex- 
perience, while  the  image,  the  representation  is  essen- 
tially mediate,  it  is  a  mental  substitute  for  die  immedi- 
ate experience  of  the  sensation.   The  idea  or  image 
bears  tiie  same  relation  to  the  sensation  as  a  photograph 
bears  to  the  original,  or  rather  as  a  symbol  to  the  thing 
it  represents.    Ideas,  images,  representations  substitute, 
represent  sensations,  but  they  are  not  sensaticms.  A 
sensory  process  is  fimdamentally  different.  A  semation 
is  not  an  intense  idea,  nor  is  an  idea  a  weak  tensation. 
Ideas  differ  far  more  qualitatively  from  sensations  than 
visual  sensations,  for  instance,  differ  from  olfactory  sen- 
sations.   There  is  not  a  particle  of  evidence  to  sub- 
stantiate the  view  that  ideas  or  images  are  copies  of  sen- 
sations \u  the  sense  of  being  weak  sensations  or  'centrally 
excited  sensations.*  There  it  nothing  of  the  sensory  in  the 


♦It  may  be  well  here  to  pmnt  out  that  the  doctrine  of  primary 
and  secondary  sensory  elenentt  advanced  by  me  has  nothing  in 
common  widi  pmaary  tad  MComUry  4)iulitic«  of  VM  qmt 
ps^cholo|iitat 


ides.  TTie  W€«lMit  ieiiwtioo  cannot  compm  with  the 
most  vivid  repfCMatatkm. 

The    laboratory    experiments    on    that  tabiecl 
(Miinsterberg  and  Kulpe)  are  inconclusive  as 
either  deal  with  incompletely  perceived  impressions, 
or  with  mumntl  sensations.    In  either  case  the  per- 
cept It  mc^plete  and  uncertain.    Kulpe  himself  is 
forced  to  admit  that  ideas  or  'ccntraUy  excited  sensa- 
tions  as  he  terms  them  "cannot  be  regarded  at  nmpie 
revivals  of  peripherally  excited  contents,  if  only  for  the 
reason,  that  their  remaining  attributes  are  very  rarely 
mdeed  identical  widi  those  of  perception."    He  then 
gon  on  making  a  fatal  admitnoii :  "The  mott  striking 
evidence  of  disparity  is  perhaps  aforded  by  intensity. 

•    .    .    It  IS  only  in  special  cases  that  centrally  ex- 
cited sensations  can  rise  from  their  accustomed  faint- 
nestto  the  vividness  of  sense  perception.  We  then  speak 
of  them  at  hattudnations  ( ?) ;  and  they  enter  into  a 
d»~ftKwt  .competition  with  the  real  material  of  per- 
ception,  completely  transcendmg  the  boundary  Une 
which  so  usefully  divides  it  from  die  material  of  tmagw 
laf  ion.     Kiilpe  admits  that  there  is  no  intensity  to  the 
image,  diat  there  is  no  variation  in  'intensity'  of  images, 
•n  attnW  characteristic  of  percepts.  Psychologic 
«My  regarded,  diit  m  itself  thowt  the  qualiutive  differ- 
ence  between  image  and  perce]^ 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Bergson  is  interested  in  on- 
chology  from  a  purely  metaphysical  standpoint,  he  nev- 
«thelets  has  some  excellent  remarks  on  memory  and  on 
Ae  quahtative  diffeience  between  image  and  percept. 
Although  he  IS  wrong  in  tnppoting  that  the  image  may 
be  prolonged  and  projected  into  perceptual  caaadon^ 
nett,  he  none  dM  leu  fophMisit  mm^  the 


I40       Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


tive  difference  of  the  two.  If  I  imdentaml  hfan  aright 
he  is  opposed  to  the  view  of  identificatioa  of  memory 
images  with  sensations.  A  memory  image  is  not  a  weak- 
ened sensation.  "The  absurdity"  says  Bergson  "he- 
comet  patent  when  the  argument  is  inverted  (although 
Ait  ou^t  to  be  l^itimate  on  die  hypodwnt  adopted) , 
that  it  to  say,  when  the  intensity  of  the  teuatioa  it  db* 
creased  instead  of  the  intensity  of  the  pure  memory  be- 
ing increased.  For,  if  the  two  states  (memory-image 
and  sensation)  differ  merely  in  degree,  there  should  be  a 
fl^ven  mcwnent  at  which  the  tenntion  changed  into  a 
niem«Mry.  If  die  memory  of  an  acnte  pain,  for  inttuioe, 
it  but  a  weak  pain,  inversely  an  intense  pain  which  I  led 
will  end,  as  it  grows  less,  by  being  an  acute  pain  re- 
membered. .  .  .  Never  will  this  weak  state  ap- 
pear to  me  to  be  the  memory  of  a  strong  state.  Mem- 
ory is  smiediing  quite  different.** 

Ideadonal  and  perceptual  proceatet  cannot  be  idtnti- 
fted.  The  two  are  qualitatively  different:  the  sensation 
has  intensity,  the  image  lacks  it.  We  may  point  out 
the  main  differences  of  sensation  and  image,  (a)  A 
sensation  has  intensity,  an  image  totally  lacks  it  {b) 
An  image  it  a  reproduction  or  rather  a  rtpretentation, 
a  tymbol  of  a  tentadm,  hnt  no  leMadon  re|»eientt 
another;  a  sensation,  unlike  an  image,  is  not  mediate, 
but  immediate  experience,  {c)  A  sensation  bears  the 
mark  of  externality,  an  image  lacks  it.  Finally  (d)  a 
sensation  cannot  be  called  up  at  will,  while  an  image 
it  independent  of  perifrfieral  t&mdadoia  of  eztenud  ob- 
jects and  is  usually  under  the  omtrol  of  the  will.  No 
sensation  differs  so  much  from  another  at  the  unBgt  Of- 
fers from  its  corresponding  sensation. 

Seniory  ekmentt  and  their  tynthceit,  the  percept, 


PrimmrymdStcomdmySmua^Ekmmis  141 

Motor  twrtanciM,  wiiile  the  image  or  idea  has  not 
any  motor  tendencies.   The  iwwm  wl^  every  image 
and  idea  has  been  made  ideo-motor  is  because  images  or 
representations  have  been  regarded  as  sensory  in  char- 
acter, as  weakened  sensations,  as  'sensationalettes'  so  to 
•jr.   BeffMO  clearly  sees  the  qualitative  difference  of 
A*  two;  he  iniitt  on  the  noiHiioior  character  of  the 
image  m  contradistinction  to  the  strongly  motor  chai^ 
acter  of  the  sensation  and  the  percept.  Recently  Thorn- 
dike  laid  great  stress  on  the  psychological  fallacy  of 
«j^«img  unages  and  ideas  as  motor  in  character.  This 
f  aii«7  b  essentially  dne  to  the  current  identification  of 
presentative  and  reiireieiitstive  elements. 

To  refer  as  Kulpe  does  to  a  hallucination  as  an  tnteo. 
sified  image  is  to  reason  in  a  circle  and  at  the  same  time 
to  be  m  sad  contradiction  with  facts.  A  haUucination 
may  be  regarded  as  a  fallacious  percept,  but  it  is  not 
00  that  aecoont  an  image;  a  hallucination  is  a  percept 
and  IS  essentiaUy  sensory  in  ch««cter.  The  fact  of  e  p». 
cept  being  fallacious  does  not  in  the  least  imply  that  it 
IS  imaginary'  and  not  sensory. 

The  ambiguity  of  the  word  'imaginary'  has  not  a 
htde  contoTwted  to  the  psychological  faUacy  helping 
tOTOdt  the  confutton  of  image  and  sensation.  'Imagin- 
ary  is  used  in  the  common  sense  meanmg  not  com. 
spending  to  any  external  reality,  or  in  the  psychological 
sense  of  consisfing  of  those  internal  events  or  processes 
known  as  images  or  ideas.  Now  'imaginary'  used  in 
tenee  of  lack  of  an  external  object  by  no  means  im- 

phcs  the  psychological  sense  of  condedng  of  images.  A 
hallucination  is  commonly  said  to  be  imaginary  in  the 
sense  of  not  having  an  objective  reaUty,  hot  we  have  to 
prove  ytt  that  it  conuati  ol  imifM. 


t42       Normsl  md  AhnormU  Psychology 


The  dwomt  of  nhninni,  halludnations  m  wdl  tt 

of  dream  states  and  hypnotic  hallucinations  are  viti- 
ated  by  that  fundamenul  psychological  fallacy.  As 
a  matter  of  fact  hallucinations  are  not  made  up 
of  images,  but  of  sensory  elements;  while  on  die 
contrary  hypnotic  imUndnatioat  «ie  not  made  op  of 
aemory  elenientt,  but  of  imagea.  HaUndaadons  are  not 
due  to  'images'  but  to  actual  sensations.  Psycho- 
logically regarded,  hallucinations  do  not  differ  in  their 
make-up  from  ordinary  percepts.  Ideas  and  images  are 
not  possessed  of  magic  virtues,  and  with  all  the  fancy 
work  about  them,  they  cannot  display  temorir  qnafi- 
tiet.  The  image  or  idea  it  that  bloodless,  shadowy, 
fluttering  affair  which  can  no  more  attain  the  life  of  a 
sensation  than  a  written  letter  can  attain  the  power  of 
sound.  Had  it  been  otherwise  the  world  would  have 
been  a  large  asylum  for  images  to  play  their  pranks  m. 

We  may  quote  Stoat  as  one  of  the  few  psychologists 
who  seem  not  to  accept  the  current  psychological  doc- 
trine. In  his  'Analytic  Psychology'  he  tells  us  'that 
complex  perception  does  not  consist  in  a  given  impres- 
sion reviving  a  cluster  of  faint  images  of  previous  im- 
pressions.* And  again  "impressioa«l  levival  does  not 
in  die  least  countenance  the  dieory  diat  ideas  aie  merely 
Aunt  revivals  of  impressions.  On  the  contrary,  it  tends 
strongly  in  the  opposite  direction.  It  shows  that  a 
revived  impression  is  itself  an  impression,  and  not  an 
idea."  In  his  'Manual  of  Psychology'  he  says  'that  at 
bottom  the  distinction  between  unage  and  percept  is 
based  on  a  difference  of  quality.'  And  again,  "per- 
cepts and  images  possess  a  relative  independence.  This 
can  be  accounted  for,  if  we  suppose  that  the  nervous 
tracts  excited  in  perceptual  process  are  not  wholly  coin- 


PrimMrymdStcondmrySmuoryEkmrnm  143 


ddent  with  those  excited  in  m 

The  elements  of  the  percept  aic  not  not 
imaginary,  they  are  essentially  sensory.  The  peneptul 
elements  are  synthetized  into  one  percept.  To  take  our 
stock  example,  the  ice.  The  lump  of  ice  is  experienced 
as  one  object  with  many  quaUties  each  of  which  fur- 
nishes  respectively  its  senMry  quota  towftitit  the  fomui. 
tionof  the  whole  of  the  perceptual  experience.  We  see, 
we  perceive  the  hard,  heavy,  smooth,  resistant  body  of 
ice,— aU  the  elements  have  alike  the  intensity  of  sensa. 
tion.  The  hardness,  the  smoothness,  the  bodily  resist- 
ance are  perceived  by  the  visual  tease  and  are  visual, 
but  as  such  they,  of  course,  diier  fnim  the  sensatioiii  ex. 
perienced  by  their  appropriate  sense  organs,  as  when 
for  mstance  the  same  sensations  are  given  by  touch  or 
by  muscuUr  and  kinesthetic  sensations.   Those  muscu- 
lar  and  tacto-motor  sen:.ations  appearing  as  visual  are 
not  roemory-images,  but  they  are  achuU  stusmthns,  they 
are  secondary  sensations;  they  are  secondary  seiMory 
elements  which  give  the  fullness  of  content  to  the  per- 
cept, having  visual  sensory  elements  as  its  nucleus.  Un- 
like memory-images,  secondary  perceptual  elements 
have  the  immediacy  of  lemory  experience.  Remem- 
bered sensory  qualitiei  are  not  immediate  experiences 
given  in  the  object  of  perception. 

If  we  turn  to  pathology,  we  find  that  cases  closely 
confirm  our  view.  In  certain  mental  diseases  the  pa- 
tient can  perceive  the  various  qualities,  although  he  can- 
not represent  them  to  himself.  In  other  cases  the  pa- 
tient can  clearly  and  vividly  represent  objects  m  all  tbetr 
details,  but  he  cannot  perceive  the  objects,  when  (firact- 
ly  confronted  with  them.  Clinical  cases,  even  if  wc 
exclude  all  facts  from  introspective  study,  clearly  point 


144       NorukU  sad  Ahmrmd  Ftyekohiy 


to  the  qualitative  difference  of  image  and  sensation, 
irrespective  of  the  assumption  of  localization — they 
may  be  (hie  to  the  fnocdoii  of  <fiiefart  hnm  Mnic* 
tiiitt»  or  to  different  proceitet  of  the  mum  braui  itrae* 
tares.  In  tlw  li^t  of  receitt  research  it  is  more  ISSukf 
that  the  neuron  structures  underlying  ideational  pro- 
cesses differ  from  those  subserving  sensory  processes. 
Whichever  view  however  we  entertain  in  regard  to  the 
aratomical  ttructarea  all  tlie  hcts  go  to  prove  tluit 
image  and  aensitioii  are  fusUuoivtly  i^«rMil  fiycMe 
events. 

The  percept  is  not  ideational,  but  sensory.  There 
are  no  memory-images  in  perceptual  consciousness,  al- 
though the  latter  may  be  closely  associated  widi  itka^ 
ttonal  [Mooeaset.  Such  ideas,  however,  are  on  the  fenge 
of  the  perceptual  coosdmaneat  and  do  not  constitute  the 
essence  of  the  percept.  The  percept  consists  of  sensory 
elements,  primary  and  secondary.  The  primary  ele- 
ments are  initiated  directly  by  incoming  peripheral  stim- 
ulations, while  the  seomdary  sensory  etenenta  are 
brought  about  indurectly,  through  the  mecfiacy  of  the 
primary  elements,  the  secmidary  denMnts  themselves 
being  really  derived  from  sense-organs  others  than  the 
ones  directly  stimulated  by  the  peripheral  excitation. 

If  the  percept  is  visual,  and  ^  stands  for  the  visual 
physiological  processes,  A  for  the  auditory,  O  for  the 
olfactory,  M  mutcular,  K  kinesthetic,  T  for  tactual 
physiological  processes;  ^tun  let  Fi,  Af«,  d,  Kt, 
Ti  stand  for  the  primary  sensory  elements;  and  let 
F;  0»,  M.,  Km,  r.  stand  for  the  secondary  sensory  ele- 
ments, then  the  total  percept  may  be  represented  by  the 
fomnila  VX)J4JL*T»,  ^ce  all  the  other  ekmenti  ap- 
ptir  in  the  vimiI  percept  under  the  vieital  MpeeCt  w 


Primary  tud  Secondary  Sensory  Ehmenti  145 

The  secondary  sensory  elements,  though  forming 
the  m«n  content  of  the  percept,  are  apparently  of 
a  visual  nature,  and  ttUI  they  radly  belong  to  qualita- 
tively different  reabns  of  senMitioni.  Thb  dewly  m. 
veals  their  origin  and  nature:  the  suoadary  sensory 
elements  are  not  visual,  but  they  become  so  by  being 
initiated  through  the  visual  sense.  In  other  words,  wc- 
ondary  tenMry  dements  are  not  peripherally  initiated. 
Are  they  then  centrally  exdted  iensaticnf?  N©.  They 
can  only  be  induced  an  external  stimuhit*  Bot  tfaet 
external  stimulus  must  act  indiraetly,  thran^  aaotlier 
senseK>rgan. 


CHAia  ER  XXII 


•BOQNDABY  tBNIOBY  BLBIOMTl  A1S>  HAUUCmATOMT 

PERCBrnoif 

IN  stimulating  a  senie-orgu  we  not  only  get  •»• 
wory  elonentt  dnracteriitic  of  ikm  p?  rriwlar  kmc, 
bitt  abo  sensory  elements  belon^ig  u  other  sense- 
organs  whicli  hn^f  n'<i  been  stimulated.  What 
really  takes  place  is  this:  the  external  excitatioa  acting 
on  a  particular  sense-organ  produces  its  appropriate  sen- 
MrtMNHb  kit  the  peripheral  j^ysiologicai  proom  dSMmm 
or  miiir  to  wy  geti  irm&Mid  iloag  odwr  l  uwi  «l 
other  terae  structures,  awakcati^  their  appropriate  sen- 
sations. Such  sensations,  not  being  directly  but  indi- 
rectly peripherally  initiated  shovld  be  ngarded  as  sec- 
ondary sensations. 

The  [iliiniiifni  of  secondary  mm«Cm»  are  well 
known  in  psychological  literature.  S<mie  psycholo^its 
following  the  general  fallacy  of  confusing  in^.age  and 
sensation  describe  vivid  images  succeedii^  soisations 
under  the  category  of  secmidary  sensations.  Barring 
ndi  confysion  we  may  say  that  the  pure  phencnnena  of 
tccowdafy  tentstioiit  are  essentiiAy  utttttf  is  dbMnsttt. 
When  a  teati^n  due  to  the  stimulation  of  a  pcrqp^ 
eral  sense-organ,  instead  of  being  followed  by  a  train 
of  association  of  ideas  is  followed  by  ar  >ther  sensa- 
tion belonging  to  the  domzia  of  another  senie-o^an, 
the  plieaomcMm  it  knowa  m       of  ijniinhMii  or  of 

C\mm  ttamqm  OT  I V  fWT  .tf  WtttriffH  *«  •  SiBMtiOR 


Secomditry  Smucry  Elemmti  mU  f'^retplim  147 


of  one  iwe  orgMi  mmf  be  mmmmi  ami  briag  m 

train  of  aMor'itions  any  other  image  relating  to  an? 
other  sentatin  of  any  other  senae-organ.  The  scrit  i 
of  ideas  or  images  is  a  r  due  ion  of  stimulated 
■fHM  fMfiiiii  with  ifccar  a^mpanying  sensations,  the 
ideas  nnniag  paraOil  to  et^nal  (wycho-physiolog- 
ical  processes,  somewhat  on  die  Spiacttialic  priacipk 
of  'Ordo  '■t  cnnnexio  idearum  '^der  est  ^rdo  et  con- 
nexio  rerum.'  And  ag  in  other  ase  when  not  re- 
imxksdng  a  prt  imis  scr.  ,  of  s-  .  7  experience,  the 
miai  ^  anoctaied  inages  may  mm  rrregular  and 
apparently  crpricio  js — a  procaan  o^ai^  described  as 
the  woric  of  fsnc  o  Imak  ^t&s  soua  «a  or 
image  then  r  1  be  ollc  by  any  ics  of  nages 
without  t  c  uif  rm*  iiacy  '  rnal  excitations  and 

peripheral  p*ysiok,  ca!  r  ..aaes.  A  sensation,  how- 
ever, cttiBot  bt  t<4b«red  a  seriM  of  seniatioM  with. 
o«t  nitem  -d.acy  of  xicrnal  a^Hmlations.  A  sen- 
sation ran  onlv  e  initiat  by  its  own  appropriate  stim- 
ulus an  bv  own  oe  ized  peripheral  physiological 
;jroce:  =es.  1  smell  rose  does  not  by  simple  as- 
mmtmm  p»e  rise  t  3  <  ies  of  sensations  of  touring  in 
nmiiiinuiii,ner  he  cMMg  of  beefsteak  give  riae, 
Hrough  assnciatioi  die  hearing  of  a  symphoajr.  la 
r  rds,  I   re  ts    1  internal  association  of  images  or 

as,  th^  is  h  £  an  internal  association  of  sensa- 
once  bom  can  be  reproduced  endlessly 
aad  at  wii  iosat  «m  <fie  abnost  hninediately  after  they 
ate  b(  a  tmi  mtr  be  raiewed  every  time  mier  the 
same  md  ionso  xteinal  stimulations.  Briefly  stated, 
there  is  memory  for  imiiges,  but  not  for  sensations.  Sett' 
sations  are  independent,  images  are  interconnected. 

If  we  represent  sensations  by  A,  B,  C,  D  and  sym- 


bolizc  images  by  a,  b,  c,  d,  the  if,  C,  D  have  no 
rektiofit  to  one  anodier,  bat  etch  oae  bcitn  t  deftute 
rdftdoD  to  each  corresponding  image,  A  to  a,  B  to  b,  C 
to  c,  D  to  d,  and  so  with  the  rest  of  the  series.  Sensa- 
tion A  will  arouse  image  a  which  in  turn  may  arouse 
the  whole  train  of  images,  h,  c,  d,  but  A  cannot  give  rise 
to  any  of  die  aemations  B,  C,  D.  The  image  series 
a,  b,  e,  d  emhe  reproduoed  at  will,  in  fact  after  a  aeries 
of  repetition  the  whole  chain  of  links  may  rattle  off 
against  will,  but  nothing  of  the  kind  occurs  in  the  case 
of  sensations.  Sensations  do  not  form  links  in  a  chain 
which  becomes  automatic  after  many  reproductions. 
RepeHHon  of  seHsatkms  does  mot  form  Msoeisud  series; 
sensaHons  memfm  their  imdependemu. 

The  diffefCDce  between  image  and  sensation  in 
spect  to  association  is,  psychologically  regarded,  appar- 
ently  flawless.  Unfortunately  as  it  is  usually  the  case 
with  flawless  generalizations  and  descriptions  of  phe- 
nomena observed  under  nmrmal  conditions,  diere  is  an 
ungracMWs  'abncmnal*  dut  refuses  to  fall  into  line. 
There  are  cases  apparendy  abnormal  from  the  psycho- 
logical standpoint,  cases  which  refuse  to  be  gathered 
into  the  normal  psychological  fold;  these  cases  seem  to 
run  counter  to  all  normal  psychological  introspectira. 
The  sensations  seem  to  run  fiot,-— nnstead  of  being 
Ibdced  with  tlwir  respective  images  they  really  call  up 
assorted  sensations ;  these  are  the  so-called  sound-phot- 
isms  or  light-phonisms,  and  similar  odd  combinations. 
It  is  true  the  sensations  are  rather  awkwardly  associ- 
ated. One  sensation  always  calls  forth  only  a  particu- 
lar sensadon  and  no  other  one,  and  besides  the  caHed 
forth  sensation  does  not  belong  qualitatively  to  the  same 

^^^BB^^^  ^^^tjfc  ^^^^^  ^^^^  U^^kn^^^j  ^ijO 


S^tomdtff  Sentoij  Mkmmti  Md  Ptngptkm  149 

true  that  the  sensa  ons  show  their  lack  of  sociable  char- 
«lBr  bf  not  entering  into  any  anodation  with  any  other 
sensation,  and  that,  unlike  images,  no  associative  strisi 
can  possibly  be  formed.  Still  the  fact  remains  that  a 
sensation  can  and  does  call  forth  another  sensaiion.  Evi- 
dently sensations  can  enter  into  associative  bonds. 

Soch  psychic  states  appear  uncanny  and  are  regarded 
as  abnormal.  The  phenomena  are  regarded  as  freaks 
belongmg  to  the  domain  of  pathology.  Now  cnriously 
enough  c-iv  study  reveals  the  fact  that  what  has  been  re- 
garded as  the  pathological  and  exceptional  turns  out  to 
be  the  ordinary  and  the  normal.  The  stone  which  the 
boildera  neglected  has  become  the  comer  stone.  The 
exception  has  turned  oirt  to  be  the  role.  Far  from  be- 
ing the  case  that  secondary  sensations  are  rare  and  ab- 
normal, they  arc  quite  common,  since  they  constitute 
the  very  flesh  and  blood  of  the  percept.  Secondary  sen- 
SMtkms  constitute  the  texture  of  the  percept.  The  rea- 
•on  why  they  appear  so  strange  is  just  because  they  are 
so  common  and  so  familiar. 

The  secondary  sensation,  when  appearing  alone  out 
of  its  perceptual  complex,  cannot  be  recognized  as  the 
old  familiar  attendant  belonging  to  the  indissoluble 
i«^weof  the  humdrum  percept.   Dissociated  from  its 
perceptual  sphere  the  secondary  sensation  appean 
ghostly,  hallucinatory.  At  a  matter  of  fact  the  lecfMHl* 
ary  sensation,  hallucinatory  and  spooky  as  kti  ifnf*nte- 
tions  are,  constitutes  part  and  parcel  of  perceptual  ex- 
perience.  In  fact,  the  matn  content  of  the  percept  con- 
sists of  hglbteinstory  secondary  sensatioxa.  Percepts  and 
hallucinations  are  of  the  tame  grain.  A  percept  is  a 
hallu'nnation  with  the  primary  nudttr  ■mwfy  iliinMiiiU 
prmnt,  a  halkunatioii  is  a  W  prctpt  vkli  the  ^ 


I50       NormiU  mU  Jbuormsl  Psychology 


mary  aentcny  ekmentt  absent. 

When  Kcoodtrf  teiuory  clonentt  become  dinoctmted 
from  the  perceptual  s^mthesis  widi  die  primary  souory 
elements,  the  elements,  thus  dissociated,  not  being  re- 
lated to  any  peripheral  physiological  process  of  their  ap- 
propriate sense-organ,  are  regarded  as  central  phe- 
nomenal at  aecon&ry  sensations  wludi  are  described 
as  nnumal,  almormal  events  of  mental  life.  What, 
however,  is  abnormal  is  not  the  ^f^condary  sensation 
per  se,  but  the  fact  of  its  dissociation.  A  secondary  sen- 
sory element  dissociated  from  its  perceptual  system  be- 
comes manifested  as  a  secondary  sensation. 

Secondary  sensations  are  free  secondary  sensc»ry  lAt- 
nwnts,  dissociated  from  the  perceptiud  amcgate  into 
the  synthetic  unity  of  which  they  enter  as  important 
components  forming  the  organic  whole  of  the  percept. 
When  appearing  isolated,  secondary  sensations  are  the 
simplest  form  oi  hallucinations  which  become  more  and 
more  comj^lex  as  the  secondary  sensory  dcnnntit  £s> 
sociafeed  from  the  primary  elements,  become  manifested 
in  complex  systems.  Hallucinations  are  systems  of  see- 
ondary  sensations  or  of  secondary  sensory  elements. 

Sensory  elements  are,  as  a  rule,  not  free,  they  usually 
appear  as  perceptual  eompmmds,  and  thb  holds  spedaOy 
true  of  siean^ry  sensory  dements.  When,  tiierelore, 
dissoftatgd  from  their  perceptual  con^pounds,  they  ap- 
pear as  ghosts  of  the  'real'  percept,  as  hallucinations.  To 
quote  from  a  previous  work  of  mine:  "The  integra- 
ticm  of  the  groups  and  especially  of  the  secondary  pre- 
scstotive  groups  »  mt  of  that  maMxSfiable  orgjoUc 
dbarader.  Aromd  a  nucleus  formed  by  a  grmqp,  Mr 
eombmatiOBS  of  groaps  of  primary  elements,  groups  ot 
•teendary  sensory  elements  become  aggr^pUadf  and  the 


Stamimj  Sensory  Elements  and  Peretfthn  151 

total  aggregate  gives  rise  to  a  consolidated  and  unified 
system  of  groups,  resulting  in  a  percept.  In  perceiving 
tte  chair  yonder  only  the  visual  sensations  constitute 
tile  tme  aemory  groupe  that  form  the  nucleus  of  the 
percept.  The  other  psychic  groupe  that  are  cryMaOtted 
round  the  percept,  such  as  weight,  remtance.  ^Hmie. 
size,  shape,  distance  are  really  visuo-tacto  motor  groups; 
they  are  largely  tacto-muscular  groups  tinged  b>  the 
•«8ory  quality  of  the  nucleus;  they  are  tacto-motor 
gnwpi  seniorially  vhimnzed,  seen  indirert^^^  Though 
these  secondary  sensory  groups  are  firmly  integrated, 
still  their  integration  is  not  of  such  a  character  at  aot 
to  become  disintegrated  and  rearranged  into  new  sye- 
temsof  groups.  Such  a  disintegration  is  no  doubt 
wwcted  with  difliculty,  but  it  is  by  no  meant  un- 
"^tible. 


Perceptual  compounds,  unlike  tentory,  acfantt  of  de> 
composition  into  elementary  primary  and  teeoadarr 
sensory  groups.    The  component  elementary  sensory 
groups  can  be  experienced  separately  under  differ- 
ent coii£ttoiit  and  circumstances.  We  can  close  our 
eyet  and  walk  np  to  the  object  of  perception,  say  the 
chair,  and  that  experience  the  free  matcidar  aematioai 
of  distance,  or  we  may  push  our  hand  agalntt  the  chair 
imd  experience  the  sensation  of  resistance,  or  take  the 
chair  in  the  hand  and  experience  the  muscular  sensations 
01  weight  and  shape.    The  primary  and  secondary 
groups  going  to        up  the  percept  can  be  isolated  by 
withdrawing  the  organizing  nuclear  gronp  of  primary 
sensations      1  bringing  about  a  dittategratioa  of  tkt 
particular  ^regate. 

"H  we  inspect  more  closely  this  process  of  isolation, 
m  md  that  tht  contUluent  tecondary  sensory  gnmpt 


152        Normal  mi  Ahnormd  Psyekohgy 


are  not  teally  isolated,  so  as  to  stand  out  all  by  them- 
selves. What  actually  happens  in  this  seeming  process 
of  Molation  is  nmply  the  fbrmttioii  of  t  leriet  of  new 
perceptual  aggregates  in  which  the  particular  •ensorjr 
groups  that  are  isolated  and  specially  brought  out  be* 
come  the  nuclei,  the  foci.  For  in  the  perceptual  aggre- 
gate it  is  always  the  character  of  the  nucleus  that  is 
specially  brought  out,  and  it  is  the  nuclear  aggregate 
tinges  with  iti  sensory  coW  all  die  other  aggre* 
gates.  To  revert  to  our  previota  example,  to  die  per- 
cept chair.  In  passing  the  finger  over  the  chair,  the 
touch  may  form  the  nucleus  of  the  moment,  but  around 
this  primary  nuclear  sensory  group  other  secondary 
sensory  groups,  such  as  diermal  and  muscular  sensory 
eleme^s  beconie  organized  to  fcwni  Ae  syntiMstt  of  die 
perceptual  moment.  If  we  try  to  find  out  the  shape  of 
the  chair  by  a  series  of  touches,  we  really  form  a  series 
of  percepts,  the  sensory  nuclei  of  which  are  not  visual, 
but  tacto-muscular  in  their  nature.  A  sensory  group 
then  cannot  in  reality  appear  in  a  purely  isolated  form.** 
In  otlKf  words,  lentory  dements  ftppear  m  groupsi^ 
and  dus  1m>1^  specially  true  of  secondary  mmory  ^ 
ments  or  of  secondary  sensations.  Secondary  sensations, 
though  present  in  every  percept,  rarely  appear  in  iso- 
lation. The  affinity  of  secondary  sensory  elements  to 
rm  into  compooi^  becoming  syndiedzed  with  primary 
dements  mdns  it  diffcnlt  to  observe  diem,  except  m  ^tut 
pecnfiar  phenomena  of  sy'-Wthewa  and  in  die  dmomMil 
states  of  hallucination. 


^Tames  lays  stress  <»  tlds  Uet  of  grouping  of  sensonr  dcoMnts: 
"All  bram  proeeues  mrt  ttuk  m  gwt  mt  to  wlwt  w»  may  caff 
Mimti  Co%seimum»u.  If  p«m  Mf«  irnMHtlid  •!  aM.  ^  arc 
frrtdiated  in  consistent  systems  and  oeeasion  ttoogltts  of  dsMte 
6kjMlSi  not  IMPS  hodge-podge  ol  dMMBli. 


Secondary  Sensory  EUmnts  Md  PtrctpAm  153 

If  secondtry  aenMdoot  are  timrle  hftnodiHitioM, 

hallucinations  are  compound  secondary  sensations.  At 
we  have  pointed  out  a  close  examination  of  halludna- 
ttoiii  shows  them  to  be  systems  of  secondary  sensations 
diasoaated  from  their  primary  nuclear  elements.  In 
states  of  dissodatioii  a  peripheral  sthmdation  with  iti 
physiological  process  and  concomitant  primary  tenaory 
elements  may  become  dissociated  from  systems  of  sec- 
ondary sensory  elements  which  alone  stand  out  in  con- 
•oowrcat  as  hallucinationi.  A  close  examination  re- 
veals  the  presence  of  some  obscure  pathological  condi- 
tions  which  by  irritation  and  by  irradiatkm  awaken  sec 
ondary  sensory  ekments  giving  rise  to  foil  fledged  hal- 
lucinations. 

In  the  cases  of  hallucinations  investigated  by  me  I 
Mve  found  pathological  processes  which  gave  rise  to 
secondary  sensations  crystaBized  into  haUudnations. 
Thus  one  of  my  cases  suffered  from  auditory  haOnct. 
nations.   The  patient  heard  voices  telling  her  all  kinds 
of  disagreeable  things.   She  complained  that  the  voices 
came  not  through  the  ear,  but  through  a  spot  located 
oirer  the  Fallopian  tubes.   An  examination  of  the  ear 
•bowed  nothing  abnormal.    Physical  examination 
realcd  nothing  abnormal  in  any  of  the  other  sense  Ofw 
gans.  The  Fallopian  tubes,  however,  were  very  tender 
and  painful  to  pressure.    The  patient  suffered  from 
•n  old  chronic  salpingitis.    The  hallucinations,  which 
were  of  a  sexual  character,  became  more  severe  at  reg- 
ular intervals  coindding  with  monthly  periocHdties. 

One  case  of  mine  suffered  from  visual  haUudnations. 
He  saw  spirits,  ghosts  and  visions  of  saints.  When  he 
travefled  in  a  car,  he  could  see  little  men  with  benevo- 
leal  nces,  and  for  some  religious  reason  he  regarded 


154       SonuU  ami  JbnomuU  Psyehohgy 


them  M  stints  who  came  to  his  help.  He  could  see 
them  splitting  the  rodcs  and  disappearing  there,  or 
smnetimes  the  rocks  split  open  and  the  saintly  little  men 
came  to  the  surface.  Occasionally  apparitions  of  the 
dead  visited  him.  The  visions  were  never  quiet,  but 
always  in  motion,  they  did  not  stay  long  and  rapidly 
disappeared,  giving  rise  to  new  vnions.  An  enmina- 
tion  of  his  special  sense-m'gans  durned  nothing  abnor- 
mal. The  sense  of  touch,  pressure  and  kinaesthetic  sen- 
sibility manifested  peculiar  abnormalities.  The  skin  of 
the  body  was  very  sensitive  and  that  of  the  scalp  was 
extremely  tender  to  touch.  The  patient  could  not  bear 
any  pressure  of  the  scalp  and  was  mostly  bareheaded, 
though  he  was  very  sensitive  to  draughts  and  to  chaises 
of  temperature.  Occasionally  he  experienced  a  sense 
of  formication  all  over  the  body,  especially  in  the  scalp 
and  in  the  region  of  the  neck,  the  muscles  of  wh!  were 
extremely  sensitive  to  pressure.  Now  when  the  head 
was  inclined  to  one  side  or  pressed  hard  or  ktpt  in  a 
tense  state  for  a  couple  of  minutes  at  a  stretch,  he  could 
see  spirits  floating  in  the  air,  he  could  see  the  little  men 
with  their  saintly  faces  coming  out  of  the  ground  and 
disappearing  into  it  again. 

One  case  of  functi<mal  psychosis,  with  epileptoform 
attacks  presenting  {dieiKMnena  of  dissociated  rtates  with 
dittinct  tendencies  toward  the  formation  of  multiple  per- 
sonality, suffered  a  good  deal  from  auditory  hallucina- 
tions. It  will  take  too  much  space  to  give  an  account  of 
the  details  of  the  different  seizures  and  of  the  various 
diModated  states  manifested  by  the  patient.  For  our 
present  purpose  it  is  enough  to  refer  to  the  hallodmi- 
ti<ms.  The  patient  complained  that  she  could  hear 
voices  talking  to  her,  her  mother  and  brothers  commo* 


^condBry  Sensory  Elements  and  PercepHom  155 
nicating  with  her  from  a  distance.  An  ewmmttioii  of 

^don^^'  ""^  \  ^^^^^'^^  of  unconscious 

ob«ervtd  to  move  her  lip.  and  whi.pei-die  whisper 
becommg  sometimes  quite  loud  u>T^u^  woS. 
which  the  patient  referred  to  the  voices  of  the 
and  h^od^ers  were  really  uttered  by  die  patient.  An 
«»«u»t,«i  of  the  eye  revealed  the  presence  of  an 
«^tjc  condmon  «d  a  limitation  of  die  field  of 
vision.  When  die  patient  was  made  to  count  or  to  read 
a  oud  or  when  absorbed  in  a  convemrion,  die  auditory 

^i^«TT  "T^-  J^'  hallucinations  c^ 

diminished,  both  in  frequency  and  inten^ty, 
wftw  the  astigmatism  was  corrected  by  eye  glasses. 

Sniularly  m  aaodier  caMs  die  patient  suffered  from 
auditory  hallucinations.  Hew  die  patient  WM^imd 

and  dicn  he  himself  became  conscious  of  die  fact  diat 

^rill^i^l^i'JrK^'-  "'<»-"»>esdiisex;eriete 
of  S??  K  -^r"^**  ^  uncontroUable  and 

IZv  .  f  ten jmcooKiou.  by  die  term  of  'auto- 
vocahzation.;  In  this  case  die  paries  now  and  diea 
can  catch  himself  telling  diings  to  himself  which  he 

^L  Vf      r^"'  "^^'^^  P*°P*'  "      »  then  coS! 

hearing  but  not  of  die  utterance  of  die 
^  ««d  This,  however,  is  not  always  the 

rhnn  T       «  •  whm  uncoi^iou. 

phonation  is  present  as.  for  instance,  m  die  ca«  of  die 
patient  with  the  epileptiform  seizures  described  above, 
^riC''"\Vto^att unconscious  of  the  fact  of  Vhi.! 
««w».  At  wUqier  and  die  iiSlti^^di^^,^!!^?^ 


156       Nofmd  ami  JhmrwuU  Psyehohgy 


Another  patient  of  mine  su£fen  from  auditory  hal- 
ludnatioiit.  He  hears  people  abusing  him  and  calling 
himnamet.  The  haHncimitiona  occur  when  he  b  wrahe, 
but  they  are  frequent  when  he  is  on  the  point  of  falling 
asleep,  or  when  he  wakes  up.  He  thinks,  in  fact  he  hears 
that  people  whisper  about  him.  The  voices  are  observed 
to  increase  in  frequency  and  intensity  with  the  presence 
of  external  noises,  such  as  mnses  made  in  the  hall,  or 
sounds  made  by  car*  ptaring  by.  The  petieiit  was  ob- 
served having  subconscious  or  unconsdous  move- 
ments of  lips,  tongue  and  even  of  the  jaws.  When  he 
hears  the  voices  the  subconscious  movements  increase  so 
that  they  may  be  perceived  at  a  distance.  Even  the 
nnrte  could  not  help  perceiving  the  sabctmscioiit  wfait- 
pering  made  by  the  patient.  When  the  patient  lodes 
throi^  a  printed  or  written  page  the  subconscious  whis- 
pering increases.  The  same  is  observed  when  the  patient 
is  very  much  interested  in  something  or  absorbed  in 
deep  thought.  During  such  times  he  complains  that  he 
bean  voicea.  Widi  his  moadi  wide  opea  and  hoUSag 
hit  tongiw  Mtionary,  the  unconscious  whispering 
ceases  and  akmg  with  it  the  auditory  hallucinationa  di^ 
appear. 

One  of  my  cases,  a  lady  of  about  sixty,  suffered  for 
about  fourteen  years  frcmi  auditory  and  vitual  halhh 
ctnatkm.  She  complained  duit  Aft  was  surrounded  by 
ghosts  of  departed  family  members  who  did  not  leave 
her  alone.  The  spirits  talk  to  her,  they  give  her  advice 
which  is  often  against  her  interests.  Her  departed  hus- 
band and  his  brother  are  the  chief  leaders,  the  'guides* 
so  to  say.  They  talk  to  her  on  tU  inqpwrtant  oocanoBS 
and  try  to  guide  her  in  li^.  Tlie  pad«U  ttaaOM  mA 
inter iCrCficea.    wnwi  aw  vetoes  pcfanie  iimiiiiii  wBm 


Stamimy  Smuory  Ekmtuts  md  Perception  157 

alM  iud  visions  of  the  spirits  and  could  hear  them  talk 
to  her,  a  proceeding  which  she  always  attempted  to  dis- 
courage, bat  ahe  admitted  that  the  voices  and  the  spir- 
ito  had  the  bctt  of  her,  and  the  was  forced  to  foUow 
their  instructions.  An  examination  of  the  patimt 
revealed  the  fact  that  the  hearing  on  the  left  side  was 
rather  defective,  the  tympanic  membrane  was  thickened 
and  there  was  present  a  chronic  pathological  process  due 
to  t  former  conditkm  of  middle  ear  disease.  Any  con- 
tinuous  and  prolonged  irritation  of  the  *<^fMfd  ear 
started  the  voices,  increased  their  iateoiity,  tad  caused 
the  manifestations  of  the  visions. 

I  may  also  refer  to  a  patient  under  my  care  who  suf- 
fered  from  auditory  halludnations  and  thought  herself 
{iniieited  by  demona.  From  her  iikdi  year  she  suffered 
at  various  intcrvab  from  those  voices  which  aonietiraei 
told  her  unpleasant  things.    Along  with  the  halb' 
cinations  she  also  had  attacks  of  automatic  speech.  Now 
and  then  she  simply  heard  voices  and  was  not  conscious 
of  any  invohmtary  speech,  but  occasionally  the  invoUm- 
tary  utterance  took  such  poiieaiion  of  her  that  the  could 
not  control  it.  She  felt  as  if  some  other  being  got  pot* 
session  of  her  organs  of  speech.   This  frightened  her 
even  more  than  the  hallucinations.  She  kept  away  from 
her  friends  fearing  sudden  attacks  of  involuntary  speech. 
It  appeared  to  the  patient,  aa  if  some  other  beings  made 
her  talk  against  her  will.  She  ihonned  Mdety,  bfcraae 
the  other  beings  forced  her  to  tdl  atood  what  the 
thought  of  the  people  in  whose  company  she  was  pres- 
cnt  When  she  was  not  conscious  of  the  forced  speech, 
•he  often  heard  voices  which  she  ascribed  to  the  same 
demoni.   There  was  nothing  of  the  delusion  of  pa- 
fMOM  n  it  ts  ihe  cottU  net  aceoott  for  tlM  amdnatiff 


158       Normsl  md  dhwmd  PsyMogf 

qwecfa  and  auditory  hallucinatioiu.  The  patient  was 
of  Ifiah  descent,  unedncated,  tbough  very  intelligent 
The  eacplanation  of  'demoniacal  possciiion*  was 

cn  and  maintained  by  her  family  in  IreUnd.  She  was 
glad  to  take  my  view  of  the  phenomena  which  I  tried 
to  make  plain  to  her,  as  much  as  it  was  possible  under 
the  drcnmstaaoes. 

A  quotation  from  her  written  account  may  be  of  in* 
terest:  "When  I  was  nine  years  dd,  one  day, 
I  remember,  I  sat  down  on  a  stone  and  and> 
dcnly  I  heard  a  voice :  'If  you  live  four  or  five  years 
more,  you  will  wish  you  had  never  grown  up.'  I 
thought  it  was  strange,  but  soon  forgot  it  and  went  to 
play  again.  I  had  no  trouble  until  I  was  fourteen,  when 
the  voice  changed  and  forced  me  to  talk  with  my  own 
voice.  The  voices  would  make  me  speak  of  things  that 
in  my  own  self  I  had  no  idea  of  doing  and  would  not  do 
for  anything.  About  eight  years  ago  I  had  a  terrible 
fright  after  which  I  thought  I  talked  with  saints  and 
angels  and  saw  unusual  things,  I  really  taw  them.*'  We 
find  here  the  presence  of  automatic  speech,  unconscious 
phonation  with  subconscious  states  resulting  in  dissocia- 
tions of  secondary  from  primary  sensory  elements  with 
the  consequent  formation  of  various  forms  of  hallu- 
dnatioBa.  ' 

Observations  and  experiments  incontettaMy  prove 
that  hallucinations  are  synthetized  compounds  of  sec- 
ondary sensory  elements,  dissociated  completely  or  in- 
completely from  their  primary  elements.  Normal  and 
abnormal  perceptive  processes  do  not  differ  psychologic- 
al^ aa  to  their  makemp,  esoqpt  in  the  reh^  of  their 
primary  and  secondary  scnwy  ^ments.  HaUn^ttF 
tioM  an  not  central;  thsy  ne  aaieatiatty  of  pvqphtnl 


Steondary  Sensory  EUments  and  Peretption  159 

origin;  they  are  induced  by  peripherd  «idt»Cioiu  giy. 
mg  rise  to  peripheral  physiological  processes,  awakening 
primary  sensory  elements  which  are  subconscious  or  f  aU 
out  entirely  of  the  pttieat't  consciousness,  leaving  the 
groups  of  secondary  sensory  elaiMiits  to  stand  oat  as 
fully  developed  haUucinations.   The  haUucuuitory  sec 
ondary  sensory  elements  may  be  tinged  with  the  qualita- 
tive  aspect  of  the  dissociated  primary  sensory  elements; 
thus  pathological  processes  in  the  auditory  sense  organ 
may  give  rbe  to  voices;  or  morbid  processes  of  the 
visual  apparatus  may  give  riw  to  vimM.  Qoiie  oltea, 
however,  the  dissociation  is  so  deep  and  extcotive  that 
the  synthetizcd  system  of  secondary  sensory  eJemcoCi 
do«  not  bear  the  least  trace  of  the  qualitative  aspect 
of  the  primary  sensory  elements;  thus  a  morbid  condi- 
tion of  the  pharymc,  for  example,  may  give  rise  to  an 
auditory  and  even  to  a  visual  haUncinatioii.  Whatever 
may  be  the  qualitative  character  of  the  sensory  com- 
pounds one  thing  stands  out  clear  and  distinct,  and  that 
IS  the  fact  that  the  percept,  whether  normal  or  ab- 
normal, does  not  consist  of  images,  but  of  sensations, 
primary  and  secondary. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 


THE  ATTRIBUTES  OF  8BN80RY  XLBMBNTS 

CONTRARY  to  the  view  maintained  by  many 
pqfchologittt  we  ksve  laid  tpecia!  ttfcn  on 
the  fundamental  qualitative  difference  hi  liiwii 
image  and  sensation.  We  shall  not  venture 
far  from  our  facts,  if  we  arrange  images  and  sen- 
sations in  two  qualitatively  different  psychic  series. 
Seatatioiit  can  be  ranged  in  a  graduated  series  of 
mtensities,  while  images  or  repretcntationt  can  be 
ranged  in  a  graduated  series  of  clearness  and  dis* 
tinctness,  or  of  vividness,  as  it  is  sometimes  described  by 
some  psychologists.  I  use  the  term  vividness  in  the 
sense  of  deamess  and  distinctness  and  not  in  the  sense 
of  intensity  as  it  is  ohm  used;  even  those  psychokv 
gists  who  do  not  use  intenntjr  siid  yindness  Hefitfrim- 
inately  ascribe  both  of  them  equally  to  wntation  and 
image. 

Vividness  and  intensity  are  understood  by  me  to 
be  two  fundamentally  qualitatively  different  aspects, 
or  attributes.  Sensations  have  intennty,  but  ik>  vvr- 
idness;  images  or  represcnutions  have  nvi<biess,  but 
no  intensity.  Sensory  elements  may  vary  from  min- 
imum to  maximum  intensity.  This  variation  in  inten- 
sity holds  true  both  of  primary  and  secondary  sensory 
elements.  Similarly,  images  or  representations  may 
pass^through  aU  degrees  of  vividaess  from  aitmiiiaMii  to 
mtmmmm.   The  image  represents  ^  seaaadf».  Is 

i6o 


Tk§  dttributts  of  Sensory  EUmtmts  i6i 

thi»  reqxct  we  may  somewhat  modify  the  well-knowB 
dictum  of  the  sensationalists  into ;  WiAi/  est  in  imapne 
^ftefuerit  in  sensu.'   The  sensory  element  it 
«PJ«o»ted  by  its  fctpective  represenutive  element. 

The  represenutive  efemeaii  may  refer  with  differ- 
ent  degrees  of  vividnesi  to  the  same  seneory  daaaiti. 
An  image  with  one  degree  of  vividness  can  be  sub- 
stituted for  another  with  a  Ilfferent  degree  of  vividness 
sad  still  refer  to  the  same  sensory  elements.   The  de- 
gree of  vividness  does  not  change  the  qualitative  char- 
acter of  the  representation.    Not  so  is  it  with  the 
qualitative  attribute  of  the  sensation.    The  sli^ttBSt 
change  in  the  intensity  of  the  sensation  changes  its  qntl. 
itative  character.  A  sensation  with  one  degree  of  inten- 
tity  cannot  be  substituted  far  another.   A  sound  or  a 
color  of  a  definite  intensity  cannot  be  substituted  for  a 
sound  or  edor  of  «  dtieient  uma^.  The 
two  are  different  sensations  and  no  sensation  am  sub- 
stitute another.  Sensations  fallinj  a  *he  same  series  of 
intensity  are  really  independent  of  oi^?   ^otf  er,  but  each 
sensation  of  die  intensive  series  can  »«  vv  resented  by  a 
whole  series  of  wpwisiaslions  of  diffeitJit  vividness, 
from  minimum  to  aMMsawiii.   Dilsfcot  seiite  of 
resentative  elements  may  also  be  regarded  as  ii 
dent,  since  they  refer  to  independent  sensations. 

If  we  symbolize  a  series  of  sensory  e^  T  ,  nt8  by  the 
lettws:  A^,  A»,  A,,  A*,  A.,    .    .    .  ^d  if  we 

symbohze  the  conespoading  series  of  repitsentac  ve 
elements  hy  a.,  ^  ^    .    .    .    ^  ^  ^ 

series  of  both  sensory  and  representative  skments  man 
be  symbolized  by  die  following  focmnla: 


d*  A*  J*  A*  A*   .    .  . 

*****  4^ 

a*  ai  at 

-  •    »  » 
a»  tu 

<l>*  oi  Hit 

ai  at 


•    •  • 


tft'Oa"  A"  tfi" 


Tl»  characteristic  of  the  image,  or  of  the  represen- 
tative element  is  just  its  extraordinary  plasticity  and 
possibility  of  substitution.    This  function  of  substitu- 
tion was  described  by  Taine  with  all  the  power  of  his 
lucid  style.    The  great  modifiability  of  representation 
plays  an  important  role  in  psychic  life — adaptabil- 
ity to  imnons  conditioiis  of  life  increases,  reactions  cease 
to  be  rigid  and  uniform,  but  change  easily  in  re^onse 
to  a  changing  environment:  Variations  of  sense-organs 
with  their  physiological  processes  are  rather  slow  and 
tardy,  often  requiring  generations  for  an  effective 
change,  while  the  representative  element  can  be  modified 
and  adapted  witfain  the  life^xistnice  of  the  individual 
and  often  in  a  very  short  time.   In  brief,  tht  ftmtAon 
of  substitution  possessed  by  the  representative  element 
in  the  processes  of  mental  selection  is  the  substitute  for 
natural  selection  in  the  highest  representatives  of  animal 
Uf*. 

Now  under  ordinary  condkiona  of  life  the  graduatad 
series  of  represantative  vivtdnesa  runs  parallal  to 
gradated  sariea  of  santoiy  iniaiiiiiiii    Uaoalfy  a 


The  Attributes  of  Sensory  EUmeuts  163 

intense  sensation  is  represented  with  greater  Tmdneit. 
The  mcrease  or  decrease  of  intensity  of  the  sen«)ry 
^^i^t  corresponding  change  in  the  vividness  of 
ttte  e^t.  of  the  representative  scries.  Intensity  and 
v.v.dne«  vary  directly.  Such  direct  variation,  however, 
l^^not  always  the  rule.  There  a«  cMc.  wh^;.  the  I];;' 
part  company.    In  states  of  distraction,  in  subwakin. 

dissociation,  and  generally  in  thec^ 
ditioM  of  functional  psychosis,  intensity  and  vividneai 
do  not  vary  directly. 

Sh^g  sdmulation.  may  give  tnt  to  sensations 
of  great  intensity,  but  the  vividne^  of  the  repie. 
sentafye  elements  may  fall  so  low  as  ahnott  to 
reach  the  mtmmum.  When  the  vividness  is  so  low 
"a^LX  J^f  "''"i!!?'       "Pre^ntative  elements 

Mon  J7  '^'^'r         "'"^^  reproduction 

belongs  to  repre«»tttive  etementa  which  aymbolicaUy 
reproduce  the  sensations  by  the  process  of  aqbatitution. 

Zntanrh"'  "^^T^  ^^e  original  experience  i. 
a^  and  there  .s  a  break,  a  gap  in  mental  continuity, 
d..joc,at.o«  results.  The  depths  and  extent  of  disio, 
ctatton  of  m^ta  systems  may  he  regarded  as  variables 
wZ  ^\"'^V^^^'^*^'rsely  as  vividness. 

h^Z  Z  -  P^*"^'"^"  of  functional  psychosis 

""LT  dissociation  may  thus  be 

regarded  psychologically  as  functions  of  vividness,  the 

ZLL"7f^  •""'^  representative  element.. 
Functional  psychosis  with  att  its  proum  mmtifastaHons, 
the  great  vartety  of  dissociated  and  subeonseious  statas 


CHAPTER  XXIV 


SENSATION  AND  EXTERNAL  ISAUTY 

WE  mutt  not  omit  to  point  out  UMiClier  fun- 
damental difference  between  sensory  and 
representative  elements.  Sensations  have 
the  significance,  or  possess  the  attribute  of 
external  reality,  while  images,  ideas,  or  representations 
entirely  lack  it.  Put  in  Baldwin's  terminotogy — sona- 
ti<ms  have  the  coefficient  of  external  reality,  the 
sensory  coefficient  of  reality.  No  matter  wheth- 
er the  sensation  was  produced  by  an  external  stim- 
ulus, or  by  a  pathological  process  going  on  in  the  sense- 
organ,  or  brought  about  indirectly  through  the  action 
of  am^Mr  seose-mrgan  by  means  of  iiulifect  assodatioii- 
padis;  no  matter  whether  die  sensaticm  is  priraarf  or 
secondary,  as  long  as  it  is  a  sensation  at  all,  it  possesses 
the  sensory  coefficient  of-  reality.  A  sensation  whether 
'true  or  false*  possesses  rightfully  the  coefficient  of  real- 
ity as  its  necessary  and  inheroit  attribi;^.  The  percept, 
true  or  haUudnatrary,  consisting  of  scmcMry  elenunts,  im 
therefore  the  sensory  coefficient  of  reality. 

Psychologically  regarded,  the  'true'  percept  and  the 
hallucination  have  the  same  sensory  constitution  with 
the  same  attributes.  The  difference  between  the  true 
and  false  percept  may  be  regarded  frwn  a  Iwofcipcrf 
standpoint  as  a  matter  of  adjtMlnMnt.  The  percepCi 
with  successful  adjustments  are  true,  while  those 
unsuccessful  motor  reactims  are  false  and  hallucina- 
tory. Psychologically,  the  difference  between  the  'true* 

164 


Stmmhn  and  External  ReaUty  i^g 

percept  and  hallucination  is  in  the  shifting  of  tfct  wi. 
majyand  secondary  sensory  elements.  Aer,  the 
^J^ory  elements  can  be  shifted  and  become  pri- 
'^:^^''ir^^'"*rue;  u,here  the  secoZ 
fy  *««or,r  Hammi  ife  not  admit  of  being  shifted  and 
becoming  pnmmj,  tka  parcept  is  regmM  m  hOki 


find^twT  representative  elements,  we 

ftid  di.t  they  lack  the  sensory  coefficient  of  realitT 

ot  the  m«ge.  There  is  also  a  posUfve  tide  to  it.  The 
.mage  .s  not  felt  as  image.  becau«5  it  i.  not  •«! 
wt.on  or  lacks  the  sensory  coefficient,  but  bccaute  tt 
P«»«»c»  a  quahtative  character  of  its  own.  A^n 

is  not  experien^  r^^oJ^cS^Xln^i:? 
«use  ,t  has  not  the  quale  of  sound  or  of  ^Z^'  ^ 
because  the  sensation  green  has  a  positivV«^tn« 
on^owj^e  same  holds  good  ^  the 
««»-7*c  poMeiMt  iti  omxi  characteristic  quale.    As  an 
experience  sui  generis  we  chta  for  .A. 
«  .pm./  p.ydM,  ^  represent2!e 

ZT''T  ^^'.'"'^^^      its  own  quafi^itive  e&tnder 

which  possesses  the  coefficient  of  external  real- 
Z\r^  or  «pe««tation  has  the  coefficient  of 

internal  reahty.    *«fc  iowitlon  «,d  image  have  reirf. 

has  external  reality,  the  image  has  intemrf 

subjectn^e  rcahty.  It  is  on  account  of  Z  ideationa^r 
^W2^.*^^«"t  every  image  is  fdaced 
mmmm^  mo'mtmn  world  of  reality,  into  iti  ova 


i66       Normal  md  Ahtormd  PsydmUtgy 


series  of  images  with  which  it  easily  associates  and  fuses. 

Writers  on  psychology  in  trying  to  define  furdier  the 
coefidmt  of  reality  refer  it  to  die  will.  Some  matnt«tn 
that  the  coefficient  of  reality  is  the  'independence  of  the 
will,'  while  others  claim  that  the  coefficient  of  reality  is 
'subjection  to  the  will.'  Baldwin  in  his  paper  'The 
Perception  of  External  Reality,'  offers  an  extreme- 
ly interesting  soludon  whidi  recmdlet  bodi  vienw. 
He  points  out  diat  diere  it  a  differeiue  between 
the  'memory  coefficient'  of  retltty  and  'sensational  co- 
efficient' of  reality.  The  two  coefficients  are  opposite 
as  far  as  control  of  will  is  concerned.  The  sensational 
coefficient  is  independence  of  the  will,  while  the  memory 
coefficient  it  oentrol  by  die  will.  A  temation,  in  thort, 
it  not  ymfer  the  cmrtrol  of  the  will,  iHiik  an  innge  it 
nibject  to  the  will. 

Baldwin  makes  a  further  distinction  between  a 
simple  image  or  'memory  image'  and  a  'memory 
image  of  external  reality.'  The  memory  image  can 
be  Imwf^t  0^  v^tMrily  by  itj  proper  tttocitttt,  but 
it  hat  no  toitatkmal  isoeffdent  at  a  result,  while  the 
memory  image  of  external  reality  can  be  followed  by 
sensational  coefficients,  that  is,  sensations  can  be  brought 
about  in  the  train  of  such  an  image.  To  quote 
Baldwin:  "Certainly  a  present  sensible  reality  is 
not  under  die  contn^  of  ray  will;  it  it  independent, 
and  if  my  coefficient  »  to  be  dttcovered  in  the  relation 
of  the  presentation  to  my  voluntary  life,  this  must  be  its 
expression  and  I  go  over  to  the  class  of  writers  who  find 
the  psychological  basis  of  external  reality  in  sensations 
t)i  renttaaoe.  Birt  when  we  ooim  to  inquire  into  die 
'nMBMNy*  mffikunt  aifcing  die  quetdon  what  chara& 
ter  M  in  a  niiiiKMy^flH^  wUdi  tttdfict  to  itt  b^m  » 


monoiy  of  reality,  the  tables  seemed  to  be  turaeA 
Without  stopptag  to  emmae  other  view*,  I  hold  that 
that  unafe  li  a  true  memory  which  we  are  aUe  to  jil 
agam  as  a  sensation  (Baldwin's  ttalica)  hf  roiaa- 
tarily  repeating  the  series   of  muscular  sensations 
which  were  associated  with  it  in  its  first  experience.  The 
memofy  coeffdent  therefore  is  subjection  to  the  wiU  in 
the  sense  indicated.    .    .    .   A  true  memory  in  short 
IS  an  image  which  I  can  get  at  will  by  a  train  of  memory 
associates,  and  which,  when  got,  is  further  subject  to 
my  will;  a  memory  of  external  reality,  on  the  contrary, 
IS  an  image  which  I  can  get  at  will  by  a  train  of  sensa- 
ttonal  nsodates  and  which,  when  got,  is  not  subject  to 
my  will." 

Now  if  I  understand  Baldwin  aright,  a  senao- 
tion  docs  not  fall  under  the  control  of  the  will,  while 
a  simple  'memory  image'  and  a  'memory  image  of  ex- 
tWMlreality'  are  both  under  the  control  of  the  will,  the 
diiefcaoe  bemg  that  the  former  does  not  terminate  in 
a  stnsatioii,  whereas  the  hitter  does.   This  I  take  to 
mean  that  a  sensation  does  not  depend  on  the  subject 
(will),  but  on  the  external  objects:  in  other  words,  a 
sensation  cannot  be  produced  from  center  to  periphery 
(not  mtemaUy  initiated  by  the  wiU),  but  is  initiated  by 
an  external  excitation  peripherally  stimuhting  the  sense- 
organ  and  giving  rise  to  sensed.  An  imafe.  on  the 
other  hand,  does  not  depend  for  its  initiation  on  the  tB- 
ternal  object  or  excitation,  but  is  essentially  an  internal 
event  which  can  be  brought  about  from  within  by  die 
process  of  associative  activity,  so  highly  characteristic 
of  the  image.  Th«  far  my  analyns  seems  to  me  to  be 
in  full  accord  with  Baldwin's  view.  fti^lMiy,  Bddwia'b 
views  m  regard  to  Wmory  imagss'  and  'memory  fan- 


1 68       Normal  and  JknornuU  Psychology 

tget  of  attemal  reality,*  the  former  not  tnSag  »  ten- 

sory  experience,  the  latter  terminating  in  experience  widi 
sensory  coefficient,  seem  to  me  to  be  closely  related  to 
the  views  expressed  by  me  in  this  work  and  in  my  other 
works  on  the  subject. 

In  qrite  of  die  agreement  on  to  many  points  there  «rt 
other  points  which  do  not  appear  to  me  acceptable.  We 
may  agree  that  kinzsthetic  and  muscular  sensations  or 
sensations  of  resistance  are  at  the  core  of  things,  but 
are  they  the  be-all  of  external  reality?  Have  not  sen- 
latioiis  of  pain,  of  hearing,  of  color,  or  of  smell  as  much 
reality  as  our  sensations  coming  from  musde,  joint, 
synovial  membrane  and  articular  surfaces?  The  acnte, 
shooting,  twinging  pains  of  rheumatism,  gout,  tabes- 
dorsalis,  the  burning  pains  of  meningitis,  the  excruci- 
ating throbs  of  megrim,  the  fine  stabbing  pains  of  tooth- 
adie,  die  agony  of  angina,  the  sharp  tormenting  pains 
of  facial  neuralgia,  and  many  other  paiini  coming  from  ' 
different  organs  and  tissues,  are  not  they  real  ami  ex- 
ternal ?  In  fact,  do  they  not  bear  on  them  more  the 
mark  of  grim,  pitiless,  external  necessity  than  any  of 
the  sensations  coming  from  active  muscle  and  joint? 
What  about  light,  color,  toaad,  Miiell,  are  not  they  ten- 
iatiom  of  external  reality,  even  if  toiMtioiM  of  retii^ 
ance  do  not  enter  into  their  make-up? 

Muscular  and  kinaesthetic  sensations  may  be  granted 
to  play  an  important  role  in  our  knowledge  of  things, 
bat  psychologically  regarded,  all  sensations  bear  on  them 
URiniatekably  the  mark  of  external  reefity.  It  it  not  the 
perdcidtr  form  or  kind  of  sensation,  but  it  is  the  sen- 
sory quale  as  such,  that  gives  the  coefficient  of  reality. 
As  far  as  resistance  is  concerned  Baldwin  is 
right,  if  it  be  applied  to  each  and  every  sensation.  For 


im  mi  Enmnisl  RemUty 

"chaiul  every  «„«tion  pae.e««i  thi.  m.A  of  ttA. 

^^'^^  opposition,  resistance.  a«d 
^d^irr^^  We  may  ..y  At  tlie  stimulus  force. 

^th  an  overwheJmmg  p<w«,    Sl«.  «  ifc 
Baldwin  «  nght  in  laying  spwitl  stress 

activity  and  resistance,  since,  biologically  n.- 
»«tfc4,  they  are  the  ones  that  give  the  smack  of  life 
and  the  Wl  W  thmg.  a«d  help  to  bring  abo«t  ad- 
jwtments  to  the  external  «ivh«iiiMiit.  » 

Thus   far  the  di&srence  betwe«  BalMi 
mj^If  seems  to  be  rather  insignificant*  Whan, 
however,  we  reach  what  Baldwin  terms  the  W 

put  ««,ewl»t  mm  rtfongly.  He  contrasts  the  two 
•mage  and  «e«ation,  on  the  of  depende«ce  or  b-' 
dependence  of  the  wiU.    The  sensationi.  nOMp^ 

rT°^  external^ 
»i«b,ert  to  the  W.U  which  can  bring  about  the  sensat^ 

origtn^,  mperuM^.    Now  it  seems  to  me  that  w! 

referred  to  by  the  memory  imag.,  ewn  if  wt  ^mmot 

bnng  about  the  original  experience.  Wt  may -pwoSe 
ArrrteTiJi/"""'  P^***'^      «peated:  a'mn! 

S^^Jl^*^^  ""tll^!."*"^-  We  may  have 
tiic  ptweptioiiirf  a  oomet  which  may  never  again  come 


I70       Nonul  mui  Ahfmrwui  Aydbofefjr 


into  our  experience,  and  even  if  it  should  come,  its  com- 
ing is  not  due  to  our  voluntary  control;  it  is  not  we 
Qwc  cm  ammK  tOK  ujuwvcxpBricncB  oonie  incD  on  pCT^ 
etplnal  or  sensory  world  with  its  sensory  coefficient  of 
external  reality.  We  may  be  in  die  position  of  Plato*s 
cave-dwellers  and  have  no  control  over  reality,  the 
reflection  of  which  is  displayed  before  us,  and  still  we 
may  agree  widi  Plato  that  for  die  cave-dwellers  die 
inMiOty  {maget  of  cxterml  icafity,  die  itcui'iwice  of 
wMch  b  not  wdep  oMrtrat*  wIB  tdll  be  ditcftiiihuittd 
from  a  general  memory  image,  from  an  image  of  fancy. 
The  sensation  or  percept  may  be  unique,  its  reproduc- 
tion may  not  be  possible,  and  still  its  memory  image  will 
be  that  of  external  reality. 

On  die  odier  hand,  we  meet  hi  peydiopftdiology  with 
a  vast  domain  of  phenomena,  such  as  recurrent  mental 
states,  insistent  ideas  which  force  themselves  on  the 
patient's  mind  against  his  will.  The  recurrent  mental 
states  or  the  insistent  ideas  are  far  more  stubborn  and 
uncoBtroBal^  dum  any  redabnt  waMMry  object.  The 
idea  may  come  nice  ttMa  whidi  oveicone  Ae  padent 
more  than  any  sensory  reality,  or  the  idea  may  be  per- 
sistent gnawing  at  the  very  vitals  of  his  mental  life.  No 
external  object  is  so  stubbornly,  so  painfully  resistant 
as  just  such  an  idea:  and  still  the  insistent  idea  is  not 
regarded  as  a  sensory  reality.  The  Imistent  idea  poe 
sesses  the  coefficient  of  e?:temal  reality,  independence  of 
die  win,  painfully  so,  and  still  it  is  not  regarded  by  the 
patient  as  external  reality;  in  spite  of  its  being  in^ 
pendent  of  the  will,  it  is  still  regarded  as  an  idea. 

It  seems  to  me  diat  we  cannot  express  the  sensational 
and  ideadomd  ooefictenti  hi  termi  of  will,  of  eontrol  or 
iioiiii^o^r^  It  if  Qot  r^iiatanc^  t9  the  wiQ      wufcii  9s> 


perience  sensory,  nor  is  it  sabJtctioB  to  tbe  wUi  ditt 
nukes  experience  ideational  or  represeotetive.  Why 
not  state  the  fact  as  it  is?  External  reality  is  the  quale 
t  "perience,  while  internal  reality  u  the  quale 

of  tlie  imace  or  rqmMntttioiL  A  sensation  is  experi- 
cnccd  as  sensation,  no  matttr  whether  or  no  it  A>r>mit 
on  the  wiU,  the  independence  is  a  secondary  matter;  the 
«amc  holds  true  in  the  case  of  the  image,  it  is  experi- 
enced as  image,  independent  of  the  fact  of  its  subjection 
totae  wiU.  ^ 

There  is  another  view  which  finds  the  fundamental 
difterence  between  percept  and  image  in  what  is  and 

what  IS  not  common  to  all  selves.  Perceptual  emeri- 
ence  is  common,  while  ideational  experience  is  not  com- 
mon  to  all  fellow-beings.  I  see  the  sun  and  other  peo- 
ple can  share  it  with  me,  while  my  image  of  the  sun 
IS  experienced  by  myself.  Thna  Calkins  tells  us: 
I  perceive  lowering  heavens,  pouring  nun,  bare  trees 
and  drenched  sparrows,  but  I  imagine  wide  horixons, 
bnUiant  sky,  blossoming  apple-trees  and  nestling  on- 
Qiea.  The  main  difference  is  this:  in  the  one  case  I  as- 
Tf^V"^  experience  is  shared  by  other  people  and 

that  everybody  who  looks  out  sees  the  same  dreary  land- 
scape;  but  my  imagination  of  the  sonny  orchard  I  re- 
gard  as  my  private  and  unshared  experience.** 

The  mark  of  being  common  is  not  the  essential  coef- 
fiaent  of  external  reality  given  by  the  percept.  The 
Pwwpt  it   not  experienced   as   external,  because 

IS  common  to  other  people.  We  do  not  see  the  tree 
yonder,  because  other  people  can  see  it  too;  we  wonld 
see  it  there,  even,  if,  like  Robinson  Crusoe,  we  had  no 
fellow-being  to  compare  notes  with.  A  haUucination 
u  as  f uUy  a  percept  and  is  perceived  in  the  full  gi^rb  of 


B7S       Nnwwrf  md  dhmotmd  ^ckoiogy 


external  reality,  althougli  it  may  have  no  currency  with 
my  fellow<Bicn.  The  percept  powestw  the  coefficient 
oi  mtmuX  raaliljr*  no  iwrtler  whether  or  no  othert  can 
■hare  in  it. 

Moreover,  pqpdiologically  NguM,  the  percept  it 
as  much  of  a  private  experience  as  *ht  image  is.  In  fact, 
every  psychic  state  has  the  privacy  ascribed  to  the 
image,  and  as  such  is  unshared  by  other  i»elves.  It  is 
simply  the  old  ptydMlogioa  fallacy  of  confusing  the 
physical  with  the  p^chic  object,  or  wkk  ^ 
psychic  state  cognizant  of  the  phynical  object.* 
The  flower  as  physical  object,  as  stimulus,  is 
shared  by  all  who  perceive  it,  but  the  per- 
ception of  the  flower  varies  with  each  individual.  My 
pevoqpbon  o^  the  flower  cannot  be  oqperieooed  by  any 
one  else;  like  the  image,  the  pereept  it  entirely  vndkni- 
ual,  unshared  by  other  selves.  I  perceive  the  flowwr  at 
having  external  reality,  not  because  my  perceptual  expe- 
rience is  the  same  as  that  of  other  people,  not  because 
it  itthared  with  others — as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  it  not  the 
S0me,  Md  from  itt  ray  natme  ammoi  be  the  tame  at 
the  experience  of  others,  as  we  cannot  possibly  iUme 
our  individual  psychic  experience  with  our  fellow-men. 
We  perceive  the  flower  as  an  external  reality  simply  and 
solely  because  it  is  sensory.  The  percept  consisting  of 
lentationt,  primary  and  tecondary,  bears  the  impress  of 
external  reality;  it  potttstcs  what  Baldwin  to  ap^ 
ly  terms  'sensational  coefficient'  giving  external 
reality.  External  reality  is  given  directly  and  imme- 
diatgiy  by  the  sensaticm  or  by  the  sensory  compound,  by 


*Royce  and  Miinsterberg  de&ie  the  physical  object  iii  terms  of 
'fomlttir/  but  if  I  understand  them  comc%  tlwy  do  sot  mard  tfa« 
dsfloWta  H  a  psycfaoioeicai  mt,  ' 


S^mstiou  Mtd  ExUnuU  JUsUtj  173 

the  percept 

To  quote  from  a  work  of  mine:  "Senmdoa 
carriee  along  with  it  the  reality  of  its  sdmuhu.  It 
it  Mft  dttt  the  Mme  of  reality  is  difierent  from  the  sen- 
•Mioa,  It  it  sHwi  in  the  WMitiMi  itMll.  Siailarty  the 
percept  and  the  sense  of  extctul reality  are  not  nra^ 
ferent  things;  they  are  given  together  in  tht  — pg^ 
cess  of  perception  and  arc  identical  .  .  .  The 
■ensory  process  is  also  the  process  of  the  sense  of  ex- 
teraal  reality.   ...   In  teeii^  or  perceiving  the 

chair  yonder  we  do  not  percm  it  at  real,  beciiite  of  its 

social  or  common  character— the  reality  of  its  ^^i»*fr^ 
is  given  directly  in  the  seatory  prowmi  of  the  pentDt 
itself.    .    .  . 

The  sense  of  reality  of  the  external  object  is 
strengthened  by  atsociatioD  of  the  original  sensory 
systenu  with  other  sensory  syrtemt,  and  the  intent^ 

rises  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  systems  of  ten* 
scry  elements,  brought  into  relation  with  the  function- 
ing sensory  systems.  ...  The  more  systems  of 
sensory  elements  are  pressed  into  service,  the  stronger 
is  the  seme  of  external  reality  and  the  more  assured  is 
the  reaction  to  the  sdmnli  of  the  external  envifomnatt. 

In  the  evolutionary  process  of  man's  adaptation  to  hb 
environment  he  becomes  extended  in  being  and  grows 
more  developed,  because  of  his  social  relations.  Man 
presses  into  active  service  the  systems  of  sensory  ele- 
ments  of  his  fellowbdngs.  Adaptationt  and  hence  sue- 
cessful  reactions  to  the  external  environment  are  now 
more  assured  and  the  sense  of  external  reality  is  still 
further  emphasized  and  intensified.  Throughout  the 
course  of  intensification  of  the  sense  of  reality  the  prin- 
ciple  remains  unchanged  in  nature.   The  sense  of  re- 


MCMCorv  MBOuinoN  mr  chart 

(M>ei  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


/1PPLIED  WVA^E  Inc 


1653  East  Main  SItett 
Rochester.  New  York  1*609 
(716)  ♦82  -  0300  -  Phon« 
(716)  2M  -  MM  -  ro 


USA 


174       Normd  md  Jbnormal  Psychology 

ality  is  given  by  and  consists  in  nothing  die  but  the  mi- 
scry  elements." 

From  a  philosophical  and  epistemological  stand- 
point the  social  aspect  may  perhaps  be  Sttfictcnt 

to  fix  the  externality  of  the  object,  but  from  a 
psychological  standpoint  the  trade-mark  of  'shares  and 
common  stock'  has  no  currency.  The  percept  consist- 
ing, as  we  have  shown,  of  sensory  elements,  primary 
and  secondary,  possesses,  on  that  account,  the  sensory 
attribute  of  external  reality. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

THl  fUBOOMICIOtTt  AND  UNOOMSaOUt  CBUBlXmNT 

PLATO  put  on  the  portaU  of  his  academy  the 
inscription,  "No  one  am  enter  here  without  a 
knowledge  of  geometry."  Simikriy  no  one  aui 
gam  access  to  the  facts  of  abnormal  paycholosy 
without  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  subconsdouS. 
The  wljonjaous  may  be  brieHy  defined  as  menul  pro- 
ces^  of  wJiidi  the  individual  i.  not  directly  con«dous. 
Such  knowledge  it  aU  the  nm  nqm^  as  psychopathic 
duturbances  with  which  psychopathology  prof»  Mt 
essentuUly  afectiom  of  subconscious  Uf,  activity. 
T^cgeneral  drift  of  my  Psycholay  of  SuggesHon  is  the 
^wjtoon  Hi  tbe  subconscious  as  a  di£fused  conscious- 
OMi  below  the  margin  ol  penonal  conciouanesa.  I 
«^ ««nn "wbciwadoya aalf »  Idaainate 
by    self  not  personal  consciousness,  but  mtrTaZ 
•aoujness.  In  P^WiVy,  in  which  I  develop 

the  theory  of  ^olds  in  regard  to  the  phenomena  of 
awnial  and  ahnomial  mental  life,  I  define  the  sub- 
cooaaoya  aa  <»aaeio«»a»  batow  the  duaahold  of  ai- 
tentivc  personal  contdouaneia.  I  lad  that  my  diakal 
and  psychological  investigations  moie  and  more  coo- 
i  "t^      ^^"^  °^      subconscious  advanced  by 

ZrJ^J^i'^r^^^^  °f  I  am  pleased  to 

ma  mt  ftof.  James,  in  a  recent  article,  accepts  the 
•Mna  view,  and  advancea  the  aame  theory  of  direthold 
m  regard  to  the  subconKious.  "Noboc^  kaowa.**  ha 
writes,  "how  far  we  are  'marginally'  eooadooa  el 

^75 


176       Normsl  mti  Jbnormsl  Psychology 

memories,  concepts  and  conational  states  at  ordinary 
tinMS,  or  how  far  beyond  tlie  *mar|^'  of  our  {Nrcsent 
diought  trans-margpnal  cMtsctouness  of  dusm  may 
exist." 

In  my  Psychology  of  Suggestion  I  pointed  out  the 
difficulties  of  the  purely  physiological  interpretation  of 
the  niboonsdous.  Since  diis  view  sdll  lingert  among 
some  psychologists,  I  cannot  do  better  than  reproduce 
die  passage : 

"The  facts  of  hypnotic  memory  alone  strongly  indi- 
cate the  intelligent  nature  of  the  subconscious.  Can  the 
theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  explain,  for  instance, 
^  fMt  of  si^giwted  amoesu  during  hypnods?  I  hyp- 
notize Mr.  V.  F.  and  make  him  pass  through  maay 
Imly  scenes  and  actions.  I  give  him  hypnotic  and  post- 
hypnotic suggestions.  The  subject  is  wakened  and  hyp- 
notized time  and  again.  At  last  he  is  put  into  a  hyp- 
notic state,  and  it  is  suggested  that  on  awakemng  he 
iImU  uut  remember  aaythiBg  of  what  had  happoied 
ia  the  rtate  of  hnvMOt.  Tne  subject,  on  emerging 
from  his  trance,  remembers  nothing  of  what  he  has 
passed  through.  I  then  put  my  hand  on  his  forehead 
and  tell  him  in  a  commanding  voice,  'You  remember 
now  everything.'  At  if  touched  by  the  wind  of  a 
mapdan,  die  mtjpfnmtd  monoriee  become  endmred 
with  life  and  movement,  and  invade  the  coMciousness 
of  the  subject.  Everything  is  now  clearly  remembered, 
and  the  subject  is  able  to  relate  the  tale  of  his  ad- 
ventures without  the  cnnission  of  the  least  incident.  So 
detailed  it  die  aocouat  that  one  cannot  helo  wonderinff 
at  die  e3ttraor(toary  memory  dispUyed  by  the  Mibject. 
How  is  the  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  to  ac- 
"XNint  for  thif  strange  fact?  Prof.  Ziehen*  in  hit  Phyt' 


Subevmdom  tmi  Umeonsdom  Csrebration  177 

iolagical  Psychology  telli  us  that  it  is  stiU  a  matter 
of  doubt  whether,  despite  their  complication,  all  the 
acta  of  the  faynotizad  individual  are  not  mouons  ac- 
coinpl«|hed  widujut  any  coooositant  psychical  pro- 
cesses."  and  that  "even  the  ftcoUeetioa  of  die  hypJotic 
psychical  processes  do  not  necessarily  argue  in  favor 
of  their  existence  during  the  hypnotic  trance."  Thb 
^"'^  «  certainly  wrong,  for  the  subject  during 
hypooiw  not  only  acts,  moves,  but  he  also  speaks,  an- 
swer.  question.  intelligMrtlf.  ttMmBM,  dbcoM.;  and  if 
such  an  individual  majr  be  retarded  at  a  mtn  omcI 
on  the  same  grounds  we  may  considtr  any  ttd&auA 
as  a  mere  unconscious  automaton. 

Tl»  advoeaaes  of  unconscious  cerebration  must  ad- 
mit ^hm^mmAi,  ikm  lqn»OM.  is  a  cooKious  sute. 
Now,  on  the  theory  of  nnrawcioiia  ceNbmioii.  it  b 
truly  inconceivable  how  psychical  states  etft  he  imb. 
pr«d,  die  accompanymg  physiological  processes  alooe 
being  left.  ancUU  that  done  by  a  mere  woid  of  the  ex- 
PCTWHw.   ITit  restoration  of  memory  is  still  more 
"««P«*««W^  Acorn. 
««nd  by  die  ezpemMnier,  "Now  yon  am,  riwi  inliLi  " 
brings  into  consciousness  a  flood  of  ideas  aad  toMt^ 
Ittt  not  diat  the  experimenter  gives  die  subject  a  dua 
wfci^ttarts  die  train  of  particular  images  and  ideas- 
!151T"  S*"*'  abitract  auggeation,  "You  can  rel 
nwwbefv  to  »ate»  nwMrwa  whk^^ 

appearances  have  completer  vmUMI  inm  tht  aimd 
of  die  subject.  Are  die  unconscious  physioJogical  aw. 
voua  modifications  so  intelligent  as  to  understand  auf 
geatioBi  and  follow  diem?  Does  unconscious  cerebri, 
tion  iwiliiiliii  1  Iht  coMMBd  of  die  experimenter,  and 


178       Normd  md  Aknomd  Psyekohgy 


On  doter  examuudon,  we  find  the  term  uncon- 
iciout  oerebntum  to  be  of  to  looee  a  nature  that 
under  tt»  head  are  often  recorded  facts  that  deariy 
indicate  the  working  of  an  intelligence.  Thus,  Mr. 
Charles  M.  Child  brings  the  following  fact  as  a 
specimen  or  unconscious  cerebration:  "I  had  earnestly 
been  trying,"  a  gentleman  writes  to  Mr.  Child, 
"to  make  a  trial  balance,  and  at  last  kft  off 
working,  the  mmmary  of  the  Dr.  and  Cr.  sides  of 
the  account  showing  a  difference  of  £2  ids.,  the  Dr. 
side  being  so  much  smaller  The  error  I  had  not  found 
on  Saturday  night  when  I  left  the  counting-house.  On 
diia  tame  Saturday  night  I  retired  filing  nenrou  and 
•atef  wtdi  myself.  Some  time  in  the  ni^t  I  dreamed 
thus:  I  was  seated  at  my  desk  in  the  counting-house 
and  in  a  good  light;  everything  was  orderly  and  nat- 
ural, the  ledger  lying  before  me.  I  was  looking  over 
the  balance  of  the  accounts  and  comparing  them  with 
the  sums  in  tile  triaUMdanoe  sheet  Sooii  I  casM  to  a 
debit  balance  of  £a  los.  I  looked  at  it,  called  myself 
sundry  names,  spoke  to  myself  in  a  deprecating  manner 
of  my  own  eyes,  and  at  last  put  the  £2  ids.  to  its  proper 
side  of  the  trial-balance  sheet,  and  went  home.  I  arose 
at  the  usual  Sunday  time,  dressed  carefully,  breakfasted, 
went  to  caU  on  sooM  .  .  .  frk^nds  to  go  to  dmrdh. 
Suddenly  tiie  dream  flashed  on  my  memory.  I  went  for 
the  keys,  opened  the  office,  also  the  safe,  got  the  ledger, 
and  turned  to  the  folio  my  dream  had  indicated.  There 
was  the  account  whose  balance  was  the  sum  wanted 
which  I  had  ondtted  to  put  hi  the  bilsno  shstt,  when 
it  was  put  now,  and  my  year's  posting  proved  corrtet** 

The  adherents  of  unconscious  cerebration  tacitly  in- 
diidt  wder  this  turn  not  only  uaconsctoui  phyiioloi^l 


Subcoiueious  mid  Uneomaous  Ctnbra^  179 

processes,  or  nerve  modifications,  but  also  psychicaJ 
^tcs.  Keep "ng  dearly  in  mind  the  real  meaning  of  vn- 
conscious  cerebration  as  referring  to  physiological  pro- 
cesses,  or  nerve  modifications  with  no  psychical  accom- 
paniment, the  difficulties  of  unconscious  cerebradon  to 
account  for  the  phenomena  of  hypnotic  memory  be- 
come truly  insurmountable.  For  if  the  physiological 
processes  subsumed  under  the  category  of  uncooicious 
cerebration  are  completely  lacking  in  all  psychical  ele- 
ments  whatever,  how  can  a  general  abstract  negative 
phrase,  "You  cannot  remember,"  suppress  particular 
p^ical  states,  and  how  can  a  similar  positive  phrase, 

You  can  remember,"  bring  the  forgotten  nemoriet 
back  to  consciousness?  It  is  simply  mcomprdientaik. 

Furthermore,  while  the  subject  is  in  a  hypnotic  con- 
dition,  we  can  suggest  to  him  that  on  awakening  he 
shaH  not  remember  anything,  but  when  put  to  the  au- 
tomatic  recorder  he  shall  be  able  to  write  everything 
that  has  taken  place  in  the  state  of  hypnostt.  The 
subject  is  then  awakened :  he  remembers  notfaint  «*  «D 
of  what  he  has  passed  through  while  in  the  state  of  hyp- 
trance.    As  soon,  however,  as  he  is  put  to  the 
automatic  recorder  the  hand  giveo  a  full  rational  ac- 
count of  aU  the  eventt.  Ifnowyouadttlieiubjectwhat 
It  IS  he  has  written,  h'  stares  at  you  in  confbrioii;  he 
knows  nothing  at  all  of  the  writing.   How  shall  we  ac 
count  for  this  fact  on  the  theory  of  unconscious  cere- 
bration? Can  unconscious  physiological  processes  write 
rational  diicourMi?   It  it  simply  miraculous,  incom- 
prehensible. 

These,  however,  are  not  the  only  difficnltbe  wilkh 
the  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  has  to  encounter. 
Take  the  following  experiment:   I  gave  Mr.  V.  F. 


Norwul  amd  dbmormal  Psyekohgy 

the  ■uggution  tbit  on  afmdcening  he  dioidd  put  my 

coat  on  three  times,  take  it  off,  and  put  it  on  again; 
that  he  should  do  it  when  he  heard  a  signal  which 
should  be  a  knock ;  amnesia  was  suggested  and  als«.  the 
possibility  of  writing  the  suggestion.  The  subject  was 
then  roused  from  his  trance.  There  was  not  the  slight- 
est recollection  of  what  had  been  suggested,  but  when 
he  was  put  to  the  automatic  recorder  the  hand  at  once 
proceeded  to  write  everything.  In  '  middle  of  the 
writing,  "when  a  signal  will  be  jn  .  .  .,"  I 
stopped  the  subject  and  asked  him  what  he  was  writing 
about.  "I  do  not  know,"  he  answered.  "How  is  it," 
I  asked  again,  "you  write  and  do  not  know  wha.t  you 
writ-?"  "I  do  not  know,  I  think  it  was  somett-^og 
about  a  coat."  "What  was  it  you  were  writing  al  _c  a 
coat?"  "I  do  not  know,  maybe  it  was  about  the  make 
of  a  coat."  Then  when  the  signal  came,  he  rose  and 
pot  on  the  coat  three  times. 

To  take  another  experiment  of  the  same  kind: 
I  give  the  subject  the  suggestion  that  he  should 
bow  to  the  gas  whenever  the  door  should  be  opened; 
again  amnesia  is  suggested,  with  the  possibility  of 
writing.  The  subject  is  stopped  when  he  finished 
his  account.  "What  was  it  yon  wrote?"  I  asked. 
The  subject  looked  surprised.  I  repeated  my  quei> 
tion.  "I  do  not  know,  I  think  something  about  a 
door."  "What  was  it  about  a  door?"  "I  do  not 
know."  I  have  made  many  similar  experiments,  and 
all  of  diem  wiA  seme  remits.  It  is  evident  thi^  the 
writing  is  not  an  tmconscious  automatic  process,  for  die 
subject  possesses  a  general  knowledge  of  what  he  hm 
written,  or  even  of  what  he  is  going  to  write. 
Now,  on  the  theory  of  unconscious  oerebratiop  this 


SMkc9»mom  md  UtKmuehm  Ctrwknfhm  ifi 

^cnJ  knowledge  ought  to  be  entirely  lacking,  since  the 
plqwrtogical  processes  of  the  suppressed  memory  have 
no  pyJiical  accompaniment.   It  would  not  do  to  say 
that  the  subject  knows  each  word  as  he  writn  it,  but  be- 
comes  unconscious  of  it,  forgets  it  as  soon  as  it  is  written 
down,  because  the  subject  is  able  to  teU  the  central  idea; 
that  IS,  he  has  a  general  knowledge  of  it;  and,  what  is 
more,  he  is  able  to  tell  us  this  general  central  idea  even 
before  he  finishes  the  writing,— «  fact,  he  can  do  it 
when  stopped  in  the  middle  of  the  phrase.   On  the 
theory  of  secondary  consciousness,  however,  the  ex- 
periments  could  not  possibly  give  other  results.  The 
conaaousness  understands  the  suggestion 
given  by  the  experimenter,  accepta  them,  obeys  the 
commands,  keeps  the  suppressed  memories,  and  si  ids 
up  a  general  knowledge  of  them  to  the  upper 
ness,  and  if  commanded,  communicates  the 
particular  suggestions  in  all  their  details. 

The  advocates  of  imconscious  cerebration  assume 
too  much:  they  asMmie  that  normal  memory,  or  recol- 
lectior,  -  th  >  normal  state,  can  be  fvlly  accoonted  for 
hy  u;  i  physiological  processes,  and  the  only 

thing  X  ,d  is  to  apply  this  theory  to  the  phenomena 
of  hypnotic  memory.  It  would  be  well  to  examine  this 
w«MT  «nd  tee  how  strong  its  claims  are  in  the  case  of 
normal  memory. 

Many  a  modem  psycho-physiologist  no  doubt  smiles 
at  the  crude,  ancient  psycho-physiological  theory  of  per- 
ception.  Images  or  copies  of  objects  emanate  from  ob- 
je<»,  get  depoMted  in  the  mind,  hence  perception,  cog- 
nition memory.  The  modem  psycho-physiological 
speculations,  however,  the  tpecdationi  of  hlmUkf, 
Carpenter,  Ziehen,  Ribot,  etc.,  are  no  leas  crnda.  Thmy 


i8i        Normal  tmd  Abnormal  Psyekohgy 

Ziehen,  for  imtuice,  omoeivet  that  eadi  fi^wtifln  de> 
posits  a  copy  of  it8elf,--ui  image,  an  idea,  m  tooie 

one  of  the  memory  ganglion  cells,  and  memory  cnnnsts 
in  the  reproduction  of  this  copy, — the  hen  lays  an  egg 
from  which  another  hen  may  come  out.  Maudsley 
expresses  the  same  thing  in  slightly  different  terms;  in- 
stead of  "deposits  of  images  in  memory  ganglion  cells," 
he  uses  "modifications  of  nerve  elements."  "It  may  be 
supposed,"  says  Maudsley,  "that  the  first  activity  did 
leave  behind  it,  when  it  subsided,  some  after-effect,  some 
modification  of  the  nerve  element,  whereby  the  nerve 
circuit  was  disposed  to  fall  again  readily  into  the  same 
acticm,  sudi  diqxMidon  (unconscious)  appearing  in  con- 
sciousness as  recognition  or  memory."  Ribot  and  many 
other  psychologists,  with  slight  variations  in  minor 
points,  follow  the  same  beaten  track.  AH  of  them  agree 
Aat  it  is  die  nerve  modificadons  produced  by  the  i^ysi- 
ological  processes  of  sensadoos,  emotions,  etc.,  that  con- 
stitute the  basis,  nay,  the  very  essence,  of  memory  itself. 

It  does  not  require  a  close  examination  to  find  the  de- 
ficiencies of  this  theory.  A  mere  modification  left  be- 
hind as  a  trace  cannot  possibly  explain  memory,  recol- 
lecdon,  die  fact  of  referring  a  particular  bit  of  experi- 
ence to  an  experience  felt  before.  The  retentioa  of  a 
trace  or  of  a  nervous  modification,  and  the  reproduc- 
tion of  that  trace  or  modification,  cannot  in  the  least 
account  for  the  fact  that  a  series  of  sensations,  ideas, 
images,  emotions  felt  at  different  times,  should  become 
combined,  brought  into  a  unity,  felt  like  being  smular, 
like  being  repetitions,  copies  of  an  original  experience. 
//  is  not  retention  or  reproduction,  but  it  is  the  reeogm- 
tion  element  that  constitutes  the  essence  of  memory. 
The  rose  of  to-day  reminds  me  of  the  rose  of  yesterday, 


Suheoiudous  sHd  Uneotueious  Ctrtbrsthm  183 

^l^^^^^rneTosc^eta^dMjhthn  ytttadMj.  Now 
the  .mage  of  the  rose  may  be  rettincd.  may  cvw  be 
reproduced,  but  .f  it  is  not  recognized  as  having  hap! 
pen^  my  past,  there  can  be  no  recollection.  In  short^ 
without  personal  recognition  tlerc  is  no  memory.  M 
James  strongly  puts  it,  "the  gutter  is  worn  deeper 
by  each  successive  shower,  but  not  for  tint  rtuoa 
brought  mto  contact  with  previous  showen."  Does  the 
theory  of  unconscious  physiological  processes,  of  mate- 
nal  bram  traces,  of  nerve  modifications,  does  the  theory 

An  T  ^  ^^"^^     P*~>"*1  rtcognition? 

Can  the  theory  of  unconsdoui  cerebration  offer  the 
faintest  suggestion  as  to  how  that  eLment  of  recosnitKMi 

brought  about?  What  is  that  something  add^toAe 
onconscious  physiological  trace  or  nerve  modificatian 
tt»t  effects  a  conscious  recognition? 

Fttrthennore,  firrt  impresnont  eta  be  localized  in  the 
past  but  so  can  abo  each  subsequent  rerniO.  How 
shall  we  explain  on  the  theory  of  unconscious  phyno- 
logical  nerve  registration  that  the  origind,  the  primi. 
tive  sense  experience,  as  weU  as  each  subsequent  re- 
vival,  on  be  referred  to  as  distinct  psychical  facts.  For 
|f  the  structural  nerve  elements  tre  slightly  modified 
with  each  revival,  how  shall  we  accomt  for  this  ptfu 
chical  distinction  of  the  original  sense  experience  as  wcU 
as  of  the  modified  revivals?  The  remembered  experi- 
«ce  leaves  its  own  individual  trace,  then  a  trace  of  its 
bemg  t  c^  of  a  former  original  impression,  and  also 
a  trace  of  its  being  a  member  m  a  teriet  of  thnilv 
traces,  each  trace  being  a  copy  of  another  and  a  copr  of 
the  origmal  impression.   How  tU  tlMt  ia  tee  k  • 
myitery/*  ■  • 

Thm  objectieae  advanced  by  me  many  yean  ago 


1 84       Normal  amd  Abnormal  Psychology 

hold  true  of  recent  theories  which  fall  back  on  the  old 
views  of  Mill  and  Carpenter,  nanwly,  uncoosdom  cere- 
bration. The  modem  upholders  of  unconscious  cere- 
bration think  that  they  have  discovered  new  facts 
and  arguments  in  favor  of  unconscious  mental  activ- 
ity, and  are  thus  justified  in  denying  subconscious  men- 
tal life.  The  arguments,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  are 
not  new,  nor  are  the  facts  advanced  in  suppmt  of  diese 
arguments  true.  The  same  objections  hold  true  in  the 
case  of  the  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  offered  us 
in  the  garb  of  nerve  currents  and  nerve  paths,  well  worn 
nerve  tracks,  opening  and  closing  of  nerve  currents  and 
tra^,  and  formaticm  of  all  riiapes  and  forms  of  neu- 
rognnu.  Why  be  misled  by  figments  and  by  soimcb? 
The  subconscious  stands  for  a  number  of  facts,  reac- 
tions, and  behavior  which  are  accompanied  by  psychic 
life,  oy  mental  activities,  by  consciousness. 

The  physiological  unconscious  registration  theories  of 
nerve  cnrrents,  nerve-padu,  and  neurograms  are  not 
only  figments,  arbitrary,  fanciful  weavings  of  the  imag- 
ination, they  cannot  even  hypothetically  explain  the 
simplest  act  of  memory,  and  especially  of  recognitive 
memory. 

Since  die  dieories  of  unconscious  refl^ttrati<m  fail  us 
in  die  mott  elementary  nMntal  processes,  how  can  we 
possibly  rely  on  cerebrati<m-fandes  in  the-  case  of  sudi 
complex  phenomena  as  hypnotic  conditions  and  various 
mental  states  of  trance  and  dissociation?  The  physio- 
logical theories,  such  as  unconscious  cerebration  and 
its  modificadofis,  failing,  we  must  use  for  all  those 
phenomena  the  psychological  interpielation.  The  sab- 
conscious  must  be  taken  as  a  necessary  theory  in  psy* 
diopathology,  ts  afemns,  molecules,  ekctrons  and  edier 


wmm 


SubeoMscious  and  Uneonseioiu  Cerebrslum  185 

are  in  chemistry  and  phy«c..  The  wbcowdoB.  i.  not 
an  unconscious,"  ,t  ,s  not  a  physiologicaa  automttttm. 
Ihe  subconscious  is  a  consciousness,  a  secondary  con. 

°^  secondary  self,  the  self  being  on. 
dcrstood  by  me  as  «  difused  consciousness. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 


THE  SUBCONSCIOUS  AND  AUTOMATISM 

THE  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  dies 
hard.  Recently  a  few  psychologists  made  an 
attempt  to  revive  it.  The  arguments  ad* 
vanced  are  rather  philosophical  than  psycho- 
logical. It  may  be  well  to  test  the  validity  of  these  ar- 
guments. If  "  2  clear  the  ground  of  all  superfluous 
speculations,  we  find  two  main  contentions.  In  the  first 
place,  it  is  assumed  that  many  hypnotic  «id  hysterical 
manifesUtions  are  solely  the  result  of  physiological  ac> 
tivities.  It  is  claimed  by  some,  such  as  Munsterberg, 
that  physiological  processes  without  any  psychic  accom- 
paniments, may  reach  such  a  high  state  of  complexity 
as  to  account  fully  for  all  the  observed  manifestations  in 
the  different  forms  of  mental  dissodations.  In  die  sec- 
ond place,  it  is  claimed,  from  a  purely  philosophical 
standpoint,  that  even  in  the  case  of  dissociation  when 
consciousness  may  be  granted  to  be  present,  there  is  no 
dissociation  in  consciousness  itself,  since  consciousness  is 
but  a  passive  onlodcer  while  the  active  changes  go  on  in 
the  content  of  comdousness;  in  odier  words,  in  states 
of  dissociation  it  is  not  consdcnmwss  that  is  changed, 
but  only  the  content  of  consciousness. 

Let  us  examine  these  contentions  and  see  whether 
they  can  stand  the  test  of  critical  analysis.  The  view 
of  regarding  mental  activity  from  a  purely  physiological 
standpoint  is  not  new,  it  dates  as  far  bade  as  Descartes, 
who  ttfptrdt  til  the  animals,  with  die  excepticm  of  mMi 

M 


The  Smhconsehiu  and  Automatism  187 

as  mechanical  automata.  The  philosopher,  Maimon, 
10  his  "Autobiosrraphy"  teUs  an  anecdote  on  himself. 
In  hts  youth  Maimon  was  an  ardent  adherent  of  Car- 
tesian  automatiim.  During  one  of  his  stroUs  with  a 
friend  Maimon  struck  a  goat.  The  animal  bleated. 
Ihe  friend  rebuked  Maimon  for  his  cruelty.  Maimon 
laughed  at  the  simplicity  of  his  friend.— "The  goat  it 
hke  a  drum  which  sounds  when  it  is  beaten." 

Huxley  carried  this  view  further,  regarding  con- 
saousness  as  an  epiphenomenon.  The  physiological 
mechanism  is  the  engine,  consctouanets  it  but  the  whit, 
tic  accompanying  it. 

Of  course,  it  goes  without  saying  that  psychologists 
and  physiologists  at  present  assume  that  aU  states 
of  contdoutness  are  accompanied   by  physiological 
procetici.  Every  thought,  every  feeling,  even  the  mcMt 
complicated  poetical  inspiration,  or  the  mott  abttniie 
mathematical,  logical,  and  metaphysical  speculatioiit, 
have  physiological  processes  as  their  accompaniments. 
We  are,  however,  hardly  justified  in  carrying  this  postu- 
late to  the  abtordhy  of  the  total  dental  of  conKiousness, 
and  regarding  all  adjustments  and  adaptatioM  as  to 
many  chemical  and  mechanical  reactions— "tropitmt,^ 
as  some  modem  biologists,  such  as  Locb  and  others,  are 
apt  to  put  it  in  the  case  of  many  animals,  a  reversion  to 
the  Cartetian  hypothetit  of  mechanical  automatism.  Mo- 
tor  reactions  can  be  regarded  tddy  from  the  physiolog. 
ical  Standpoint,  but  consciousness  cannot  be  entinly 
ruled  out.     What  probability  is  there  that  a  play  of 
atoms  and  electrons  would  produce  the  Iliad,  Hamlet, 
the  Principia  of  Newton,  the  Celestial  Meckamc%  of  La- 
P«ce,  or  Darwin't  Origin  of  Species  f 
Even  if  we  dttccnd  to  anch  motor  imctioiit  at  are 


1 88       NorwkU  Mid  dbuornuU  Psychology 


exprewed  m  the  compoutioiis  of  a  sdboolboy,  we  idll  im- 

hesitatingly  assume  a  conscious  activity.  We  cannot  re- 
fute the  philosopher  who  would  regard  all  such  mani- 
festations as  so  many  physiological  processes  without 
any  conscious  accompaniment.  For  though  every  one 
is  directly  ccmsdous  of  his  own  mental  life,  no  one  can 
experience  directly  the  mental  life  of  another.  We  can- 
not inspect  directly  the  psychic  processes  that  go  on  in 
other  living  beings,  or  in  our  fellow  men.  Mind  is  in- 
ferred from  action,  from  behavior.  Reactions,  ad- 
justments to  environment,  accompanied  by  conscious- 
ness, by  intelligence  in  us,  are  rightly  judged  to  have  the 
same  accompaniment  in  odier  beings,  in  our  neighbours. 
To  deny  consciousness  to  our  neighbour,  and  to  regard 
him  as  a  physiological  automaton,  is  to  put  oneself  in 
the  absurd  position  of  denying  the  existence  of  states 
which  are  observed  b  ourselves  under  similar  condi- 
tions. In  fact,  the  burckn  of  proof  falls  cm  those  who 
make  such  a  denial. 

Now,  in  the  case  of  hypnosis  or  various  states  of  dis- 
sociation, we  meet  with  ■  intelligent  adjustments  often 
expressed  in  gestures,  writing,  and  speech.  We  can,  by 
means  of  various  methods,  enter  mto  active  relati(»i- 
ship  with  those  dissociated  activities,  unknown  to  the  ui> 
dividual  himself.  We  can  obtain  intelligent  replies  to 
our  questions  either  by  writing,  or  by  speaking,  or  by 
other  arranged  means  of  communication.  What  right 
have  we  to  deny  consciousness  m  one  case  while  we 
affirm  it  in  another  case  un<ter  similar  drcumttances? 
When  I  receive  a  letter  from  my  friend  I  regard  the  let- 
ter as  having  been  written  by  a  being  who  possesses 
consciousness,  but  when  a  similar  letter  is  written  by  a 
friend  in  a  hypnotic  or  post-hypnotic  state,  we  regard 


Tig  Smkcomdous  mid  AuUmmHsm  189 

it  u  the  result  of  physiological  automatism,  with  no 
coMaoM  accompaniment.  It  is  dear  that  the  denial  of 
ccHucKnisness  to  the  hypnotic  individaaHty  is  purely  ar- 
bitrary.  It  is  certainly  arbitrary  in  the  caw  of  doidde 
or  multiple  personality  to  regard  one  perMoality  at  000. 
scious  and  the  other  personalities  as  purely  automatic, 
with  no  consciousness  in  them.  It  would  have  been 
more  con«ttent,  if  the  psychologist  were  to  take  the 
sohpwitic  pomt  of  view  and  deny  coaMtouness  to  all 
else  except  himself. 

The  arbitrary  standpoint  of  the  psychologic  who  de- 
nies  secondary  and  multiple  consciousness  can  be  still 
further  made  clear  in  the  case  of  coexistent,  dissociated 
mental  activity.   Thw  one  hand  of  the  subject  or  of 
the  patient  may  write  a  letter,  while  the  other  hand  may 
be  engaged  m  drawing  or  writing  a  compoiitioii,  of 
whicl  the  individual  is  not  cognizant.     Both  handt 
enter  mdependently  of  each  other  into  communication 
with  the  external  observer.    The  communications  are 
independent  and  equally  intelligent.   In  each  case  we 
get  intelligent  replies  and  reactions  to  our  ffiieMknt 
and  stimulations.   Which  of  the  two  it  aumoMd  to  be 
conscious?   To  take  a  concrete  experiment.    Mr.  M. 
presents  phenomena  of  dissociation.    When  in  one  of 
thow  states  of  dissociation  Mr.  M.  is  made  to  write  a 
letter  with  one  hand,  whUe  the  other  hand,  being  an- 
aesthetic,  is  put  under  a  screen  and  made  to  carry  out  a 
calculation.    One  hand  replies  to  questions,  while  the 
other  solves  problems.   Both  hands  give  inteUigent  re- 
plies. To  which  of  them  is  consciousness  to  be  ascribed  ? 
If  we  dmy  it  in  one  case,  we  should  also  deny  it  in  die 
other.   But,  then,  why  not  be  coasisteat,  and  ^aiy  it 
in  every  case  of  intelligent  «4|tatiiieiit?  We  ndisc 


X90       Normal  amd  Abnofmd  P»ychology 

how  arbitrary  and  illogical  is  the  potitioo  of  those  psy- 
chologists who  coquet  with  physiology  under  the  de- 
lusion that  they  are  more  scientific.  They  are  led  to 
take  arbitrary  positions  which  lead  into  the  pitfalls 
of  solipsiion,  with  all  its  contradictions  and  absurdities. 

Betides,  physiological  processes  are,  after  all,  but  hy- 
pothetical concepts;  physiological  currents  are  con- 
ceived after  the  model  of  electrical  currents,  and  are  by 
no  means  theoretically  proven.  While  tJiey  should  be 
used  for  the  sake  of  a  b-  tter  elucidation  of  the  facts,  it 
b  not  good  scientific  sense  to  sacrifice  to  them  the  very 
material  of  the  sdoice  of  psychology.  Sensations,  ideas, 
feelings,  emotions,  are  after  all  the  durect  data  of  the 
psychologist,  while  physiological  processes  and  currents 
are  purely  hypothetical.  When,  therefore,  these  hy- 
pothetical entities  lead  not  to  a  better  understanding 
of  the  facts  of  mental  life,  but  to  their  denial,  the  very 
purpose  of  the  hypoth  etical  creations  is  completely  di^• 
feated. 

Physiological  processes  are  framed  to  explain  states 
of  consciousness  with  their  motor  reactions.  When, 
therefore,  these  hypothetical  creations  threaten  to  sweep 
away  the  actual  living  facts,  it  is  time  to  halt  and  ex- 
amine  closely  the  sterile  character  of  the  hypothesis. 
The  central  fallacy  lies  in  the  tacit  assumption  that  un- 
known and  possibly  unknowable,  highly  problematical 
brain  currents,  with  their  "opening  and  closing  valves," 
widi*SreU  worn  or  blocked  paths,"  all  of  a  purely  conjec- 
toral  character,  have,  by  their  ingenious  complexity,  be^ 
come,  likes  marionettes,  so  marvelhmsly  endowed  with 
•ense-like  activities  as  to  dispense  completely  witii  tile 
mental  states  which  these  0(uceptual  entitict  wtrt 
called  in  to  explain. 


The  SmhcomsdoMS  a$U  /iutomsthm  t^t 

Qinical  cases  and  experimenul  facts  go  further  to 
invtlidate  the  theory  of  the  purely  physicd  inteipreta- 
tioii  of  the  subconscioiis,  or  what  may  be  6taa^td  u 
automatism-psychology.   If  anything  it  of  the  otmott 
importance  in  mental  life,  it  is  surely  memory.  Mem- 
ory forms  a  unity  of  our  life,  brings,  so  to  speak,  to  a 
focus  our  life-experiences,  which  would  have  otherwise 
been  diMonnected,  confined,  and  chaotic.    I  remem- 
ber just  now  what  I  did  an  hoar  ago,  a  day  agi>,  what 
I  lived  through  many  years  ago.   I  remember  the  ex- 
periences of  my  childhood,  boyhood,  •'nd  youth.   I  re- 
member my  struggles  and  disappointments,  niy  loves, 
my  friendships,  my  enmities,  my  feelings,  sentiments, 
emotions,  ideas,  and  tensationt.   All  these  inter-con- 
nected, interlocked  links  of  memories  form  the  solid 
chain  of  my  conscious  personality. 

In  my  memory  of  the  past  experiences  there  is 
the  present  consciousness  that  all  that  I  had  gone 
through  at  the  time  of  the  experience— any  change, 
any  modification,  that  had  taken  plao»— occurred 
in  my  mind,  in  my  consdousness.    Unles*  mrfer 
delusion  or  illusion  of  memory  we  cannot  remem- 
ber what  did  not  occur  in  consciousness.    fTe  can- 
not remember  what  we  were  not  conscious  of.  The 
past  mental  state  which  the  present  memory  refers  to  is 
a  state  of  consciousness;  otherwise  memory  is  impossi- 
ble and  meaningless.    Memory,  recollection,  reminis- 
cence, can  only  refer  to  a  previous  state  of  consciousness. 
Surely  no  one  else  can  have  a  better  and  more  direct 
knowledge  than  I  myself  have  of  the  ideas,  emotions, 
and  moods  that  I  remember,  as  experienosd  by  me. 

The  memory  factor  is  all  the  more  important  » 
pqrchobgy,  sbwe  we  havt  to  takt  aceowii  of  tlM  inb* 


19*       Normal  and  Abnormal  Psyekohgy 

ject's  inner  experiences.   In  each  case  of  memory  the 
burden  of  proof  falls  on  those  who  deny  the  validity  of 
that  memory,  as  referring  to  a  past  state  of  conscious^ 
nest.  Suppose  I  have  a  memory  in  a  full  state  of  con- 
sdoiniien  that  I  lighted  a  lamp  an  hour  ago,  the  burden 
of  proof  would  faU  on  thow  who  deny  the  existence  of 
such  a  state.  It  would  be  an  arbitrary,  :f  not  a  prepot- 
terous  position  for  an  outside  observer  to  claim  that  the 
lighting  of  the  lamp  was  carried  out  mechanically,  by 
a  physiological  automatism,  and  that  the  subsequent 
memory  was  but  an  illoiion.   The  onus  of  proof  that 
the  original  act  had  no  conscious  accompaniment  it  en- 
tirely on  those  who  take  toch  a  potidon  m  oppotition 
to  the  direct  introspective  account.  Where  such  a  proof 
is  not  forthcoming,  the  position  taken  is  arbitrary.  Were 
we  to  take  such  a  position,  the  very  science  of 
pqrchology  would  become  an  impostibility,  since  aU 
memory  would  have  to  be  declared  a  anare  and  a  deb- 
sion.   All  psychological  studies  based  on  introspection 
and  memory  would  have  to  be  abandoned,  and  we 
should  have  to  follow  Gomte,  and  declare  psychology 
an  impostibility.    A  psychologist  mainuining  such  a 
point  of  view  is,  from  the  very  nature  of  hit  attitude, 
disqualified  to  give  his  opinion;  he  mutt  fall  back  on 
physiology,  and  rule  out  all  psychology. 

If,  however,  n.emory  and  introspection  are  not  re- 
jected, then  the  recollection  of  a  conscious  state  should 
not  be  arbitrarily  ditmitted,  unless  there  are  good  rea- 
sons for  such  a  dismissal.  Now,  the  hypnotic  subject, 
or  the  patient,  in  the  case  of  functional  ptychotit,  un- 
dergoes an  experience  of  which  he  is  apparently  uncon- 
scious. In  a  subsequent  state,  in  a  hypnotic  or  trance 
ttate,  he  actually  recollects  that  the  experience  wat  a 


Tht  Suheonseknu  and  Autommtism  193 

conscious  one;  wc  cannot  possibly  reject  this  recoUec- 
tion  M  an  iUution  of  memory.  The  burden  of  proof 
that  the  former  state  wu  oot  a  comdoiM  one  faOt  on 
him  who  denies  the  person's  mental  experience.  Saeh  a 
proof  is  all  the  more  requisite,  since  it  can  be  demon, 
stratcd  that  in  subconscious  states  there  is  really  pret* 
ent  a  subconscious  consciousness. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 


THE  SUBCONSCIOUS  AND  THE  PASSIVE  CONSCIOUSNESS 

DRIVEN  out  of  the  psychological  fortress, 
•ome  psychologists  of  the  philosophical  type 
( Munsterberg)  stUl  take  refuge  in  the  mett- 
physical  citadel.  It  is  claimed  that,  psycho- 
logically, mental  life  is  analyzed  into  consciousness  and 
its  content.   Now,  it  is  further  assumed  that  all  mental 
modifications  occur  in  mental  contents,  but  not  in  con- 
sdonsneis.    Consdousness,  itself,  is  supposed  to  be  a 
passive,  immutable  looker-on,  a  sort  of  psychic  deity. 
We  thus  have  a  mental  content  which  is  not  conscious 
and  a  consciousness,  the  blessed  Buddha  in  his  blissful 
state  of  Nirvana.  Consciousness  is  regarded  in  the  light 
of  a  substance  which  contains  the  mental  content  some- 
what after  the  fashion  of  a  material  substance  undcrly- 
ing  physical  qualities.  This  view  of  an  underlying,  im- 
mutable substance,  with  a  changing  qualitative  content, 
was  long  ago  criticized  by  Hume,  both  in  the  case  of 
mmd  and  body.    T^e  assumption  of  an  entity  under- 
lying observed  phenomena,  whether  physical  or  mental, 
has  since  become  so  weakened  diat  it  is  no  longer  re- 
garded  as  a  living  hypothesis  among  thinking  men  of 
science. 

We  can  see  at  a  glance  that  the  substance-conscious- 
ness with  its  changing  qualitative  content  is  but  a  piece 
of  metaphysical  speculation,  it  is  a  revival  of  the  old 
soul-hypothesis,  long  ago  buried  by  modern  psycholo- 
gists.  The  soul-consciousness  hypothesis  must  be  re- 

194 


5mheoiu€hm  md  ikg  PmssiiM 


jected,  for  the  simple  reuon  diat  k  oomplicates 

matters,  and  explains  nothing.  In  htt,  tht  hypo- 
thesis  of  an  imperturbable  soul-consciousness  from  tbe 
very  nature  of  its  hypothetical  being,  itself  requires  an 
explanation,  while  it  does  not  in  the  least  explain  the 
menul  content,  which  is  the  material  of  the  psycholo- 
gist. Such  a  passive,  changeless  soul-consdomiiesi  is 
a  sort  of  box  in  which  the  content  of  soul-coas^Hnmss 
resides  a.id  has  its  being.  This  soul-consciousness  is  bat 
a  survival  from  a  past  metaphysical  period. 

In  the  case  of  double  and  multiple  personalities  it  is 
claimed  that  while  the  pefsonaUtes  ate  different,  their 
consciousness  is  not  different,  but  one  and  the  same.  In 
the  different  personalities  found  in  the  case  of  multipk 
personality,  there  is  among  them  but  one  consciousness, 
somewhat  like  the  Greek  myth  of  the  three  old  women 
with  one  eye  among  them.  By  a  parity  of  reasoning  we 
may  say  that  the  minds  of  different  individuals,  such  as 
John's  and  Peter's,  are  really  identical.  John  and  Pe- 
ter  are  different  personalities  with  different  contents, 
but  with  the  same  consciousness.  In  fact,  we  may  gen- 
eralize further  and  say  that  the  whole  human  race  and 
the  beasts  of  the  field  and  the  birds  of  the  air  share 
in  one  and  the  same  indivisible,  passive,  immutable  con- 
sciousness, a  sort  of  world-soul.  This  may  be  a  grand 
metaphysical  speculation,  but  it  is  neither  psychological 
nor  scientific. 

There  is  another  objection  to  the  subconscious,  an 
objection  based  on  an  artificial  fast  and  hard  line  drawn 
between  the  purpose  of  science  on  die  one  hand,  and 
that  of  will  on  the  other.  Science,  it  is  claimed,  deals 
with  artificial  concepts,  while  personal  will  is  concerned 
with  the  real  values  pf  life.  It  is  cUimed  that  the  con- 


196       Normd  tmi  AkwrmA  PsyMog, 

cept  of  the  mbcofiKiout  it  illegitimate,  becaiue  it  h 
keeping'  «nct«pli^  double  bod 

The  world  of  description  and  the  world  of  appr 
oation  were  brought  out  and  contrasted  by  Professc 
Koyce  in  hit  early  works,  and  afterwards  elaborated  h 
a  few  pqrchologittt  of  the  Schopenhanerian  tinge.  Th 
division  IS  not  new,  and  dates  back  to  the  Middle  Affei 
with  ite  split  of  science  and  philosophy  on  the  one  hue 
and  religion  on  the  other.  It  is  the  doctrine  of  the  twc 
fold  ^  (Die  Lehre  von  dcr  zweifachen  Wahrheit) 
According  to  mediaeval  thought,  there  are  two  reabu 
the  realm  of  knowledge  and  the  realm  of  faith;  di 
realm  of  intellect  and  the  realm  of  will.   What  it  tru 
in  the  one  may  not  be  true  in  the  other.   From  Maimo 
Albertus  Magnus,  Thomas  Aquin» 
to^Dnnt  Scotiit  and  Occam  the  same  doctrine  of  the  two 
fold  truth  and  die  two  reabns  prevaUed.  The  scholastii 
could  say  anything  he  withed  provided  he  wat  amtioiii 
to  claim  that  what  wat  true  secmubm  rMihrntm  wm 
true  secundum  fidem. 

Thit  double  view  stiU  surv  ves  in  some  philosophical 
qwrteri.  Inttead  of  finding  fault  with  the  aubcon- 
scious  for  ignoring  this  tirae^onored  double  trudi,  it 
should  rather  be  regarded  as  a  special  merit  At  a  mat- 
tcr  of  fact,  the  subconscious,  unless  interpreted  in  meta- 
physical  terms  of  a  cosmic  self,  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  heirloom  of  metaphysical  mediaeval  thought.  The 
subconscious  it  lated  on  experience  and  factt  to  which 
philosophical  and  metaphytical  dittinctiont  tfaould  cdapt 
themselves. 

We  thus  find  that  the  objections  to  the  subconsdow 
are  btted  on  msuffident  grounds.  We  alto  find  that  die 


Si*»m€hmmd$kgFMih0Comsekmim  197 

abuidonment  of  the  subconscious  leads  to  a  tangle  of 
difficnlbet  and  to  the  quagmire  of  mediaeval  metaphys- 
la.  If  the  metaphyiicd  iaterpretatkm  of  the  aub- 
conscious  m  t'le  sense  of  a  comic  aelf  lands  one  in  the 
misty  regions  of  religious  mystidmi,  the  oppoiite  wkw 
of  the  total  negation  of  the  subconscious,  apparently  m 
the  mterests  of  science,  lands  one  in  regiom  no  leat 
shadowy,  regions  of  naturalistic  mysticism. 

So  fundamental,  however,  is  the  concept  of  the  sub- 
conscious that  even  its  opponents  have  to  admit  it  under 
different  names.   They  admit  the  fact  of  dissociation, 
of  dissociated  mental  systems,  and  of  dissociated  person- 
alities.  But  they  put  forth  the  hypodietical  claim  that 
It  IS  one  and  the  same  consciousness  present  in  all  the 
diftercnt  forms  of  dissociation.    Now,  if  we  omit  that 
speculative  metaphysical  consciousness  which,  being  b. 
active  and  unchangeable,  is  of  no  use  in  scientific  work, 
we  are  reaUy  left  with  the  mutations  and  permutations 
of  mental  systems  which,  from  their  very  nature,  must 
be  conscious.    The  psychopathologist  must  postukte 
the  subconscious  just  as  the  geometrician  poitahtes  space 
and  position,  or  as  the  physicist  postnhtet  matter  and 
force. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 


SUBCONtaOUS  AND  UNCONSaOUS  IDEAS 

THERE  is  a  school  which  regards  the  sub- 
comdoot  M  formed  of  "suppressed  mental 
complexet."   The  views  of  this  tchool  are 

not  psychologically  clear.  It  seems,  however, 
that  the  subconscious  is  viewed  in  the  light  of  "un- 
conscious ideas."  "Unconscious  Ideas"  were  discussed 
by  me  in  my  Psychology  of  Suggestion,  and  I  cannot 
do  better  than  to  quote  from  that  volume,  "For  the 
mechanism  of  consciousness  is  hidden  deep  down  in  the 
depths  of  the  subconscious,  and  it  is  thither  we  have  to 
descend  in  order  to  get  a  clear  understanding  of  the 
phenomena  that  appear  in  the  broad  daylight  of  con- 
tdomnest. 

The  German  school,  with  Wondt  at  its  head,  at  first 

started  out  on  simititr  lines,  but  they  could  not  matf  any 
use  of  the  subconscious,  and  their  speculations  ran  wild 
n  the  fancies  of  Hartmann.  The  reason  of  this  failure 
IS  due  to  the  fact  that  the  concept  of  the  subconscious 
as  conceived  by  the  German  school  was  extremely  vague, 
and  had  rather  the  character  of  a  mechanical  than  that 
of  a  psychical  process.  An  unconscious  consciousness 
— that  was  their  concept  of  the  subconscious.  In  such 
a  form  as  this  the  subconscious  was  certainly  meaning- 
less— mere  nonsense— and  had  to  be  given  up.  The 
German  psychological  investigations  are  now  confined  to 
the  content  of  consciousness  in  so  far  as  the  individnal 
is  immediately  conscious  of  it.  But  as  tliis  form  of  con- 

198 


W  UwamiAm  !Mm  199 


imyed  it,  though  nawriuible  for  their  thor- 
oughne..,  arc.  after  aU.  of  .  ,«ther  triml  Xu 

TTiii  mtidsm  applies  well  to  Freud  and  his  adhciw 
^  ,  Du$  Unhmsst^  is  conceived  as  "Suppressed  .m 
conscious  dea-co™pl«e..»   Of  course.  ^TlZ 
that  ^ool  to  ongjnality  «.d  to  the  .pp.«t 
fiL  Psychoneurosis  are  entirdyoZS 

.  <Lo^.^dTr'  ""P^"."  -oth- term^i 
oW??l  'y'^f™' ^'".'"only  accepted  in  psychopath- 

».on  of  unpleasant  or  painful  idea,  .re  enMy 

ous  andfaUe  m  the  Hght  of  modem  ptycholog/iidX 
ical  experience.  i-/—— »7  ant. 

baPon  J^^'^S^r^'"  unfortunately  faUen 

Ret  n    -^"^^  '^''^  metaphysical 

Reals  or  ideas  which  by  their  mutual 

suppressing  one  another,  thus  detenniamg  the  ^ 

play  of  the  contents  of  consciousness.     As  Her 

^J^'  ^  '^^"^       or  more 

opposed  concepts  encounter  one  another."  This  proposi- 
t.on  or  prmaple  prodaimcc  V  Herbart  !•  at  tL 
of  Freud's  n^ythic,  specula-  "A  concept  isbcSS! 
saousness  in  so  far  as  it  is  nc  suppressed."  Herbart  t^ 
.1^1  ""^^  representation.  When  it  rises  out  of 
conipletc  ttippiwsion.  it  enten  into  consciousness."  Ac- 

pre«ed  ideas  become  forces  and  impulses.  Coicepte 
which  are  not  opposed  or  contrarted  with  oae  aaodi^ 


soo       Normal  tmd  Abnormal  Ppftkohgy 


so  far  as  they  meet  unhindered,  form  a  "complex,**  a 
favourite  term  used  by  die  psycho-analytic  sdiod  and 
its  followers. 

It  may  possibly  be  of  interest  to  remark  that  Herbart 
is  closely  followed  by  the  psycho-analytic  school 
in  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  desire.  Desire  with 
Herbart  is  fundamental.  "The  faculty  of  desire 
must  include  wishes,  instincts,  and  every  spedes  of  long- 
ing.** "The  expression  'desire'  must  not  be  so  limited 
as  to  exclude  those  wishes  which  remain,  though  they 
may  be  vain,  or  so-called  pious  wishes,  and  which,  for 
the  very  reason  that  they  do  remain,  constantly  incite 
men  to  new  efforts,  because  through  tiliem  die  duraght  of 
a  possibility  is  ever  anew  suggested,  in  spite  of  all  rea- 
sons which  appear  to  prove  the  impossibility  of  attain- 
ment. It  is  very  important  to  give  the  concept  of  the 
unattainability  of  the  wished-for  object  strength  enough 
so  that  a  peaceful  renunciation  may  take  place  of  the 
desire.  A  man  dreams  of  a  desirable  future  for  him- 
self, even  when  he  knows  it  will  never  come.'*  These 
Herbartian  doctrines,  long  ago  abandoned  by  psychol- 
ogy, are  now  being  revived  by  the  marvellous,  "scien- 
tific" psycho-analytic  technique  as  a  new  discovery  in  the 
sdence  of  normal  and  almormal  psychology.  No  better 
criddsm  can  be  passed  on  diis  revival  of  HerlMrtiaii 
psychology  in  the  domain  of  psychopathology  dian  die 
one  made  by  James:  "I  must  confess  that  to  my 
mind  there  is  something  almost  hideous  in  the  glib  Her- 
bartian jargon  about  Vorstellungmassen  and  their  Hent' 
muugen  (suppressions)  and  smktm  and  trkthtm  and 
schweben  and  Ferschmehtungen  §nd  Comptmhiun 
(complexes.)'* 

It  is  daimed  by  some  of  Freud's  younger  adhtrcnti 


'i^fiKlous  mi  Vnamaoia  Uut  mi 

in  order  to      A,  apluution  of  menul  phenoma,. 

fWttnng  s^ten,.    It  i,  truly  ,m„i„g  a»t  ^ 

1  Philo^phical  that  wh«,  ,  ^ 

"       I*  well  to  point  one  dut  uli<mtTz. 
d.«ory  hypothec,  are  „„t  ,„ite  .ccepfble  in 
A  ,c«„t,fic  hypoth«,i,  should  .t !««  h«e  the  m^S 
bemgrahonal  logical,  and  not  concei«d  inTwiM 
muTT^  A  good  «i«,«fic  hyi^ti^^ 

must  h.«  t^on,  ^  definite  «ndition..  I  thS 
«  «  Huxlq,  who  »„  d„e  in  the  c»e  of  «olen  g»oA 
two  hypotheses  are  at  hand:  one  hypoAed,  i  hSm 
angel responsible  for  it,  and  the  odTSto  .  thtf  llj 
c^n^ff  the  g<K,ds.   The  angel-hypothesi, 

conceived  in  term,  of  ex- 

The  hypothetical  agency  must  either  he  t  fact  <& 
««^y  observed  in  nature,  or  a  fact  which  can  be  ^fiS 
iTf^  J}«-  *' *f""T  g"vitation  is  based  on 
tiLl^.L^'T^'"'  *'  of  natural  selec 

observed  in  the  orgMic  world.  In  ihoit,  ,  good  ecien. 
.lie  hypothesis  n,«,t  take  a,  it,  cj^,^,*^ 

^^^'*".«l>'™"«.  Atoms,  electron" 

««nW  Iqr  d»  pfc,«a«  M  wiwl  fancfe.,  unred  abttrut 


20S        Normal  mti  Abnormtd  Psyehohgy 

nodom  to  explain  die  real  facts;  but  eadi  of  these  hy- 
pothetical agents  is  regarded  as  real,  as  a  vera  causa. 

We  cannot  help  agreeing  with  J.  S.  Mill  on  the  sid>ject 
of  hypothesis :  **I  conceive  it  to  be  necessary,  when  the 
hypothesis  relates  to  causation,  that  the  supposed  cause 
should  n  t  only  be  a  real  phenomenon,  something  actu- 
ally existing  in  nature,  but  should  be  ah^ady  kno^  to 
exercise,  or  at  least  to  be  capable  of  exercising,  an  influ- 
ence o^  some  sort  over  the  eflect.  In  any  other  case  it  is 
no  sufficient  evidence  of  the  truth  of  the  hypothesis  that 
we  are  able  to  deduce  th?  real  phenomenon  from  it." 
Again,  "What  is  true  in  [Newton's]  maxim  is  that  the 
cause,  thou^  not  known  previously,  should  be  capable 
of  being  known  thereafter;  that  its  existence  should  be 
capable  of  being  detected,  and  its  connection  with  the 
effect  ascribed  to  it  should  be  susceptible  of  being  proved 
by  independent  evidence." 

If  we  apply  this  very  simple  rule  of  logic  to  the  theory 
of  "unconscious  ideas,"  we  at  once  realize  the  illegiti- 
mate character  of  such,  a  hypothesis.  An  idea  is  essen- 
tially of  a  conscious  nature.  To  speak,  therefore,  of 
unconscious  ideas,  is  to  introduce  into  psychology  the 
self-c  '>ntradictory  impossible  concept  of  uncmscious 
ccmsciout  ideas.  This  is  equivalent  to  die  assumpdon  of 
an  unamsdotts  consciousness.  An  uncmisciout  idea  is 
neither  a  vera  causa  nor  a  fact  ultimately  to  be  verified. 
The  conception  of  an  unconscious  Icsa  is  like  the  cbn- 
ception  of  a  round  square. 

Moreover,  it  is  not  true,  psychologically,  that  ideas 
can  be  "suppressed**  so  that  they  beomie  disMdated  or 
"unconscious."  It  is  not  true  that  we  suppress  painful 
ideas  into  the  "unconscious."  We  do  not  forget  our 
painful  idaas.  On  the  contrary,  painful  ideM  stand  out 


Suieomeioiu  mi  Unamtehiu  Idui  343 
all  the  more  prominent  in  our  contrinn-.-,  i— 
€xpmence  into  ,h,  mind.  In  fact  we  may 
ngte  d«t i,  ,He  fUasuratU  ideas  ,hI,Z  f„. 

"penence  associated  with  p«n  i.  never  forgotten  iZ 
a  splmter  ,n  the  llesh.  it  remain,  in  comdoJSi  ftH 

facT*^M"K  '"^"'l' ™      ™Portance  of  thi, 

ultiL;  I "  ^  ""'""^  '°  ^«  individual  and 

«SSn    T^.   h'*^'*!'  were  for- 

gotten. The  mdividual  must  learn  to  >Toid  harmful  ob- 

K  Tl  . ™s  can  onlyT.^ 

pl»h«|  by  actuaUy  r.nun,h,rint  painful  experi^ 
Th,,  ,^d«J  would  survive  who  remembired  S 

v.du.1  wo|,ld  be  very  much  in  the  oomlition  of  the  pro- 
verM  ,,Uy  b,rd  that  hides  its  head  at  the 
hunter  The  subjectjve  painful  experiencesXt  b.~ 
n>«be«d;  a  painful  experience  fixe,  die  attention. 

0»  thif  fact  of  itrengthening  memory  by  p,;.  was 
baaed  the  once  univer«Uly  reconired  n^thod  of  tr^ 
mg  and  educafon.  What  is  fixed  by  p.i.  i.  ,^*f^ 
«n.  What  may  bnng  about  foftetfulne.  i,  ^ 
a  con«.t.t.onaUy  bad  memory,  Ta  state  of  t^. 
terenw,  or  ta  mtense,  paralyting  emotion  of  fear 
..pecalljr  m  «ttly  childhood.   Th.  wkoU  ,h.or,  of 

M,e  chmcal  and  psychological  assumpHont.  NdtJ 
dKre  such  a  proce«i  „  ",uppres«on  of  cooiptaaC 

who  M  MWd  hM  hii  hand  everywhere,  tato 


Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


up  cudgels  in  defense  of  the  unconscious.   In  his  work 
"Matter  and  Memory"  he  argues  that  common  sense 
assumes  the  presence  of  external  objects,  although  it 
may  not  be  directly  cognizant  of  them.  Being  an  ideals 
ist  and  pan-psychist  Bergson  regards  the  nature  of  things 
as  made  up  of  images.   If,  then,  he  reasons,  common 
sense  believes  in  the  existence  of  objects  'passed  out  of 
sight  and  sense,'  if  it  affirms  unhesitatingly  the  actual 
existence  of  not  directly  experienced  objective  images, 
there  should  be  no  difficulty  in  assuming  the  existence  of 
subjective  images,  or  of  psychic  ttotea  of  which  there  is 
no  consciousness.    The  argument  is  essentially  meta- 
physical and  will  hardly  have  any  weight  with  the  psy- 
chologist or  psychopathologist. 

Bergson's  psychology  is  unfortunately  so  much  satu- 
rated with  metaphysics  that  many  a  valuabk  sug- 
gestion becomes  lost  in  the  haze  and  tangle  of 
his  speculations.    The  psychologist  has  nothing  to 
do  with  the    constitution    of    matter    as    it  is 
in  itself.  This  belongs  to  metaphysical  ontology.  The 
psychologist  assumes  matter  as  an  external  exiateiice, 
and  separates  it  from  hia  own  subject  matterr--piychic 
s  tes,  m«»tal  processes,  their  elements  and  relations.  A 
psychic  state  made  up  of  'images'  after  the  fashion  of 
'material  images'  with  no  consciousness  to  them  ceases 
to  be  psychic  in  the  psychological  sense.   From  a  pay- 
chological  standpoint  the  term  'psychic*  can  only  mean 
some  form  of  consciousness,  however  vague  and  mar- 
ginal.   Bergson's  view  would  have  probably  been  near- 
er the  truth,  if  he  had  assumed  the  existence  of  a  subcon- 
scious consciousness. 

An  "unconscious  idea"  in  the  sense  that  the  idea  hat 
no  consdouinen  can  have  no  meantiig.  If,  however,  by 


S$ib€otudotu  md  Uneoiueiotu  IdtsM 


an  "unconscious  idea"  is  understood  a  consciousness  of 
which  the  individual  or  personal  self  it  not  conscious, 
then  we  come  arwuid  to  a  stAconseious  conseiousuess,  as 
developed  by  me  in  my  various  works.  A  qtMCation 
from  Hd£fding  may  brii^  out  my  point  in  a  clearer  and 
stronger  light: 

"The  question  before  us  is,  whether  the  unconscious 
can  be  other  than  a  purely  negative  concept.   In  daily 
speech  (and  more  than  is  proper  even  in  the  scientific  use 
of  the  language)  we  use  such  expressions  as  unconscious 
sensations,  unconscious  ideas,  unconscious  feeling.  As, 
however,  sensations,  ideas  and  feelings  are  conscious 
elements,  the  expression  is  in  reality  absurd.   If  by  an 
unconscious  idea  is  meant  the  idea  which  I  hitve,  then 
the  predicate  "unconscious"  signifies  only  that  I  do  not 
think  of  or  pay  heed  to  the  fact  that  I  have  it.  This  use 
of  the  word  unconsciousness  is  connected  with  a  twofold 
use  of  the  word  consciousness.  It  is  used  to  denote  not 
only  the  inner  presentation  of  our  sensations,  ideas  and 
feelings,  but  also  self^ooacioiitiiest,  the  attention  espe- 
cially directed  to  our  seimtioaa,  ideas,  and  feelings. 
We  have,  of  course,  many  sensations  and  ideas 
without    being    conscious    that    we    have  them, 
that  is,   without  self-consciousness:   many  feelings 
aiul  impulses  stir  within  ns,  widurat  our  dearly 
apprehending  their  nature  and  direction.  In  this  sense 
we  speak,  for  example,  of  unconscious  love.    A  man 
who  has  this  feeling  does  not  know  what  is  astir  in  him; 
perhaps  others  see  it,  or  he  himself  gradually  discovers 
it;  but  he  /ku  the  feeling,  his  conscious  life  is  determined 
in  a  particular  way." 

In  other  words,  what  Hdffding  practically  claims  here 
it  that  there  it  no  tuch  mental  ttate,  no  idea  that  it 


io6       Normd  mtd  Ahnomtd  Psyehologf 


"unconscious,"  but  that  there  are  mental  states,  ideas, 
feelings,  which,  though  conscious,  do  not  reach  self- 
consciousness.  In  other  words,  there  arc  in  us  mental 
procesMS  which  have  comdousness,  but  no  self-con- 
sdoaaness.  This  is  precisely  what  I  mean  by  the  sub- 
conscious,— mental  states  which  have  consciousness,  hut 
do  not  reach  the  personal  consciousness.  In  short,  the 
only  possible  psychological  assumption  is  a  subconscious 
consctousness. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 


THE  SUBCONSCIOUS,  CONSCIOUS,  AND  UNCONSCIOUS 

THOSE  who  accept  the  division  of  the  sub- 
conscious into  co-existing  consciousness,  or  the 
co-ccmsdous  and  the  unconscious  really  as- 
simie  the  doctrine  of  the  tnlwoiiKioat.  They 
claim  that  it  would  be  better  and  more  {nrecue  to  imfi- 
cate  whenever  possible  the  conscious  or  unconscious, 
that  is,  the  strictly  physiological  character  of  the  ob- 
served manifestations.  This,  however,  is  more  easily 
said  than  done.  We  know  next  to  nothing  of  the  physi- 
ological brain  processes,  which  are  mainly  hypothetical, 
and  we  do  not  know  the  limits  of  the  snbconadous  con- 
sciousness. In  many  cases  it  is  not  easy  to  determine 
what  the  exact  character  of  the  subconscious  manifesta- 
tion is,  how  far  it  is  conscious,  dimly  conscious,  how  far 
it  has  fofw  toward  die  developmeitt  of  an  independent 
personality,  and  how  far  it  shades  in  the  diractkm  of 
the  purely  physiological.  In  the  absence  of  any  exact 
determination,  the  term  'subconscious'  indicates  the  char- 
acter of  the  mental  state  without  any  definite  commit- 
oil  to  any  of  the  possible  hypotheses. 

The  term  'Wmsdous"  is  all  the  more  objecdoaable, 
«B  Hdffding  has  already  pointed  out,  it  is  fmntiaWy 
an  ambiguous,  negative  concept.  The  "unconscious" 
may  mean  absence  of  self-consciousness,  or  lack  of  con- 
sciousness, that  is,  purely  physiological  processes  with 
no  conscious  concomitant.  He  who  uses  the  term  "un- 
consetotis'*  must  in  each  case  indicate  in  what  sense  he 

207 


ao8       NornuU  mtd  Ahmtrmd  Psydk>hgy 


uses  the  term.  Is  the  manifestation  entirely  phjrsiolog- 
ical,  or  is  it  conscious  in  the  sense  of  consciousness  with 
no  teU-oonsdouaneM?    The  two  meanings  are  £a- 

metrically  opposed  to  each  other.  The  unconscious  in 
the  sense  of  the  purely  physiological  assumes  the  theory 
of  unconscious  cerebration ;  the  other  use  of  the  uncon- 
scious in  the  sense  of  mere  consciousness  with  no  self- 
oonadousness  recognizes  die  view  of  die  rabomdoiis- 
ness  as  advanced  in  my  woria. 

It  is  claimed  again  that  in  many  cases  of  psjrchopathic 
maladies  there  Is  no  need  to  have  recourse  to  sub- 
conscious systems.  It  is  quite  probable  that  the  associa- 
tion between  the  stimulus  and  the  emotion  called  forth 
it  a  direct  one.  The  patient  who  is  afraid  of  dogs  has 
the  fear  called  forth  by  the  si^t  of  a  dog.  There  is 
no  need  to  assume  that  there  are  here  any  intermediate 
links  in  the  chain  of  association.  Even  physiological 
links  may  be  totally  absent  here.  It  may  be  that  by 
invesdgaticm  it  can  be  shown  dut  this  aaaociadcm  has 
a  history  based  on  tofut  former  operience.  That  it  no 
reason  to  assume  that  the  experience  is  functioning  sub- 
consciously, whether  consciously  or  "unconsciously,"  that 
is,  physiologically.  The  dog  and  the  fear  have  formed 
an  indissoluble  association,  so  that,  as  soon  as  the  dog 
is  perceived  the  fear  is  awakened. 

HiiSf  however,  is  rather  a  debatable  subject,  since  it 
is  impossible  to  tell  in  the  case  of  purely  physiological 
links,  whether  such  are  present  or  not.  Thus,  Hd^ 
ding  says,  "Not  only  may  conscious  results  come  from 
unconscious  (subconscious)  working  up,  but  there  may 
also  be  unconscious  intermediate  links  in  the  midst  of 
conscious  work.  Supposing  the  idea  a  to  be  linked  with 
die  idM    and  b  again  widi  c,  dun  a  will  finally  ^o* 


Tkg  SubeoMscious,  Conscious,  and  UucoHsdoiu  209 

duce  c  directly  without  the  intervention  of  b.  The  inter- 
mediate links  are  often  so  numerous  that  they  cannot 
be  recovered  at  all  or  with  great  difficulty.  Many  psy- 
chological paradoxes  and  taddea  suggestions  have  their 
explanation  in  this  nnconsctous  determmtng  of  oonsdous 
ideas." 

Wundt  seems  to  maintain  the  same  view:  "The 
memory-process  is  especially  predominant  in  those  cases 
where  the  elonent  of  the  new  impression  that  gave  rise 
to  die  aatimihiticm  is  entirely  suppressed  by  odier 
components  of  the  image,  so  that  the  associative  rela- 
tion between  the  memory-idea  and  the  impression  may 
remain  completely  unnoticed.  Such  cases  have  been 
spoken  of  as  'mediate  memories'  or  'mediate  associa- 
tions.' Still,  just  as  with  'mediate  recogniticuis/  we 
are  here,  too,  dealing  with  proceaset  that  are  fondft- 
moitally  the  same  as  ordinary  associations.  Take,  for 
er  pie,  the  case  of  a  person  who,  sitting  in  his  room 
a  ning,  suddenly  remembers,  without  any  apparent 
re4^on,  a  landscape  that  he  passed  through  many  years 
before;  anminati<m  diows  diat  dme  ippeatd  to  be 
in  the  room  a  fragrant  flower  which  he  saw  for  the  fink 
time  in  the  landscape.  The  difference  between  this  and 
an  ordinary  memory-process  in  which  the  connection 
of  the  new  impression  with  an  earlier  experience  is 
clearly  recognized,  obviously  consisted  in  the  fact  that 
here  the  elements  whtdi  recall  the  idea  ftre  pushed  into 
the  obscure  backgromd  of  consciousness.  The  not 
infrequent  experience,  commonly  known  as  the  'spon- 
taneous rise'  of  ideas,  in  which  a  memory-image  sud- 
denly appears  in  our  mind  without  any  assignable  cause, 
is  m  all  pn^Mbili^  redndUe  in  every  case  to  such  latent 
tttociation."  It  appetn,  dien,  thtt  bodi  IM£ng  and 


no       Ncfmd  mi  Aknormd  Psytkohgy 


Wundt  acknowledge  the  presence  of  intermediate  links 
in  what  appears  to  be  a  case  of  purely  "immediate"  as- 
sociation. 

In  cases  where  the  intennediate  links  are  'W 
conscious,"  in  the  sense  of  a  purely  physiological  pro- 
cess, there  is  no  criterion  to  prove  the  presence  of  such 
intennediate  physiological  links,  and  one  may  as  well, 
from  a  purely  psychological  introspective  standpoint, 
deny  their  very  existence.  On  the  odier  hand,  if  widi 
Wundt,  Hoffding  and  others  we  assume  the  pretence 
of  intennediate  psychic  links,  there  is  no  way  of  dis- 
proving them.  It  is  quite  probable  that  such  inter- 
mediate links  are  present  in  every  single  case.  The 
very  hct  diat  'Smconsdous"  systems  can  be  revived 
as  memories  or  hallucinatory  hypiv)icUc  states  would  in- 
dicate their  functioning  when  one  of  their  ocMnpoMitts 
becomes  awakened  to  activity. 

As  an  objection  to  the  presence  of  intermediate  psy- 
chic links  Pavlow's  experiments  are  brought  forward 
to  show  diat  associations  can  be  formed  between  re- 
mote stimuli  and  glandular  secreti<ms,  for  instance. 
Thus,  a  dog  with  a  fistula  in  the  parotid  gland  can  be 
msde  to  react  with  secretions  to  light  or  sound  stimuli. 

This  objection  may  be  easily  obviated  by  the  consider- 
ati<m  diat  we  do  not  know  whether  diere  are  or  are 
not  intennediate  mental  links  between  tlw  artifdal 
rtimuli  and  the  discharge  of  die  g^dular  secretion. 
This  consideration  is  all  the  more  cogent  as  the  remote 
stimuli  can  only  give  results,  if  persistently  associated 
with  food  stimuli.  If  such  association  with  food  stimuli 
is  absent,  and  new  stimuli  are  assodated  widi  remote 
stimuli  which  give  reactions  through  their  assodations 
with  food  ttimuti,  the  result  is  mkibition  of  lecittioii. 


Tkt  Smkeonsdous,  Comuums,  mti  Umcomaom  si  i 

In  other  words,  each  new  stimulus  must  be  directly  a»- 
sociated  indi  the  ori^nal  food  sdmulut. 
To  quote  from  Stvadiky's  work  carried  out  m  ^vr- 

low's  laboratory:  "Wasiliev  and  Mishtovt  were  the 
first  to  investigate  conditions  of  inhibitions.  At  first 
the  authors  had  in  mind  to  develop  conditional  reflexes, 
not  on  the  basis  of  the  unconditional  reflex  (i.  e.  food) 
but  on  the  battt  of  another  conditicmal  reflex  (todi  at 
a  sound  or  lig^t  stimulus  giving  secretion.)  Their  ex- 
periments were  as  follows :  From  time  to  time  they  aa> 
sociated  -with  the  usual  conditional  stimulus  another 
stimulus  which  had  no  relation  whatever  to  salivary 
secretion,  and  this  combination  was  not  accompanied 
by  the  presence  of  the  imconditiooal  sdmiihit  (food). 
By  means  of  a  great  number  of  repetitions  of  such  a 
combination,  it  was  supposed  to  associate  with  the 
quality  of  the  extraneous  stimulus  the  quality  of  bring- 
ing about  salivary  secretion.  It  ti:  ned  out,  however, 
that  such  an  arrangement  of  experimentation  could  by  no 
means  transform  the  extraneous  agent  into  a  conditional 
stimulus.  In  that  way  it  became  dear  that  the  omdi- 
tional  stimulus,  contrary  to  the  unconditional,  is  not 
capable  of  communicating  its  property  of  bringing  about 
salivary  secretion.  The  fact  is  that  the  associative  ex- 
ternal stimulta,  when  accompanied  by  the  unamditicmal 
stimulus  alone,  becomes  after  a  itm  reptlaSaOM  0  power- 
ful  inhibiting  agent." 

This  clearly  shows  that  the  conditional  reflex  in  the 
dog  can  bring  about  salivary  secretions  only  when 
associated  with  die  unconditimal  reflex.  What  it  means 
is,  diat  tile  dog  on  seeing  a  li^t  or  hearing  tiie  sound 
expects  food,  and  hence  the  psjrchic  stimulation  of  his 
salivary  glands  renilting  in  secretion.  Pavlow't  cepm- 


IIS       Normd  mid  Ahnomd  Psyekohgy 


ments  and  tbo  the  expcrimenti  carried  out  under  hk 
directions  by  his  pupils  clearly  prove  dut  dwre  b  mo 

direct  association  between  secretion  and  an  external 
stimulus,  such  as  light  or  sound,  but  that  the  secretion 
it  brought  about  by  an  intermediate  psychic  link,  namely 
tk*  expectation  of  food.  Thw  we  ftid  diat  die  work 
of  Pavlow  and  his  pupils,  far  from  showing  die  poaei- 
bility  of  formation  of  direct  associations,  really  goes  to 
substantiate  the  view  of  the  presence  of  intermediate 
mental  links  in  cases  of  apparendy  immediate  associa- 
ticms. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  there  is  no  need  for  us  to  eitab^ 

lish  hypothetical,  intermediate,  unconscious  or  physio- 
logical links.  The  "unconscious"  brain-processes  are 
problematic  entities  and  there  is  no  way  of  getting  at 
them.  What  we  need  to  discover  in  cases  of  mediate 
assodadcm,  and  especially  in  cases  of  psychopathic  dtt> 
eases,  is  whedier  ^e  intermediate  links,  or  die  mriginal 
experience  that  brought  about  the  trauma,  or  die  state 
of  dissociation  is  present,  consciously,  or  subconsciously, 
or  coconsciously.  This  is  possible  to  test  by  hypnosis 
or  by  means  of  the  hjrpnoidal  state.  In  many  such  cases 
we  actually  find  diat  die  patient  lives  through  die  orig- 
inal experience  either  consciously  in  a  hypncHdal  state, 
or  in  a  hypnoidic  state,  thus  undergoing  a  mental  experi- 
ence which  is  immediately  forgotten  or  dissociated;  or 
what  is  more  commonly  the  case,  the  patient  lives 
through  the  original  experioice  subconsciously.  But, 
whedier  cmudous  or  subconscious,  die  moital  state  is 
not  **unconscious,"  but  is  essentially  of  a  consciom  char- 
acter. In  short,  we  deal  here  either  with  the  personal 
consciousness  or  with  the  subconscious  consciousness. 
Thus,  all  the  facts  of  mental  life,  normal  or  abnormal, 
iqbrt»nriate  die  inreaeooe  of  a  subeonuiom  eomwmsnm* 


CHAPTER  XXX 


THE  THRESHOLD  AND  MENTAL  SYSTEMS 

IT  may  be  well  to  point  out  some  principles,  im- 
portant in  many  respects,  but  which  at  the  present 
moment  are  of  interest  frcmi  a  psychopathological 
standpoint. 

Living  tissue  can  only  be  set  into  activity  hf  sdmnli 
of  certain  minimal  intensity;  should  the  stimulus  fall 
below  that  minimal  intensity,  the  living  protoplasm  does 
not  react.  This  holds  true  of  all  cells,  from  the  lowest 
to  die  highest, — from  the  bacterium  and  infusorium  to 
the  highly  differentiated  cell,  such  as  raoide  ceU,  or 
neuron.  The  reaction  of  the  liidng  protoplasm  to  the 
stimulus  shows  the  irritability  or  sensitivity  of  the  cell. 
This  sensitivity  has  its  physiological  threshold,  so  that 
a  stimulus  falling  below  a  certain  intensity  cannot  call 
forth  uny  reaction  in  the  cell.  The  rise  or  fall  of  the 
threshold  would  mean  an  imrease  or  <lecrease  of  the 
minimal  intensity  of  the  stimulus  requuHte  to  bring  about 
a  cellular  reaction.  By  varying  the  conditions  of  sensi- 
tivity, such  as  mechanical,  thermal,  electrical,  chemical 
and  nutritional,  the  physiological  threshold  can  be 
raised  or  lowered. 

The  same  holds  tru?  of  a  whole  psycho-f^ynoiog* 
ical  system, — there  is  a  threshold  of  sensitivity  be- 
low which  the  minimal  stimulus  cannot  fall,  the 
latter  does  not  awaken  any  reaction  in  the  system. 
All  the  senses  reveal  the  presence  of  such  thresholds 
which  are  also  present  in  the  case  of  all  the  higher  psy- 

213 


1X4       Normal  Mid  Abnormal  Psychology 


cho>physioIogical  systems.  If  we  temi  die  ^mnhM 
which  can  just  bring  about  a  reaction  in  the  system  the 

stimulus  threshold,  we  can  say  that  a  given  system  can 
only  be  thrown  into  activity  by  a  stimulus  rising  in  in- 
tensity above  the  stimulus  threshold.  Intensity  of  stim- 
ulus, then,  is  an  indispensable  ccmdition  of  the  fuactimi^ 
ing  of  a  psycfao-physiolopcal  syttem. 

In  hi^y  differentiated  cells,  however,  it  is  not  only 
the  quantity,  or  intensity  of  the  stimulus  that  is  to  be 
considered,  but  also  the  quality.  The  visual  sense  or- 
gan is  not  affected  by  auditory  stimuli  nor  can  the  audi- 
tory sense  organ  be  affected  by  visual  stimulations.  Sim* 
ilarly,  in  the  functioning  of  die  higher  psycho-physio* 
logical  systems  the  quality  of  the  stimulus  should  not 
be  overlooked.  Systems  that  remain  inactive  under 
one  set  of  stimuli,  however  intense,  will  respond  to 
another  set  of  a  different  quality. 

Hie  same  holds  true  of  that  syndwsis  of  mental  lys- 
tems  which  we  term  moment  conscioumess,  and  wiuch 
we  shall  treat  in  detail  further  on.  To  set  the  moment 
into  activity,  the  morhent  threshold  must  be  passed,  and 
not  only  the  intensity  of  the  stimulations  should  be  taken 
into  ccmsideration,  but  also  the  qualitative  aspect  of  die 
stimuli.  Ideas,  emotion  and  feelings  wfaidi  apparently 
remain  dormant  at  the  action  of  one  set  of  excitations 
will  respond  readily  to  the  action  of  excitations  of  a 
different  nature.  Habits,  habitual  movements,  habitual 
thought,  depend  entirely  on  the  qualitative  character  of 
die  enitations,  on  the  combmadons  of  spedal  objects, 
circumstances  and  times.  The  quality  of  the  stimulus 
is  one  of  the  important  factors  in  the  activity  of  a  psy- 
chophysiological system,  or  of  a  moment  consciousness. 

Besides  those  two  faaors  of  intensity  and  quality, 


The  Thrtshold  and  Mental  Systems  215 

another  factor,  that  of  inhibition,  plays  quite  a  r6Ie  in 
the  variations  of  the  threshold.  We  are  acquainted  with 
inliibitions  in  physiology,  ^uh.  for  instance,  as  the  inhi- 
bitions  exerdted  hy  the  pneumogastric  nerve  on  the 
heart,  or  the  arresting  of  the  activity  of  ^andi  or  of 
the  peristalsis  by  the  st  p  ulnlon  of  afferent  nerves.  We 
know  also  of  central  inhibitions,  such  as  fear,  distress, 
pam,  acting  as  so  many  inhibitions  on  the  peripheral 
orgins  tnd  serving  to  arrest  functioning  activity.  Sim- 
ilarly  m  mental  life,  complex  as  it  is,  the  highly  organ- 
ized  psycho-physiological  systems,  with  their  concomi. 
tant  moments  consciousness,  still  fall  under  the  same  gen- 
eral  physiological  laws  of  inhibition.   In  the  course  of 
tssodative  activity  systems  become  organized  into  com- 
plex gnwps,  into  complicated  systems  or  constellations 
of  systems  which,  to  maintain  their  fimctioning  equifib- 
num,  keep  one  ancAer  in  check  or  under  inhibition. 

Such  a  formation  of  checks  and  inhibitions  is 
just  what  takes  place  in  the  training  and  the  edu- 
cation of  the  individual  and  the  race.  Every  psy- 
cho-physiological system  or  moment  entering  into  re- 
lations  With  other  systems  and  moments  n  bomd  hi  the 
courae  of  its  associative  activity  to  form  inhibitions  to 
its  function  by  the  direct  influence  of  external  or  ir 
temal  excitations.  In  other  wor  Is,  there  is  «  rise  of 
threshold  doe  to  inhibitory  associations. 

Inhibition  and  rise  of  tfai«shold  may  also  icndt  b  t 
different  way  in  the  process  of  assodatfoa.  We  mtf 
possibly  lay  it  down  as  a  law,  which  plays  no  small  tHk 
mthe  interaction  of  systems  and  moments,  that  in  t 
Jirw  of  aggregation  of  various  systems  or  moments, 
wMwIag  t  ttmtt  eemito  orsuu'zed  whole,  due  to  as- 
•odttioii  tad  tfoAuk  of  tlie  eon^OBoie  wfmum,  frnf- 


si6        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


ing  various  thresholds,  the  ones  having  the  higher 
thresholds  will  raise  the  thresholds  of  the  moments  hav* 
ing  a  greater  sensitivity.  This,  however,  may  be  coun- 
terbalanced  by  the  lowering  of  die  uMxnait  dirediold 
by  assodadmis  with  moments  of  great  senndvity,  dut 
it,  with  low  moment  thresholds. 

While  on  the  one  hand  the  inhibitions  and  the  conse- 
quent rise  of  threshold  go  along  with  the  complexity  of 
systemic  structure  as  well  as  with  the  increase  of  asao- 
ciative  activity,  bodi  in  extensitm  and  iiitatti<m,  diere 
it  at  the  same  time  an  advantage  gained  for  die  tyt- 
tem,  inasmuch  as  it  really  has  now  more  chances  to  be- 
come active,  on  account  of  the  greater  number  of  sys- 
tems with  which  it  has  become  associated.  The  thresh- 
old of  the  associated  system  ritet,  but  on  die  odier  hand, 
the  chances  for  acdvity  increaae,  while  the  liberadon  or 
discharge  of  energy  with  the  amsequent  evil  effects  of 
extreme  fatigue,  exhaustior  and  ill  nutrition  is  checked 
and  guarded  against  by  the  inhibitions  and  the  rise  of 
threshold. 

What  happens  now  iN^en  a  ptydio-phytiological  lyt- 
tem  beccmies  dissociated?  The  inhibitions  become  re- 
moved and  the  threshold  falls.  The  system  is  no  longer 
checked  by  inhibitions  or  by  other  systems,  and  hence, 
with  a  lowering  of  the  threshold,  becomes  sensitive,  re- 
acting to  any  slight,  passing  stimulus,  manifetdng  or 
liberating  all  die  emrgy  it  poatettet  until  fadgoe  and 
eompkte  exhaustion  set  in.  From  this  vantage  groimd 
we  can  understand  the  fact  of  the  extraordinary  en- 
ergy which  the  dissociated  subconscious  systems  mani- 
fest, so  much  so  that  the  unusual  energy  appeart  almott 
rapematural,  and  hM  on  diat  accBUiit  bMR  MttiWd  \pf 
dia  tup€fititiont  to  (&tbcdical  pontirfoB* 


The  Tkrtshold  and  Mentsl  Sysitm  117 

To  quote  from  t  fonner  work  of  mme; 
"When  a  system  present  in  the  upper  personal  con- 
scioujmess  is  to  be  disintegrated,  the  suggestion  given 
Aoald  be  kept  out  of  ^he  patient»s  personal  memory. 
One  can  obMrve  this  fact  clearly  in  post-hypnotic  sug- 
gestions.  If  a  post-hypnotic  suggestion  is  fully  remem- 
bcrcd,  It  usually  miscarries.— the  siiggeMion  loNt  its 
efficacy,  and  often  comes  up  as  a  word-memory  without 
the  strmgency  of  realization.    When,  however,  am- 
newt  18  enforced,  the  post-hypnotic  suggestion  is  fully 
realiMd.    A  disMciated  system  present  in  the  sub- 
conscious,  when  coming  to  the  surface  of  the  tipper 
strata  of  consciousness,  becomes  manifested  with  uitenM 
scnsori-motor  energy.  Dissociation  gives  rise  to  greater 
dynamogenesis.    This  principle  of  dynamogenesis  is 
importint;  caiet  of  so^alled  impulsive  insanities  and 
psychic  epilepsy'  are  really  doe  to  this  cause. 

"A  system  entering  into  association  with  other  sys- 
tems is  set  into  activity,  not  only  directly  by  its  own 
appropriate  stimuli,  but  also  indirectly  through  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  various  systems  associated  with  it.  These 
aMoattlve  interrehitlons  bring  about  an  equable  and 
nonnal  functioning  activity,  controlled  and  fegulated 
by  the  whole  mass  of  associated  systems.  The  msss 
of  associated  systems  forms  the  'reductivcs'  cf  each  in- 
dividual  vftttm.  In  dissociated  systems  the  controlling 
infiuence  of  the  'reductive  mass'  i^  lost  and  the  result  is 
an  overwtctiWty,  nnehecked  by  any  counteracting  ten- 
dencies.  • 

"This  relation  of  dissociation  and  dynamogentsit  is 
closely  related  to  periodicity  of  function,  with  its  con- 
^iijnt  manifestation  of  psychomdtor  activity  charac 
t«»«c  of  in  pMnoRs  and  periodicaUy  appearing  in- 


II 8        Nermal  mtd  Ahnemud  Psychology 


stincts.  P  ssociated  systems  present  impulsiveness,  be- 
came of  iack  of  associated  counteracting  systems.  The 
only  way  to  diminish  the  overpowering  impulsivniess 
with  which  the  dissociated  subccHncicHis  systems  make 
an  onset  in  their  rush  into  the  personal  consciousness  is 
to  bring  about  an  association  with  counterbalancing  or 
inhibitory,  controlling,  conscious  systems,  to  work  the 
dissociate  systems  into  the  dssue  of  the  personal,  con- 
trolling consdousnen  whidi  has  to  be  fortified  and  de- 
veloped. 

"Physiologically,  it  may  be  said  that  a  neuron  ag- 
gregate, entering  into  association  with  other  aggregates 
and  being  called  into  activity  from  as  many  different  di- 
recticms  as  there  are  aggregates  in  the  associated  duster, 
ha:  its  neuron  energy  kept  within  Ae  limits  of  the  phys- 
iological level.  A  dissociated  neuron  aggregate,  on 
the  contrary,  is  not  affected  by  the  activity  of  other 
aggregates;  it  is  rarely  called  upon  to  function  and 
stores  up  a  great  amount  of  neuron  energy.  When  now 
an  appropriate  stimulus  liberates  the  accustomed  en- 
ergy,  the  activity  is  overwhelming,  and  is  very  much  like 
the  eiiiption  of  an  underground  volcano,  giving  rise  to 
temporary  attacks,  to  'seizures'  by  subconscious  states 
of  the  whole  field  of  the  upper  ccmsciousne^s, — 'seiz- 
ures' which,  being  really  of  the  nature  of  post-hypnotic 
automatisms,  are  generally  mistaken  for  epilepsy,  the 
attacks  being  regarded  as  epileptic  manifestations,  as 
'larval  epilepsy,'  as  'epileptic  equivalents,'  as  'psychic 
epilepsy.'  With  the  restoration  of  the  equilibrium  of 
the  neuron  aggregate,  with  the  synthesis  of  the  associ- 
ated systems,  a  synthesis  whidi  can  be  brought  about  by 
different  methods,  the  subccmsdoiM  eruptions,  tihc  at- 
tacks,  or  'seizures'  vanish,  never  to  return." 


CHAPTER  XXXI 


THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  RESERVE  ENERGY 

WE  have  pointed  out  the  significance  of  inhi- 
bitions in  keeping  back  the  systemic  neuron 
energy  from  fully  being  discharged  under 
normal  conditions  of  life,  and  we  have  also 
shown  that  the  removal  of  inhibitiont  results  in  the  full 
liberation  of  the  accumulated  neuron  energy.  This  fact, 
so  striking  in  the  domain  of  recurrent  psychomotor 
staces,  almost  forces  itself  on  the  attention  of  the  stu- 
dent of  abnormal  psychology.    From  such  a  funda- 
mental fact  of  abnormal  mental  phenomena,  we  may 
draw  some  conclusions  in  regard  to  mental  life  in  gen- 
eral.   For,  after  all,  the  laws  of  pathology  do  not  dif- 
fer from  those  of  physiology  in  general,  the  patholog- 
ical really  being  the  physiological  under  special  condi- 
tions.    The  normal  is  either  the  usual,  the  habitual, 
the  customary,  or  is,  at  best,  an  ideal  constructioo  of  the 
variations  of  life  more  or  less  successfully  adjusted  to 
the  conditions  of  the  external  environment. 

This  adjustment,  however,  keeps  on  constantly  shift- 
ing  ground,  continually  changing  the  relative  position 
of  the  normal  and  the  abnormal.  From  this  standpoint 
pathology  is  of  the  utmost  importance  in  the  study 
of  organic  life.  The  pathological  being  the  normal 
out  of  place,  the  abnormal  being  the  normal  un- 
der special  conditions,  padiology  that  deals  with 
the  abnormal  gives  us  a  deep  insight  into  the  gen- 
eral laws  of  normal  physiological  actiyity.   All  the 

ai9 


220       Normal  tmd  Abnormal  Psychology 


experiments  in  physiology  connst  practically  in  the 
production  of  so  many  pathological  ccMiditioat  and 

states.  When  the  physiologist  makes  infections,  sections 
and  stimulations  by  various  agencies,  what  else  does  he 
effect  if  not  the  production  of  the  pathological,  in  order 
to  learn  the  physiological  action  of  the  various  tissues 
and  organs?  In  psychopathological  studies  we  fol- 
low the  interrelations  of  mental  phenomena  uadtr 
special  conditions;  it  is  the  physiological  method 
of  experimentation  by  production  of  pathological 
variations ;  the  conclusion  arrived  at  in  psychopathology 
should  apply  to  mental  life  in  general.  What  is  this 
conclusion?  It  is  die  principle  of  potential  subconscious 
energy  or,  more  briefly  steted,  the  principle  of  reserve 
energy* 

The  moment  thresholds  of  our  moment  conscious- 
ness, or,  put  in  physiological  terms,  the  thresholds  of 
our  psycho-physiological  systems,  are  usually  raised, 
mental  activity  working  in  the  course  of  its  devek^mmt 
and  growth  of  associative  processes  under  ever-increas- 
ing inhibitions  with  ever-higher  thresholds.  It  is  enough 
to  compare  the  educated,  the  civilized,  with  the  unedu- 
cated or  with  the  barbarian  and  the  savage,  to  realize 
the  truth  of  our  statement.  On  account  of  die  threshold 
and  inhibiticms,  not  the  whole  of  the  pa]rcho>i^yMolog- 
ical  energy  possessed  by  the  system  or  moment  is  mani- 
fested ;  in  fact,  but  a  very  small  portion  is  displayed  in 
response  to  stimuli  coming  from  the  habitual  environ- 


♦When  this  principle  was  formulated  by  me  in  a  series  of  articles 
published  in  The  Boston  Medical  and  Surgical  Journal  for  March 
and  April,  1907,  James  sent  me  his  article,  "The  Energies  of  Men," 
in  which  he  developed  a  similar  point  of  view,  though  on  widely 
diflFercnt  lines.  Nothing  gives  me  more  pleasure  than  to  find  myscff 
in  accord  with  the  great  American  psychologist  and  philosopher. 


The  PrmdpU  of  Rguroe  Eturgy 


ment  What  beoomet  of  the  rest  of  unused  energy?  It 
is  stored,  reserve  energy. 

Biologically  regarded,  we  can  well  see  the  impor^ 
ance  of  such  stored  or  reserve  energy.  In  the  strug- 
gle for  existence,  the  organism  whose  energies  are  eco- 
nomically used  and  wel!  guarded  against  waste  will 
meet  with  better  success  m  the  process  of  survival  of 
die  fittest,  or  will  have  better  chances  in  the  process  of 
natural  selection.  The  high  diresholds  and  inhibitions 
will  prevent  hasty  and  harmful  reactions  as  well  as  use- 
less waste  of  energy,  unnecessary  fatigue,  and  states  of 
helpless  exhaustion.  Moreover,  natural  selection  will 
favor  organisms  with  ever  greater  stores  of  reserve  en- 
ergy which  could  be  put  forth  under  critical  conditioos 
of  life.  In  fact,  the  higher  the  organization  of  the  indi- 
vidual, the  more  varied  and  complex  the  external  envi- 
ronment, the  more  valuable  and  even  indispensable  will 
such  a  store  of  reserve  energy  prove  to  be. 

The  course  of  civilization  and  education,  by  con* 
tmuously  raising  the  thresholds  and  inhibitions,  foUows 
the  line  of  natural  selection,  and  keeps  on  increasing  the 
disposable  store  of  potential  subconscious  or  reserve 
energy,  both  in  the  individual  and  the  race.  It  is  in  this 
formation  of  an  ever-greater  and  richer  store  of  dis- 
posable, but  well-guarded,  reserve  energy,  that  lies  the 
superiority  of  the  educated  over  the  uneducated,  and 
the  supremacy  of  the  higher  over  the  lower  races. 

Civilization  and  education  are  processes  of  economy 
of  psycho-neural  force,  savings  of  mental  energy.  But 
what  society  is  doing  in  a  feeble  way,  natural  selection 
has  done  far  more  effectively.  What  education  and 
civiIi7ation  arc  doing  now  on  a  small  scale  and  foi  a 
brief  period  of  time  die  process  of  survival  of  the  fit- 


%li       Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


test  in  tbe  ever-raging  struggle  for  eristence  Iim  (kme 
for  ages  on  a  large  scale.  We  should,  dieref<»e,  ex- 
pect that  the  natural  reserve  energy  would  far  exceed 
that  of  the  cultivated  one.  The  brain  and  mind  of  the 
ancieiic  German  differed  in  nothing  from  his  modern 
descendant,  the  German  philosopher,  and  still  what  a 
difference  in  the  manifestatimi  of  mental  energy!  The 
savage  brain  and  mind  do  not  differ  from  those  of  their 
civilized  descendants,  and  still  what  an  ocean  of  mental 
life  separates  the  civilized  man  from  his  savage  pro- 
genitor 1 

It  is  against  the  evidence  of  biological  sciences  to 
nippose  that  the  acquisitions  of  the  cultivated  brains 
have  actually  been  transmitted  from  generation  to  gen- 
eration. It  is  not  likely  that  acquired  characteristics 
brought  about  by  social  life  will  change  so  radically  the 
brain  in  the  course  of  some  forty  or  fifty  generations 
that  separate  the  civilized  man  from  his  savage  progeni- 
tor; and  the  trend  of  biological  evidence  hardly  favors 
the  transmission  of  such  acquired  characteristics. 

"There  sits  the  savage,"  once  exclaimed  a  friend  of 
mine,  an  eminent  neuro-pathologist,  "with  three  quar- 
ters of  his  brain  unused."  Yes,  there  sits  the  savage 
with  a  brain  far  surpassing  the  needs  of  his  envinm- 
ment,  harboring  powers  of  a  Socrates,  Plato,  Aristotle, 
of  a  Shakespeare,  Goethe,  Darwin,  and  Newton.  The 
ancient  German  and  Briton  hardly  differed  in  their 
mental  powers  from  their  contemporaries,  the  civilized 
Egyptian  and  Babylonian.  What,  then  did  thos'. 
Aryan  savages  do  witii  tiieir  richly  endowed  nie..<al 
energies?  N(Ahtng.  The  moital  energy  was  lying 
fallow, — it  was  reserve  energy,— energy  for  future  use, 
for  the  use  of  future  ages  of  coming  dvilizatioo. 


Tk4  frm€$pU  of  tUurvt  Emrgy 

But  what  about  the  cultivated  man?  Does  he  suf- 
fer from  neurasthenia,  horn  nenroua  impotence,  be> 
caui as  some  would  have  it,  on  account  of  the  itrahi 
of  civilized  life  he  has  exhausted  his  store  of  nervous 
energy?  One  may  well  ponder  over  the  significant  fact 
that  it  is  the  neurasthenic,  the  "psychasthenic"  who  is 
doing  the  worlds  work.  We  must  renumber  that  civi- 
lization is  but  of  yesterday,  and  that  the  reserve  energy 
is  hardly  touched  upon. 

In  the  treatment  of  the  phenomena  of  psycho-physio- 
logical dissociation,  in  the  protean  symptoms  of  ner- 
vous and  mental  exhaustion,  we  should  not  forget  this 
biological  principle  of  reserve  energy,  and  should  make 
attempts  to  use  it.  In  many  cases  the  inhibtti(»is  btCTme 
too  heavy  and  the  thresholds  too  high.  fVe  must  loosen 
the  grip  of  some  of  the  inhibitions  and  lower  the  thresh- 
olds,  thus  utilizing  a  fresh  supply  of  reserve  energy. 

The  treatment  of  psychopathic  diseases  should  be 
based  on.  this  biol(^cal  principle  of  dormant  reserve 
energy.  In  many  cases  the  inhibitions  become  too  heavy 
and  the  threshold  too  high.  We  must  loosen  the  grip 
of  the  inhibitions  and  lower  the  thresholds,  utilizing 
a  fresh  supply  of  dormant  reserve  energy.* 

A  sunilar  train  of  thought  was  developed  by  Dr.  S. 
J.  Meltzer,  in  his  exceUoit  paper  on  "llie  Factors  of 
Safety  in  Animal  Structure  and  Animal  Economy."  By 
a  striking  series  of  instructive  facts,  Dr.  Meltzer  points 
out  that  "all  organs  of  the  body  are  built  on  the  plan 
of  superabundance  of  structure  and  energy."  I  cannot 
resist  the  temptation  of  quoting  Dr.  Meltzer's  conchi- 

*The  principle  of  reserve  energy  is  of  great  importance  in  educa- 
tion. I  hope  to  work  cut  this  subject  elsewhere.  I  have  also  shown 
the  importance  of  the  principle  of  reaerve  energy  in  my  work  Thi 


224        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psycholoiy 

sions  at  some  length,  beouiae  they  so  deariy  efamdftte 

our  principle  of  reserve  energy,  which  is  all  the  more 
valuable,  as  Dr.  Meitzer  has  formulated  it  indepen- 
dently on  widely  different  grounds.    "Of  the  supplies 
of  energy  to  the  animal,  we  see  that  oxygen  is  luxuri- 
ously supplied.  The  supply  of  carbohydrates  and  fats 
IS  apparently  large  enough  to  keep  up  a  steady  luxurious 
surplus.    .    .    .    The   liberal  ingestion  of  proteid 
might  be  another  instance  of  the  principle  of  abundance 
ruling  the  structure  and  energies  of  the  animal  body. 
There  is,  however,  a  theory  that  in  just  this  single  in- 
stance the  minimum  is  meant  by  nature  to  be  also  the 
optimum.   But  it  is  a  theory  for  the  support  of  which 
there  is  not  a  single  fact.   On  the  contrary,  some  facts 
seem  to  indicate  that  Nature  meant  differently.  Such 
facts  are,  for  instance,  the  abundance  of  proteolytic  en- 
zymes in  the  digestiv    inal  and  the  great  capacity  of 
the  canal  for  absorption  of  proteids.    Then  there  is 
the  fact  that  proteid  material  is  stored  away  for  use  in 
emergencies  just  as  carbohydrates  and  fats  are  stored 
away.    In  starvation,  nitrogenous  products  continue  to 
be  eliminated  in  the  uri  .  ^  which,  according  to  Folin, 
are  derived  from  exogenous  sources,  that  is,  from  in- 
gested  proteid  and  not  from  broken-down  organ  tis- 
sues.  An  interesting  example  of  storing  away  of  pro- 
tcid  for  future  use  is  seen  in  the  muscles  of  the  sabnon 
before  they  leave  the  sea  for  the  river  to  spawn.  Ac- 
cording to  Mescher  the  muscles  are  then  large  and  the 
reproductive  organs  are  small.  In  the  river  where  the 
animals  have  to  starve,  the  reproductive  organs  become 
large,  while  the  muscles  waste  away.   Here,  in  time  of 
affluence,  the  muscles  store  up  nutritive  material  for  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  the  life  of  the  animal  during 


Tkt  FrmdpU  of  tburnvt  Bmrgy  M5 

•Carvstkm  and  of  aitiadiig  in  the  function  of  reproduc- 
tion. This  instance  teemt  to  be  qnite  a  good  ilkntratioa 

of  the  role  which  the  factor  of  safety  playi  also  in  the 
function  of  the  supply  of  the  body  with  proteid  food. 
The  storing  away  of  proteid,  like  the  storing  away  of 
glycogen  and  fat,  for  the  use  in  expected  and  unex- 
pected exceptional  conditiom,  is  exactly  like  the  super- 
abundance of  tissue  in  ui  «^an  of  animal  ot  Uke  an 
extra  beam  in  the  support  of  a  bnildtng  or  a  bridgf 
a  factor  of  safety. 

"It  seems  to  me  that  the  factors  of  safety  have  an 
important  place  in  the  process  of  natural  selection. 
Those  species  which  are  provided  with  an  abmubnoe  of 
useful  structure  and  energy,  and  are  prqpared  to  meet 
many  emergencies,  are  best  fitted  to  nurviv*  m  the  stti^ 
gle  for  existence." 

Unusual  combinations  of  circumstances,  great  radi- 
cal changes  of  the  envinmment,  often  unlooser  the  inhi- 
bitions, and,  overstepfHng,  or  \amena%  tlM  dueshdds, 
release  some  of  the  reserve  energy.  Critical  period 
great  dangers,  wars,  revolutions,  often  make  man  rise 
to  the  occasion,  so  that  apparently  insignificant  and 
worthless  individuals  di'-.play  an  energy  unforeseen  and 
unsuspected,  and  which  nukes  of  diem  heroes  and 
heroines.  There  is  a  rse  in  intensity  and  a  qoa&athre 
change  in  the  stimuli,  an  unloosening  of  some  of  the 
inhibitions  with  a  consequent  release  of  some  of  the 
bound-up  reserve  energy. 

In  diis  respect  wars  and  revolutions  may  be  regarded 
as  important  factors  in  the  manifestation  of  human  po- 
tential energy.  The  Persian  and  Pelopmnenan  wars 
unloosened  some  of  the  energies  of  Greece,  giving  rise 
to  great  thinkers,  sdoitists,  and  artists,  having  a  laadng 


i 


Il6        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

influence  on  the  destiny  of  humanity,  1  he  consunt 
wars  and  national  misfortunes  of  the  Jews  released 
their  reserve  energy  making  of  them  a  race  of  proph- 
ets, apotdct  and  martyrs,  deeply  affecting  the  course 
of  Imman  dvUizadon.  The  wtn  of  the  Refomuu 
tion  open  a  new  era  of  free  development  of 
modern  European  civilization.  The  English,  Ameri- 
can, and  French  revolutions  have  released  new  supplies 
of  energies  and  have  opened  a  new  arena  for  the  free 
development  of  pditical,  social,  and  industrial  forces. 
In  our  own  times  we  meet  with  the  eyunple  of  the 
Japanese,  who,  under  the  strain  of  great  national  dan- 
ger, have  released  a  reserve  emrgy  unsi^wcted  in  races 
of  the  Mongolian  stock. 

Reserve  energy  becomes  manifested  under  the  influ- 
ence of  radical  changes  in  the  environment,  just  as  we 
have  found  that  psycho-physiological  systems  react  and 
start  into  function  under  the  influence  of  special  condi- 
tions and  special  appropriate  qualitative  stimuli.  In 
the  study  of  functional  nervous  and  mental  diseases,  in 
the  ttudy  of  neurasthenia,  or  psychasthenia,  hysteria, 
and  insistent  or  recurrent  mental  states,  one  Lxomes 
more  and  more  impressed  with  the  fact  that  beyond  the 
psycho-physiological  limits  of  energy,  available  for  the 
habitual  adjustments  to  the  ordinary  external  condi- 
ticMis  of  life,  there  is  a  vast  store  of  reserve  energy 
whose  depths  (Mie  cannot  gauge. 

A  us  dem  Kelche  dieses  Geisterr  etches 
Schaumt  ihm  seinr  Uuendlkhkeii. 


CHAPTER  1 


THE  MOMENT  CON8CIOU8NB88 

WE  must  try  to  realize  the  prectte  metning 
of  the  "moment  consciousness,"  as  a  dear 
comprehension  of  it  is  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance to  psychology  in  general  and  to 
psychopathology  in  particular. 

In  a  former  work  I  pointed  out  that  "conseiomnen 
is  not  uniform,  that  of  die  infant  differs  from  that  of 
the  adult;  the  consciousness  of  the  brute  differs  from 
that  of  the  man,  and  still  they  all  belong  to  the  genus 
consciousness."  I  also  insisted  on  the  fact  that  diere 
is  a  confusion  in  the  me  of  tlie  term  "consciousness,"  a 
confusion  which  almost  amounts  to  what  I  nay  tem 
as  "the  psychologist's  fallacy."  The  fully  developed  type 
of  consciousness  characteristic  of  the  adult  human  mind, 
namely,  self-consciousness,  is  substituted  for  the  lower 
forms,  or  for  types  of  consciousness  characteristic  of  the 
lower  animals.  The  psychologist,  and,  especially  die 
physiologist,  when  writing  on  psychological  matteri  ii 
apt,  to  substitute,  either  on  account  of  the  introspective 
method  used  or  on  account  of  lack  of  discrimination,  the 
type  of  consciousness  of  the  observer,  namely,  self-con- 
sciousness. 

No  biolog^,  not  even  Lo^,  will  aeeept  unfcstrlctedly 

Ae  Cartesian  view  that  consciousness,  or  the  soul,  or 
mind  is  the  privilege  of  man  alone,  while  all  odier  ani* 
mals  have  no  soul,  no  mind,  no  consciousness,  diey  are 
complex  reflex  mechanisms,  hig^  developed  aolimiatt 

%%9 


S30       NormMl  mU  dhnormd  Psyeiohgy 

with  no  psychic  life  to  them.  We  must  allow  the  fact 
that  other  animab  lower  than  man  in  the  rungs  of  devel- 
opment possess  some  form  of  psychic  life.  The  horae, 
the  dog,  the  cat,  the  cow,  the  ant,  the  bee,  and  other 
animals  have  some  form,  however  varied,  of  psycho- 
physiological  activity,  some  form  of  mental  life,  how- 
ever  different  in  type  from  that  of  man.  Abnormal  psy- 
chology discloses  to  us  dissolving  views  of  human  con- 
sctousness,  such  as  found  in  the  various  forms  of  insan- 
ity and  in  the  various  manifestations  of  psychopathic 
states,  presenting  conditions  of  all  stages  of  dissocia- 
tion and  disaggregation  of  consciousness.  Psychic  life 
is  by  no  means  uniform,  there  are  many  types  of  con- 
sciousness. 

We  have  pointed  out  above  that  synthetic  unity  is 
the  essence  of  consciousness.  Consciousness  is  not  an 
association  of  independently  existing  ideas,  images,  feel- 
ings,  and  sensations.  Mental  events  must  form  a  unity, 
a  synthesis  in  the  total  psychic  life  of  some  psycho-biolog- 
ical organization.  Disconnected  words  of  a  sentence 
thought  by  a  series  of  thinkers  do  not  give  rise  to  that 
unified  mental  process  which  goes  to  form  the  psychic 
experience  of  the  meaning  of  the  sentence.  The  words 
mm  be  cognized  by  the  consciousness  of  one  psycho- 
biological  orgMiism.  Ideas,  images,  feelings,  emotions, 
volitions  do  not  meet  on  independent  ground,  associ- 
ate, fuse  and  go  to  to  form  a  unity,  a  new  idea  or  feel- 
ing. Experiences  in  diflPerent  minds  do  not  combine 
and  associate  to  form  a  new  synthesis.  Even  the  as- 
sodatioiiist  ttdtly  implies  that  the  various  associations 
of  ideas  and  feelingi  tike  j^ce  in  sone  oiu  mind. 

In  order  to  get  some  form  of  cognizana  or  tcmw 
form  of  expertcace  of  scnsttioiit  and  id«w  there  rnnit 


The  Moment  Consciousness  231 


be  some  one  organic  consciousness  that  experiences  or 
lives  through  the  psychic  events.  Thoughts,  feelings, 
ideas,  images,  and  sensations  are  occurrences  in  some 
one  ps3rchic  individotlity,  a  psycho-biological  or  psycho* 
physiological  organitm,  an  organnm  which  powwei 
die  living  synthetic  unity  of  contdomness.  From  a 
purely  psychological  standpoint  we  may  term  this  living 
organic  unity  of  consciousness — a  subject.  I  use  the 
term  "moment-consciousness,"  or  simply  "moment"  to 
indicate  diis  syndietic  tinity  of  coradoamtn  nhiA  coo- 
stitutes  the  characteristic  of  die  subject  havif^  tbe  lyii* 
thesis  of  mental  experiences.  This  holds  true  of  aH 
psychic  life,  from  the  very  lowest  representative  of  men- 
tal life  to  the  very  highest,  such  as  the  self-consciouttie«« 
of  man. 

The  mbject,  or  die  unity  of  d^  peydio-physio- 
logical  incfiiddiiality  cannot  be  repreicnted  hf  a  tcrat^ 
whether  temporal  or  spatial,  as  a  series  ceases  to  be  a 
unity,  or  a  synthesis.  For  a  series  of  independent  events 
remains  a  series,  while  the  synthesis  or  unity  of  the 
series  n  a  mimdded  evei^  A  series  of  psychic  events 
must  exist  m  and  for  srane  psydlic  imtty  or  ia^yidMfitjr 
which  stands  for  dw  organic  onity  of  cmndoosness,  or 
for  the  syndiesis  of  consciousness,  no  matter  what  the 
type  of  consciousness  is,  low  or  high,  animal  or  human. 
This  synthetic  unity  of  consciounsess,  no  longer  a  series, 
IS  tndicatiBd  by  tern  'Snonent**  or  ''momeiit  omi* 
scionsnesK**  There  are  various  types  of  moRNBt  oob> 
sciousness,  accordii^  n  diere  are  various  Inw  or  types 
of  synthesis. 

Psychic  contents  or  states  of  consciousness  are  always 
found  in  connectim  with  some  individuality.  That  piece 
of  bread  lying  yooder  may  awakatt  Iwdwdi  of  aaaial 


t$*        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psyekjhgy 


states  under  different  conditions  and  in  various  organic 
nations.  My  fntnd  sitting  by  my  side  sees  it,  so  do  I, 
and  so  does  the  child,  so  does  the  bird  in  die  cage,  so 
does  the  dop:,  and  so  possibly  does  die  fly  flitting  around 
the  table.  The  states  awakened  are  no  doubt  different, 
but  they  are  of  a  psychic  character  none  the  less.  My 
friend  and  I  may  be  conscious  of  the  personal  element 
along  widi  It.  We  may  think  it  in  the  form  of  owner- 
ship; "It  is  who  thinks,  who  has  the  thought  of 
the  bread but  this  is  only  one  of  the  many  forms  un- 
der which  the  perception  or  thought  of  the  bread  may 
appear.  One  thing,  however,  is  essential  to  all  the 
states,  different  as  they  may  be  in  their  con- 
tent, and  that  is  die  fact  that  they  belong  to  some  one 
individuality  whidi  under  certain  special  conditions  may 
also  be  of  the  nature  of  a  personality.  The  individuality 
may  be  of  a  high  or  of  a  very  low  type,  it  may  be  that 
of  a  man  or  it  may  be  that  of  a  fly,  but  it  must  be  some 
one  conscious  being  that  synthedzes  the  psychic  state.  It 
is  this  one  lynthetizing  consciousness  that  constitutes  the 
essence  of  what  we  term  "moment  consciousness." 

The  moment  consciousness  is  the  subject,  the  psycho- 
biological  indivldualitv,  requisite  in  all  psychic  activ- 
ity. The  psychic  individuality  cannot  be  regarded  as  a 
series  of  independent  physical  events.  For  it  may  be 
asked,  for  whom  does  diat  series  esdst  and  to  whom  is  it 
presented?  A  synthetiring  moment  consciousness,  both 
subject  and  content.  Is  a  fundamental  assumption  of 
psychology,  just  as  space  is  that  of  geometry,  and  mat- 
ter and  force  that  of  physics  and  chemistry.  This  neces- 
sity of  assuming  a  syndietizing  moment  consciousness 
becomes  dearly  manifested  in  the  highest  form  of  psy- 
dilc  acdvity,  tudi  as  •elf-comdoqinesp    For  if  tdf- 


Tk4  Momtnt  Comdousmm 


«33 


consdomneM  be  reduced  to  a  series,  it  may  be  per- 
tinently asked  with  John  Stuart  Mill,  **How  can  a  series 
be  aware  of  itself  as  a  series?" 

A  moment  consciousness  must  not  be  considered 
as  something  apart  from  its  content;  it  does  not  exist 
by  itself;  it  exists  wherever  and  whenever  psychic  states 
are  synthetized;  it  Is  the  synthetized  psychic  material; 
mere  synthesis  widiout  material  is  meantngleat.  On  die 
whole,  we  may  say  that  the  moment  consdomnesi  b  like 
an  organism,  it  forms  a  whole  of  many  constituent  parts. 

In  the  moment  :onsciousness  we  find  psychic  material 
synthetized  round  one  inmost  central  event  which  in  its 
turn  may  have  a  central  point.  It  reminds  one  atrong^ 
of  the  cell;  although  it  branches  out  m  all  directions,  it 
has  always  its  inmost  central  point,  its  nucleus,  nucleolus, 
and  nucleolinus.  While  T  am  sitting  here  writing,  I 
take  in  the  many  impressions  coming  to  me :  The  sun- 
shine pouring  through  the  window,  the  table,  the  tick- 
ing of  the  dock,  the  cb^ir,  the  bookcase,  and  many 
other  things  in  the  room;  all  of  them  are  formed  and 
synthetized  into  one,  and  as  such  they  form  a  moment 
consciousness. 

They  are  not,  however,  indifferently  grouped; 
their  unity  is  an  organized  whole  with  a  cen- 
ter, with  a  vital  pokit,  so  to  say.  At  the  heart  of  the 
synthetized  whole  there  is  a  central  point,  the  grouping 
around  which  constitutes  the  individuality  of  the  partic- 
ular moment  consciousness.  Tn  my  own  case,  the  cen- 
tral interesting  point  is  the  paper  on  which  I  write  the 
sentence  Just  formulated,  and  is  the  inmost  point,  the 
nrincipal  idea  aider  discussion  whidi  forms  die  nucleo- 
linus,  so  to  say,  of  the  whole  moment  consdousness.  The 
most  interesting  or  the  moit  important  experience  fbrmt 


234        Nortrn^  ati4 ^Ak*'0''W^  P^ytchology 

die.  .center  of  the  moment. 

The  same  object  which  seemingly  gives  the  same  ex- 
perience assumes  different  meanings  and  is  therefore 
really  quite  a  different  experience,  according  to  the 
moment  consciousness  in  whidi  the  perception  or  knowl- 
edge of  that  object  is  synthetized.  These  presently  ex- 
perienced states,  synthetized  within  the  moment,  form 
the  matter,  or  what  we  may  term  the  content  of  the  mo- 
ment consciousness.  The  moment  of  consciousness  will 
change  with  the  changes  of  the  synthetized  content.  As 
an  official,  I  am  now  in  my  office  doing  my  work,  and 
the  different  experioices  form  one  whole,  an  association 
of  experiences,  S3rstematized  and  synthetized  into  an 
organic  unity.  As  a  family  man,  I  am  at  home  enjoy- 
ing the  company  of  my  wife,  children,  and  friends,  and 
once  more  the  experiences  are  organized  into  die  unity 
of  a  moment  OMisdousness.  Now  I  am  climbing  moun- 
tains and  stand  on  the  slippery  edge  of  a  predpioe,  now 
I  enjoy  a  conversation  with  the  child  I  love,  now  T 
take  part  in  the  excitement  of  the  political  arena,  now  T 
sit  on  the  bench  of  the  jury  listening  gravely  to  the  cross- 
examination  of  witnesses  in  a  murder  case  ;  all  these 
are  nuclei  for  die  formation  of  dilferait  mmnaits.  AJ! 
of  these  depend  on  the  different  central  experiences  that, 
form  the  kernel  for  the  moment  consciousness. 

The  central  experience,  round  which  all  other 
experiences  are  grouped  and  synthetized,  forms,  so 
to  say,  the  very  essence  of  die  given  moment  con- 
sdoun^s,  and  as  long  as  this  central  experience  remtiiis 
unchanged  in  its  position  the  new  experiences  are 
assimilated  within  the  same  moment  consciousness. 
The  moment  consciousness,  therefore,  does  not  vary 
with  the  diange  of  the  content,  if  oply  die  astimiladn^ 


Tkt  Moment  Cousdousueu 


nucleus  remains  invariable.  Should,  however,  the  am- 
tent  vary  so  that  the  central  experience  is  transposed  and 
some  other  one  occupies  its  place,  then  the  moment 
comdouthen  itielf  is  changed.  In  fact,  we  may  have 
the  content  of  the  moment  ooaadousneN  entiiely  un- 
changed ;  but  if  the  central  experience  alone  it  ditrtttfii 
from  its  position,  then  the  moment  consciousness  itself 
becomes  changed  in  its  nature.  Thus,  if  as  a  traveller 
1  climb  the  mountains  chiefly  for  the  sake  of  pleasure, 
and  keep  the  scientific  and  aesthetic  aspects  in  the  back- 
ground,  the  moment  conadouaoen  will  be  entirely  dif- 
ferent from  the  one  where  the  scientific  or  aesthetic  as- 
pects are  in  the  foreground,  and  all  other  considerations 
in  the  background.  The  moment  consciousness,  we  may 
say,  is  entirely  determined  by  the  leading  central  ex- 
perietue. 

The  content  of  the  moment  consciousness,  however, 
is  not  confined  to  the  presently  experienced  peydiic  states 
only;  it  embraces  the  past,  it  includes  memory,  that 
is,  it  synthetizes  outlived  moments.  In  my  present  ca- 
pacity of  physician  and  working  in  the  office,  I  may  also 
include  the  experience!  as  traveller,  at  juror,  at  teidier, 
as  companion,  and  as  lover,  but  still  the  tone  of  thtt  ptr- 
'icular  moment  consciousness  is  given  by  the  duties 
)f  my  present  occupation.  The  most  vivid,  bter- 
csting,  and  leading  experiences  form  in  this  synthesis 
the  nucleus  round  which  all  other  experiences  are  crys- 
tallized and  synthetized  into  one  organic  whole.  We 
have  here  a  series  of  moments,  all  of  them  bdng  codr^ 
dinated  and  contained  in  one  iynthesit  of  one  mooKiit 
consciousness. 

I  jt^bS  members  of  this  synthetized  series  are  not 
of  I^^Viifu^^iio^iire'^y  quAMtatlVdr  ^ 


236       Normsl  muL  A^uonmd  Psyckohgf 


The  leading  expericaoe  thirt  ocmttitirtM  die  ••- 
wmiUting  elemcBt  of  the  ffvm  moaneat  has  reality,  or 
cereat,  and  value,  while  others  are  only  so  much  mater- 
ial support  for  the  principal  central  experience.  This  cen- 
tral experience  differs  also  from  the  other  experiences 
synthetized  in  the  moment  consciousness  by  the  fact  that 
it  alone,  that  it,  the  oudeus  only,  has  the  oioat  ▼hrid 
psychic  states,  sensational  and  perceptual  elements, 
while  the  others  may  totally  lack  them.  Other  subsidu- 
ary  synthetized  moments  are  rather  of  an  ideational 
character;  they  are  what  is  called  "reproductiixis,"  ideal 
representatives  of  formerly  experienced,  (mdived  mo- 
ments. 

The  m<mient  consciousness  may  omtain  momenti  that 
happened  to  emerge  by  the  dynamic  process  of  associa- 
tion, such  as  contiguity,  similarity,  or  contrast.  Each 
moment  consciousness  may  become  content  for  the  next, 
Each  successive  moment  consdoiunest  may  synthedu 
the  preceding  ones,  contain  than  in  an  abridged  idea- 
tional form,  and  may,  moreover,  recognize  and  claim 
them  as  belonging  to  itself,  and  as  being  one  with  them. 
There  may,  in  short,  be  various  forms  of  mental  unifi< 
cation,  but  one  thing  stands  out  clear  and  that  is  thi 
nature  of  the  moment  amsdousnest.  Hie  essence  oi 
the  m<Hnent  consciousness  is  mental  synthesis. 

If  we  take  a  cross  section  of  the  moment  conscioiM 
ness,  and  try  to  fixate  it  with  our  mental  eye,  we  find  a 
central  psychic  element  round  which  other  psychic  ele 
ments  are  crystallized.  This  coitral  psychic  element  ii 
prominent,  vivid,  forms,  so  to  say,  the  vital  pdiik  oi 
all  the  states  and  gives  the  tone  to  the  rest,  forming  : 
whole,  one  organized  experience.  The  psychic  matte 
that  surrounds  the  luminous  central  point  does  not  stam 


Tkg  MowuM  Contdousmm 


237 


in  a  free,  more  or  less  disconnected  relation  to  the  lat- 
ter, it  is  intimately  related  to  the  centre,  and  cannot  be 
separated  without  destroying  the  moment  as  a  whole 
and  tsvuk  the  life  CTiitqice  of  each  particiilu'  'p«*"fti*wfnit 
The  whole  moment  seems  to  form  an  orymic  ottwofk 
in  which  the  (Mher  yVmrntt  take  their  place,  aoomiiiig 
to  a  plan. 

The  structure  of  the  moment  may  in  this  respect 
be  compared  to  that  of  the  cell.  In  the  cell  we 
discriminate  the  niideus  round  which  the  protoplasm 
is  grouped.  The  protoplasm  is  connected  with  the 
nucleus  by  a  network,  a  cytoreticulum.  The  destruction 
of  the  nucleus  afiects  the  protoplasm  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  protoplasm  afiects  the  nucleus.  The  two 
are  intimately,  organically  intenehited  by  the  conunon 
network,  the  graenU  plan  of  dior  <»saiiizatioa. 

A  c(mcrete  example  will  perhaps  best  answer  our  pur- 
pose. Suppose  the  moment  is  perceptual  and  consists 
only  of  one  percept.  Now  in  the  percept  we  find  a  cen- 
tral sensory  element  surrounded  by  other  elements.  This 
coitral  element  stands  avA  promineittly  in  the  (^ven 
psychic  state,  while  the  other  eicmcnts  are  subcu'dinate. 
Not  that  those  elements  are  unimportant  for  the  percept, 
on  the  contrary  they  are  of  the  highest  consequence  and 
moment,  they  only  lie  outside  the  focus  of  the  psychosis. 
Along  with  the  focus  those  elements  form  one  organ- 
ized whole.  The  intmsity  of  the  psychic  state  pro- 
ceeds from  the  periphery  to  the  centre.  The  demmts 
can  as  little  be  separated  from  the  central  element  as 
the  area  of  the  circle  from  its  centre.  By  removing  the 
centre  the  circle  will  be  destroyed  and  the  centre  will 
cease  to  be  what  it  is.  All  the  elements  of  the  percept 
form  one  texture  having  dtt  central  sensory  dement  it 


its  nudent. 

Inttgrated  u  all  thoie  «lmicnt»  are  they  are  not,  how- 
cver,  of  equal  value  and  anportaaoe  lor  the  Hie  e»ife> 
ence  of  the  whole.  The  central  sensory  element  is  of 
the  utmost  consequence,  it  is  the  vital  point  of  the  whole 
experience.  While  the  change  or  destruction  of  one  or 
some  of  the  subordinate  elements  may  still  leave  the 
total  moment  unchanged,  or  hot  slightly  mocfified»  a 
diange  of  the  central  sensory  element  or  oi  the  mideui 
will  profoundly  modify  all  the  other  elements  and  their 
interrelatim;  and  a  destruction  of  the  nucleus  will  des- 
troy the  total  moment.  Like  their  neur(m  counter- 
parts, the  moments  may  be  regarded  as  being  organized 
into  groups,  systems,  communities  and  constellariooi, 
aggregatca  of  greater  and  greater  oomidcxity. 


CHAPTER  n 


TYFBS  or  MOillMTS  AND  MOMBNT-TBlttilOLD 

WE  may  ditcrimiiiate  the  following  typet  of 
moment-consciousness : 
I.  The  Desultory  Moment 
(a)  The  Absolute, 
(b)  The  Relative,  or  Reflex  Moment. 
IL  The  Synthetic  Moment 

(a)  The  Simple  Accmwdative, 

(b)  The  Compound  Accumulttifv. 
III.  The  Recognitive  Moment. 

(a)  The  Synthetic,  or  Generic  Recognitive, 

(b)  The  Specific,  die  Reflective,  or  the  Synthet- 

ic Moment  of  Self^oMdouaneit. 
The  chief  characterirtic  of  the  desultory  moment  ia 
tlie  lack  of  interconnection  of  the  links  of  the  psychic 
series.  Each  pulse  of  psychosis  stands  out  as  au  isolated 
fact  without  "before"  and  "after."  A  moment  of  such 
a  character  haa  no  reproduction,  no  recognition,  no 
memory*  and  oertably  no  personality.  The  lowtr  ttagea 
of  diis  moownt,  die  absi^ifie  deaultory  momen«:-.on- 
scioinness  are  mere  moment-content  devoid  of  all  or- 
ganization and  substance.  The  higher  forms  of  the  des- 
ultory moment,  those  of  the  eHjc  moment-conscious- 
nest,  have  an  ^nentary  organization,  hat  of  such  a 
fixed  character  that  the  series  of  manifeMations,  or  of 
functioning  remain  completely  isolated.  ReprodhKtiOQi 
appear  here  for  the  first  time  in  an  elementary  form, 
inasmuch  as  the  recurreticss  of  the  moment  kaive  the 

239 


240       NortmU  and  Abnormd  Psychology 

latter  unmodified;  it  is  r^coduction  ooly  on  ac- 
count of  the  mudificatioM  pracfaned  ia  a  ^a^j^m 
observing  moment. 

This  moment  has  the  germs  of  reproouoion,  but  no 
reoagmtion  ami  hence  no  memory,  no  Mbko»> 
■ciouincii.  The  moment  of  the  tbaolnle  dtMltory 
type  may  possibly  be  found  in  uaoxganized  p(Ol»> 
plasm  and  in  the  lourst  forms  of  the  pro- 
tozoa. The  higher  forms  of  moment  of  e  desultor) 
type,  the  reiex  momeiu,  may  be  found  u.  the  lower 
ionn  of  knrty  organized  life  and  m  ^  lower  •tmc' 
tures  of  tiK  hifl^r  raetazoa. 

The  moment-consciousness  of  the  synthetic  type  has 
its  series  of  links  interconnected.  In  each  link  the  pre- 
ceding ones  are  synthetized.  The  recurrence  of  this 
type  of  annent,  onlike  the  mora^  of  rdative  desuicor> 
mwrirwiMicM,  is  en^odied  in  tiw  iUucUsie  mi  Awe* 
tion  of  the  moment.  It  is  in  this  type  of  monMOt  tibot 
reproduction  is  for  the  first  time  clearly  and  fuli  man- 
ifested. The  moment  is  modified  with  each  leoroduc- 
tion;  it  accumulates  more  ccHitent  with  each  recurrence 
and,  at  tnch,  the  tynthetic  moment  may  also  he  char- 
acterized as  sccumulative. 

This  type  of  moment  has  reproduction,  and  the  re- 
production is  not  only  for  the  external  bserver,  but  is 
present  and  inherent  through  changes  in  the  organiza- 
tion, structure  and  function  of  the  moment  itself.  Mem- 
ory fint  appears  in  this  type,  but  k  w  rather  organic,  not 
recogntd^  in  ntture. 

The  more  elementary  form  of  this  type  of  mome^ 
shows  accumulations  only  along  single  lines  (  t  develop- 
ment. The  lines  remain  disconnected.  Sen  iory  nuclei 
•urrowided  by  secondary  sensory  eiemeitts  do  not 


occur,  and  p«rceptual  pfychosis  characteristic  of  the 
higher  ioam  m  ahtott  m  dui  atage  of  tke  ajnotfaetic  mo- 

/ii/cz;^  moment  >f  synthetic  con  cvMmta.  It  is  otSj  m 
the  higher  forms  of  synthetic  msciousness,  in  the  com- 
pound synthetic  moment  ttut  pefceptual  life  may 
be  said  to  arise. 

la  die  com^fnuid  syntbetic  mumen^.  wenm  akMig  di- 
verse lines  t^rome  seversSv  coasfOH^ed  and  aeiiMry 
luidei  with  b.cui  .ry  sensory  el^^estt  audce  their 
appeara  e.  Bu  c  en  her  rec©^  ^^i*  ^  not  pres- 
ent and  hencc  mt  nory  ioav  '  ti  subj^'ctive 
stanc^int  be  regar  <a<b'Ci  as        H!  syn  etic 

moment  cv«n  n  ite  higfae  nliaic  ol  tJevelop.  leitt 
lacks  ideatir«nai  lite  atd  is  en  ^  dcvmd  of  self-coo* 
sciousness.  !lie  Hi||j  n-  ir  nebrates  and  the  lower 
vertebrates  ^.obafc  a  n  se  in  their  psychological 
develop^  ent  abc  vc  tht  h.  aer  form  of  synthetic  con- 
scioQMMMv  the  ctej^poBttd  ^iidhatw  moment* 

la  #tt  rKQp  *vrt  wmm  the  leaea  ol  repiroducUont 
aee  in^^ttely  cuitnected  t  find  At  case  to  be  in  the 
s  tthet?  moment.  '  ner  t  becomes  modified  with 

e  :ii  oc^  arring  repr-  n,  containing  in  an  abridged 
t  -rr  thf  hi  'ory  .  previous  modifications.  The 
mcHir  of  ctpto^  f  the  recog^ye  moment,  horn- 
m  from  that  of  die  lyuUiatk  mo> 
n  Th  Oil.  If  of  the  previous  oocune&oe  aced  aot 
be  ii  u  H  prod  ^e<^  but  only  representee!  und  any 
psychic    eiii  jit  rill  this  function  of  representa- 

tion, w  is  irougi  uch  representation  that  ^  repro- 
duction of  fSik  type  ^  moment  it  eftcted.  Hiroogh 
representatiai  tl^  moment  reproduces  form  and  content, 
and  coyiizct  over  agun  immediately  wiiat  it  hat  juat 


24^       Nomsl  imd  Onotnui  Psyehology 


experienced,  in  short,  it  re-cognizes. 

,  ,   Recognition  is  the  function  of  representation  and  is 

,  thf^  estendal  dumKteritdc  of  this  type  of  moment-con- 
^ousness.  Idettioiial  ptjfchoMs  germinates  and  devel- 
ops with  the  growth  of  the  recognitive  m<mieat.  For 
the  very  function  of  the  idea  is  the  cognition  over  again 
of  what  has  been  cognized  in  perception,  in  short,  rec- 
ognition is  the  essence  of  the  idea. 

In  generic  recognition  the  time  element  it  tbtent  or 
but  vaguely  present.  In  perceiving  the  taUe  yoodtt 
we  also  recognize  it  as  table  by  classing  the  percept  ta- 
ble  with  representations  derived  from  previously  per- 
ceived tables,  but  hardly  does  any  time-element  enter 

^  into  ,  this  form  of  recognition,  the  idea  of  having  gen- 
frk  fBOOgnf^tioii  docs  not  refer  to  any  percept  experi- 
enced at  tome  de^te  point  of  tine.  The  recognitive 
moment  uses  the  idea  as  a  means  to  reproduce  iti  f(Mm> 
er  experience  without  actually  living  them  over  again. 

.  The  representation  in  the  lower  form  of  moment  is  so 
up  with  the  percept  that  the  fonction  of  recog- 
ipitlpo  ,i|  bjBt  implicit,  and  becomes  explicit  in  the  higher 
foqns,  when  the  ideational  or  representative  elements 
become  completely  free  and  appear  in  mantel  tnuns»  or 
ip  series  of  associated  ideas. 

In  its  specific  form,  however,  the  recognitive  moment 

,a||p  indwies  the  time  element  The  moment-content 
or.  object  genericsUy  recognized  is  dassed  or  combined 

.ffirh  a  definite  representation  generically  referring  to 

l^rceptuM,  experience ;  specifically  recognized,  the  am- 
tent  pr  object  is  plaoid  in  a  definite  point  of  the  objec- 
tive schenu  of  the   flowing  time  series.  The 


Types  of  Moment'  and  Moment-Threshold  143 

*'         1        ■    I-  «...   1  , 

substitutes  and  represents  the  percept  and  has  tbe 
function  of  the  percept  as  reproduced,  thus  referring  io 
the  same  object.  That  is  why  the  qualitatively  different 
representadoa  is  ideirtified  with  the  actual  perception. 
What  is  common  to  die  two  is  their  reference  td  tbe' 
same  object,  in  all  else  they  really  differ  widely.  The 
recognitive  moment  that  lacks  the  time-element  is  termed' 
generic,  while  the  moment  that  has  time  element  in- 
cluded in  the  process  of  its  recognition  is  termed  spe- 
cific recogidthe  moment-conseiotuness. 

In  the  lower  and  simpler  tttget  of  the  recognitive 
moment  the  generic  form  predominates,  in  the  higher' 
and  more  complex  stages  the  specific  form  of  recogni- 
tion arises  and  attains  its  full  development.  From  a 
biolc^cal  standpoint  one  can  understand  the  import- 
ance and  immense  advantage  m  the  struggle  for  ex- 
istence of  those  organisms  whose  mcrnient-cdmcioiMiieM 
has  varied  in  the  direction  of  representation  and  has 
begun  to  reproduce  after  the  mode  of  the  recognitive' 
type.  To  effect  a  modification  and  new  adaptation  to 
changes  in  the  envtronmoit  the  moments  of  the  desul- 
tory type  have  no  other  mode  of  modflicatkm  bat  l»y  tte 
slowly  working  factors  of  spontaneous  variations  and 
natural  selection,  a  process  of  adaptation  and  usefbl 
modification  prolonged  throughout  the  course  of  gener- 
ations. The  adaptations  of  the  different  forms  of  the 
synthetic  type  are  greatly  fadllliti^  and  the  course  of 
the  process  is  so  much  foreshortened  that  it  bec^amef  re> 
duced  to  the  life-existence  of  the  given  indmdual  or- 
ganisms. The  adaptations  are  brought  about  by  the 
slow  process  of  chance  success  and  error,  and  the  whole 
series  of  modifications  must  be  fully  and  directly  under* 
gone  hy  the  orgtidiim  "  •  »       .  .  . 


S44       NornuU  mid  Ahnornud  Piychology 

The  recognittve  m<»Miits  liive  reduced  die  time- 
elonents  of  adaptationt  to  diaages  of  ccMufidont 
in  the  external  environment  almost  to  a 
the  series  of  reactions  in  the  growth  to  most  per- 
fect adaptations  is  effected  in  representation,  saving 
itself  the  necessity  of  actually  undergoing  a  series  of 
intervening  modificadons.  Representative  elements,  be- 
ing free,  can  enter  into  diierent  modes  of  combinatiom, 
and  thus  form  adjustments  and  adaptations  with  an  ease 
of  which  the  primary  and  secondary  sensory  elements  of 
the  lower  moments  do  not  admit.  This  freedom  of 
movement  in  the  formation  of  new  representative  com- 
binations is  an  important  factor  in  organic  fife,  as  it 
pves  the  organinn  that  possesses  diis  variation  an  ad- 
vantage in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Adaptation  can 
be  made  for  the  futrire  from  the  experiences  of  the  past. 

In  those  forms  of  the  recognitive  moment  in  which 
die  time-element  plays  a  part  in  the  determinatk»  of  tlie 
yrhoXt  diere  is  always  fwesent  a  specific  dnne-kMi^catioii 
of  the  s^voi  psychic  or  moment  contei^  Where  the 
form  of  recognition  is  specific  the  representation  or  idea 
is  regarded  as  actual  and  localized  in  some  definite  point 
in  the  stream  of  past  time,  where  the  recognition  is  gen- 
eric die  representation  or  idea  is  refefred  to  no  definite 
point  in  the  stream  of  objective  dme,  and  whoi  present 
in  die  highest  types  of  moments,  is  regarded  as  beloaf- 
ing  to  what  is  termed  imagination.  Recognition  de- 
termines the  place  of  the  given  experience  in  the  series 
of  events. 

bdtt  kywer  stages  of  tlie  reoogidtive  moinent  no  thne 
element  is  present,  in  the  higher  stages  some  vague  ref- 
erence to  time  may  be  present  in  the  forms  of  specific 
recqpiticm,  bat  definite  localisadon  wf^mn  only  with 


Typti  9f  Momtnta  md  MomenuTkraheli  145 

the  rise  of  the  recognitive  moment  of  self-consciousness. 
With  the  appearance  of  the  conceptual  schema  of  objec- 
tive time  the  specific  form  of  recognition  refers  not  only 
to  a  defmite  point  on  the  scale  of  objective  time,  but  to  a 
definite  mental  synthesis  localized  on  that  objective  time- 
schema;  in  other  words,  the  self-concept  is  involved  in 
specific  recognition,  which  therefore  belongs  to  the  high- 
est form  of  the  recognitive  moment,  namely,  tiie  mo- 
ment of  self-contciomncM  or  of  personmlity. 

In  specific  recognition  the  present  self  fmjectt 
the  bit  of  representative  experience  into  the  past 
self  which  is  felt  to  be  identical  with  the  former  in  the 
series  of  selves  to  which  the  reproduction  of  the 
mmnent  gives  rise.  The  highest  recognitive  mo- 
ment, or  mmnent  of  sdf-comdousness  may  be  rep> 
resented  as  t  series  of  selves  projected  in  the  time 
schema  the  precding  selves  being  synthetized  by  each 
succeeding  self.  From  this  standpoint  we  may  regard 
such  a  moment  as  synthetic  ari  term  it  the  synthetic 
moment  of  self-consciousness. 

Should  this  aerict  of  reproductions  constituting  the 
history  of  the  moment  become  dissociated  and  isolated 
through  mental  degradation  and  degeneration,  then  the 
form  of  consciousness  becomes  analogous  to  the  desul- 
tory consr'jusness  and  may  therefore  be  termed  the 
desultory  monunt  of  self-emueknuuess. 

The  functionfaif  moments  of  a  highly  orgtnised 
psychic  being,  at  anr  -^oint  of  rime,  present  a  hierardlir 
of  moments  dif  '  not  only  in  degree  of  con- 
sciousness, but  Sii  .  in  the  type  of  structure  and 
^JRCtion.  Moments-consciousness  from  the  lowest 
to  the  hif^Mt,  from  the  limirfnt  to  tilt  mott  com- 
plex, from  the  4mStotf  type  to  die  recogrftlfe  type 


Normsl  md  Ahmtrmd  Psyekotogj 


of  self-consctousness  all  are  present  in  the  adult  stage  of 
the  most  highly  organized  psychic  life.  Now  in  the 
series  of  moments  going  to  form  such  a  highly  complex 
being,  diose  that  are  of  the  recognittve  type  cui  become 
focal,  while  those  diat  belong  to  the  lower  types  can 
never  enter  the  focus.  The  lower  types  of  moment- 
consciousness,  belonging  to  the  groups  and  systems  of 
reflex  and  instinctive  activity,  cannot,  from  their  very 
nature,  reach  that  level  of  ctmaciousness  and  that  degree 
of  psychosis  as  to  become  qualified  to  alter  into  the 
focus  of  the  moment  of  self-consciousness. 

From  this  standpoint,  then,  the  subconscious  may  be 
divided  into  two  regions,  the  one  including  all  the  mo- 
ments belonging  to  that  of  the  recognitive  type,  the  odi- 
er  comprising  all  the  numients  belonging  to  die  lower 
types.  Within  the  subconscious,  then,  diere  is  a  tfare»> 
hold  which  the  lower  types  of  moments  cannot  pass. 
This  threshold  may  be  termed  the  threshold  of  recogn^ 
true  consciousness. 

The  m(nnents  lying  above  the  direshold  of  recogpi- 
tive  consciousness  may  change  in  psydiic  inteimty,  taxf 
pass  through  all  degrees  of  sensory  intensity  and 
sentative  vividness  ranging  from  minimum  to  maximum; 
they  may  sinic  and  rise  gradually  or  suddenly,  but  they 
do  not  and  cannot  fall,  without  becoming  degenerated, 
bdow  the  recog^idve  direshold.  Those  moments  diat  lie 
below  the  recognidve  threshold  cannot  rise  above  it,  they 
are  condemned  to  remain  in  the  obscure  regions  of  the 
subconscious;  their  fate  is  never  to  enter  the  strong  light 
of  the  upper  world  of  consciousness.  At  the  same  time 
their  psychic  intensity  does  not  suffer  any  change,  diey 
do  not  diift'  forwards  and  backwards  in  die  ^Id  of  cm> 
i^oiisiieif  Uke  die  moments  of  the  reeogi^iTe  type 


Types  of  Moments  and  Moment-ThrukoU  147 

ing  above  the  thrediold,  they  ranaiii  unaltcrtblc,  they 

are  fixed.  ' 

In  a  certain  sense  the  moments  lying  below  the  thresh- 
old  of  recognitive  consciousness  may  be  considered  as 
diMoaated  from  the  upper  regions,  inasmuch  as  they 
he  outside  the  field  of  the  upper  consciousness.  From 
the  standpomt  of  activity,  however,  they  stand  in  inti- 
mate  relation  to  the  upper  level  of  consciousness.  The 
highly  organized  moment  uses  th  lower  ones  as  instru- 
ments to  carry  out  its  purpose,  and  through  them  it  also 
aiten  into  relation  with  the  external  environment 
Stimali  are  received  by  the  lower  moments,  and  motor 
responses  are  once  more  given  by  these  momeati.  In 
other  words,  the  lower  types  of  moments  are  m  service 
of  the  higher  moments. 

From  a  teleological  standpoint  one  can  understand 
the  miportance  of  it  for  the  life^xistence  of  the  Individ- 
ual.  In  order  to  save  time  and  energy  any  activity  that 
can  be  carried  out  by  the  lower  aggregates  is  direcdy 
responded  to  by  the  less  complex  and  more  fixed  mo- 
lowermost  moments  are  the  easiest  to 
gam  access  to  by  the  external  stimuli,  and  in  case  the 
adaptation  is  sunple  the  response  hnmediately  follows 
without  any  reference  to  higher  aggregates.  Should, 
however,  the  stimulus  be  under  conditions  where  more 
complex  adaptations  are  requisite  then  the  next  higher 
aggregate  is  set  into  activity.    The  ascending  degree 
of  complexity  of  aggregates  set  into  activity  grows  in  ac- 
cordance  with  the  need  of  complexity  of  adaptation,  un- 
til  the  most  complex  of  all  aggregates  is  reached,  titt 
one  representing  the  complete  organization  of  seBtorl- 
motor  adaptations  of  the  organism  as  a  whole. 
At  the  same  tune  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  there 


t4t       Normsl  emi  Aknorwtd  Psyehology 


is  a  series  of  momeiits  almost  independent  of  this  organ* 
ized  hierarchy  of  moments,  never  falling  under  the 
sway,  or  but  indirectly  and  casually  being  affected  by  the 
principal  complex  mwnait-consciousncss;  such  are  tile 
moments  that  go  alcmg  with  functions,  directly  subserW- 
ent  to  the  internal  needs  of  the  organism.  This  complex 
aggregate  of  moments  from  its  very  nature  is  withdrawn 
from  the  general  control  of  the  other  aggregates,  inas- 
much as  it  need  not  adapt  itadf  to  the  varj^g  coikB* 
tions  and  different  stimuktions  of  the  external  enviroii- 
ment.  The  set  of  stimuli  this  aggregate  responds  to 
remains  almost  unchanged,  hence  their  activity  is  of  a 
low  order,  belonging  to  the  character  of  the  reflex  mo- 
ments. 


CHAPTER  III 

MODIFICATIONS  OF  MOMENTS  IN  THE  ORGANIZED 


IN  pointing  out  the  paraUcl  in  the  series  of  mo- 
ments  at  they  appetr  in  ontogenesis  and  phylo- 
genesis,  we  must  make  ■onie  wstoiohiM.  The 
scries  of  the  subordinate-momenn  in  the  orgaaiza- 
tion  of  a  highly  evolved  and  complex  moment  may  be 
homologous  to  the  phylogenetic  series,  but  still  the 
two  greatly  differ  in  character.   Each  moment  in  the 
senes  subordinate  to  the  principal  moment  is  greatly 
modified  in  its  activity  and,  as  such,  difers  in  aatofe 
from  the  moment  of  the  corresponding  stage  in  the  phy- 
logenetic series.  A  complicated  act  after  a  series  of  rep- 
ctitions  sinks  into  the  subconscious,  becomes  degraded 
m  character  and  falls  to  the  level  of  the  soKslled  "sec- 
ondary automatic**  acts.  This  does  not  mcMiliMtm  the 
phylogenetic  or  even  in  the  ontogenetic  evobcioB  the 
moment  occupying  a  parallel  stage  is  of  a  secondary  au- 
tomatic character,  as  it  appears  in  the  momcat  of  higher 
organization. 

When  the  sensori-moior  series  going  to  con- 
stitute the  secondary  automatic  act  beeomes  i^  oti> 
ganized,  the  links  in  the  series  fall  to  a  mhimum  ol  peyw 
chic  intensity,  but  the  moment  consciousness  occupying  a 
corresponding  position  in  the  scale  of  evolution  has  a 
higherpsychic  h^ity  than  the  one  characteristic  of 
the  seem&ry  autenttk  stage.  The  psychods  of  a  <kw, 
hone»  moose,  nkkk  m  huHfy  M  the  stne  oedsr  of 


f! 


150       NarwuU  and  Abnormd  Psyeholoiy 

intoMttjr  characteTMtic,  for  instance,  of  the  act  with 
which  one  buttons  his  coat,  opens  his  door,  walks  in  the 
street,  or  simply  maintains  his  equilibrium.  The  con- 
sciousness of  the  dog,  rabbit  or  mouse  may  be  and  surely 
is  of  a  lower  order  than  that  of  a  man,  but  it*  intensity 
is  not  necessarily  of  the  same  level  with  the  automatic 
actiiaty  of  man. 

The  greater  differentiation  of  elements  in  the  highly 
constituted  being  is  also  their  greater  simplification.  The 
lower  a  moment  is  in  the  scale  of  a  highly  organized 
being,  the  more  differentiated  it  is,  and  the  more  simpli- 
fied is  its  function  in  the  oi^anic  whole.  Quite  different 
n  it  in  die  case  of  the  lower  type  of  moment  in  the  jAylo- 
genetic  series,  there  the  differentiation  has  not  proceeded 
far,  and  although  it  may  be  low  in  type  and  structure, 
the  very  lack  of  differentiation  of  function  makes  that 
lowly  monent  more  complex  at  to  fimcdon.  A  Vm 
moment  of  a  hi|^  type  of  wganization  is  lower  than  « 
high  taament  ui  a  lower  type  of  organization.  A  mo 
mcnt  occupying  a  low  stage  in  a  statically  established 
hierarchy  is  really  lower  than  a  corresponding  stage  in 
either  the  phylogenetic  or  ontogenetic  serwt.  The  high- 
est nKWPent-cottsciouimss  of  a  fiih  it  hMndogoot  wA 
a  very  low  moment  in  man,  but  the  btter  hidct  the  in 
tensity  to  which  the  former  attains. 

The  moment  by  entering  as  a  unit  m  an  organizec 
hierarchy  becomes  degraded  and  loses  much  of  it 
psychic  activity  by  becoming  ^Ikrendtted  vA  cm 
fined  to  one  mode  of  reaction,  thoufl|i  reachhig  ttt  acmi 
of  perfection  in  that  direction.  The  number  of  func 
tions  present,  though  in  an  imperfect,  undeveloped 
sketchy  way,  in  the  representatives  of  the  low  type  o: 
moment  becomes  narrowed  down,  even  limited  to  ow 


Momnttt  m  Organized  Aggregate  251 

function,  highly  developed  and  intensified  in  the  lower 
representotive*  of  moments  belonging  to  a  hienuchy 
organized  oa  the  plan  of  a  higher  type. 

If  a,  b,  e,  d,  e  .  .  .  etc,  represent  the  imuSMKuag 
modes  of  a  low  type  of  moment,  then  the  total  of  fime- 
tioning  modes  of  the  moment  may  be  represented  by  the 
sum  .  .  .  ).  each  function  is  in  its 

first  degree,  that  is,  it  is  present  in  a  primitive  undevel- 
oped form.  The  low  moment,  however,  forming  a  part 
of  a  highly  developed  organic  hierarchy,  becomes  highly 
differentiated  in  the  process  of  evolution  of  the  whole 
and  is  finally  reduced  to  the  exercise  of  one  function 
only,  fully  developed  and  intensified  to  its  highest  pitch. 
The  number  of  functions  then  present  in  a  primitive 
form  in  the  moment  of  low  type  is  in  the  course  of  evo- 
lution  gradually  sundered  into  its  units,  each  onit  reach- 
iag  a  high  stage  of  perfection  in  the  low  mancnt  be* 
longing  to  a  high  type  of  moment  hierarchy. 

If  a  function  in  its  primitive  form  is  represented 
by  a  quantity,  then  the  same  or  analogous  function 
highly  developed  may  be  reptescuteJ  by  the  same 
or  similar  quantity  raised  to  dtgfte.  Now 

let  stand  for  the  primitive  function,  then  will  stand 
for  the  fully  developed  function.  The  number  of  the 
moment's  functions  is  limited,  but  highly  developed. 
The  momoit's  ftmctioning  activities  may  be  represented 
by   the    formula:  The  highest  momcae  of 

the  low  type  has  a  richer  and  more  variable  conteat 
than  the  lower  moment  belonging  to  the  higher  type. 
This  truth  can  be  still  further  realized  by  having  re- 
course to  the  higher  guiding  moment-consciousness,  the 
lower  monwttts  are  shown  there  to  work  with  an  almost 
nMchnicaMlb  activity.   Man,  dog^  or  aoakty  widi 


252       Nomd  mtd  Akmormd  Psyehohiy 


their  spinal  or  medullary  gang^a  only  fall  lower  than 
a  fully  developed  fish  or  a  full  grown  lobster. 

If  we  oome  to  coniider  the  moment  of  corresponding 
stages  in  the  ontogenrtic  and  phylogenetic  teriet,  we 
OMe  more  meet  with  resemblance,  but  at  the  tame  time 
with  one  of  fundamental  difference.  The  moment  of 
high  type  that  passes  ontogenetically  the  stages  of  phylo- 
genetic  evolution  does  it  in  a  general,  and,  so  to  say, 
sketchy  form,  each  stage  of  ontogeneais  in  mlity  faiid»> 
mentally  diiermg  from  that  of  the  parmllel  stage  m 
phylogmeais.  Just  as  the  iraman  embryo  in  the  coune 
of  its  growth  and  passing  the  stages  that  r&> 
fleet  phylogenesis  is  not  necessarily  once  a  worm,  then 
a  fish,  then  a  bird,  but  only  approaches  these  types  in  a 
moet  general  f<Mrm,  so  abo  n  it  in  the  caae  of  the  moment 
in  the  different  stages  of  its  growth;  it  approaches  the 
lower  types  of  activi^  in  •  moet  senenU  and  eketdqr 
form. 

Themoment  in  phylogenesis  is  independentand  is  fully 
developed,  while  the  corresponding  stage  in  ontogenesis 
b  hot  a  stage  in  the  powth  of  mother  and  htg^  mo- 
ment, and  as  such  is  certainly  different  in  nature  from 
the  phylogenetic  moment.  The  embryo  in  the  first 
state,  though  provided  with  gills,  is  still  not  a  fish  and 
could  not  live  in  water.  The  consciousness  of  the  infant 
in  passing  dirough  stages  running  parallel  to  the  lowtr 
moments-aMisdottsness  docs  not  temporarily  bmrnie  that 
particular  low  moment-consciousnese.  It  ie  nmply  a  gen- 
eral outline  of  the  type  of  moment-consciousness  that  the 
higher  moment  is  passing  or  a  stage  in  the  coune  of  its 
ontogenetic  development. 

Utt  Hifam  in  the  growA  of  its  psychic  Mft 
doce  not  actwUy  torn  hnlleiif,  fish,  bird,  mmkaft 


Moments  in  Orgtuaaud  AggrtgMU  253 

savage,  he  does  not  really  pass  those  modes  of  pqpchk 
states,  but  he  passes  through  stages  which  in  a  general 
outline  remotely  resemble  the  lower  grades  of  animal 
psychoiit.  AH  the  itiiget  are  determined  by  the  principal 
type  of  moment^OMcioiiaiMM,  and,  in  reality,  are  not  ft 
series  of  low  moments  ending  in  a  l^|k  type,  tlftCM 
of  growth  of  one  high  type  of  moment-consdooMMM. 
The  stages  through  which  the  infant  and  child  pats  are 
the  evolution  of  man.  The  mon«cnts  of  the  low  form 

develop  on  the  type  of  1^  I  »■  1 1*  I   ,  while  the 

moments  of  the  hi^est  forme  dev>dop  on  die  type  9i 
 )•  ft  fftr 


CHAPTER  IV 


MENTAL  ORGANIZATION 

MOMENTS  of  the  same  type  form 
gations  in  an  ascending  series  of  complex- 
ity, groups,  systems,  communities,  dusters, 
OMUtellations.  Isolated  moments  are  or- 
ganized into  groups,  group*  into  systema,  syalemt  into 
commuBities  and  communities  into  conHtllatioiM. 
Groups  are  the  simplest,  while  constellations  are  the 
highest  and  most  complex  of  the  aggregates.  The  firm- 
ness, the  stability  of  organization  stands  in  direct  rela- 
tion to  complexity,  the  nMite  oomidez  an  aggregation  tlie 
ktt  staUe  it  is. 

The  order  of  complexity  also  reprMenti  the  order 
of  development,  so  that  the  more  complex  is  ako 
the  latest  to  appear  in  the  course  of  evolution.  Evo- 
lution and  stability  stand  thus  in  inverse  relation.  What 
appears  early  in  the  conne  of  development  ie  km  iaaif 
orguuzed  than  what  appears  hrter  on.  The  whole  tm* 
dency  of  evolution  is  from  stability  to  instability.  The 
order  of  growth  and  instability  is  in  the  ascending  scale 
> — from  groups,  through  systems,  communities,  to  dus- 
ters, and  ccmstellations.  The  simpler  sensori-motor  re- 
ecdou  are*  both  ontogmeticelly  and  phylogenetkally, 
the  first  to  appear  in  the  course  of  evohition  and  they  are 
also  more  stable  than  the  more  complex  sensori-motor 
reactions.  We  can  possibly  best  realize  the  relation  of 
instability  to  complexity  of  structure,  if  we  regard  life, 
indnding  both  physiological  an  J  psychic  processes,  as  an 

254  ' 


Memud  OrgtmhtaUon  t|| 

ascending  organization  of  8enaori«Miar  mrtiwM  to 
the  influences  of  the  external  environment. 

The  seiMori-motor  reactions  represent  a  hierarchy  of 
orgMMMd  aggregations  beginning  in  the  knrett  re. 
flexes  and  culminating  in  the  highest  activity. 

An  illustration  of  the  lower  leioes  any  be  *^^fn. 
such  as  the  knee-jerk,  the  action  of  the  Uadder,  penMUl- 
tic  movements  of  the  intestines,  respiratory  movemeals, 
heart-beats,  and  other  organic  activities.  AswKiation 
among  thew  vurione  leiexes  may  be  taken  at  high- 
er  ^gregitet.    The  conpks  coofdinrtion  of 
entation  and  space  ad^tttment,  such  at  the  nnhMmnama 
of  equilibrium,  walkm    running,  jumping,  lying,  swim- 
miiy,  etc.,  represent  more  complex  activity.     A  still 
higher  aggregate  is  to  be  found  in  the  association  of 
groiqii  end  lyiteme  of  aeniori4BOCor  reactions  within  die 
sphere  of  a  senMrgen  with  the  complex  cooidtMtion 
oi  r-otOT  adjustment  of  the  wiiole  body.  The  hUHtt 
aggregates  arc  to  It  found  in  die  associaucn  of  aH  the 
motor  reactions  organized  witiiin  die  differ.:     n  re. 
of  sense-organs  with  the  complex  motor  coordin;.a«in  of 
body-adjustineati. 

Simple  sensori  motor  reflexes,  coaqiiac  r^exes,  se»- 

son-motor  coordinations,  instinctive  adaptatioas  end  in- 

'k-'y"*-**^^"**™^"'*'  ''^^^'^^"y  regarded,  correspond  to 
the  daaaificationof  psycho-motor  aggregates  into  pr-  ps, 
s)MeiBB»  conrninnities,  dusters,  and  constellations  In 
other  words,  the  stmfy  of  the  sensorinnolor  constitu- 
tion of  tiie  higher  organised  beings  in  thnr  ednft  stages, 
reveals  the  presence  and  interrelation  of  moments.  We 
find  tiiat  die  history  of  die  use  and  growdi  of 
aggregates  is  in  the  order  of  dieir  complexity. 
«  ootatOMSM  «•  Ibd  tktt  the  simple  reflexes  ap- 


*\  1  ■ 


s 


1 '  ! 

..1 

t 

f          •  s'f  1 

!  •■  i*' ' 

1 

i      1  1    I  V. 

256        Normal  and  Ahnormal  Psychology 

pear  first,  then  the  association,  the  more  complex 
sensori-motor  coordination,  later  on  the  so-called  in- 
stinctive adaptations  begin  to  appear,  while  the  intelli- 
gent adaptations  appear  late  in  the  course  of  dcvdop* 
ment. 

The  child  at  its  iMrth  it  a  purely  reflex  being; 
the  different  rj  flexes  are  not  even  associated,  it  is  the 
medulla  and  the  spinal  cord  that  are  principally  active; 
the  pupils  react  to  light,  the  legs  and  hands  react  to 
more  or  \tu  interne  sensory  ttimnU,  toch  m  ^dfai|^  and 
seniori-motor  reflexes  to  tasto^timnh  are  present.  All 
of  those  reactions  are  isdated,  incoordinated;  they  are 
so  many  simple  groups  of  sensori-motor  reflexes,  even 
the  sucking  activity  of  the  infant  is  largely  of  the  sen- 
sori-motor reflex  type;  the  child  at  its  birth  is  a  spinal 
beiim^  and  its  nKmient  coractouHMM  it  demllory,  efN»> 
Htdai  of  die  dendtory  twdTitiet  of  itolaltd  fmcdoB- 
ing  sensori-motor  groups. 

Later  on  the  reflex  activity  such  as  of  the  hands, 
legs,  eyes  become  associated  through  the  develop- 
ment of  sight  and  lunaesthetic  sensationt;  the  eyet 
can  folknr  an  object,  die  luuidt  bceont  td^pMl 
to  the  seizing  movements.  Movemattt  and  t«d^ 
coordination  then  begin  to  appear,  such  as  turn- 
ing the  body  to  right  or  left,  then  sitting  up,  then 
creeping,  standing,  then  walking,  then  talkini^  all 
involving  mmre  and  more  coorcHnatinn  of  onMlM  mi 
kfauwtthctic  sensationt,  aided  by  the  ■ttocialion  of  wmm^ 
tion  and  sensori-motor  reactions  from  different  sense- 
organs.  It  is  late  in  its  history  of  development  that 
the  child  begins  to  gain  full  control  of  its  actions  and 
adjustment  to  the  stimuli  coming  from  the  external  cup 


MtukU  Orgi 


m 

The  hnmry  of  pMogaiieM  rmw  a  pmBd  ooone. 
llie  lower  organisms  are  purely  reflex  b  tlwir  seaeori- 

motor  reactions,  and  as  such,  they  belong  to  the  type  of 
the  dcsdto^nioment-consciousness,  such  for  instance 
"  ^yj*  lower  form  of  the  MoUusca 

as  tbe  daat  Tuaictti.  In  the  higher  forms  of  Mol- 
lusca  associatton  of  sensorMnolor  leiexet  begins  to 
appear.  These  associations  become  more  and  more 
complex  with  the  rise  and  growth  of  diflFerentiation  of 
senseK)rgMs  m  the  higher  forms  of  MoUusca  and  the 
lower  Arthropodes,  giving  rise  to  groups,  systems,  com- 
munities, reachmg  the  chnter^tice,  in  the  higher  Arth- 
ropodes  and  the  lower  Mammalm,  (ineUy  cafaunatiat 
in  the  complex  functions  characteristic  of  the  consteQaP 
tion^tage,  such  as  found  in  the  sensori-motor  reactions 
of  man  m  hit  adaptation  to  physical  and  social  surround- 
ings. 

Each  hi^  offgtnised  moment  itpmeMi  a  hiet^ 
archy  of  many  moments,  but  of  lower  typea.  The  higll- 
est  constellation  has  at  its  command  lower  types  of  pc^ 
chic  aggregates,  and  had  it  not  been  for  these  lower 
moments,  the  higher  type  would  have  lacked  matter 
and  activity  for  carryiaff  on  ha  own  worit. 

The  lower  forms  of  moments,  howem,  aie  MbofdI. 
nate  lo  the  higher  type  which  constitutes  the  caMft,  tlw 
nucleus  of  the  total  psychosis.  The  other  constitant 
moments,  from  the  simplest  to  the  most  complex,  are  in 
the  serm  of  the  highest  type  of  moments,  though  the 
former  Be  oatakie  the  eentnl  foeaa  of  the  principal  con- 
trolhng  moment<onsciousness.  These  lower  fonaa  are  by 
no  means  to  be  ignored,  since  they  form  the  main  fao> 
torsAat  determine  indirectly  the  moment's  activity;  they 
«aiwtate  the  storehouse  from  which  the  osatnl  aw- 


%S%       Normd  md  Ahnormd  Ptyekohgy 


ment  draws  its  material.  Without  the  lower  moments 
the  principal,  controlling  moment  could  not  have  re- 
cmd  MimiikiticMis  from  the  otemal  envinmment,  nmr 
wwdd  k  have  been  aiaUcd  to  make  proper  motor  re- 
sponses. In  fact  we  may  say  that  without  the  lower 
forms  of  moments,  the  moment-nudeut  would  have  lott 
its  vitality  and  even  its  meaning. 

The  perception  of  an  object  and  the  proper  adjutt> 
mcms  to  it  depend  not  so  miKh  on  what  b  direcdy  prat* 
ent  in  the  focus  of  consciousness,  but  on  the  wetlth 
of  accumulated  material  lying  outside  the  moment  focus. 
In  reading  a  book,  for  instance,  the  handling  of  it,  the 
motor  adjustments  in  keeping  it,  the  perception  of  the 
letters,  of  the  words,  of  the  phrases  lie  outside  the  focus 
of  consciousness,  and  still  it  is  this  mass  of  perceptions 
that  forms  the  matter  of  the  controlling  moment.  The 
inventor  in  working  on  his  particular  invention  has  a 
mass  of  accumulated  material  and  experience  indispen- 
saUe  for  die  develoimient  of  the  invention,  subconscious 
mMtakl  fyiag  in  the  bedcgsoimd  of  hk  eomdamam. 
Similarly  the  mathematician  in  solving  hit  probhll 
which  forms  the  focus  of  his  consciousness  possesses  a 
body  of  knowledge  or  a  mass  of  material  which,  though 
it  lies  on  the  margin  of  his  consciousness,  forms  the  main 
stay  of  hk  particukr  investigation. 

Thera  is  more  in  conscimnness  than  is  actuaUy  (fi- 
rectly  present  in  the  focus  of  the  moment  Whik  I  am 
writing  these  last  phrases  my  consciousness  is  occupied 
with  them  alone,  but  they  are  supported  by  a  body  of 
subccmscious  thought.  All  our  perception  is  largely  de- 
tcrmintd  by  the  nsuHs  of  our  previoot  cxperieaoe  iMik 
fftlb  outside  the  central  point  of  conscioumctt.  Many 
petctpftMa  ilhitioat  faid  ihttr  eKphiiwuictt  hi  hakik.  Am 


otherwise  novel  experience  nmnndi  ilMif  wilii  haal^ 
iar  experience  which  disguises  the  novelty  and  i.-ans- 
forms  the  percept  by  subilituling  what  it  odwiwiw  ^ 
miliar  and  habitual. 

Th»  niMs  of  familiar  experience  is  not  present 
in  die  focus  of  tile  mooMiit-comdouaness,  it  lies 
outside  the  centre  and  it  oflm  SBbmeigtJ  m  n- 
gard  to  the  direct  introspective  scrmiay?  it  hatt 
however,  a  powerful  influence  on  the  activity  of 
the  moment.  The  submerged  moments,  though  lying 
outtide  the  direct  group  of  the  main  focus,  still  exercise 
a  great  iaioaiee  on  the  course  of  the  raoineat't  growth 
and  development.  The  conscious  controk  t!ie  miterial 
supplied  by  the  subconscious,  while  the  subconscious 
by  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  mass  of  its  material, 
in  its  turn  modifies  and  determuies  the  ccHirse  of  con- 

A^^ft^&^A^b  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

scMMt  activitf  . 


CHAPTER  V 


TH£  GROWTH  AND  FUNCTION  OF  THB  MOMENT 

WE  may  turn  now  to  the  study  of  the  mo- 
ment's functions.  This  can  b<  best  investi- 
gated in  following  up  its  history,  in  watch- 
ing the  growth  and  development  of  the 
most  elementary  mcxnent-contciooaicst.  In  its  perceptual 
stage  the  OKMimit-conscioinnets  may  become  modified  in 
it!  ralKntltiiate  pqn^c  elements  only,  indirectly  reacting 
on  the  nuclear  sensory  elements,  giving  a  further  determ- 
ination of  the  total  moment  without  changing  its  funda- 
mental character.  The  moment  nuy  express  then  only 
more 

distinctly  the  final  aim  to  winch  it  it  •trhfing.  The 
changes  brought  about  in  the  moment  are  of  sudi  a 
nature  that  the  latter  in  its  whole  tendency  becomes 
adapted  for  reaction  to  the  external  environment,  a  re- 
action for  which  it  primarily  maintains  itself  in  being. 

The  moment  as  percept  may  have  at  first  an  inade> 
quate  content  which  brings  about  a  reaction  inadequate 
for  the  purpose  «f  the  given  psychic  mcmient.  The  reac- 
tion brings  more  content,  both  primary  and  secondary. 
The  new  content  enriches  the  moment  and  gives  rise  to  a 
modification  resulting  in  a  reaction  which  in  its  turn 
further  enriches  the  content,  uitil  a  reaction  resohs  fuBy 
adeqmte  to  die  pwpose  of  die  moment.  The  moment 
reaches  for  the  time  being  its  full  maturity.  To  give  a 
concrete  example.  A  small  puff-fish  is  thrown  into  a 
tank  containing  a  hungry  tautog.  The  tautog  perceives 
the  puS-fisb  and  comes  up  to  seize  it;  the  puff-fish  be- 

160 


giiM  to  flweH  The  sudden  swelling  of  the  little  fish 
fri^iieiM  the  tratog  awsy.  The  tantog't  imctioii  has 

proved  unsuccessful.  Sone  modification  it  being  pro* 
diired  in  the  tautog's  state  relating  to  the  pafi^  yon- 
der. Another  reaction  may  then  follow,  a  sudden 
pounce  and  bite,  the  puff-fish  swelling  in  the  tautog's 
moulfa.  The  tautog's  reaction  is  once  more  a  fail- 
ure, the  puff  fish  is  dropped,  bat  considerably  hurt  A 
series  of  similar  reactions  with  a  series  of  nmHar  mod* 
ifications  finally  result  in  a  totally  different  reaction. 
The  fish  by  a  series  of  sudden  pounces  and  bites  succeeds 
in  debilitating  the  puff-fish,  paralyzing  its  power  of 
swelling  and  finally  deronring  it.  A  series  of  rach  repe- 
tition of  txptxwastt  determine  the  general  procediift  of 
the  tautog  to  the  puff-f^sh.  The  tendency  to  a  series 
of  sensori-motor  reactions  may  thus  become  organized. 

The  chick  emerging  from  the  egg  sees  an  object,  say 
a  caterpillar,  and  atUcking  the  caterpillar  misses  it  at 
fine.  Thb  pffocediife  cftridM  the  dikk't  pt]Fcho4iiolor 
life  and  modifies  its  next  iMdiont  in  relation  to  die  cat> 
erpillar,  until  the  whole  moment  of  peddng  at  edible 
obj«,cts  when  presented  to  the  eye  consists  of  success- 
ful reactions,  as  the  result  of  their  repetition,  finally 
ending  in  perfect  organization.  The  infant  in  seeing 
an  ob^  nudkat  tt  fine  Inndeii  tttempli  at  aeiting  h. 
These  futile  attempts  further  determine  his  activity  and 
finally  he  reaches  a  state  when  die  adaptation  is  complete. 
The  psycho^notor  reaction  becomes  adequate  to  the 
stimulus. 

In  aB  tlMtt  CMit  llMre  it  80  BMd  littt  the  growth  and 
improfWMM  «l  adapeaHw  itnuM  hi  Ifoiihl  hr  ex- 
plicit ppnrMm  ol  jndgmtnts  and  assodations  of  free 
tdtat.  ThiMt  dliddfhf  dMhi6uithMi«at  diilbet 


s6s       Nornud  mti  AhnomuA  Psychology 

consciousness  of  what  sort  of  psychic  process  is  going 
on,  nor  do  they  deliberately  after  weighing  the  pros  and 
eoHS  of  their  acdont,  finally  decide  on  one  which  is 
cooscionsly  to  be  rejected  on  trial  and  so  on,  at  length 
hitting  on  die  right  solution  of  the  problem.  Such 
is  not  the  state  of  their  mind.  To  ascribe  to  them  con- 
scious thought,  cunning,  knowledge,  is  to  ascribe  modes 
and  forms  of  adult  human  consciousness  to  a  lower  stage 
where  an  thb  it  tbeent.  Their  psychic  proceaiet  are  far 
simpler.  The  growth  of  the  moment-consciousness  in 
the  stage  under  consideration  is  altogedier  differotf  in 
nature  from  that  of  the  adult  stage. 

In  the  moment-consciousness  under  consideration  each 
sensory  response  to  a  given  stimulus  along  wtdi  itt  re> 
Miking  rootw  reactimi  brings  about  a  nio£fication  of 
tlK  total  nKNnent.  Eadi  new  nu>dification  brings  the 
moment  nearer  In  Its  sensory  and  motor  elements, 
to  a  more  perfect  adaptation  to  the  specific  conditions 
of  the  external  environment;  this  modification  is  repro- 
duced on  the  recurrence  of  die  moment. 

Let «  be  die  momoit  and  h,  ht,  h„  die  soccesnve 
modifications,  then  the  modified  moment  at  each  stage 
of  its  growth  may  be  represented  as  follows:  a,  ab,  abbi, 
abbtb,,  abb^bX,  etc.  The  reproduced  successive  mod- 
ifications do  not  emerge  singly.  The  reactimis  of  die 
moment  do  not  occnr  in  repeddon  of  die  order  hi  ^Uk 
diey  have  primarily  foHowed  eadi  other.  In  other 
words,  the  reactions  are  not  gone  through  In  the  order  in 
which  they  have  taken  place.  The  series  Is  not  literally 
repeated.  Each  subsequent  modification  is  super-imposed 
on  the  previous  ones  and  modifj^ofl;  them  becomes 
syndiedzed  in  a  single  compln  reacdoo.  The  last  soe- 
oessM  nMdon  is  die  oaly  one  dttt  emerges  in  dit  oe> 


Tht  Growih  m$d  Fumaiou  of  the  Mommt$  S63 

cnrreiiM  of  tlw  ptrtiailar  fdmiilw  vn§u  a  f^mk  tet 

of  conditions. 

All  the  intermediate,  unsuccessful  reactions,  al- 
though they  have  gone  to  determine  the  last  state 
of  die  moment  widi  its  particular  reactions  and  are 
implicitly  contained  in  it,  gradually  drop  out,  and  only 
the  last  fbnnt  of  reaction  occur.  The  hat  mement^Mi- 
sciomneaa  at  each  birth  generated  hf  a  ghm  Mimilus  un- 
der appropriate  conditions  possesses  in  a  vague  outline 
the  history  of  its  previous  stages.  Most  of  the  stages 
seem  to  drop  out,  only  the  ones  that  are  indispensa- 
hit  reniabi. 

The  monwnt-contdonneM  in  iti  giowtil  wad  develop 
ment  expands  into  a  series  of  moments,  esdi  subssqueat 

moment  being  an  expansion  of  the  preceding  one.  In 
this  expanded  series  each  succeeding  moment  is  richer 
in  content  than  the  one  that  has  passed  away,  and  is 
more  adapted  to  die  original  end  for  wUcb  the  monent 
as  a  whole  subsists  and  maintiditt  itself  in  the  stn^gle 
for  life.  Tlie  last  moment  is  an  epitome  of  the  preeed&^ 
series,  an  epitome  in  which  by  adaptive  selection  many 
links  have  dropped  out,  and  in  which  the  ones  that  sur- 
vive appear  not  in  dieir  bare  isolation,  but  in  a  synthesis 
of  orgaidc  mStf. 

In  respect  to  syntiiesis  the  moment  may  be  campafsd 
to  the  percept  in  which  the  moment-elements  are  not  in 
a  free  state  and  cannot  be  separately  reinstated.  In  the 
moment  as  in  the  percept  the  elements  are  firmly  bound 
together,  and  m  ^  bondage  they  are  reproduced.  In 
the  psydiic  momoit  itidf  die  previous  stafss  ate  not 
(fiscriminated,  since  the  whole  moment  emerges  as  one 
compound  in  which  the  elements  are  firmly  held  together 
in  a  form  of  "mental-diemistry'*  by  a  process  of  comii- 


a&i       Normal  mtd  Ahnormd  Psyskohgy 

latioii,  a  proceM  which,  at  we  htme  pointod  out,  is  es- 
sentially different  from  the  process  of  aMoriatioii  of 
ideas  in  wliich  the  ideal  elements  are  free. 

A  moment-consciousness  lacking  free  elements  in  its 
constituents  cannot  know  its  own  history;  m  oAw 
w«»]s,  it  camiot  recognize  the  identity  or  simihrity  ol  its 
damsatB  with  the  ones  that  have  been  present  in  a  pre- 
vions  state.  The  recognitive  element  is  entirely  wanting 
in  such  a  type  of  moment-consciousness.  A  moment- 
consciousness  of  such  a  nature  may  be  termed  reproduc- 
tive. A  reproductive  moment-consciousness  reproduces 
Us  eoumts,  hu$  Uuks  the  element  of  recognUkm, 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  RELATION  OF  THE  MOM£NT  TO  THl  BNVnONlONT 

IF  we  iiMpect  doMly  the  reprodnctive  momeiit- 
consciousness,  we  can  discover  in  it  definite  tnriti 
specially  characteristic  of  it.   From  the  very  char- 
acter  of  Its  organization  the  moment^onsdousness 
It  of  mcfa  «  nature  as  to  be  accessible  to  and  at  the  same 
time  affected  by  definite  stinmU  of  the  external  environ- 
ment.    The  moment<onscioiiine»  Mf  k  fbnned 
through  the  influence  of  stimuli  coming  from  its  en- 
vironment.  The  psychic  states  that  go  to  make  up  die 
nudett«ontent  of  the  moment<onsciousne88  are  pri- 
manly  wiiory  in  character,  due  entirely  to  incoming 
stimulations  proceeding  from  lome  extmd  tonrce.  ThS 
IS  fundamentally  true  not  only  of  die  kmctt  and  aimpletC 
but  also  of  the  highest  psychic  moment.   The  infinite 
wealth  of  our  experiences  is  of  an  incoming  character 
denvttJ  entirely  from  stimulations  coming  from  the 
periphery,  or  from  die  outside  world.  Even  where  die 
moment  is  ideal  in  character  it  it  idll  originally  derivwi 
Irom  sensaticm. 


The  nature  and  primary  function  of  the  moment 
IS  to  be  sensitive  to  stimuli.  The  origin  of  the  mo- 
menttakea  itt  rite  in  sensory  responsiveness,  and  its 
growdi  li  due  to  die  formation  of  toccettive  layert  of 
sensory  elements.    The  sensory  charactwiitle  it  tiffl 

Z?"^*"^         ****  tdtptation  and  pos- 

sMity  of  further  modification  of  the  moment.  Psychic 
mochfication  under  die  influence  of  external  stimuli 
dearly  dtmooitrMM  dtt  important  characterittict  of 

96$ 


i66 


NorwuU  ami  Ahnormd  Psychology 


MOMttvity.  We  mty  say  that  semitivity,  meaning  by 
it  psychic  processes  aroused  by  stimuli,  is  a  fundamental 
character  of  the  moment-consciousness,  however  ele- 
mentary. 

The  moment-comcioanwN  is  not  snly  sensory,  but 
abo  motor  in  character.  The  whole  purpose  of  the  mo- 
ment's being  is  adaptation  to  external  conditions.  These 
adaptations,  however,  are  brought  about  not  by  the  mere 
sensitivity,  but  by  motor  reactions.  If  the  OKinwnt  diovra 
sensitivity  towards  the  play  of  deftute  exIerMl  ttimidi, 
it  ilKmt  ittelf  still  more  feady  to  fhre  vent  to  its  scthrity 
in  definite  sets  of  motor  reactions.  In  fact  we  may  say 
that  primarily  sensitivity  is  readiness  for  reaction.  The 
stimulus  that  irritates  the  naked  protoplasm  of  the 
amoeba  results  in  movement  of  its  pseudopodhim.  The 
irritation  of  the  nerve  endings  of  the  asd^an  or  of  the 
iiwdast  results  in  the  contractions  of  the  muscular  coat. 
In  the  more  highly  organized  animals  the  excitation  of 
the  peripheral  sense-organ  results  in  contraction  and  re- 
laxatic.  of  muscles  or  secretions  of  glands. 

This  is  clearly  manifested  in  the  Kfe-phenomenn  of 
invertebrates  and  lower  vertebrates.  The  fly,  the 
bee,  the  ant,  the  butterly,  the  fish,  the  frog  react 
immediately  as  soon  as  they  are  acted  upon  by 
influences  of  their  external  medium.  In  this  respect 
they  almost  resemble  highly  complicated  mechanisms 
that  manifest  definite  sets  of  movements  when  acted 
on  different  parts  of  structure.  Especially  ts  this  mani- 
fested in  the  lower  centres. 

The  fly,  the  ant,  the  bee,  the  butterfly,  without  their 
higher  central  ganglia  are  pure  automata.  Thus  if  die 
fly  is  deprived  of  its  frontal  ganglia,  or  head,  it  remains 
qntet  as  if  dead,  ontil  it  b  stum^ted,  when  a  motor 
reaction  himwdiatify  fblloira*  If  mdi  a  "l»a<SaN '  ly 


it  tniMd  on  its  back,  it  rights  itself,  or  flies  some  dis- 
iMMt,  sK^itiiig  OQ  its  legs,  aad  tfra  nadaiiV  « 

same  state  until  a  new  stimulus  brings  it  out  of  k»  ttM^ 
per.  If  the  thorax  is  stimulated,  the  front  legs  pats 
through  the  wiping  movement.  If  the  delicate  hair  on 
the  lower  part  of  the  abdomen  are  irritated,  the  hind 
legs  react  If  the  suk  hair  are  stimulated,  the  side  legs 
respond,  and  io  on.  In  short,  the  fdnmlas  it  fbUoipwl 
by  immediate  reaction  of  the  sdnnilated  organ. 

With  the  central  ganglion  present,  the  fly  differs  but 
little  as  a  reactive  being,  only  the  reactions  are  more 
complicated,  more  co-ordinate,  more  adaptive;  they  do 
not  occur  m  a  unifbrm  and  autonaatic  fashion  in  the  di- 
rectly stimulated  organ,  but  in  aoaie  other  organs  dis- 
tant from  the  stimulus  direcdy  applied  and  in  a  series  of 
co-ordinate  movements,  responding  to  the  stimulus  in  a 
form  advanugeous  to  its  needs,  or  preservative  of  its 
life. 

In  the  frog  we  meet  once  more  with  the  same  state  of 

things,  \intbont  its  brain  the  frog  is  an  attto- 
maton  responding  to  external  stimuli  immediatdy  with 
some  simple  set  of  movements.  With  its  brain  present 
the  response  differs  only  in  the  fact  that  it  is  more  omi- 
plex  and  more  adaptive  The  same  holds  true  in  the 
case  of  the  highw  vertebratea,  in  tlie  biid,  in  the  rabbit, 
in  the  dog,  in  the  monkey,  and  also  in  man.  When  da> 
prived  of  the  brain  they  are  automata  immediately  re- 
sponding to  stimuli  with  simple  movements  of  but  little 
adapution.  With  their  brain  in  full  and  healthy  func- 
tion they  are,  Inologically  regarded,  highly  organized 
beings  responding  to  external  stinmlationa  widi  COCO* 
plex  movements  of  more  or  less  perfect  adaptation. 
Should  we  like  further  ilhntratioa  and  ffvidmotwc  OHi 


(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  7) 


A    /APPLIED  IM/1GE  Inc 

^^F.      1653  Eost  Main  Street 
^^^S      Ro'hesUr.  Utm  York      14609  USA 


a68       Normal  rnU  Jbuormsl  Psychology 


find  it  not  only  in  phylogenesis,  but  also  in  ontogenesis. 
Young  animab  react  to  any  passing  stimulus;  tlieir  life 
is  full  of  movement  and  activity.  The  movements  are 
not  adaptive  to  the  special  oraditions  of  the  enviroii> 
ment;  in  fact  these  reactions  may  often  be  of  such  a  na- 
ture as  to  hurt  and  even  endanger  the  life  of  the  young 
animal.  External  stimuli  simply  liberate  pent-up  en- 
ergy in  centres  which  are  but  little  co-ordinated.  In 
this  respect  of  lack  of  coK>rdination  and  adaptation 
young  animab  resemble  vertebrates  or  invetebrates  de- 
prived of  their  frontal  ganglia. 

The  restlessness  of  children  and  of  infants  is  notori- 
ous ;  in  an  infant  under  my  observation,  I  have  observed 
kidcing  of  lep  as  many  as  25-35  P^'  minutet  and  this 
was  kept  up  for  a  quarter  of  an  hour,  sometimes  for 
half  an  hour  at  a  time;  each  kick  of  the  leg  served  as 
a  stimulus  for  another  one,  until  fatigue  was  induced. 
An  external  stimulus  at  once  calls  forth  a  reaction  in 
the  child  or  the  infant.  The  reaction  is  usually  not 
adaptive,  purposeless,  and  fr«iuently  hnrtfuL 

There  are  also  purposeful  reacticms,  reactions  that 
are  of  a  purely  instinctive  character,  useful  for  the  life 
and  growth  of  the  animal.  These  reactions,  however, 
are,  physiologically  regarded,  of  a  more  complex  re- 
flex character.  Given  a  definite  stimuhit  and  a  certain 
set  of  conditions,  a  series  of  reactions  immediate^  fiA- 
lows  in  a  certain  order  and  succession.  Thus  the  aphis 
secretes  its  limpid  drops  of  sweet  juice,  when  its  abdo- 
men is  tickled  by  the  antennae  of  the  ant  only.  No  other 
delicate  tickling  stimulations  can  bring  about  the  reac- 
tion of  secretion.  Hie  ant  on  seeing  tiie  afdlin  nan  at 
once  up  to  it  and  begins  to  play  its  antennae  on  the 
abdomen  of  the  anhis.  and  the  latter  on  feclinff  the  nar- 


RelaHon  of  ike  Moment  to  the  Emnrommeut  369 

ticular  stimnlatioiu  reacts  in  fiftnig  op  in  ■bdwiiiiii  aad 
secreting  the  viscid  juice. 

The  white  butterfly  lays  her  eggs  as  soon  as  it 
omics  m  contact  with  stimuli  coming  from  cabbage 
leaves.  As  soon  as  the  change  of  tcmperatiire 
occurs,  the  migratioii  iastinct  of  birds  b  awak- 
ened. Young  pointers  are  sometimes  known  to  pomt  die 
first  time  they  are  taken  out.  Young  chicks  disperse  and 
show  fright  as  soon  as  they  hear  an  intense  sound.  In 
an  infant  of  two  days  old  I  have  observed  protective 
grasping  movements;  the  infant  wlMn  inunsrsed  in  the 
bath  tub  for  the  first  time  got  hold  and  da^ied  firmly 
with  his  little  finger  the  hand  of  the  person  that 
bathed  him.  Furthermore,  the  whole  body  assumed 
strained  and  rounded  positions,  lifting  itself  out  of  the 
water  wiA  which  it  came  In  contact;  the  infant  was 
clinging  with  all  its  little  streaglli  to  the  hand  dmt 
bathed  him. 

The  character  of  instinctive  reaction  is  perhaps  more 
closely  manifested  in  the  following  interesting  experi- 
ment performed  by  me  on  a  very  young  infant.  The 
infant  was  not  mote  than  three  hoars  old,  he  was  put  to 
the  breast  and  the  nipf^e  pot  to  the  nooth.  The  stim- 
ulus of  the  nipple  in  the  mouth  at  once  excited  the  pl^st- 
ological  arrangement  for  sucking  movement,  an  arrange- 
ment which  the  infant  brings  with  him  in  a  more  or  less 
ready  state,  on  his  coming  into  the  world.  When  the 
infant  iMd  enou|^,  die  sacking  moftaentt  ceased.  The 
nipple  was  then  withdrawn,  and  th«  put  agtm  into  kis 
mouth,  the  sudden  fresh  stimulus  once  more  awaknMl 
the  mechanism  to  activity,  and  the  sucking  movements 
began  only  to  stop  soon.  This  was  repeated  a  few 
times,  every  time  as  soon  as  the  stimulus  was  supplied 


170       Normal  and  Abnormd  Psyckoloiy 


the  sucking  movement  began. 

The  experiment  was  then  slightly  modified,  the 
baby  after  ceasing  its  sucking  movements  was  left 
keeping  the  nipple  in  its  mouth,  and  imtead  of 
(•king  away  die  nii^  and  putting  it  back,  diui 
oiforcing  the  stimulus  directly,  smne  odier  stimuli 
were  employed.  The  infant's  legs  were  tickled,  the 
skin  of  the  body  was  rubbed,  pricked  in  different  places, 
and  every  time  as  the  stimulus  was  applied  the  sucking 
movements  were  started. 

A  few  hours  bter  when  the  baby  became  sensitive  to 
sound,  I  tried  the  same  experiments  with  sound  stimuli, 
and  obtained  the  same  results.  Sensory  stimulations  fol- 
lowed by  motor  reactions  are  the  elements  out  of  which 
moment-consciousness  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest  is 
formed.  If  one  aspect  of  the  momentcontctowntw  it 
sensory,  the  other  aspect  is  motor.  The  two  aspects  are 
inseparable,  owrrelative. 

The  sensori-motor  relation  is  observed  not  only  in  the 
lowest  forms  of  psychic  life,  but  abo  in  the  highest. 
In  the  highest  form  of  mental  life  we  still  meet  with  the 
tame  factor  of  motor  reactiont.  Mental  activity  ttnds 
to  pass  into  acdcm.  Psychic  processes,  motor  ai^ 
l^andular  reactions  are  interrelated.  All  along  the  course 
of  mental  activity  reaction  is  present  as  its  invariable 
concomitant.  Some  muscles  are  in  a  state  of  tension, 
others  in  a  condition  of  relaxation.  According  todieflow 
and  content  of  ideas,  repreaentation  it  now  retard^ 
now  accelerated.  The  functioning  activity  of  the  glands, 
of  the  vaso-motor  system  is  influenced,  the  circulation 
of  blood  is  affected,  more  blood  rushing  to  the  brain. 

This  reaction  aspect  of  mental  life,  and  especially 
of  affective,  emotional  life,  can  easily  be  demoMtnted 


Relation  of  tht  Moment  to  the  Envirommm  tyi 

by  appropriate  iutrumeiits.  Bjr  aid  of  die  iphysmo- 
graph,  the  tromograph,  the  pneumograpli,  the  Mnt. 
mograph,  the  automatograph,  the  galvanometer,  ami 
other  iitttrunients  registering  physiological  results,  it  can 
clearly  be  shown  that  menul  activity  with  its  aflfective 
tone  results  in  sonie  end  eiiect,  moKolar  or  glandular 
reaction  With  a  very  deUcate  automatograph,  or  swing- 
ing pendulum,  it  can  even  be  shown  diat  die  movemeott 
m^festcd  often  express  die  content  of  consciousness. 

lUis  IS  especially  striking  in  case  of  different 
fomwof  awtomatiwa-in  people  who  are  of  die  mo- 
tor  type.    When  die  subject's  hand  is  put  on  die 
automatograph,  and  die  subject  begini  to  diink,  die 
pen  of  the  automatograph  begins  to  move  and  write. 
When  die  person  thinks  of  die  left  side  of  die 
room  the  movements  swing  to  the  left;  when  die  sub- 
ject  dimks  of  a  series  of  definite  movements,  movements 
of  a  similar  order  and  character  are  followed  out  by  die 
pen  of  die  automatograph.  Subject!  who  are  of  a  pro. 
nounced  motor  type  when  their  attention  is  dis^cted 
write  with  die  automatographic  pen  die  ideas  of  wbich 
tiiey  happen  to  diink  at  diat  moment  The  remarkable 
expermienti  made  by  Pavlow  and  hit  pupils  are  here  to 
the  point.    The  experiments  clearly  prove  die  dote 
interrelation  of  mental  activity  and  glandular  function. 

The  reaction  character  of  mental  life  is  still  more  db- 
tmctly  manifested  .  die  various  forms  of  mcntol  disso- 
ciation, such  as  are  to  be  found  in  the  psychopadiic  and 
neuropathic  diseaiet  and  in  die  statea  of  hypnosis,  and  in 
tact  in  all  die  phenomena  belonging  to  die  order  known 
as  the  subconscious.  Many  of  the  most  important  meth- 
ods  in  psychology  and  psychopathology  are  based  on 
dus  reaction  aspect  of  die  moment-contdousnasa. 


CHAPTER  VII 


THE  ASSIMILATION  OF  THE  MOMENT  IN  NOIMAL 

VTATBS 

THE  fact  dut  nKMnent-amsdousness  ex- 
pands,  grows,  and  develops  in  its  organization 
until  it  -eaches  a  point  of  perfe^  adaptation 
to  external  conditions  clearly  shows  that  the 
moment  is  capable  of  working  new  psychic  material 
into  its  cotistitiition.  The  material  whidi  it  gets  is  of 
sudi  a  nature  as  to  help  to  perpetuate  die  psychic 
life  of  the  moment.  The  moment  cannot  possibly  go 
on  growing  without  having  such  material  at  hand.  If 
the  moment  comes  in  contact  with  any  psychic  element 
or  experience  that  can  further  its  content,  the  experience 
is  at  once  seized  on  and  q^ttthetized  indie  mmiMnt.  The 
psychic  ekmoit  is  not  simply  taken  in  and  associated  or 
annexed  to  the  rest  of  the  tontent,  it  is  actually  trans- 
formed in  this  process. 

When  the  moment  is  stimulated  to  ?^tivity  by  an  ex- 
ternal object,  the  sensory  stimulations  of  dtt  ptutxd 
tune-moment  are  new.  Just  these  particular  stimulations 
and  sensory  processes  awakened  have  not  occurred  as 
yet  in  the  life  history  of  the  animal,  and  still  the  object 
meets  w'th  its  appropriate  sensory  response  and  motor 
reaction.  The  moment  that  has  more  or  less  like  con- 
tent to  the  given  new  psychic  experience  aroused  appro* 
priates  the  new  states,  works  them  into  its  own  pqrdiic 
content,  and  sends  out  its  characteristic  reaction  in  re- 
sponse to  the  stimuli.   The  moment  that  gets  hold  of 

272 


AsHmUmtion  of  th*  Mom$mt  m  Normst  StOtt  t^j 

new  psychic  materia)  is  ordinarfly  tht  one  wUcb  k  in  tbe 
process  of  activity  at  the  given  time  when  the  stim- 
ulations  occur.  The  new  material  is  absorbed  by  the 
nwment  as  a  whole,  and  is  then  assimilated  by  the  func- 
tioning nucfoos.  The  primary  sensory  element,  of  the 
nucleus  become  strengthened. 

At  the  same  time  the  new  sensory  mtleriai  ab- 
sorbed awakens  some  new  secondary  sensory  eb- 
ments  which  are  assimilated  by  the  secondary  sen- 
sorjr  elememt  constituting  die  3o<alled  protoplasm 
of  the  mooient  la  this  ab^wptk-i  of  new  mate- 
rial  the  moment  does  not  and  cannot  poMibly  iconm  ex. 
actly  the  same,  it  is  modified  in  a  degree,  although  die 
internal  relations  of  its  constituents  may  practically  re- 
main  oj^ed.  Readjustments  may  occur  and  usually 
do  io,  byt  they  are  made  at  nearly  as  possible  to  the  old 
plan,  and  are  atimiUatad  Co  tlie  old  conteot 

In  the  perceptual  moment  of  the  tantof  that  wych 
constitutes  its  content  may  be  die  perception,  of  a 
littkfish  yonder;  soon,  however,  a  new  feature  may  arise 
in  the  cootie  of  experience,  namely,  change  in  color  for 

n/S""    ?!  "f.     "^'"^"^^^  °'  in  die  case 

ofthepuflF-fish.  If  die  &h  woaBy  reacn  hi  making  at- 
tacks  when  receiving  perceptive  stimidi  eomag  from 
small  fish,  and  if  die  new  experience  is  somewhat  "»^| 
in  Its  ordinary  life  experience,  and  at  die  same  time  not 
*^.lr^  forth  the  reaction  of  fear,  die  fish 

wiU  itfll  cawy  out  itt  ordhiary  reaction  of  aggressive 
movement,  ih^  «odiied  by  the  new  meoming  ex- 
perience.  • 

The  chick  in  seeing  a  cinnabar  caterpiflar  has  die  new 
experience  of  the  different  color  from  diat  of  die  cater- 
piliir  M^M^  it  ttsuaUy  feeds,  but  die  reaction  is  stiU 


274       Nonud  smd  AhtMrmd  PsyMogf 


the  same  which  caterpillars  call  out  in  chicks,  namely* 
seizing  and  pecking.  The  new  experience  of  taste  got 
dmNi^  die  reaction  may  fardier  moffify  the  reacttoa 
of  die  chtcki  when  confronted  with  cinnabar  caterpillar. 

The  young  infant  pushes  indiscriminately  everjrthing 
in  its  mouth,  everything  is  for  sucking,  and  only  by  ex- 
perience it  learns  gradually  to  modify  its  reaction  to- 
wards objects.  On  seeing  a  lemon,  a  child  dui**  't  only 
acquainted  with  oranges  will  take  it  at  an  orar  ^,  *  The 
child  will  percme  the  new  viaual  experience  «iven  by 
the  lemon,  as  different  from  orange,  but  they  will  ht 
assimilated  to  his  sensory  orange  experience.  The  spec- 
ial visual  experiences  will  give  rise  in  the  child's  mind  to 
some  qualification  of  the  percept  "orange,"  the  object 
being  a  kind  of  orange,  a  bad  orange.  The  leactioa  in 
relation  to  the  lemon  will  then  be  of  the  kind  relating  to 
orange  in  general.  This  reaction  will  be  of  course  mod- 
ified by  repeated  experiences  resulting  from  a  series  of 
reactions  in  relation  to  the  lemcm. 

Savages  confronted  for  ^  first  time  widi  die  hofie 
or  the  ctx,  ciMinder  di«n  a  tpedet  of  pig,  an  animal  widi 
which  they  are  well  acquainted,  and  they  expect  from 
the  horse,  or  the  ox  similar  manifestations.  Their  re- 
actions towards  those  new  species  of  animals  will  be  of 
the  same  kind,  as  if  those  animals  were  pigs. 

The  same  rebdoo  it  tdll  better  iUnttrated  in  catet  ol 
ymmg  children  widi  a  definite  moment-cmisciousnest, 
which  for  convenience  sake  may  be  characterized  as  the 
family-moment.  The  child's  moment-content  of  life- 
relationship  consists  of  his  experience  gotten  from  his 
relati<m  with  his  papa  and  mamma.  Baby,  papa,  and 
mamma  and  dieir  various  relations  go  to  make  up  die 
total  moment  of  the  child's  family  life  experitncet* 


Jssh$ikuiom  of  the  Moment  in  Normal  States  275 

When  the  child  is  confronted  with  young  animals,  the 
latter  are  regarded  in  the  light  of  "babies,"  they  are 
also  babies,  they  have  their  papas  and  nuunmas  who 
give  them  cookies,  tea,  and  ottmeal,  mdren  them, 
and  put  than  to  bed. 

A  young  child  of  about  three  yean  mad  a  half 
asked  me  whether  the  baby-calf's  mamma  gave  it 
pic  to  eat.  Another  time  the  same  child  on  see- 
ing a  yuung  kitten  inquired  after  its  mamma  and 
papa,  and  when  die  baby  kitty  was  going  to  have  its 
tea  and  pot  to  bed.  In  one  child  of  lets  dum  three 
years  old,  young  animals,  plants,  such  as  young  trees 
and  flowers,  and  even  little  stars  were  so  many  "baby 
WUies."  Their  lives  were  fully  assimilated  to  his 
own,  they  were  eating  oatmeal,  drinking  milk  and 
were  having  tea,  sugar,  and  biscuits  for  their  nipper. 
The  same  child  was  gready  surprised  and  pardy  even 
horrified  at  finding  that  baby-Willie-flowers  had  no 
papa  and  no  mamma.  The  moment-consciousness  is 
awakened  bv  definite  specific  traits  in  the  object,  by 
familiar  r.  pc  ^  sense-data  constituting  the  content 
of  die  mc  ^  '  .  ae  rert  and  (fiffer«adftl  traitt  of  die 
object  are  wo^ueu  into  tlw  geiMral  ^phn  and  ^racter 
of  the  functioning  moment. 

The  assimilative  power  of  the  mioment  is  clearly  re- 
vealed in  the  very  character  of  perception.  That 
pitted  object  yonder  is  perceived  as  an  orange  with  all 
its  attributes  of  color,  shape,  size,  weight,  fragrance, 
and  taste.  The  synthesis  of  so  many  sensory  donento 
corresponding  to  such  a  complex  of  stimuli  was  grad- 
ually effected  in  die  course  of  ontogenetic  development, 
and  no  doubt  determined  by  inherited  disposition  of 
phylogenedc  erolotkm. 


%7€       Normd  mi  Ahmmd  Pijchohgf 


Suppose  the  orange  turns  out  to  be  t  new  spedet 
never  met  before  by  the  individual;  it  feels  differently 
when  touched,  it  htt  different  weight,  spedtl  tiete,  and 
fragrance.  When  sach  tense  date  are  eiperienced  re- 
peatedly, the  percept  orange  is  nuxfiffed  by  assimila> 
tion  of  the  new  sense  data.  On  seeing  another  time 
such  a  sort  of  an  orange  all  the  previously  separately 
experienced  tense-data  appear  together  in  one  syntfae- 
tised  percept.  The  moment^ontdontnett  wfaidi  we, 
for  illustration  sake,  have  attorned  as  consisting  only 
of  experiences  relating  to  oranges  and  ^th  corres- 
ponding psycho-physiol(^cal  reactions,  has  enlarged 
its  content,  has  increased,  and  modified  its  adaptation 
to  external  ooncltf ont. 

The  assimilative  power  of  tfie  momettt-oontdoot- 
ness  is  well  brougltt  out  in  the  activity  of  the  hi^er 
form  of  consciousness.  TTie  desire  to  go  to  the  post-of- 
fice to  get  my  mail  forms  the  central  point  of  my  present 
moment-consciousness.  Round  it  as  a  focus  are  grouped 
ideat,  feelings,  and  tentations,  all  more  or  less  tending 
in  the  same  direction.  The  actual  wafldng  to  the  pott- 
office  g^ves  a  series  of  new  motor  tentaticmt  iriiich  are 
subconsciously  assimilated  by  the  moment  as  a  whole. 
The  tactual  and  motor  sensations  coming  from  eadi 
step  are  assimilated  by  the  moment,  leading  in  their 
tarn  to  new  series  of  reactiom.  Eadb  new  step  is  fol- 
lowed by  new  sensations  that  give  rise  to  new  reac- 
tions and  so  on,  imtil  die  end  of  the  numient  it  rea^wd 
and  the  purpose  accomplished. 

The  whole  sensori-motor  series  is  guided  by  the 
nndear  elements  of  die  moment,  aldiough  die  succes- 
sive ttaget  of  the  teriet  are  atnmilated  tobcontciously. 
In  reading  a  book  die  tnccetdve  ttaget  are  gnided  by 


the  central  general  ides.  The  perception  of  the  letters, 
words,  and  their  isolated  meanuif  it  •tt^natird  aob- 
consdously,  all  of  diem  incorporated  into  the 

guiding  moment-consdousness  whidi  is  growing  aad 
developing,  becoming  enriched  with  more  and  more 
content.  In  writing  a  letter  or  an  artidc  on  a  certain  sub- 
ject  we  find  the  same  fact  of  assuniUtion  by  die  moment- 
consdousness  of  die  sense^iata  coming  m  the  tnccea- 
sive  steps  of  the  whole  experience.   The  handling  of 
the  pen,  the  dipping  it  into  ink,  its  guiding  by  die  hand, 
its  gliding  over  the  paper,  the  drawing  of  the  letters, 
the  formation  of  letters  into  words,  and  of  the  words 
into  lines  and  sentences,  all  follow  in  succissive  stages 
and  are  assimilated  pardy  sabconadomly  and  partly 
consdously.   All  are  guided  by  the  prindpd  moment 
which  grows  richer  in  content  with  each  successive  step 
made,  with  each  succeeding  link  of  die  series.  In  fact 
^       *y  successive  steps  are  stages  in 

the  growth  and  devdopmenC  of  die  one  moment-con- 
saousness. 

The  growth  and  development  of  the  moment-con- 
sdousness is  through  its  assimilation  of  fresh  psychic 
material.  In  die  man  of  sdence  a  favorite  theory  ex- 
eidees  socii  an  assunilative  power  over  facts  other- 
wise disconnected.  The  momeiitHSJMdoiiMiess  having 
the  given  theory  as  its  nudeus  abeorht  more  aad  more 
material,  and  with  the  assimilation  of  new  material  tfie 
content  and  strengdi  of  the  internal  organization  grows 
m  a  corresponding  degree.  The  assimilation  is  guided 
hy  the  intense  mterett  aroused  by  the  nudeus  of  die  to- 
tal  moment,  and  it  m  its  turn  aided  hy  die  acdve  pro- 
cess of  assimilation,  etpedaOy  by  the  htfocace  of  tob- 
merged,  subconsdons  moments  which  have  reached 


syS       Normsl  md  Akmomd  Ptyektiogy 


die  minimmm  of  comdomcii,  or  fie  on  die  margin  of 
the  iplieie  of  weldiig  coiMCtoiiiiieii. 

The  influence  of  the  tubcomciout  b  in  proportion  to 
the  duration  and  intensity  of  the  actiinty  of  the  mental 
process.  We  are  well  acquainted  with  the  fact  that  an 
action  requiring  at  first  great  stress  of  attention,  finally, 
widi  itt  repeddon,  drops  ont  of  the  fbcut  of  oomdooi- 
ness  and  becomes,  as  it  is  cafied,  automatic  or  unccm^ 
scious.  They  who  have  observed  a  child  striving  to 
stand  by  himself  or  beginning  to  walk  realize  how  sudi 
seemingly  automatic  acts  as  standing  or  walking  are 
at  first  accompanied  with  intense  attention.  The 
child,  when  standing  up  all  by  luniidf,  does  it  hentafe* 
io^i  he  shakes  and  trembles,  as  if  occupjrii^  unsafe 
ground,  or  doing  a  difficult  act;  he  looks  around  for 
support,  stretches  out  his  hands,  asking  the  help  of  his 
parents  or  nurse,  and  if  he  does  not  get  aid  in  time, 
begins  to  cry  from  fear  and  drops  on  all-fours.  It  it 
a  ^fficult  feat  for  him.  Wididraw  hit  attendm  from 
his  performance,  and  in  die  first  stages  of  hit  series  of 
trials  he  drops  helplessly  to'  the  groimd. 

The  same  holds  true  in  the  pase  of  walking.  The  child 
in  beginning  to  walk,  does  it  with  great  hesitation  and 
fear.  It  can  mily  be  compared  to  die  attenqpt  of  an 
addt  m  learning  to  waflc  a  rope,  or  a  narrow  board  on 
a  hi|^  fdace.  Each  step  requires  intense  attention.  The 
least  distraction  of  attention  and  the  baby  falls  down 
in  a  heap.  The  least  change  in  the  touch,  muscular 
and  kinaesthetic  sensadons  arrests  the  successful  at- 
tempt at  standing  or  walking.  Thxa  in  die  case  of  my 
baby  of  fourteen  mondis  after  die  first  two  days  of  more 
or  less  successful  trials  at  walking,  a  new  pair  of  shoes 
was  put  on.   Tbb  arrested  the  waDcing.   When  the 


JsHmikikm  of  the  Moment  h  Normal  States  279 

baby  became  accustomed  to  the  new  sensation-  which 
fell  in  the  background  of  his  consciousness,  he  once 
more  started  a  series  of  triab,  and  with  such  success  that 
after  two  dtyi»  practice  he  walked  ahnost  a  whole  mile. 

After  a  period  of  long  practice  the  complex  mmcnitr 
adjustments,  required  in  the  acts  of  standing  and  walk- 
ing, gradually  retreat  to  the  background  of  conscious- 
ncss  and  become  automatic.  Not  that  consciousness  in 
those  acts  is  lost:  it  has  simply  reached  its  necessary 
minimum,  leaving  the  focus  of  consciousness  free  for 
other  new  and  unaccustomed  adfnstments,  which  in 
their  turn  retreat  from  the  centre  to  the  periphery  tnd 
fall  into  the  subconscious.  The  usual  movement  of 
mental  processes  is  from  the  conscious  to  the  subcon- 
scious. 

Experiences,  however,  may  first  be  perceived  by  sub- 
merged subconsdous  moments  and  then  traasrahted 
to  the  focus  of  consdousness,  the  movement  of  the 
process  thus  taking  a  direction  opposite  to  the  usual  one, 
from  the  subconsdous  to  the  consdous.  Exj^eriences, 
for  mstance,  lived  throng^  hi  hypnotic  states,  in  trance 
states  or  hi  dreams,  may  come  to  the  surface  as  hyp. 
noidal  states  and  then  become  synthetized  in  the  upper 
waking  consdousness,  or  they  may  be  K-^  -d  up  m 
hypnosis,  and  then  permanently  synthetized  in  the  cen- 
tre  of  attentive  consciousness. 

Smilariy  experiences  first  Uved  through  in  the  sub- 
consaous  states  induced  by  alcoholic  intoxication  or  by 
anaesthetics  may  be  brought  by  hypnoidal  states  or 
by  hypnosis  into  the  focus  of  consdousness.  Hypnol- 
dal  states  are  uprushes  of  the  subconsdous,  and  by 
means  of  them  many  a  hidden  and  obscure  region  of 
thetobcowdowmaybeifiscovered.  Thus  the  Hanaa 


28o       Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


case  was  largely  marked  by  hypnoidal  states.  In  nuuij 
of  my  cases  hyimoidal  states  are  die  means  by  which 

subconscious  experiences  become  completely  revealed. 
In  cases  of  amnesia  the  hyproidal  states  give  glimpses 
into  subconscious  regions  which  even  deep  hypnosi' 
can  not  reveal. 

The  method  of  guesses  is  valuable  in  showing  die 
reverse  process  of  mental  activity,  the  passage  of  r 
subconscious  state  into  the  focus  of  consciousness. 

If  the  anaesthetic  spot  of  a  psychopathic  case  is  stim*- 
ulated,  the  patient  is  unaware  of  such  stimulation; 
should  he,  however,  be  a^ed  to  guess,  or  to  tell  any- 
thing that  happens  to  come  into  his  mind,  he  is  often 
found  to  give  correct  answers.  The  patient  perceives 
subconsciously.  This  perception,  often  in  a  slightly 
modified  form,  is  transmitted  to  the  upper  conscious- 
ness, or  to  what  for  the  present  constitutes  the  patient's 
principal  moment  comciousness,  or  personality. 

If,  for  instance,  the  anaesthedc  spot  of  the  patient  is 
pr  Icked  a  number  of  times,  the  patient  remains  quiet  and 
is  seemingly  insensible.  Should  we  now  ask  the  patient 
to  tell  anycii!:;g  that  comes  into  his  mind,  he  will  say, 
"pricking"  and  will  be  unable  to  tell  why  he  happened 
to  diink.of  "pricking"  at  all.  ^ould  we  now  adt  him 
to  give  any  number  diat  may  enter  his  mind,  he  will 
give  the  correct  number,  once  more  not  being  able  to 
give  die  reason  why  this  particular  number  happened 
to  enter  his  mind,  considering  it  a  mere  "chance  num- 
ber." The  subconscious  sensadons  experienced  are 
traamntted  m  abstract  ideas  to  die  focus  of  conacioi»> 

Often  instead  of  the  particular  idea  being  trans- 
mittedf  only  the  general  aspect  of  it  reaches  the  focns. 


Jssimihtion  of  the  Moment  m  Normal  States  28 1 

Thus  the  patient  is  not  able  to  guess  the  particular  na- 
ture  of  the  stimulus,  but  he  may  give  the  character  of 
the  unfelt  stimuli.  This  reveals  the  reverse  movement 
from  the  subconscious  to  the  conscious. 

This  reverse  movement  of  the  psychic  sttte,  from 
the  originally  subconscious  to  the  upper  consciousness, 
IS  weU  manifested  in  psychopathic  cases  of  visual 
anaesAesia  as  well  as  hypnotically  induced  anaesthe- 
sia. The  patient's  field  of  vision  is  limited.  If  objects 
arc  inserted  in  any  place  of  the  zone  extending  from 
the  periphery  of  the  narrowed  field  to  the  utmost 
boundary  of  the  normal  field,  the  patient  can  guess 
correctly  the  names  of  the  inserted  objects  invisible  to 
him.    General  guesses  are  correct  on  the  periphery 
of  that  "subcoiisdous"  zone.  Some  of  the  phenomena 
of  paramnesia  can  be  explained  by  this  principle  of 
reverse  movement,  when  subconsdout  experiences 
transmitted  to  central  consdousncM  appear  under  the 
form  of  "familiar"  memories. 

A  lighting  up  of  the  subconscious  regions  bringing 
about  a  reverse  movement  from  the  subconscious  to 
the  consaous  can  also  be  brought  about  by  the  use  of 
toxic  drugs.    Pent-up  neuron  energies  become  liber- 
ated  from  lower  and  lower-most  moment  consciousness, 
long  forgotten  experiences  well  up  to  the  centre  of  con- 
saonmeM;  outlived  moments  are  resurrected  and  come 
to  the  focut  of  conidoasness  with  all  the  vividness  of 
a  present  perceptual  experience.  Thus  De  Quincey,  in 
his  Confes8.ons  of  an  English  Opium-Eater,"  tdls  at 
that  the  minutest  incidents  of  childhood  or  forgotten 
•cenet  of  later  years  were  often  revived.    I  could  not 
be  taid  to  recollect  them,  for  if  I  had  been  told  of  them 
when  waking.  I  ihoiild  not  have  been  able  to  acknowl- 


282        NorvuU  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


edge  tibon  as  my  pa^  experience.  But  fdaced  as  diey  were 
before  me  in  dreams  like  intuitions  and  dothed  in  all 

their  evanescent  circumstances  and  accompanying  fed- 
ings,  I  recognized  them  instantaneously." 

Hypnoidic  states  reveal  the  wealth  and  extent  of 
psydiic  experience  hidden  in  the  subconsdous  regions. 
Glimpses  into  die  subconsdous  are  also  pven  in  hyp- 
noidal  states  which  are  induced  by  the  process  of  hyp- 
noidization.  The  patient  is  asked  to  close  his  eyes  and 
keep  as  quiet  as  possible  without,  however,  making 
any  special  effort  to  put  himself  into  such  a  state.  He 
is  dien  asked  to  tell  anything  that  comes  into  his  mind. 
The  patient  may  also  be  asked  to  attend  to  some  stimuli, 
such  as  reading  or  writing  or  the  buzzing  of  an  electri- 
cal current,  and  he  is  then  to  tell  the  ideas,  thoughts, 
images,  phrases,  no  matter  how  disconnected,  that 
happen  to  flitter  through  his  mind. 

This  same  omdition  of  hypnoidization  is  sometimes 
better  accomplished  through  mental  relaxation  with  con- 
centration of  attention  in  a  definite  direction.  The  pa- 
tient is  put  into  a  quiet  condition,  and  with  his  eyes 
closed  and  the  experimenter's  hand  on  the  patient's  fore- 
head, the  latter  is  urged  to  mental  effort  and  strain,  and, 
if  necessary,  given  some  hints.  Experiences  seemin^y 
inaccessible  flash  lightning-like  on  the  upper  regions  of 
self-consdousness.  In  all  such  cases  the  active  mo- 
ment-consciousness seizes  on  and  assimilates  any  cog- 
nate experience,  conscious  or  subconscious. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


ABNORMAL  MOMENTS 

THE  power  of  the  moment's  assimilation  is 
well  brought  in  the  activity  of  abnormal  mo- 
ments.   Distressing  thoughts,  gloomy  ideas, 
painful  sensations,  and  feelings  of  depres- 
sion form  a  nudeut  round  which  other  mental  states 
become  firmly  organized.   A  delusion  aritet  which 
constitutes  the  moment-consciousness  of  the  mebnchol- 
lac.  This  moment  assimilates  all  other  cognate  experi- 
ences.  Everything  that  takes  place  is  seized  on  by  the 
moment  and  assimilated.  The  patient  who  believes  that 
he  has  no  intestines,  or  that  he  is  made  of  glass  and  is 
transparent  and  hence  hides  himself  from  people,  at  hit 
functions  are  open  to  the  sight  of  outsiders,  such  a 
patient  will  make  all  experiences  confirm  and  strength- 
en the  delusion.  The  delusion  constituting  the  predom- 
inant monient<onKiou«ieM  m  the  patient's  life  absorbs 
and  aMimilatet  most,  if  not  all  of  the  material  that 
gams  access  to  the  patient's  psychic  life.  The  moment 
like  a  cancerous  growth  expands,  grows,  and  develops  at 
the  expense  of  other  moments,  starves  them  by  cutting 
off  their  mental  food  supply.  What  cannot  be  used  by 
the  moment  is  rejected  as  waste  material. 

A  similar  sute  of  affairs  we  meet  with  in  paranoia, 
as  well  as  in  many  paranoidal  states  of  a  purely  psycho- 
pathic character.  A  moment-consciousness  is  formed  of 
high  organizing  and  assimilating  power.  Any  experience 
relevant  and  irrelevant  entering  consciousness  is  greed- 

183 


284        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psycholoiy 

ily  absorbed  and  assimilated.  Any  flitting  thought,  any 
passing  impression  is  worked  in  and  organized  into  the 
moment.  All  other  moments  fall  a  prey  to  this  domi- 
nant all-absorbing  moment. 

In  tome  cases  the  assimilating  capacity  of  the  mo- 
ment seems  to  be  limitless.  In  fact,  the  more  it  assim- 
ilates, the  greater  grows  its  craving  and  capacity  for 
getting  more  material.  The  most  trivial  facts,  the 
slightest  sense-impressions  all  are  pressed  into  the  ser- 
vice of  the  despotically  ruling  moment.  The  insignifi- 
cant becomes  significant  and  points  to  the  central  delu- 
si<Mi. 

In  other  cases  the  limit  of  the  process  of  assimilation 

soon  reaches  its  maximum  point,  more  psychic  material 
is  rejected  by  the  moment.  Such  conditions  are  to  be 
found  in  various  states  of  dissociation  manifested  in 
different  forms  of  psychopathic  diseases.  The  mo- 
ment's capacity  for  assuuilating  new  materiel  is  of 
limited  range,  soon  reaches  its  utmost  bounds  and  loses 
for  the  time  being  all  capadty  for  further  assimilation. 
Such  states  may  be  found  in  amnesia.  The  moment  is 
then  said  to  be  dissociated  from  the  main  current  of 
psychic  life-activity.  Specific  stimuli  under  definite  con- 
ditions are  requisite  to  resuscitate  the  moment  and 
arouse  its  power  of  assimilation. 

It  is  certainly  interesting  and  instructive  to  study  the 
fluctuations  of  the  moment's  power  of  assimilation  in 
abnormal  mental  states.  In  some  forms  of  mental  dis- 
eases and  general  psychic  derangements  the  momoit 
may  be  of  ephemeral  and  unstable  character;  it  may 
dissolve  soon  after  its  birth.  Such  conditions  are 
to  be  found  in  various  forms  of  maniacal  states 
and  in  the  initial  stages  of  many  cases  of  general 


AbHormal  Moments 


paresis. 

In  psychomotor  manifestadons  of  a  psychopathic 
character  moments-consciousness  are  often  formed 
and  dissolved  like  soap-bubbles.  The  investigation  of 
them  is  of  the  utmost  inteiest  and  value.  In  hypnosis 
moments  of  such  a  nature  may  be  experimentally  in- 
duced and  studied.  The  whole  process  can  thus  be 
followed  through  all  the  sUges  of  evoUition  and  disso- 
lution. 

A  greater  condition  of  stability  is  to  be  found  in  the 
various  automatisms  preceding  or  follow'-'g  epileptic 
seizures,  or  in  the  so-called  "psychic  equivalents  of  epi- 
lepsy." The  pure  "psychic  epilepsies"  are  essentially 
hypnoidic  states,  moments  of  stable  character.  This 
can  be  demonstrated  both  by  observation  and  experi- 
ment. 

The  principle  of  selection  is  fundamental  in  the  life- 
history  of  the  moment.  The  whole  tendency  of  the 
moment  is  to  select  material  conducive  to  die  furdier- 
ance  of  its  activity  and  to  reject  all  material  that 
thwarts  its  functions  and  growth.  This  process  of  se- 
lection is  from  a  biological  standpoint  essential  for  the 
survival  and  development  of  the  moment. 

The  devel(q>ment  of  the  moment  may  become  ar- 
rested on  some  one  stage  of  ontogenesis,  and  then  the 
moment,  belonging  to  a  higher  type  resembles  in  its  psy- 
chic activity  that  of  a  lower  type;  although  it  has 
many  vestiges  of  the  higher  type,  it  is  greatly  modi- 
fied in  nature  and  as  such  really  differs  from  the 
healthy  normal  representative  of  the  corresponding 
low  type.  Still  we  may  affirm  that  the  arrested  high 
type  has  virtually  become  a  moment  of  low  type.  The 
state  of  psychosis  of  the  imbecile,  or  idiot,  may  be  tak- 


a86       Normal  and  Abnormal  Psyehologf 


en  M  a  good  illustration.  The  mental  activity  of  the 
idiot  resembles  the  lower  types  of  animal  psychosis. 
Although  as  we  have  already  pointed  out,  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  idiot  and  that  cf  the  animal  are  by 
no  means  identical,  still  both  belong  to  a  low  type  of 
mcnnoit,  and  as  such,  they  may  be  put  on  the  same  level. 

In  pathological  cases  where  moital  d^;eneration  sets 
in  we  also  have  a  similar  course.  The  moment  of  the 
higher  type  becomes  degraded  and  falls  to  the  level  of 
lower  and  lowermost  types,  according  to  the  advance  of 
the  process  of  degeneration.  Such  states  are  to  be 
found  in  the  degenerative  psychosis  characteristic  of 
secondary  dementia.  When  the  patholo^cal  process 
is  wide,  intense,  persistent,  and  lasting,  then  secondary 
dementia  results  in  most  cases  of  mental  degeneration. 
Should,  however,  the  process  become  arrested  then  the 
moment  simply  falls  to  the  level  of  a  relatively  lower 
type. 


CHAPTER  IX 


MENTAL  CONTINUITY  AND  THE  PSYCHIC  <IAF 

THE  activity  of  the  moment-consciousneM  it 
continuous,  without  break  and  interruption. 
Should  the  activity  become  arrested  and  the 
break  be  wemingly  absolute,  continuity  is 
still  present  with  the  renimptioii  of  actiWty.  The 
thread  is  taken  up  where  it  wu  dropped,  the  moment 
appears  as  a  whole  without  any  break.  There  is  no  U- 
sion  in  the  moment  consciousness,  at  least  as  far  as 
the  moment  itself  is  concerned.  In  going  to  sleep  and 
waking  up  again  we  may  be  indirectly  conscious  of  the 
interruption,  but  the  tcdvity  of  the  moment  t»  ttOI 
continuous,  the  moment  begins  its  activity  at  the  po^t 
where  it  has  left  oflf.  In  fainting,  'n  coma,  in  hypnoMS, 
or  somnambulism  the  periods  of  unconsciousness  are 
immediately  bridged  over  by  the  awakening  activity  of 
the  mommt 

Objectively  considered,  we  have  the  moment's  ac- 
tivity, then  break,  or  absence  of  that  activity,  and 
then  the  resumption;  subjectively,  however,  the  mo- 
ment's activity  is  felt  as  one  and  continuous  with- 
out a  break  and  gap.  In  consciousness  the  psychic  con- 
tent and  activity  preceding  the  break  along  with  pret- 
ent  cognizance  of  the  break  are  synthetiaed  into  a 
unified  continuity;  the  present  consciousness  of  the 
break  is  taken  into  the  synthesis,  the  very  gap  thus 
forming  the  bridge  for  unity. 

The  cognizance  of  the  break  may,  however,  be  com- 

»S7 


288        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


pktely  absent,  and  the  edges  of  the  mental  wound 
may  become  closed,  healed,  and  united  with  the 
functioning  activity  of  the  moment,  the  moment, 
without  even  the  least  consciousness  of  the  in- 
tervennig  gap,  resuming  its  line  of  woric  piedaely 
at  the  place  where  it  had  been  arretted.  From  the  mo- 
ment's own  standpoint,  the  gap  is  as  if  non-existent| 
there  is  no  break,  in  the  moment's  psychic  life-activity. 

The  break  formed  by  the  interruption  of  the  mo- 
ment's functioning  activity,  objectively  regarded,  may 
present  an  actual  gap  in  whirh,  for  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses, it  may  be  supposed  that  no  mental  activity  is 
taking  place.  Such  cases  are  found  in  the  state  of 
deep  sleep,  undisturbed  by  dreams,  or  in  the  states  of 
unconsciousness  produced  by  toxic  and  narcotic  agen- 
cies, in  states  of  deep  conHa,  in  the  attacks  of  typical 
epilepsy,  petit  or  grand  mal,  in  status  epilepticus,  in  die 
states  of  unconsciousness  produced  by  intense  mechani- 
cal stimuli,  such  as  a  blow,  or  a  fall,  or  a  strong 
electrical  current.  In  all  such  cases  we  often  find 
a  state  that  may,  for  all  intents  and  purposes,  be 
characterized  as  unconsciousness.  No  other  moment 
comes  to  the  surface,  c  -en  temporarily,  to  fill  tibe 
mental  gap  caused  by  the  interruption  of  the  moment's 
functional  activity.   The  gap  presents  a  mental  blank. 

To  the  important  question:  "How,  then  are  we  to 
explain  amnesia  where  consciousness  is  indicated?" 
Ribot  answers  "By  the  extreme  weakness  of  the  con- 
scious state."  This  explanation  is  inadequate.  For 
first  of  all,  what  is  the  meaning  of  a  weak  state  of  con- 
sciousness? Is  it  a  state  felt  as  being  weak?  If  so,  the 
explanation  is  obviously  wrong.  We  may  far  better  re- 
tain in  memory  the  whisper  of  a  dear  friend  than 


M*nt4U  Contimtity  mU  tht  Psychic  Gmp  189 

the  ttrikiiif  of  the  tower  dock  or  the  explosion  of  a 
gun.  Does  he  mean  by  t  wesk  ttete  of  conacioiinieM 

a  confused  indistinct  state?  Once  more  he  is  wrong. 
A  confused  and  indistinct  state  of  mind  is  often  clearly 
remembered.  I  am  dizzy,  everything  is  confused  and 
indistinct,  I  am  unable  to  teU  in  detail  what  I  have 
seen  and  heard,  but  I  can  clearly  and  distinctly  remem- 
ber the  state  of  dizziness  and  confusion,  and  very  often 
far  better  than  any  other  less  confuted  mental  state. 
This,  however,  is  not  the  case  in  the  ttatet  of  amnena 
under  discussion. 

In  amnesia  there  is  no  memory  at  all  of  the  experi- 
enced mental  states  and  what  the  subject  or  the 
patient  remembers  is  the  last  link  of  the  state  pre- 
ceding  the  amnesia.  The  state  preceding  the  am- 
nesia  and  the  one  succeeding  it  are  joined  together, 
the  mtermediary  is  left  out,  as  if  it  had  never  been  in 
existnice.  Evidently  the  theory  is  that  the  state  of 
consciousness  is  so  weak  that  it  leaves  no  "trace,"  no 
memory  behind.  But  if  this  be  the  case,  then  the  ex- 
planation  is  a  tautology.  The  problem  is,  why  is  there 
no  memory  m  certain  states  of  consciousness  ?  To  this 
the  reply  is  that  the  states  of  consciousness  leave  no 
memory  behind.  It  is  obvious  thit  this  explanation  is 
vague  and  when  one  tries  to  give  to  it  a  definite  mean- 
ing, It  is  either  wrong  or  turns  out  to  be  a  reasoning  in 
a  circle. 

Granted,  however,  that  a  weak  state  of  conscious- 
ness IS  something  definite,  that  by  it  is  meant  to  indi- 
cate confusion,  mdistinctness  of  consciousness,  and 
granted  furthermore,  that  such  a  state  leaves  no  mem- 
ory behind,  how  then  shaU  we  explain  amnesia  of  men- 
tal  states  when  conadooaooa  waa  iatente,  dear  and 


81 


t90       Normsl  md  Abnormsl  Psychology 


ditdiict,  as  in  the  ctte  of  hyimotit  or  of  artificial  •oiii> 
nambulism  ?  In  diete  states  the  senses  are  ahnost  hyp- 

eraesthetic,  the  sense  of  discrimination  Is  extremely 
acute  and  memory  is  in  a  state  of  exaltation.  Why  is 
it  then  that  amnesia  can  be  enforced  in  the  case  of  al- 
most  any  experience  immediately  after  the  trance  is 
over,  or  even  during  the  very  state  of  hypnosis?  The 
state  of  consciousness  is  intense  and  stiU  there  is  am- 
nesia. 

How  is  it  in  cases  of  double  consciousness  or 
of  multiple  personality?  Surely  the  explanation  of 
"weakness"  of  the  states  of  consciousness  cannot  be 
advanced  by  any  one  who  has  a  personal  knowledge 
of  these  phenomena.  How  is  it  in  psychopathic  cases 
where  the  amnesia  is  brought  about  by  an  intense  pain- 
ful state  of  consciousness,  such  as  fright,  fear  or  great 
grief  ?  On  the  theory  of  weakness  of  consciousness  all 
these  phenomena  are  mysterious,  inomiprehensible. 
On  our  dieory  of  moment-consciousness,  however,  the 
phenomena  presented  could  not  possibly  be  odierwise, 
in  fact,  we  should  expect  them  a  priori,  if  our  theory  be 
correct. 

A  psychic  blank,  however,  is  not  the  only  possible 
consequence  of  the  moment's  lapse  o\  funcdon.  The 
moment's  activity  is  interrupted,  but  only,  what  is  more 
ofte  the  case,  to  give  rise  to  activity  of  another  mo- 
ment. The  break  produced  in  the  moment's  life  is 
not  a  real  gap ;  for  the  gap  is  filled  in  with  the  function- 
ing activity  of  anotlier  moment  which  is  usually  of  a 
lower,  diough  sometimes  it  may  even  be  of  a  higfae. 
type.  From  die  standpoint  of  the  arrested  moment, 
however,  tliere  is  a  distinct  gap,  not  that  the  moment 
itself  is  cognizant  of  the  gap,  but  it  is  so  for  the  es> 


Mtnua  ComHmttty  md  tht  PtyeUe  Gitp  191 

ternal  observer  that  takes  that  moment  for  his  stand- 
point The  gap  exists  in  the  moment,  though  not  for 
the  mmnent. 

Such  itates  may  be  found  in  hypnosis  especially 
in  that  stage  of  it  known  as  somnambulism.  When 
the  subject  falls  into  a  deep  hypnotic  state,  it  is 
possible  to  make  him  pass  through  a  scries  of  compli- 
cated acttont,  changes  of  personalities  without  the  least 
awareness  on  awakening.  The  whole  series  of  his 
waking  consciousness  it  is  as  non-existent,  in  short,  it  is 
a  gap. 

This  gap  however,  is  far  from  being  a  mere  men- 
tal blank.  On  the  contrary  there  may  have  been 
intense  psychic  activity,  but  only  that  of  another  mo- 
ment which  in  the  waking  state  hat  become  submerged. 
This  submerged  moment  may  be  brought  up  in  Ae 
waking  state  by  suggestions  or  by  means  of  hypnoidiza- 
tion  and  be  synthetized  in  the  upper  consciousness. 
Sometimes  glimpses  of  the  submerged  moment  may 
come  up  in  dreams,  in  reveries,  in  sudden  flashes  dur- 
ing the  waking  state,  or  in  spontaneous  hypnoidal 
states,  the  subject  doubting  whether  they  refer  to  some- 
thing actual  or  are  simply  mere  whims  and  fancies. 

In  the  cases  of  the  so-called  "psychic  epilepsy"  which 
are  reaUy  amnesia  of  a  psychopathic  character,  one 
meets  wiAk  psychic  states  in  iAA<k  the  gap  is  not  abso- 
lute, but  relative,  being  fflled  with  the  activity  of  an- 
other moment.  Thus,  M.  carried  on  conversations, 
arguments,  and  discussions  while  in  the  abnormal  sub- 
conscious  state  and  could  not  remember  anything  of  it 
when  emerg^'ng  from  it  and  returning  to  the  normal 
condition,  ^mllariy  F.  in  his  subconscious  state  trav- 
elled a  distance,  sold  horses  and  returned,  but  knew 
nothing  of  what  had  taken  i^ace  ima  the  begtoniog  to 


29*       Normal  smd  Jbmormsl  Psyehohgy 

the  end  of  Lit  jornmey. 

In  the  H.  caw  the  gaps  formed  in  the  second- 

ary  state  by  the  manifestations  of  the  primary  state 
were  as  if  non  existent  for  this  secondary  conscious- 
ness. The  same  held  good  of  the  primary  con- 
sdousnen:  the  two  were  woridng  independently  of 
each  other,  each  synthedzing  its  own  experirace,  eadi 
beginning  at  the  place  where  it  had  left  off.  Neither 
of  them  knew  of  and  felt  subjectively  the  gap.  There 
was  a  gap,  only  it  was  filled  in  by  another  moment 
consciousness  of  which  the  present  functioning  moment 
was  net  aware. 

In  cases  of  typical  epilepsy  subconscious  states  are 
sometimes  found,  states  that  constitute  gaps  in  die  ac> 
tivity  of  the  normally  working  moment-consciousness. 
Thus  in  some  cases  of  idiopathic  epilepsy  under  my 
observation^  the  patients  in  the  stuporous  states  suc- 
ceeding the  epileptic  attack  anr  wer  questions,  but  do 
not  recognize  me,  nor  do  they  know  the  nurw  who  takes 
care  of  them,  although  th  y  can  remember  and  recog- 
nize '^♦^her  names  mentioned  to  them.  In  their  nor- 
mal however,  they  neither  know  of  their  attacks 
nor  do  diey  remember  anything  of  the  conversations 
and  experimentations  during  tihe  stuporous  post-epilep- 
tic state.  In  other  severe  cases  of  epilepsy  with  fre- 
quent attacks  of  grand  mal  and  petit  mal,  the  patients 
during  the  periods  of  their  stuporous  post-epileptic 
states  answer  questions  often  mistaking  persons  and 
environmoit,  referring  to  events  and  inddents  of  their 
early  childhood.  On  dnergmg  from  their  aboiumial 
states,  the  patients  are  comi^etely  unaware  of  what 
had  taken  place,  the  epileptic  attack  with  soporous 
post-epileptic  state  forming  a  gap  in  the  functional 


•ctivitf  of  hit  principal  or  upper  moment-coiucioiu. 


If  we  look  at  the  moment  from  its  rabjectivt  stand- 
point there  may  be  consciousness  of  the  gap  bridging 

over  the  edges  of  the  mental  lesion,  or  such  conscious- 
ness may  be  altogether  lacking,  the  psychic  edges  of 
the  mental  lesion  being  closely  unified  in  the  synthetic 
activity  of  the  temporarily  arrested,  but  now  once  more 
'•mctioning  moment-consdonsness.   If  we  look  at  the 
objective  side  of  the  gap,  we  find  that  there  may  be 
total  absence  of  all  mental  activity,  no  other  moment 
coming  up  to  fill  the  place  of  the  one  that  has  ceased 
functioning,  or  another  moment  may  take  the  place  of 
the  one  arrested  in  function,  seemingly  fill  up  the  men- 
tal gap,  and  become  submerged  with  the  restitution  of 
the  arrested  moment's  activity.    Not  that  the  gap  is 
really  filled  up  objectively  or  subjectively;  it  is  like  the 
dose  successive  manifestations  of  different  individuali- 
ties.   The  dose  observer  can  easily  detect  the  arrest, 
the  gap,  the  filling  up  of  the  gap  with  another  moment's 
activity,  and  finally  the  restitution  of  the  original  tem- 
porarily arrested  moment-consciousness.   What  is  pre- 
sented to  cursory  observation  is  apparent  continuity 
of  mental  activity. 
Mental  gaps  may  be  dassified  as  follows: 


Subjective  (with  conscioi 
Standpoint  (without  consi 

{  """"'"t:  f  Higher. 


-s  of  mental  gap. 
isness  of  mental  gap. 


Mental  gap 

,  nuacucc  01  moment.  ,tj-_. 
Stanc^mt  1  Presence  of  nnoment  {l^^^" 

Whtn  the  prindpal  moment  becomes  arreitMl  in  its 

activity  and  a  new  dominating  moment  takes  it  (dace 
in  the  formed  gap,  the  type  of  die  n«w  moneae  »  us- 


194        Normsl  snd  Abnormal  Psyhology 


ually  of  a  lower  grade.  The  conditionti  dist  bring 
about  an  aggregation  of  moments  are  of  such  a  nature  as 
to  allow  of  the  activity  of  a  high  type  of  moment.  Not 
appearing  in  the  mental  synthesis  of  the  organization 
of  momente  characteristic  of  consdousiwss  in  die  nor- 
mal state,  the  mcmient  is  poor  in  content  and  simple  in 
nature.  Falling  as  it  does  outside  the  complex  normal 
aggregate  of  moments,  the  moment  lacks  the  harmony 
and  balance  in  its  psychomotor  and  psycho-physiological 
reactions,  since  the  counteracting  balancing  and  hence 
regulative  psychomotor  tendencies  of  other  systems  of 
moments  are  wanting. 

A  moment  that  enters  into  a  highly  complex  aggrega- 
tion of  moments,  when  stimulated  to  activity,  sets  also 
other  moments  into  functioning,  moments  that  are  closely 
associated  with  it  and  often  of  different  and  even  con- 
trary psychomotor  and  psycho-physiological  reacticms. 
Strengthening  other  systems  against  the  lines  of  its  own 
activity  the  moment  is  thus  controlled,  inhibited,  and 
regulated  in  the  very  act  of  awakening  to  functioning  ac- 
tivity. For  it  must  be  clearly  understood  that  there  is  no 
special  controlling  agency  somewhere  in  the  mind  send- 
ing out  orders,  mandates,  inhibitions,  like  a  despotically 
ruling  autocrat,  like  a  p83rcho-analytic  censor,  or  like 
an  omniscient,  omnipotent,  omnipresent,  invisible  deity. 
The  regulative,  inhibiting  control  to  which  a  moment 
is  subject  is  in  the  mutual  interrelation,  balance,  and 
harmony  of  the  systems  and  constellations  of  moments, 
entering  into  an  aggregate,  and  forming  the  organized 
ae^ty  of  a  highly  complex  moment-consciousness. 

When  a  moment  becomes  dissociated  and  isolated 
from  other  systems  of  moments,  it  loses  it?  balance  and 
being  freed  from  control,  manifests  its  psychomotor  re- 


Meui^  Contimnty  md  the  PsfcMe  Gap  195 

actions  in  the  full  force  of  its  original  powers.  The  lack 
of  control  and  the  moment's  energy  of  manifestations 
are  just  m  proportion  to  tfie  depth  and  extent  of  disso- 
ciation or  of  disaggregation  of  moments.  Dissociation 
and  over-action  are  co-related. 

The  intimate  relation  of  dissociation  and  over-action 
IS  clearly  seen  in  cases  of  so-called  "psychic  epilepsy." 
The  dissociated  subconscious  states  manifest  diemselves 
with  an  over-powering  activity,  with  an  energy  that  can 
neither  be  resisted  nor  controlled,  they  come  like  irre- 
sistible,  uncontrollable,  imperative  impulses,  which  are 
closely  related  to  them  in  nature.  If,  however,  these 
statw  are  brought  out  from  die  hidden  subconscious 
depth  from  which  they  make  invasions;  if  they  are 
brought  to  light  before  the  court  of  the  upper  conscious, 
ness  one  by  one  in  hypnoidal  states,  and  are  forced  to 
become  associated  with  and  synthetized  into  the  princi- 
pal moment-consciousness,  the  impetuosity  and  energy  of 
their  manifestations  are  gone.  All  my  cases  of  dissocia- 
tion  give  experimental  confirmation  of  this  law  of  dyna- 
magenesis  of  dissociation. 

The  dissociated  cluster,  altiiough  inaccessiWe 
through  the  ordinary  channels  of  intercornmum'cations, 
on  account  of  the  disaggregation  of  the  aggregate  into 
which  It  enters  as  a  constituent  part,  may  stiU  be 
reached  through  other  channels,  coming  from  other 
moment-aggregates.  For  a  moment,  or  a  combination 
of  them  forms  a  constituent  part  not  only  of  one  ag. 
gregate,^  but  of  many  other  aggregates.  Loss  of  com- 
munication through  a  certain  channel  does  not  neces- 
sarily  exclude  loss  of  aU  communications.  If  tiie  lost 
channel  is  habitual,  the  activity  of  the  seemingly  lort 
moments  may  be  awakened  through  uahabitnal  chta. 


2^6        Normal  and  Ahnormal  Psychology 


nds. 

If  die  moment  camiot  be  set  into  acdyity  by  die 
organizadon  of  constelladons  constituting  die  con> 
scious  personality,  on  account  of  disaggregating  pro- 
cesses, the  moment  may  still  be  set  into  fuctioning  ac- 
tivity througL  aggregates  falling  outside  the  focus  of 
personality,  but  which  woi^  ^di  that  focus  in  dose 
co^peradon,  namely  die  subconscious.  In  odier  words, 
in  the  process  of  disaggregation,  conscious,  or  rather 
self-conscious  experiences  fall  into  the  region  of  sub- 
conscious life;  what  is  absent  in  personal  thought  may 
be  present  in  impersonal,  subconscious  states.  All  psy- 
chopadiic  funcdonal  disturbances  consist  just  in  sudi 
an  interrelation  of  mental  aggregates;  in  the  process 
of  disaggregation  of  the  self-conscions  personality  ag- 
gregates of  moments  drop  out  and  fall  into  the  domain 
of  the  subconscious.  What  disappears  from  attendve 
consdousness  may  fall  into  subconsciousness.  The  dis- 
aggregated moment,  ceasing  to  enter  into  relations  widi 
the  upper  personal  consciousness  of  the  hi^ly  com- 
plex constellation,  may  still  form  a  component  of  the 
lower  aggregates  of  the  subconscious. 


CHAPTER  X 


THE  MOMENT-THRESHOLD 

TAKING  an  initial  stimulus  with  its  concom. 
itant  sensory  effect  as  the  starting  point  wc 
add  by  degrees  small  unperceivcd  stimuli  un- 
til  a  pomt  is  reached  when  a  barely  percepti- 
ble change  of  che  external  stimulation  is  effected  in 
consciousness.   The  sum  of  the  differential  stimuli  up 
to  the  point  where  the  perceptible  change  is  produced 
18  found  out,  and  brought  into  relation  with  the  quanti- 
ty of  the  initial  stimulus.   Working  with  this  method 
of  least  observa>Dle  differences  Weber  succeeded  in  ex- 
pressing  the  rclarion  of  the  differential  stimulus  to  sen- 
sation  in  the  formula  known  as  "Weber's  law  "  With 
m  certain  limits,  no  matter  what  the  absolute  value  of 
the  stimulus  be,  the  differential  stimulus,  or  what  is 
toe  same  the  barely  sensible  addition  to  the  initial  to- 

total  stimulus.    By  many  experiments  Weber  found 
that  m  the  ^se  of  weight,  for  instance,  the  relation  is 
one-  h.rd.    Thus  if  the  first  weight  be  nine  pound,  the 
barely  sensible  addition  will  be  one-third  of  nine, 
^IrA  TJllV     '^7*^*^  P°""^*       '"^^^^'"^nt  is  one- 

t  r.^      ^u^^-  P°""^''     fi^t""  pounds  the 

barely  sensible  mcrcmcnt  is  again  one-third  of  the  total 
stimulus  that  .s  on^third  of  fifteen,  or  five  pounds,  aS 

Further  investigations  have  shown  that,  within  cerw 

297 


398       Natrnd  md  AknomuA  Psychology 


tain  limits,  there  is  for  all  the  senses  which  admit  of  ex- 
act meatnronent  a  constantly  uniform  quantitative  re> 

lation  between  the  stimulus  and  the  just  noticeable  stim- 
ulus-difference. Experimentation  by  different  investi- 
gators have  confirmed  "Weber's  law"  for  the  different 
senses  by  showing  that,  within  a  certain  range  of  in- 
tensities of  stimuli,  tiiere  is  a  more  or  less  constant  ra- 
tio between  the  increase  of  the  stimulus  necessary  to 
produce  a  just  noticeable  difference  of  -sensation  and 
the  total  stimulus  intensity.  Thus,  it  has  been  shown 
that  noise  stimuli  must  increase  by  one-third;  pressure 
stimuli  by  one-fortieth ;  stimuli  of  muscular  sensations, 
sudi  as  lifting  weights,  by  one-fortietii;  achromatic 
lig^t  stimuli  by  one-hundredth.  Weber  in  hit  paper 
De  Tactu  expressed  his  law  as  follows:  "In  observan- 
do  discrimine  rerum  inter  se  comparatarutn  non  dif- 
ferent'tam  rerum,  sed  rationem  differentiae  ad  magni- 
tudinem  rerum  inter  se  comparatarum  percipimus." 

Gustav  Theodor  Fedmer,  tiie  founder  of  psycho- 
physics  and  its  methods,,  starting  with  Weber's  law 
worked  out  a  general  formula  for  the  quantitative  re- 
lation between  physical  stimuli  and  sensations.  As- 
sumitif  that  the  just  noticeable  differences  of  sensation 
given  uy  ascending  or  descending  series  of  different 
stimuli  to  be  equal  unite,  he  finds  by  meant  of  differoit 
psycho-physical  methods,  first  elaborated  by  him,  the 
threshold  of  sensations  or  that  stimulus  which  is  just 
near  the  limit  of  giving  rise  to  a  sensory  effect,  but 
which  is  still  not  sufficient  to  awaken  a  sensation;  in 
short,  he  finds  the  stimulus  the  correlating  sensation  of 
which  it  zero. 

The  minimum  perceptible  or  stimulus-threshold  is 
found  by  measurements  of  the  differmt  tmtet.  Hiiii 


Th4  MomenuThntholi 


29$ 


two  parallel  lines  are  for  most  people  barely  dis- 
tinguishable when  the  distance  between  them  sub- 
tends an  angle  of  less  than  60  seconds.  In  the 
sense  of  hearing  the  vibratitms  recurring  betwem  30-35 
per  second  are  barely  distinguishable.  Below  16  vibra- 
tions per  second  no  sensation  of  sound  can  be  produced. 

Thresholds  have  been  similarly  determined  for  all 
other  sensations.  Thus  the  sense  of  touch,  when  tested  by 
the  aesthesiometer,  an  unsatisfactory  instrument,  gives 
the  average  for  the  tip  of  the  forefinger  about  1.65  nun., 
on  the  back  of  the  hand  about  16.0  nun.,  Sensibility  to 
pain  as  tested  by  the  algeometer  varies  from  10  to  15 
dtgrees.  Sensitivity  to  smell  varies  with  different  sub- 
stance; thus  for  smell  of  garlic  sensitivity  varies  in 
detecting  i  part  in  44,000  parts  of  w«ter  to  one  part  in 
57,000  parts  of  water;  for  oil  of  kmon  from  i  to 
1 16,000  to  I  to  280,000.  Taste  can  detect  the  bitter- 
ness of  quinine  in  a  solution  of  i  part  quinine  to  about 
400,000  to  459,000  of  water;  the  sweetness  of  sugar 
can  be  detected  in  a  solution  of  i  part  sugar  to  200  of 
water;  the  tttte  of  salt  can  be  detected  in  a  solution  of 
I  part  salt  to  about  2,000  parts  of  water. 

After  discovering  the  zero  point  of  sensation  and 
the  minimum  perceptible  he  finds  the  constant  ratio  for 
the  just  noticeable  difference.  The  minimum  percepti- 
ble formt  the  unit  of  sensation.  Each  increase  of  the 
stimulus  giving  a  just  noticeable  difference  b  counted 
as  an  additional  sensation-unit  to  the  total  sum  of  sen- 
sations. 

Let  A  be  the  threshold  giving  sensation  zero,  and  let 
r  be  the  constant  ratio  of  increase  then  we  have  the 
following  series  of  stimuli  and  thdr  corresponding 
•ematioiii: 


300        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

SeoMtion  o  is  given  by  tdmulus  A 

1  "  "     "  (i+r)i 

2  "  "     "  (i+r)« 

3  "  "     "  (i+r)« 

3       "  "     "  (i+r)» 

"       n       "  «     "  (i+r). 

Thus  we  find  that  while  the  ttimulus  increases  in  a 
geometrical  ratio,  the  sensation  grows  in  an  arithmeti- 
cal ratio.  The  sensations  stand  therefore  in  the  same 
relation  as  the  logarithms  to  their  numbers.  Hence 
we  may  say  that  sensation  increases  as  the  logarithm 
of  the  stimulus.  If  S  be  the  sensation,  R  the  sdmulut 
itnd  C  the  magnitude  of  the  constant  ratio,  then  we 
have  the  following  formulae: 

S=C  log.  R. 
This  formula  is  known  as  'Techner's  law." 
Fechner's  expression  of  Weber's  law  is  rather  ques- 
tionable. Fechner  assumes  that  the  just  noticeable  dif- 
ference of  different  stimuli  are  qualitatively  and  quanti- 
tatively  equal,— a  dubious  assumption.  A  third  of  an 
ounce  added  to  an  ounce  iioes  not  feel  the  same  as  a 
third  of  eighteen  pounds  added  to  the  same  number  of 
pounds,  or  as  nine  pounds  added  to  twenty-seven 
pounds.  These  units  even,  if  they  have  a  quantitative 
expression,  do  not  stand  in  a  simple  quantitative  rela- 
tion and  are  rather  incommensurable. 

Furthermore,  it  may  even  be  considered  that  Fech- 
ner's assumption  is  fundamentally  wrong  and  unpsycho- 
logical.  In  opposition  to  the  first  elementary  principle  of 
psychology  Fechner  tacitly  postulates  that  sensation}  can 
be  measured  and  that  one  sensation  or  a  complex  sensa- 
tion is  a  muhiple  of  another.  Now  the  peculiar  trait  of 
the  phenomena  of  mental  life  is  essentially  their  qualita- 


The  Moment-ThrgskoU 


tive  character.  Sematioot  are  not  quantities  to  be  meat- 
ured,  but  are  essentiaUy  qualities.  A  strong  sensa- 
tion is  not  a  weak  sensation  mrny  times  over,  but  its 
very  strength,  its  intensity  is  its  own  separate  individ- 
ual quality  constituting  the  essence  of  that  particular 
sensation.  An  intense  sensation  of  pure  white  is  not  a 
multiple  of  a  weak  sensation  of  grey  just  as  the  thought 
"nation"  is  not  the  thought  "man"  raised  to  the  n*^ 
degree. 

In  psychological  investigations  one  must  be  care- 
ful not  to  confound  the  nature  of  the  physical  stim- 
ulus widi  diat  of  die  sensation.  A  physical  stimulus 
can  be  measured  quantitatively,  but  a  sensation  does 
not  consist  of  quantitative  units,  and  hen^,  is  not 
measurable.  The  only  relation  that  can  be  measured 
and  expressed  quantitatively  is  that  between  stimulus 
and  physiological  process,  the  physical  concomitant  of 
psychic  states. 

Whether  or  no  we  accept  Fechner's  statement  of 
Weber's  law  we  may  safely  assume  that  the  threshold 
rises  with  successive  stimulations.  This  law  holds  true 
of  all  life  processes,  from  the  life  of  an  ameba  to  the 
life  activity  of  a  highly  organized  moment-conscious- 
ness. In  the  sphere  of  sensation  we  find  such  a  rise  of 
thr-  old.  We  are  all  acquainted  with  the  fact  that  an 
ac.divJt  nal  candle  or  lamp,  for  instance,  in  a  well  light- 
t  .Ota  does  not  produce  the  same  sensory  efifect  as 
when  brought  into  a  more  or  less  dark  room.  An  elec- 
tric light  in  the  sun  is  scarcely  perceptible.  An  addi- 
tional ounce  to  a  lifted  pound  does  not  feel  as  heavy  as 
when  raised  by  itself.  A  sound  added  to  another  sound 
or  noise,  sounds  less  loud  than  when  appearing  iso- 
lated, or  when  the  same  sound  is  breakug  upon  silence. 


502       Normal  and  Ahnormd  Psfckohgf 

The  same  reUtion  holds  true  ia  the  ctae  of  other  trntft. 
This  same  truth  is  still  more  clearly  brought  out  ia 

the  fact  that,  if  we  take  a  certain  stimulus  as  a  unit,  giv- 
ing rise  to  a  definite  sensation,  then  as  we  progressively 
Mcend  and  add  more  and  more  units  of  the  same  stim- 
ulus, the  intensity  of  stimulation  is  far  from  rising  pro- 
portionately. If  we  take,  for  instance,  the  weight  of 
an  ounce  as  our  unit  of  stimulation,  then  the  successive 
moments  of  unit  stimulations,  that  is,  of  ounces,  will 
not  give  rise  to  as  distinct  and  similar  sensations  as  the 
initial  sensation.  The  second  ounce  will  give  a  sensa- 
tion fainter  than  the  first  one,  and  the  third  fainter 
than  the  second,  and  so  on  until  a  point  is  readied 
when  the  sensation  of  an  additional  ounce  will  not  at 
all  be  appreciated,  will  dwindle  away  and  almost  reach 
the  zero  point 

In  the  same  way,  if  the  pressure  of  a  gramme 
ii  excited  in  the  hand,  successive  mctements  of 
grammes  will  not  in  equal  degree  increase  the  sensory 
effect;  the  additional  increments  of  grammes,  though 
they  are  equal  units  of  stimulation,  give  rise  to  fainter 
and^  fainter  sensations,  until  finally  all  sensory  appre- 
ciation of  the  added  unit  fades  away  and  disappears. 
If  the  hand  is  immersed  in  water,  say  at  the  freezing 
point,  an  addition  of  ten  degrees  will  be  perceptibly 
appreciated,  while  successive  increments  of  ten  degrees 
each  will  be  felt  less  and  less,  and  finally  will  not  be 
noticed  and  will  be  difficult  to  detect.  In  short,  the 
threshold  rises  with  the  process  stimulation. 

To  bring  about  a  sensory  response  of  an  already  stim- 
ulated sense-organ  the  intensity  of  the  stimulus  must  be 
relatively  increased.  This  is  what  constitutes  Weber's 
law.  The  continuous  progressive  sensory  response  of  a 


303 

soiae^rgan  requires  a  constant  increase  of  stimulations 
^ch,  within  certain  limits,  bears  a  constant  ratio  to 
the  total  ttumiliit.  This  Uw  is  sometimes  summed  up 
by  psychologists  in  the  statement  that  "the  increase 
of  the  stimulus  necessary  to  produce  an  increase  of  the 
sensation  bears  a  constant  ratio  to  the  total  stimulus." 
Activity  raises  die  threshold;  it  is  die  beginning  of  fa- 
tigue. 

The  rise  of  direshold  after  stimulation  holds  true  in 
die  whole  domain  of  biological  activity.   If  the  gas- 
trocnemius  muscle  <il  a  frog,  for  instance,  is  stimn- 
lated  by  an  electric  current,  die  muscle,  with  each  suc- 
cessiyc  stimulation,  responds  less  readily  witii  a  con- 
traction, and  tills  becomes  more  evident  witii  die  on- 
set of  fatigue.  Pffefer,  in  a  teriea  of  extremely  inter- 
ettmg  aq>eriments,  has  shown  diat  spermatozoidi  of 
ferns  are  attracted  by  malic  add,  die  progrestive  re- 
sponse  o'    traction  of  die  ceU  requiring  a  constant  in. 
crease  o      •  degree  of  concentration  of  die  acid,  die 
increment  of  stimulations,  as  in  die  case  of  sensation, 
bearing,  widiin  certain  limits,  a  constant  ratio  to  die 
total  stimulus.   The  threshold  rises  with  each  mcces. 
sive  stimulation. 

The  rise  of  diresholds  increases  widi  intensity  and 
duration  of  stimulation  as  we  approach  die  state  of 
fatigue.  Through  die  influence  of  exhaustion,  fatigue, 
or  die  mfluence  of  toxic,  autotoxic,  emotional,  and 
otiicr  stimulations,  die  diresholds  of  certain  momenta 
have  been  raised  so  diat  ordinary  or  even  maximal 
stimuli  can  no  longer  call  out  any  response.  When 
such  a  rise  of  diresholds  is  present  die  moments  widi 
rawed  thresholds  can  no  longer  enter  into  association 
with  tyMemt  of  momentt  with  wiifeh  the^  tre  unuXtf 


I 


304       Normal  amd  Abnormal  Psychology 

assodatedt  and  the  result  is  diwodation,  giving  riae  to 

the  great  multitude  of  phenomena  of  functional  psy- 
chosis with  a  subconscious  background,  the  extent  of 
which  depends  on  the  number  of  raised  threaholdti  on 
the  extent  of  the  dissociation  effected. 

When  a  moment  or  aggregate  of  momenta  begins  to 
function,  it  radiates  Emulation  to  odier  moments  or 
aggregates  of  moments.  All  the  aggregates  which 
these  radiated  stimulations  reach  do  not  equally  be- 
gin to  function.  It  will  depend  largely  on  the  state  of 
the  aggregate  and  its  threshold.  If  the  radiated  stim- 
uli be  minimal,  the  many  aggregates  that  have  a  high 
threshold  will  not  be  effected  at  all.  Furthermore, 
many  aggregates  whose  arousal  could  otherwise  be 
easily  effected  by  the  given  stimulus  may  temporarily 
be  in  a  condition  in  which  their  thresholds  have  become 
raised  and  thus  fall  outside  the  sphere  of  activity  of 
the  functioning  aggregate.  On  the  other  hand,  a^r^ 
gates  that  are  usually  inaccessible  to  those  minimal 
stimuli  may  under  certain  conditions  be  set  into  activity 
by  minimal  stimuli,  if  there  is  a  lowering  of  the  thres- 
hold of  the  total  aggregate.  Thus  the  aggregates  set 
into  activity  by  the  functioning  aggregate  are  comfi- 
tioned  by  the  rise  and  fall  of  their  thresholds. 

In  case  where  the  threshold  of  an  aggregate  is  raised 
the  radiated  minimal  stimuli  coming  from  a  particular 
functioning  aggregate  may  become  efficient  and  reach 
the  threshold,  when  another  aggregate  begins  to  func- 
tion simultaneously.  This  holds  true  even  in  the  case 
when  the  minimal  stimuli,  coming  from  two  different 
ag&*^*gates  are  just  below  the  threshold-stimulus.  Th», 
under  certain  conditions,  when  visual  stimuli  are  bare- 
ly or  not  at  all  discernible,  they  can  become  intensified 


by  re^orang  them  with  auditory  stimuli.  This  is 
commonly  found  in  the  mode  of  recovery  of  some  for- 
gotten  name,  or  of  some  kp^d  o^rience.  We  try 
to  find  the  name  and  seelc  to  come  to  it  in  one  line  of 
thought  but  of  no  avail;  new  lines  are  attempted,  and 
ftnally  the  combined  activity  of  the  systems  reaches  the 
lapwd  aggregate  whose  threshold  has  become  tem- 
poranly  raised. 

We  find  the  same  law  further  exemplified  in  the  case 
ot  the  mfant  under  my  observation.    When  with  the 
nipple  m  his  mouth  the  infant  ceased  nursing,  the  suck- 
mg  movements  could  be  induced  again  by  stimulating 
some  other  sense^irgan.  The  tactUe,  pressure,  tempera- 
ture, and  taste  stimuli  coming  from  the  nipple  in  the 
infant  s  mouth  became  insufficient  :o  ttimuhte  to  ac. 
tivity  the  functioning  aggregate  of  sucking  movements, 
on  account  of  its  raised  threshold;  only  adr^itional  stim- 
ulatiwi  could  brmg  about  a  further  functicning  of  the 
I'-psed  aggregate.   Thie,  of  course,  could  also  be  effect- 
ed  by  makmg  the  tactual  and  presturt  ttimuU  more  in- 
tense,  such,  for  mstance,  as  shaking  the  nipple  wfaOe  the 
infant  kept  it  in  its  mouth.   This  increase  of  intensity, 
however,  mainly  indicates  that  the  stimuli  were  no  long- 
er  effective,  and  an  additional  stimulus  was  requisite,  a 
•tnnulw  that  might  come  either  from  the  same  awre- 
gate  or  from  a  totally  diierent  aggregate. 

In  the  many  cases  of  post-hypnotic  amnesia,  we  find 
the  same  truth  further  illustrated.  In  the  deeper  stages 
of  hypnosis,  from  which  the  subject  awakens  with  no 
r?manbrance  of  what  had  occurred  during  the  state 
tile  lapsed  memories  can  be  brought  into  the  upper 
consciousness  by  plying  the  std>ject  with  many  qu«. 
tions.    During  ^  truce  or  firing  the  mtermedittc 


3o6       Normsl  tmi  AkuorwuU  Psyehohgf 


stages,  with  subsequent  truce  aiid  suggested  amiMm, 

the  subject  is  made  to  perfonn  a  certain  ifrimit  to  Kffct 
and  extinguish  the  gas  four  times  in  iiirmiiioii.  or  to 
open  and  close  the  door  a  certain  number  of  times.  The 
subject  ii,  then  awakened  from  his  trance;  he  remem- 
bers nothing  of  what  hat  taken  place.  If  he  is  asked 
point-blank  whether  he  remembers  any  incidents  of  his 
hypnotic  state,  he  answers  with  an  emphatic  negative. 
If  f^ow  the  subject  is  asked  whether  he  knows  how  much 
two  times  two  are  or  his  attention  is  incidentally  direct- 
ed to  the  gas  or  to  the  door,  he  at  once  becomes  reflec- 
tive, the  subctMisdoia  memories  are  <m  die  way  to  surge 
up,  and  a  few  further  indirect  questions,  the  number 
depending  on  the  depth  of  hypnosis,  finally  bring  out  the 
lost  memories.  The  threshold  that  has  risen  at  the  end 
of  the  trance  is  stepped  over  by  the  combined  effect  of 
the  many  stimulations  coming  item  different  directions, 
and  die  subconsciously  submerged  momart  or  aggre- 
gate of  nuncnti  surges  up  to  the  focus  or  nn^os  of  the 
upper  consciousness. 

Once  a  particular  moment  is  stimulated  in  its  appro- 
priate way,  it  may  go  on  developing,  and  usually  does 
so  by  stimulating  and  setting  into  activity  aggregates  of 
moments  associated  with  it,  or  may  form  new  comhina- 
tions  of  aggregates.  The  solution  of  a  problem  may 
present  great  difficulties,  but  once  started  on  the  ap- 
propriate line,  the  whole  series  of  combination  goes  on 
unfolding,  stimulating  otner  moments  and  aggregates 
and  forming  more  and  more  complex  combiiuitiotts. 
Thus,  Archimedes,  as  the  story  runs,  while  m  the  badi, 
made  the  discovery  of  the  law  of  specific  gravity.  Ac- 
cording to  the  popular  account  Newton  was  led  to  his 
discovery  of  universal  gravitaticm  by  the  accidental  fall 


of  «tt  apple.  Hnghet  wm  surted  by  the  idea  of  sym- 
metry in  hit  ditoomy  of  the  hwt  of  cryatallography. 
Goethe  was  led  to  his  conception  of  metamOTphotb  and 
evolution  by  a  skull  on  the  plains  of  Italy.  Darwin  by 

reading  Malthas'  economical  treatise  on  population  was 
inspired  to  work  out  the  great  principles  of  the  strug- 
gle for  existence  and  natural  selection.  Myers  was  led 
by  the  greater  redness  of  blood  in  die  blood-vtseeb  of 
m>pical  patients  to  his  grand  conceptions  of  transforma- 
tion, equivalence,  and  conservation  of  energy.  All  these 
examples  illustrate  the  fact  that  once  a  moment  has 
been  started  it  goes  on  developing  by  stimulating  other 
cognate  moments  uid  aggregates  to  fimcticming  activity. 

The  same  condition  b  also  fomul  in  ptydiopathic 
borderland  states,  such  as  dreams.  In  dreamt  a  peri- 
pheral stimulus  gives  rise  to  sensations  that  start  the 
activities  of  moments,  which  in  turn  give  rise  to 
phantattic  combinations  of  different  aggregates.  This 
phanta^c  comlHnation  of  aggregates,  giving  rite  to 
the  functioning  of  otherwise  unusual,  or  what  may  be 
termed  abnormal  constellations,  is  largely  lue  to  the 
fact,  of  redistribution  of  thresholds  in  the  dream  state. 

The  dream  state  is  characterized  by  a  rise  of 
the  thresholds  of  momoits  and  their  aggregates 
that  have  been  functioning  during  the  waking  states,  the 
thresholds  of  these  aggregatet  having  been  raised 
through  activity.  In  the  sleep  state  moments  that  have 
their  thresholds  relatively  or  absolutely  lowered  through 
inactivity,  moments  or  aggregates  that  are  unusual  or 
have  not  been  in  use  during  the  waking  state,  become 
aroused,  and  begin  to  function.  Hence  the  arousal  of 
hypnotic  dream  states  reproducing  l<»g  lapsed  mo- 
ments of  child-life,  hence  the  ph*i?f  wnt  of  the  world 
of  dreamt. 


CHAPTER  XI 


THE  PROCESS  OF  MOMENT  DISAGGREGATION 

EACH  Stimulation  leaves  after  it  some  mo- 
ment-disaggregation,  a  condition  that  makes 
further  disaggregation  more  difficult.  The 
more  intense  the  stimulation  is,  the  more  ex- 
tensive and  deeper  is  the  disaggregation,  and  hence, 
the  more  difficult  further  disaggregation  becomes.  If 
the  stimulation  is  continued  or  made  highly  intense,  a 
pomt  IS  soon  reached  beyond  which  no  stimulation  can 
pass  without  giving  rise  to  disaggregation  having  as 
Its  manifestation  the  different  forms  of  pathological 
mental  dissociation.   The  pathological  process  under- 
lymg  the  phenomena  of  abnormal  mental  life  is  not 
essentially  different  from  the  one  taking  place  in  nor- 
mal  states.   If  difference  there  be,  it  is  not  certainly 
one  of  a  quality,  but  of  degree. 

The  more  intense  a  stimulation  is,  the  more  ex- 
tensive  is  the  process  of  disaggregation,  the  higher 
mounts  the  moment-threshold  giving  rise  to  the  dif- 
ferent  phenomenon  of  psycho-physiological  and  psycho- 
motor dissociation.  As  expressed  in  a  former  work: 
I  he  process  of  disaggregation  setting  in  under  the 
action  of  strong  and  hurtful  stimuli  is  not  some- 
thing  new  and  different  in  kind  from  the  usual; 
It  IS  a  continuation  of  the  process  of  association 
and  dissociation  normally  going  on  within  the  function 
and  structure  of  higher  constellations.   The  one  pro- 
em graduaUy  passes  into  ikt  other  with  the  intensity 

308  ' 


The  Process  of  Moment  DisaggreisHon  309 

of  dontioii  of  the  stimulus." 

The  process  of  <fisaggregation  is  a  descending  one, 
It  proceeds  from  constellations  tc  groups.  Under  the 
influence  of  strong  srimulatic  ri  such  as  mechanical  and 
chemical  agencies,  and  psyc  iv  affections,  such  as  in- 
tense  emotions  of  fear,  anger  -ru^t  -  nxlity,  or  worry, 
the  degenerative  process  of  disaggregation  sets  in,  af- 
fecting first  the  higher  aggregates  and  dien  with  the 
continuity  and  intensity  of  die  stimulations  die  process 
descends  deeper  and  deeper  affecting  less  complex  ag- 
gregates,  finally  reaching  the  simplest  aggregates  of 
moments.  The  higher  types  of  moments  degenerate 
and  fall  to  lower  and  lower  stages  of  consciousness. 

The  law  of  disaggregation  as  that  of  degeneration 
m  general  is  from  the  complex  to  the  simple.  The  low- 
er  moments,  on  account  of  the  simplicity  of  their  organ- 
ization, are  more  stable,  awd  are  in  a  better  condition  to 
resist  the  disaggregating  action  of  hurtful  stimulations. 
Furthermore,  the  lower  and  simpler  an  aggregate  of  mo- 
ments  is,  the  older  it  is,  either  phylogenetically  or  onto- 
genetically,  and  its  stability  is  therefore  more  firmly  as- 
sured by  selection  and  adaptation.   In  the  course  of  the 
life-existence  of  the  individual  and  the  species  lower 
types  of  moments  have  come  more  often  into  activity, 
since  the  higher  an  aggregate  is  die  later  does  it  rise  in 
the  history  of  evolution.  Hence  moments  that  are  not 
working  smoothly  and  with  little  friction  are  continually 
weeded  out. 

This  same  process  is  going  on  not  only  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  species  by  the  eliminating  action  of  natural 
selection,  but  alio  by  the  special  adaptations  brought 
about  in  the  life  experience  of  the  individiitl.  In  phylo- 
genetts  the  best  and  nuMt  firmly  orgtniKed  undnctt  tor. 


3ZO       Normsl  and  Jbnormal  Psychology 

inve,  while  in  ontogenesis  those  habits  are  consciously  or 
unconsciously  selected  which  are  most  firmly  established 
and  arc  best  adapted  to  the  given  end.  At  the  same  time 
the  older  an  instinct  is,  the  more  thoroughly  organized 
it  becomes,  the  more  is  it  enabled  to  withttend  the  oa- 
slaught  of  external  hurtful  stimuli.  The  same  holds 
true  in  the  case  of  habits.  A  habit  of  long  standing  is 
well  organized,  and  it  is  often  extremely  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  control 

Food  instincts,  sex  instincts,  social  instincts,  and  per- 
sonal moral  life  from  an  ascending  series  both  as  to  time 
of  appearance  in  the  history  of  the  species  as  well  as  com- 
plexity of  structure  and  function.  Food  instincts  in 
time  and  simplicity  precede  sex  instincts,  and  sex  in- 
stincts in  their  turn  precede  social  instincts  which  ante- 
cede  personal,  moral  life.  Now  we  find  that  the  instabil- 
ity is  in  the  same  ascending  line.  Food  instincts  are  more 
stable  than  sex  instincts,  sex  instincts  are  more  stable 
than  social  instincts  which  are  more  firmly  organized 
than  a  highly  unified  personal  life,  guided  by  a  moral 
ideal.  The  itructure  and  functions  of  the  system  of 
alimentation  remain  unchanged  for  ages ;  the  sex  instincts 
may  become  slightiy  modified  for  some  period  of  time; 
the  functions  relating  to  social  life  vary  from  generation 
to  generation,  while  the  moral  life  guided  by  the  moral 
ideal  is  highly  individualized  and  personal. 

In  the  downward  course  of  mental  disease-processM 
the  degeneration  is  from  the  complex  to  the  simple, 
from  the  stable  to  the  unstable,  from  the  highly  organ- 
ized to  the  lowly  organized.  In  the  different  forms  of 
mental  diseases  first  the  moral  life,  then  the  social  in- 
stincts become  affected,  the  patient  becomes  selfish,  in- 
trospective, morally  selfish,  then  toset  all  regard  for 


rhe  ProMss  of  Momsni  Dismurggathm    3 1 1 

others,  becomes  orelest,  wwteful  and  negligent  of  his 
vocations,  life-work,  uid  dutiet;  his  whole  thought  be- 
comes  con -entrated  on  himself.    In  certain  forms  of 
mi  ;tal  alienation,  such  as  mela;  holia  and  paranoit, 
the  patient  becomes  suspicious  of  others,  of  his  near  and 
dear  ones,  becomes  cruel  and  revengeful,  sometimes 
ending  by  attackmg  his  own  friends  and  near  relatives, 
and  committing  homicide.   When  the  deterioration  of 
personal  moral  life  and  social  instincts  is  well  underway, 
degeneration  of  other  functions  sets  in,— the  patient 
gives  himself  over  to  excesses,  to  all  kinds  of  debauches, 
and  indulges  in  the  different  forms  of  abnormal  sexual 
practices.  Only  very  late  in  the  course  of  the  disease 
are  the  food  instincts  in  any  way  affected. 

Even  in  the  lighter  forms  of  psychic  degeneratiye 
forms  that  l,e  on  the  borderland  of  mental  alienation, 
such,  for  instance,  as  are  present  in  the  various  forms 
of  iMychopathic  maladies  we  still  find  diat  the  same 
relation  holds  good.  Moral  Ufe  is  the  first  to  be  af- 
tected.  Social  instincts,  follow,  while  disturbances  of 
sex  and  food  instincts  set  in  very  late  in  the  coarse  of  the 
pathological  process  of  disaggregation  and  degenenu 
tion.  ^ 

In  the  mentally  defective,  such  as  in  imbeciles,  idiots, 
and  cretins  we  once  more  find  that  our  law  holds  good, 
rhe  depth  of  the  congenital  mental  degeneration  b 
trom  moral  to  social,  then  to  sex,  and  last  to  food  in- 

tellectual  ac^vittes  are  affected,  the  imbecility  being  ao 
cording  to  the  depth  of  the  degeneration,  the  other  in- 
stuie^  are  more  or  less  normal.  I«  the  i<fiot  tad  cr». 
tin  the  process  of  degeneration  has  goie  stffl  daeptr 
and  sex  and  food  instincts  with  thmr  psycho-piiyriol^ 


I 


i  n  m. 

Ill 


311       Normal  and  Abnormd  Psyehohiy 

cal  ft  ctions  and  psychomotor  adjustments  become  af- 
fecteu,  the  idiocy  being  in  proportion  to  the  graiaty  of 
die  affection. 

The  phenomena  manifested  under  the  action  of  nar- 
cosis go  further  to  confirm  the  same  point  of  view. 
Moral,  personal  life  is  the  first  to  succumb,  other  activi- 
ties follow  in  the  order  of  their  complexity  and  duration 
of  function!.  In  other  words,  the  law  of  disaggregation 
or  that  of  degeneration  is  from  the  complex  to  the  sim- 
ple, from  the  highly  organized  to  the  lowly  organized, 
from  the  least  stable  to  the  most  stable.  This  stability 
is  proportionate  to  the  complexity  of  moment  aggre- 
gates, and  the  frequency  and  duration  of  dieir  associa- 
tive activity. 

In  habits,  formed  within  the  life  time  of  the  indi- 
vidual, the  same  law  holds  true.  Old  habits  become  in- 
veterate, habits  formed  in  childhood  and  perpetuated 
can  hardly  be  eradicated,  while  those  that  are  formed 
later  in  life  become  more  easily  dissolved.  Complex  hab* 
its  formed  in  late  life,  relating  to  moral  life  and  social 
intercourse,  become  dissolved  at  the  first  onset  of  the 
process  of  mental  degeneration,  while  habits  formed 
early  in  life,  such  as  handling  spoons,  fork,  and  plate 
or  dressing  and  buttoning  the  coat  long  resist  the  de- 
generative process.  Paretict  and  patients  of  tecof^ 
try  donentia  in  general,  tibough  far  advanced  on  dlie 
downward  path  of  degeneration,  are  still  for  some 
time  able  to  attend  to  the  simpler  functions  of  life  ac- 
tivity, such  as  dressing  and  feeding.  Once  more  we 
are  confronted  with  facts  pointing  to  the  same  law 
that  die  proceu  of  degenertdon  of  which  dStaggr^- 
don  constitutes  a  stage  is  from  the  highly  to  dit  Ufwtf 
orgtmzcdi  from  die  CMni^ex  to  die  unple. 


The  Process  of  Moment  DisegiregaHon  313 

If  we  observe  more  closely  the  history  and  stages  of 
disaggregation,  we  find  that,  although  the  process  it- 
self  IS  going  on  within  the  centre  or  nucleus  of  the  ag- 
gregate, the  course  of  the  process  is  inverse,  from  the 
periphery  to  the  centre.  This  law  is  really  a  corrolary 
of  the  first  law  of  degeneration.    For  the  nucleus  of 
the  moment  aggregate  usually  consists  of  moments  that 
have  early  become  organized,  and  round  which  more 
moments  gather  from  all  sides,  the  aggregate  finally 
attaimng  a  high  grade  of  organization.  The  further 
away  from  the  centre  or  from  the  nucleus,  the  newer 
IS  the  formation  of  the  strata  of  moments,  and  the  more 
unstable  IS  their  structural  and  functional  relationship 
widiin  the  total  aggregate.   Hence,  when  the  process 
of  degeneration  sett  in  affecting  the  controlling  nucleus, 
the  associative  ties  of  moments  within  the  aggregate 
become  lowered,  and  the  newest  strata,  the  mott  re- 
mote  from  the  nucleus  are  the  first  to  be  affected,  the 
process  passing  from  newer  to  older  strata.    In  other 
words,  the  process  of  degeneration  is  from  periphery 
to  cratre. 

In  the  building  up  of  a  moment-aggregate  the  early 
deposits  are  less  complex  than  the  later  deporitt  which 

are  not  as  yet  well  organized  by  use  and  adaptation. 
1  he  child  under  my  observation  learned  early  that  the 
shining  point  yonder  in  the  "ky"  («ky)  is  'Venu(s) 

n^  ^'l  .^^C^^  ^«  by  a 

c(l)oud."  This  knowledge  is  certainly  extremely 
meagre,  but  still  it  forms  the  nucleus  round  which  grad- 
ually  more  knowledge  will  become  formed  and  organ- 
ized.  The  child  will  learn  the  dimensions  of  the  plan- 
et, ttt  ^^tnce  from  the  earth,  its  orbit,  its  relation  as 
a  member  withtn  the  wbr  system,  relations  that  may 


314  N ormal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

be  extended  endlessly,  nuking  die  whole  moment-sgw 
gregate  more  and  more  highly  complex  and  unstable. 

If  we  turn  to  motor  adaptations,  we  find  a  similar 
course  of  development.  It  took  the  infant  time  before 
out  of  the  aimless  series  of  spontaneous  motor  reactions 
SOTie  definite  adaptatiims  emerged  relative  to  external 
visual  stimuli,  so  that  he  learned  to  grasp  the  object 
yonder.  These  grasping  motor  reactions  are  at  first 
crude  and  inexact.  The  distance  of  objects  is  often  mis- 
taken, and  the  child  stretches  his  hand  to  fetch  distant 
objects,  while  small  objects  cannot  be  picked  up;  the 
hand  often  goes  in  the  wrong  direction  and  objects  are 
often  dropped,  because  the  reactions  are  not  exact  and 
steady.  Still  these  grasping  movements  form  the  nu- 
cleus for  the  formation  of  new  and  more  complex  strata 
of  motor  reactions.  He  learns  the  delicate  adaptations 
of  grasping  small  objects  and  the  fine  adjustments  of 
producing  a  series  of  highly  complex  and  extremely  del- 
icate motor  reacticms,  such  for  instance  as  one  fmds  in 
the  handling  of  instruments,  reading,  writing  in  the 
execution  of  musical  pieces,  in  singing,  and  piano  play- 
ing. All  these  motor  reactions  as  they  become  more 
comi^  and  delicate  are  further  and  further  removed 
from  the  organized  nuclew. 

What  happens  now  in  the  (tescending  process  of  dis- 
solution ?  The  reverse  process  takes  place.  The  more 
complex  the  psycho-motor  structure  is,  and  the  further 
it  is  removed  from  the  original  nucleus,  the  more  easily 
does  it  become  disintegrated  in  the  downward  course 
of  the  process  of  degeneratioa.  In  the  different  forms 
of  mental  diseases,  such  as  the  various  types  of  mania 
melancholia,  paranoia,  general  paresis,  primary  demen- 
tia, dementia  praecox,  senile  dementia,  and  in  all  those 


The  Process  of  M oment  Disagfregation  315 

chronic  forms  that  end  in  secondary  dementia,  adapta- 
tions and  acquisitions  further  removed  from  the  orig- 
mal  nucleus,  constituting  the  simple  relations  of  things 
acquired  in  early  youth  and  childhood, gradually  become 
dismtegrated.  The  more  remote  the  stntom  is  from 
the  central  nucleus  the  earlier  does  dissolutioa  set  in. 

With  the  setting  in  of  the  process  of  dissolution  the 
scientist,  the  professor,  the  student  loses  by  degrees  the 
lately  acquired  wealth  of  knowledge,  the  complex 
and  delicately  balanced  conceptual  structure  of 
scientific  relationship;  the  more  remotely  related  to  the 
original  nucleus  of  sense  experience  is  the  first  to  be- 
come shaken  and  tumble  down.  When  the  degenera- 
tive  process  has  gone  far  enough,  the  original  meagre 
nucleus  of  sense-experience  becomes  disintegrated  in  its 
turn. 

With  the  onset  of  the  process  of  degeneration 
the  banker,  the  business  man,  the  speculator,  grad- 
ually  begin  to  lose  the  understanding  of  those 
speculative  aspects  of  business  adaptations  and  adjust- 
HMnti  tfctt  are  remotely  related  to  the  original  nucleus 
of  aelf-preaervation.  With  the  fnrtlicr  advance  of  the 
process  of  disintegration,  more  stable  ttrtta,  more  neafw 
ly  related  to  the  original  nucleus  become  affected,  until 
finally  the  nucleus  itself  is  reached  and  its  constituents 
are  affected,  the  patient  is  unable  to  take  care  of  himself. 

In  motor  reactions  we  find  that  the  same  law  holds 
true.  The  finer,  the  more  complex  a  given  activity  is, 
the  more  remote  it  it  from  the  primary  nndeui  of  mo- 
tor  adaptations,  the  easier  and  sooner  does  it  beoonie 
dwintegrated  in  the  course  of  the  pathological  procesi. 
The  nmsidan,  die  virtuoso  loses  the  power  of  infus- 
lof  humcMy,  lifa,  and  cmotioii  into  the  pky;  the 


\  'j'l 


I 

I  111 


3i6       Normal  amd  JbuomuU  Psychology 

painter  loiet  control  over  his  brmh,  the  singer  oyer  hit 
voice;  the  watchmaker,  or  the  mechanician  it  unable  to 

regulate  the  fine  movements  of  the  spring,  the  wheeb  of 
the  delicate  mechanism,  and  the  mechanic  is  unable  to 
handle  his  instruments.  Drawing  deteriorates,  writing  is 
impaired  and  defective.  The  liquid  "r"  a  sound  which 
children  acquire  kte  becomes  difficult,  if  not  impossible 
to  pronounce.  The  speech  test  of  general  paralyttt  it 
well  known.  The  patient  is  unable  to  repeat  such  a  sim- 
ple formula  as  "round  about  the  rugged  rock  the  rag> 
ged  rascal  ran,"  or  "truly  rural." 

With  the  further  advance  of  the  process,  such  simple 
actions  as  picking  up  a  pin,  or  threading  a  needle  are  ex- 
ecuted with  great  difficulty,  and  much  hesitation.  To 
produce  a  straight  line  or  to  draw  a  circle  becomes  im- 
possible. Involuntary  tremor  is  predominant,  a  tremor, 
the  rhythmical  regularity  of  which  becomes  fully  mani- 
fested in  senile  degeneration,  and  which  is  also  observed, 
tfaou^  without  its  rhythmical  regularity,  cm  die  very 
eve  of  mental  life,  in  infangr. 


CHAPTER  XII 


RBPKODUCnON  AND  THB  BEFLBX  MOMBNT 

WE  have  described  the  moment-conscious- 
nets  as  being  stimulated  to  activity,  as 
emerging,  as  assimilating  new  nuterial, 
as  growing  and  developing,  as  passing 
through  many  stages  in  the  history  of  its  individual 
evolution  and  dissolution.  All  this  tacitly  implies  anoth- 
er characteristic  besides  the  ones  found  as  belonging 
to  the  nature  of  the  mxmtat.  The  moment-conscious- 
ness hM  the  function  of  reproduction.  We  have  ii^- 
dentally  discussed  reproduction  of  the  moment-om- 
sciousness,  but  we  have  not  studied  this  character  more 
closely  from  the  standpoint  of  the  moment's  general 
nature. 

A  close  inspection  of  the  moment-consdousness  re- 
veals the  fact  that  every  moment-consciousness  can  be 
reproduced  as  long  as  it  is  not  destroyed,  as  long  as  it 
is  not  dissolved  into  its  constituent  elements.  For  as 
long  as  the  moment  exists,  each  time  when  it  is  stimu- 
lated to  activity  the  manifestation  of  its  content,  both 
sensory  and  motor,  is  ipso  facto  die  moment's  repro- 
duction. What  remains  for  us  to  investigate  is  the 
various  modes  and  forms  of  rq>rodttctioii,  .and  fily> 
the  conditions  under  which  they  occur. 

The  simplest  case  we  may  suppose  is  a  moment- 
contdousness  set  into  activity  by  an  appropriate  stimu- 
li. This  activity  runs  a  certam  course  and  comet  to 
an  end;  it  ceatet  ^riies  die  purpose  of  die  vofmait  h 

317 


3x8       Norm^  md  Ahnomd  PtyMogf 

accompiulMd.  A  tecood  ttimylw  wiU  caU  f orth  »  rei 
etibon  of  the  activity,  a  recurrence  of  the  phenomena 
a  third,  a  fourth,  a  fifth  stimuhn  of  the  tame  kind  wS 
each  time  call  to  life  the  moment<ontciousnes8 ;  th 
moment  will  be  produced  again,  will  be  reproduced.  I 
repetition  of  the  specific  appropriate  stimulus  will  b 
followed  by  a  rq>rodiictioQ  of  the  moment. 

The  reappearance  of  the  moment  presents  a  seriei 
of  moments  situated  at  a  distance  of  different  time  b 
tervals.  The  members  of  this  series  are  disconnected 
iMsmuch  as  each  member  docs  not  contain  the  fact  of 
Its  previous  appearance.   The  present  functioning  ac- 
tivity IS  not  felt  in  the  moment  by  some  modification 
effected  m  die  content,  it  is  not  cognized  m  a  reappear- 
ance.   This  is  impossible  from  the  very  character  of 
this  form  of  repro  ^  tion,  since  die  emerging  moment 
IS  supposed  to  ap,  ar  widi  an  unchanged  content, 
wmie  modifications,  feeling,  and  cognition  of  previous 
appearances  require  somediing  added  to  the  moment 
which  makes  it  different  in  content.  The  members  in 
J«uch  p  senes  are  discor  ected  and  do  not  enter  into  re. 
lation.  Each  moment  presents  a  separate  beat  of  con- 
sciDosness.  The  previous  appearances  of  die  moment 
are  not  represented  in  its  subsequent  appearances: 
each  one  stands  by  itself.   No  modification  is  pro- 
duced  m  the  organization  of  die  moment  by  Ae 
previous  history  of  its  life  activity,  no  "trace"  is  left 
by  and  of  former  experience.   On  each  occasion  the 
••me  psychic  content  is  reproduced. 

Since  die  f  onn  of  consciousness,  now  under  considera- 
tion, IS  of  such  a  nature  as  to  have  no  modification  left  by 
each  separate  beat  of  die  moment,  no  connections  ax« 
formed  by  die  fact  of  functioning.  Only  that  MMe- 


RtprodtuHoM  and  the  RefU»  Momm  319 

tion  exists  which  is  given  in  the  organic  conttitadoii. 
Inother  words,  we  may  say  that  a  being  with  such  a 
type  ot  moment<onsciousness  does  ..ot  profit  by  indi- 
vidnt^  openeace;  it  does  not.  and  cannot  get  any  ac- 
quired characters  during  its  individuti  life  existence.  It 
hves  only  by  what  has  been  obtained  by  tile  proceM  of 
nattiral  selection,  during  the  life  history  of  the  tpedet. 

Fnmary  sensory  elements  are  certainly  present,  but 
••CMdary  sensory  elements  may  be  absent  as  it  de- 
pendi  entirely  as  to  whether  such  comiections  requisite 
for  secondary  sensory  dements  hmrt  been  established 
by  vanafaon  and  natural  selection  in  the  pMogeaelic 
history  of  the  moment.  We  may  possibty  wiTSit 
ij*ile  such  connections  are  absent  in  a  lower  stage  of 
tte  moment,  they  are  present  in  a  higher  stage.  Both 
•tiges,  however.  Itdt  the  fonnation  of  acquired  char- 
acters  dunng  their  individual  history. 

Such  states  of  the  moment  consciousneM  may  be  krae. 
y  hypothetical,  but  they  are  probably  present  in  the  ve^ 
lowest  representatives  in  the  scale  of  evolution.  The 
«»«»wmg  o«  of  pscudopodia  in  the  amoeba  are  as  per- 
feet  m  the  daughter  amoeba  as  in  the  mother  before 
fusion  has  taken  pkce.    The  young  vorticdh  it 
just  as  efficient  as  its  parent  in  its  sudden  spring-like  re- 
actions  of  contracture  and  expansion,  both  of  its  body 
and  of  iti  long  atuched  thread-like  fibre.  What  is  pres- 
«tMi  m  all  pnAaWlity  some    primitive  primary 
ptycho-biological  element,  a  gcim  out  of  which  the  ele- 
ments of  die  higher  fonns  of  peychic  life  have  diier- 
entiated. 

The  structure  and  functions  of  the  higher  forma 
of  life  have  become  differentiated  out  of  the  homo- 
Vamm  activity  of  bww  forms.   The  sensory  nerve 


330       Normal  aitd  Abnornud  Psychology 

cell,  the  recipient  of  the  stumiUtion,  like  the 
muscle  cell,  the  reagent  to  stimuli,  has  evolved 
from  the  primitive  cell  by  greater  and  greater  difiFei- 
entiation,  both  of  structure  and  function.  In  the  crus- 
ttceans,  invertebrates,  and  lower  vertebrates  where  mo- 
tor  reactions  to  tdmnli  are  more  or  lest  complex  and 
varied,  the  sensory  aspect  of  the  moment  it  probably  cor- 
respondingly complicated,— organic  connections  are 
present  giving  rise  to  secondary  sensory  elements,  ooii> 
sdtuting  the  material  of  perceptual  life. 

The  soft-bodied  hermit  crab  as  soor  as  he  hatches  out 
from  the  egg  looks  for  a  sheU  to  fit  his  body  in,  to  pro- 
tect  it  from  danger,  and  does  the  fitting  and  measuring 
of  the  shell  with  as  delicate  a  nicety  and  circumspection 
as  his  seemingly  more  experienced  older  relatives.  As 

a  matter  of  fact,  experience  does  not  count  here,  a 

baby  hermit-crab  is  as  learned  as  its  parent.  Not  even 
organic  modifications  are  acquired,  the  organization  or 
mechanism  is  ready,  and  the  first  appropriate  stimulus 
sets  into  activity  reactions  to  external  conditions  in  the 
most  perfect  way  of  which  this  organization  is  capable. 
The  butterfly,  the  ant,  the  bee  on  emerging  from  their 
chrysalis  are  as  perfect  in  their  reactions  as  any  of  the 
adult  individuals.  Acquired  characters  count  for  noth- 
ing, inherited  organization  is  everything. 

In  the  lower  vertebrates  such  as  fishes,  acquired  char- 
acters, modifications  formed  during  the  life  time 
of  the  individual  begin  to  appear,  but  this  is  only  in  its 
germ;  here  too  inherited  organizMion  is  everything. 
The  mechanism  is  ready  id  perfect  as  soon  as  it  comes 
into  life,  and  enters  into  x-elation  with  the  condition  of 
the  external  environment.  The  moment-consciousness 
concomitant  with  such  a  type  of  organization  is  perfect 


RtproSme^n  ami  the  Reflex  Moment  311 

from  the  start  and  has  reached  its  maturity  at  birth. 
The  contents  of  the  moment  cannot  be  enriched,  the  in- 
tenul  relatioiit  cannot  be  improved,— no  modifications 
can  be  bnm^  about  in  its  tensory  response  and  motor 
reactions.  External  stimuli  set  the  orgaanalioa  into 
activity  with  an  unvaried  psychic  content,  with  an  naal. 
terable  psycho-physiological  structure  and  motor  mani- 
festations.  The  content  of  such  a  moment  is  fixed  and 
unalterable.  This  low  stage  differs  but  little  from  reflex 
activity;  in  fact,  such  a  type  of  psychoiia  may  be  termed 
reflex  momeut-consdousness. 


CHAPTER  XUl 


DESULTORY  CONSCIOUSNESS 

THE  characteristic  feature  of  the  reflex  mo 
meat-consciousness  is  its  activity  on  singl( 
lines  of  sensori-motor  reaction.  This  is  wel 
seen  in  the  more  differentiated  form  of  thii 
stage  of  psycho-physiological  organization.  In  the  a* 
cidian,  for  instance,  we  meet  with  one  sensory  nerv« 
ccU  connected  with  the  muscular  reacting  apparatus. 
This  is  of  the  nature  of  reflex  action  found  also  in  the 
higher  represenutim  of  the  life  series.  In  the  high- 
cr  forms  of  the  fixed  moment  some  connections  are 
formed,  several  sensory  ganglia  are  connected;  the  ac- 
tion may  then  become  more  varied.  In  the  still  higher 
stages  of  the  same  form  many  systems  of  ganglia  of 
several  organs  become  connected,  thus  giving  rise  to 
a  highly  differentiated  sensori^notor  apparatus. 

At  this  suge  secondary  sensory  elements  enter  into 
the  content  synthetized  by  the  moment-consctoiisoess. 
What,  however,  characterizes  all  these  forms  as  be- 
lon^ng  to  the  same  type  of  moment-consciousness,  is 
the  fact  of  their  being  unmodifiable,  fixed  in  their  or- 
guuMtioa.  The  moment  does  not  get  modified  by  its 
recurrent  manifestations.  The  organization  does  not 
get  improved  by  repetition.  Things  are  in  statu  quo 
smce  the  time  of  birth.  The  moment,  not  being  modi- 
iiaUe  by  its  previous  occurrence,  when  stimulated, 
onefi^  each  time  with  aa  vnchangeable  content  Each 

tmit  the  momeBt  recurs,  it  shows  not  the  slightest  trace 

3tt 


DntUtory  Comsctoutmni  313 


of  its  fonner  life  activity. 

The  varioot  reprodncdoas  of  thii  type  of  momcat- 
consdousnest  presents  a  disoomiected  series.  The  mo- 
ment at  each  time  of  its  occurrence  may,  psychologi- 
cally,  be  regarded  as  an  entirely  new  moment,  inas- 
much as  it  bears  no  trace  of  its  having  been  in  activity 
once  before.  To  an  objective  observer  confronted  for 
die  first  time  with  diis  type  of  moment,  the  latter  ap- 
pears, and  rightly  so,  as  if  it  were  just  come  into  the 
world.  The  moment  is  regarded  as  reproduced,  not 
by  a  mark  inherent  in  its  constitution,  due  to  the  fact 
of  its  recurrence,  but  by  modifications  in  the  observer. 
In  short,  the  moment  in  its  recurrent  manifestations 
presents  a  (fisconnected  series. 

If  we  look  at  consciousness  from  the  stan^iohit  of 
serial  relationship,  then  die  disconnected  moments  in 
the  series  appear  as  separate,  as  isolated.  This  isola- 
tion of  the  members  in  the  series  is  the  chief  character- 
istic of  diis  type  of  moment-consciousness  which  may 
thai  be  termed  desultory  consdousntss. 

The  moment  consdousiiess  of  the  desultory  type 
may  also  be  represented  in  a  more  hypothetical  form. 
There  may  be  a  type  of  consdousness  in  ^ich  die  mo- 
ment does  not  recur  at  all.  Each  moment  appears  and 
vanishes,  never  to  come  again,  and  is  followed  by  an- 
other moment  of  a  totally  different  content.  The  mo- 
mfents  have  no  relation  to  one  aiMther.  The  Mrtece- 
dcnt  moment  is  totally,  and  we  may  say  absolutely  di>> 
connected  from  the  subsequent  moment.  The  series  of 
moments  appearing  are  unrelated  and  are  also  different 
in  content.  The  moments  appear  like  a  series  of  suc- 
ce^  bdihlcs,  etch  b^e  horstii^,  vuishing,  giving 
place  to  t  Mw  hobycf  1^  to  on.  t||^  ^  ao  commo. 


314       Normal  md  Abnorwud  Psyekohgy 


tioa  between  the  tiiocetiive  moraentt,  neitlier  in  reia 
tion  nor  in  matter.  Such  a  moment  is  a  purely  detul 
tory  form  of  consciousness  and  may  possibly  be  prea 
ent  in  the  completely  unorganized,  non-nucleated  proto 
plasm. 

The  lade  of  a  definite  stable  organizati<m  may  resul 
in  an  indefinite  mass  of  sensory  responses  and  motor  re 

actions,  hence  with  a  changeable,  indefinite  psychic  con 
tent.  When  life  becomes  more  differentiated  and  or 
ganization  appears,  then  the  psychic  content  becomes  or 
ganized  in  a  recurrent  desultory  moment-coHsciousness 
with  a  more  or  less  definite  ctmtent  Amorphous  lift 
has  as  its  concomitanf  amorphous  psychosis. 

Reproduction  probably  begins  with  the  more  or  lesi 
definite  formation  of  the  moment  and  its  nuclear  ele 
ment.  When  the  moment-consciousness  appears  to  b< 
definitely  organized  then  reproduction  is  present.  Ir 
other  words,  reproduction  is  a  fundamental  characterit 
tic  of  the  formed  mmnent-consciousness.  The  ffeprodoe 
tion  of  the  moment,  the  type  of  which  we  have  just  an 
alysed,  is  fixed  in  its  activity,  unmodifiable  in  its  func 
tion  from  the  very  start  of  its  entering  into  relation; 
with  the  external  environment.  This  type  of  momeni 
is  of  audi  a  natnre  as  imt  to  admit  of  furdier  growtl 
after  it  ha^  come  into  die  world  and  hat  begun  to  imSf 
tion ;  it  admits  of  no  improvement,  of  no  modificadmi. 

It  is  interesting  to  find  that  such  a  type  of  moment- 
consciousness  is  not  altogether  absent  in  the  very  highest 
forms  of  psychic  life.  Under  certain  conditions  we 
meet  in  the  higher  mental  types  widi  a  form  oi 
moment-oensciousness  closely  resembling  the  fixed 
moments  of  the  lower  forms  of  psychic  life.  In 
the  degenerative  states  of  idiocy,  we  fbid  the  moment 
to  be  of  the  desultory  type.  The  moment  it  fixed,  admiti 


Desultory  Comdnmrns  325 

of  no  furdier  growth;  die  moment  recurring  at  more 
or  leti  regular  intenralt.  Such  are  the  rhythmical  move- 
ments often  observed  in  low  types  of  idiots,  movements 
that  arc  closely  allied  to  those  of  the  vordcella  type. 

In  the  pathological  states  known  as  hypnoidic,  found 
in  many  forms  of  amnesia,  in  somnambulistic  states,  in 
the  so<alled  "psychic  equivalents"  of  epilepsy  and  in  the 
pure  '^psychic  epilepsies,'*  the  moment  possesses  a  definite 
content,  highly  organized,  of  course,  considering  the 
stage  in  which  it  ocairs,  but  essential'/  fixed  in  its  char- 
acter, not  capable,  not  admitting  of  any  changes,  of  any 
improvements.  The  hypnoidic  state  resembles  more  the 
desultory  reproductive  movement  of  the  second  stage 
with  a  highly  varied  and  diierendated  content,  but  oth- 
erwise fixed  in  character.  The  hypnoidtc  state,  when- 
ever it  appears,  recurs  with  a  content  unchangeable,  un- 
modified by  the  previous  repetiti(ms;  it  acquires  no 
new,  no  modified  characters  in  the  course  of  its  repro- 
ductimis.  Previous  reproductions  leave  no  trace  behind. 
The  hypnoidic  state  ahrays  appears  fresh  and  new,  as  if 
coming  into  the  world  for  the  first  tune,  not  bearing  the 
starnp  of  its  life  history. 

An  inspection  of  the  hypnoidic  state,  when  it  oc- 
curs, does  not  in  the  least  reveal  the  fact  of 
its  having  had  a  past,  of  its  having  similarly  ap- 
peared once  before.  The  hypnoidic  state  is  the  past 
itself,  and  nothing  more  than  the  past.  Like  the  mo- 
ment-consciousness of  the  crustacean,  or  that  of  the  in- 
vertebrate, it  reacts  to  the  stimuli  of  the  external  en- 
vironment with  a  given  moment-content,  with  a  definite 
set  of  h^jhly  complieatedstnsoriHBOfeor  reactions.  From 
this  stttw^eint  the  hyjmddic  stats  toKf  be  n^tgdnA.  as  a 
reversion  to  a  primitive  form  of  psychic  life,  it  b 
a  reversion  to  the  fixed  moment  of  tfat  desuliory  type. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


THE  SYNTHETIC  MOMENT  AND  ITS  KEPRODUCTION 

IN  our  lait  analyib  we  have  examined  the  trait  of 
reproduction  in  the  lowest  types  of  psychic  life, 
such  as  the  different  forms  of  desultory  momeat. 
consciousness.    We  may  now  turn  to  the  higher 
types  of  moments  and  show  that  in  them,  too,  the  same 
fundamenul  character  is  present,  only  of  course,  be- 
coming  more  complicated  and  more  differentiated  with 
the  progress  of  psychic  life.   The  moment  which  we 
have  thus  far  studied  is  one  in  which  growth  is  impossi. 
ble  as  the  reproduction  of  the  moment  does  not  embody 
the  previous  manifestations  of  the  moment.    In  other 
words,  the  type  examined  is  of  such  a  character  as  only 
to  synthetixe  content  within  the  occurring  moment,  but 
It  lacks  synthesis  of  moments  themselves.   The  repro- 
duction  is  of  inherited  content,  it  is  phylogenetic  in  na- 
ture.  We  turn  now  to  higher  types  of  moments  in  which 
content  and  moments  are  synthctized  alike.  Such  a  type 
of  psychic  activity  may  be  termed  synthetic  conscious- 
ness, and  its  moment  the  symtketie  moment-conscious, 
ness. 

The  reproduction  of  the  syndietic  moment-coosdoiis- 
ness  is  not  isolated,  it  stands  in  relation  to  the  antecedent 
and  subsequent  moments.  Each  reproduction  modifies 
the  next  ons  to  a  certain  degree,  however,  slight  that 
maybe.  The  moment  it  essentiaUy  modifiaWe  and  capa- 
ble  of  improvement  up  to  a  certain  point  of  which  its 
internal  organisation  permits,  the  repro^ieHon  of  the 

ja6 


Th4  Synthetic  Moment  md  Its  Reprodttetion  3*7 

synthetic  type  bears  in  its  organization  the  stamp  of  its 
previont  file  hittory.  We  may  say  that  just  as  the  mo- 
ment of  the  desultory  type  is  an  epUome  of  phylogenetie 
evolution,  so  is  the  moment  of  the  synthatie  type  em  epi- 
tome  of  ontogenetic  development. 

In  its  lowest  form  the  synthetic  moment  undergoes 
modification  by  the  fact  of  previous  functioning  ac- 
tivity. The  synthetic  moment  in  its  reproduction  may 
be  represented  in  a  series  of  momenti,  each  repro- 
duced moment  is  modified  by  the  preceding  moment 
and  in  its  turn  modifies  the  succeeding  moment.  The 
series  is  interrelated  and  interconnected.  Each  link  in 
the  series  includes  the  previous  link,  and  is  in  its  turn 
included  by  the  succeeding  link.  Etch  member  in  the 
series  possesses  itself  of  the  wealth  and  b^  of  itt 
predecessor,  and  is  itself  inherited  by  its  successor.  The 
whole  series  is  really  a  history  of  the  continued  growth 
and  development  of  the  one  moment-consdousness 
passing  through  various  stages  in  the  way  of  reaching 
maturity,  both  in  stmctiire  a.^d  fuiKdon. 

It  is  tnie  that  once  the  synthetic  moment  hat  reached 
its  maturity'  it  may  go  on  reproducing  in  the  same  wty 
as  the  desultory  moment,  but  the  element  of  modifica- 
tion is  still  present,  although  it  cannot  be  so  clearly 
seen  by  a  superficial  examination.  To  detect  this 
element  of  mcKfifying  influent  of  one  reprodiKdcMi  mi 
the  succeeding  one,  we  mtt^  watch  the  moment  dotely 
and,  if  possible,  experiment  on  it.  As  long  as  the  con- 
tent of  the  moment  remains  relatively  unchanged,  no 
change  is  observed  in  its  reproductions  after  having 
reached  the  acme  of  development.  Should,  however, 
some  change  be  introduced  during  the  functioning  of 
the  moment,  at  once  this  mo<fiiicatkn  mppean  on  tlit 


328       Normsl  and  AbnonuU  Psyehohgy 


nproducdoii  of  the  raomeBt 
A  change  may  be  introduced  in  the  momeat  m  i 

somewhat  different  way,  namely,  by  letting  it  rctt  foi 
a  time  longer  than  requisite  for  its  restitution  by  arrest- 
ing its  activity.  This  introduces  a  change  in  the  inter- 
nal constitiidon  of  the  moment,  weakening  the  intensity 
of  itt  activity,  or  lootening  the  co-ordinadon  of  itt  ia- 
temal  relationship.  The  co-ordination  ami  acdWiy 
of  the  psychic  elements  synthetized  in  the  moment  be- 
come shaken;  the  stability  of  the  moment  is  interfered 
with;  its  equilibrium  gained  in  growth  and  develop- 
ment 1^  die  tBccewive  teriea  of  modifications  is  partial* 
ly  overdirown;  die  numient  becomes  mutaUe,  ita  ttmo* 
ture  and  funcdon  regress  and  fall  back  a  few  stepa 
lower  in  the  course  of  its  adaptation  to  the  condidont 
of  the  external  environment,  adaptations  acquired  dur- 
ing the  life  history  of  its  individual  development.  I'he 
mere  arrest  of  the  moment't  function  for  a  shorter  or 
Imiger  period  at  <Hice  tells  on  ^  tabieqiM«t  reproduc- 
tion of  the  moment.  The.  function  of  the  moment  tne- 
ceeding the  period  of  arrest  is  less  perfect;  the  moment 
is  less  adapted  in  its  reactions  to  external  stimuli. 
These  facts,  it  seems,  clearly  indicate  that  in  reaching 
maturity  die  moment  hat  not  lott  itt  capacity  for 
adaptability  and  modification. 

Furthermore,  the  fact  of  arrest  widi  subsequent 
modification  and  degradation  of  function  shows  that 
the  adaptation  reached  by  the  moment  in  its  mature 
state  it  really  kept  in  stable  equilibrium  by  its  more 
or  lett  condnned  reprodncdon.  Each  re|>roducdon  of 
the  moment  It  indispensable  to  the  existence  of  the 
next  one,  and  manifests  its  influence  by  maintaining 
the  succeeding  moment  in  the  ttage  of  maturity  reacM 


by  the  long  series  of  modifications. 

The  moment  of  the  synthetic  type  profits  by  experi- 
ence,  the  moment  of  the  desultory  type  does  not.  We 
realize  now  the  difference  between  the  moment  of  the 
desultory  type  and  die  moment  of  die  syntiietic  type. 
The  desultory  reproductive  moment  is  highly  stable  in 
Its  organization,  formed  by  variations  and  the  iron  hand 
of  nttural  selection;  it  is  crystalized  in  character,  func 
tion  does  not  effect /its  organiution.  The  reproductive 
moment  of  the  synthetic  type,  however,  while  himof  on 
the  one  hand  as  its  basis  a  functioning  apparatus,  formed 
in  the  course  of  phylogenesis,  has  on  the  other  hand  a 
large  capacity  for  modification,  and  is  mainly  built  up  by 
function;  it  is  profoundly  modified  by  its  own  function- 
ing activity.  Inodierwofd^  while  the  moment  of  the 
desultory  type  is  entirely  organic  in  its  natum,  tile  mo> 
ment  of  the  synthetic  type  is  mainly  of  a  functional  chaiw 
acter.   The  contrast  between  the  two  types  of  moment 
may  be  summarized  in  the  one  phrase:  "function  vs. 
structure."  The  aphorism  "function  maketii  structure" 
holds  good  only  of  the  synthetic  mommt. 

In  speaking  of  the  fact  that  the  synthetic  moment 
profits  by  its  experience,  while  the  desultory  moment  does 
not,  we  must  be  guarded  against  the  term  'experience.' 
For  It  implies  a  psychic  state  belonging  to  a  higher  type 
of  moment>conscioaine8s,and  it  is  misleading,  unless  die 
term  be  qualified,  when  used  for  a  lower  type  of  psychic 
life.  Experience  would  imply  diat  the  moment  under 
consideration  has  an  idea  of  its  state  and  remembering 
It  takes  on  anodier  occasion  advantage  of  its  acquired 
knowledge.  Nodiing  of  die  kind  occurs  in  die  synthetic 
type.  The  syndietic  moment  hM  no  knowledge  of  what 
is  takii^  place  in  bi  pifchic  MtMtt,  it  it  aol 


330       Normd  wU  Jhnonmid  Ptychohgy 


of  the  ttetet  it  is  living  through.  The  only  knowledge 
die  qm^etic  moment  pottem  it  die  me  dumwinri^ 
of  sensory  life  in  general, — it  is  somewhat  iflse  wlitt 
some  writers  term  knowledge  of  acquaintance.  The 
content  of  the  synthetic  moment  only  approaches  to  this 
form  of  knowledge,  which  is  really  different  in  nature, 
inasmuch  as  "knowledge  of  acquaintance"  is  only  a 
lower  stage  of  mental  activity  characterisdc  of  a  higher 
type  of  moment  than  the  one  under  mvettigation. 
Knowledge  of  acquaintance  implies  a  sensation  also  the 
free  image  and  free  idea  of  that  sensation.  The  synthetic 
type  on  the  contrary  has  only  the  sensation,  the  free 
image  and  idea  are  feohilly  wanting. 

The  psychic  life  of  the  infant  is  probably  the  neftr- 
est  that  comes  up  to  the  nature  of  knowledge  or  ex* 
perience  characteristic  of  the  synthetic  moment.  I  say 
that  the  infant's  psychic  life  comes  nearest  to  that  of 
die  synthetic  moment,  but  still  the  two  are  not  exactly 
the  same.  In  die  infai^s  ccmscioosnesst  however 
young,  free  images  and  ideas  are  potential  and  on  the 
way  to  germinate,  while  the  synthetic  moment  ladn 
this  potentiality,  inasmuch  as  the  synthetic  moment 
reaches  its  full  development  without  giving  rise  to  free 
psychic  elements.  The  consciousness  of  the  infant  is  a 
low  stage  of  a  higji  type  of  numtait-coiMdoiiMieis; 
while  the  syndietic  consciousness  is  a  hig^  of  a 
low  type  of  moment-consciousness.  The  high  stage  of 
a  low  type  and  the  low  stage  of  a  high  type  may  be 
respectively  illustrated  by  the  algebraic  formulae: 
(a+by  and  («+M-c+i-f e+/-+- . . . . )»  where  a,  b,  c,  d 
....  are  the  functions  of  the  moment  and  le  die  de- 
gree of  develojmient  of  the  m<mient. 

The  oomdoiiiiieii  of  die  jomi$  infant  at  dotelf 


Tit  SyniMc  Momsmt  md  Its  Rtfrodmeliom  331 

Miiiblet  the  synthetic  moment  m  the  fiah  stage  of  the 
hmMn  embryo  retcmblet  die  fish  itself.  Still  the  anal- 
ogy H  nteful  as  it  gives  a  closer  iasigfat  into  the  consti- 
tution and  relations  of  the  two  types  of  moment-con- 
sciousness. The  infant  in  its  psychic  growth  no  doubt 
passes  through  the  inferior  types  of  moment-conscious- 
ness, but  in  a  most  general  and  sketchy  form.  The 
ontogenesis  of  psychic  life  is  probably  as  much  an  epi- 
tome  of  its  phylogenesis  as  die  ontogenesis  of  biosis 
is  an  epitome  of  its  phylogenesis.  Both  give  a  most 
generalized  epitome  modified  by  adaptations  and  by 
the  specific  type  of  organization  in  which  the  ontogene- 
tic endntion  is  taking  place. 


CHAPTER  XV 


THE  ACCUMULATIVE  CHASACTER  OF  THE  SYNTHETIC 

MOMENT 

THE  experience  of  the  synthetic  moment 
means  not  consciousness  of  the  presented 
amtent,  but  nmplj  modi&ation  of  pfychic 
function.  The  eiperienn  of  die  functioning 

moment  influences  the  content  on  its  next  reproduction. 
If  A  is  the  original  functioning  synthetic  moment  and 
b>,  bt,  hi,  b*  its  modifications  due  to  the  functioning  ac- 
tivity, then  the  successive  reproductions  of  the  moment 
may  be  represented  by  the  following  formula :  A,  Ai^h 
A^,  A*^,  AJf*,  A'bi  vatidl  it  reaches  its  maturity  or  state 
of  stable  equilibrium,  say  A„&b>  The  whole  series  may 
be  represented  by  the  formula:  A,  Ai^i,  A»^»,  Atb*— 
AJ?u'  Each  member  of  the  series  reproduces  in  an 
epitomized  form  all  the  members  that  preceded  it  and 
die  latt  (me,  die  mature  moment  in  its  state  of  equil> 
ibrium,  representing  an  epitome  of  die  whde  series. 
The  series  in  its  successive  stages  represents  the  life 
history  of  the  growth  and  development  of  the  synthetic 
moment. 

Concrete  examples  may  help  to  make  the  matter 
dearer.  The  fish  in  making  repeated  attacks  on  an- 
odier  fish  contained  in  the  same  tank  and  meeting  re* 
peatedly  with  failures  will  finally  desist  from  its  at- 
tempts. The  fish  that  has  been  snapped  at  many  times 
and  has  escaped  will  keep  away  from  the  dangerous 
place.  This  does  not  mean  that  die  fish  remembers  its 
experioices,  that  it  is  cookIous  of  its  failures»  of  die 


JeeuwMilstivt  CharMcUr  of  Syntkttic  Monuui  J33 

fiidlitjr  of  its  ttlMiEt,  or  that  it  knowt  ditt  yoA> 

der  is  a  dangerous  place  which  is  to  be  avoided. 
The  whole  matter  is  far  simpler.  Each  repeated  fail- 
ure modifies  the  moment-consciousness  so  that  the  con- 
tent slightly  changes,  the  unsuccessful  motor  reactions 
dimiaiih  wad  finally  disappear,  whik  in  their  plaoe 
others  are  sabitttiited.  Thus  the  fish  on  perceiving  its 
prey  may  either  avoid  it  and  swim  away,  or  it  may 
keep  quiet  simply  following  the  prey  with  its  eye. 

The  chick  on  emerging  from  the  egg  may  peck  at  its 
excrements  a  few  times,  but  each  time  the  disgust  ex- 
perienced modifies  ^  mcHsent  Hie  reaction  of  die  next 
mrnnent,  when  confronted  with  the  same  stimulus,  be- 
comes less  vigorous  and  finally  with  the  reproductions  of 
the  moment,  the  adaptation  becomes  so  perfect  that  the 
mere  sight  of  the  disagreeable  object  suffices  to  repel  the 
chide  and  make  it  turn  aside.  Here  once  more  it  is  not 
that  the  chick  remembers  the  diiguit,  and  as  soon  aa  it  is 
confronted  widi  its  excrements,  its  straightway  remem- 
bers the  disgust  it  has  experienced.  This  is  to  ascribe  a 
high  form  of  cmisciousness  to  a  moment  of  a  low  type. 
The  process  that  has  taken  place  is  simpler.  The  disgust 
experienced  hat  to  modified  die  saiscMry  motor  reactions 
of  the  monM^  that  finally  differait  reacdone  result  in 
respoue  to  definite  itunnlations  under  defiiute  condi- 
tions. 

The  same  holds  true  of  the  cat,  and  the  dog.  The 
first  weeks  of  their  life  kittens  c  pjppies  are  unable  to 
walk  weB,  thqr  seem  to  imk  thdr  way  oottinwKisly; 
gradually  they  learn  to  walk  and  run;  the  dog  soon  be- 
gins to  race  and  the  cat  becomes  graceful  and  nimble  in 
its  movements.  It  will  ;.£rtalnly  be  agreed  that 
youo;  puppies  or  young  kittens  do  not  actually  remem- 


334        NornuU  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

ber  the  steps  of  tht  r  cxperiencei.  What  l^ppeiis  is 
that  the  activity  of  the  organs,  along  with  tht  growth 
of  the  corresponding  motor  cells,  so  modi..c3  the  func- 
tioii  tfait  the  widking  becomes  more  and  more  perfect 
until  it  reaches  perfect  adaptatioa. 

The  same  thing  occurs  in  the  training  of  brutes.  It 
is  not  diat  the  brute  remembers  the  steps  of  tlM  profiM^ 
and  knows  how  improvement  lus  taken  placr  Sy  a  given 
way  of  action.  In  the  process  of  training  mv  ifications 
•re  brougiit  about  by  each  successive  reproduction  of  the 
moments  in  response  to  the  action  ol  tmmd  atHHiU. 
Modifications  due  to  succenful  rhiif c  ^ffjait  Hing 
more  satisfactory  to  the  brute,  are  stronger  and  modify 
the  moment  in  their  own  direction,  while  unsuccessful 
reacdcM  tnd  to  drop  out  and  thus  adapution  improve- 
matt  it  broi^t  rtMwt  Tlie  art  m  saatehing  for  the 
door  to  open  it  scratches  at  first  aimlessly  aad  doat  ase 
open, — the  actions  are  unsuccessful.  SluHild  die  cat  lap. 
pen  to  scratch  the  handle  and  open  the  door,  which 
certainly  is  probable,  considering  the  activity  of  tht  cat's 
PMT,  the  fwdt  ii  attisfactory.  The  repetition  of 
nch  chance  actioos  wiU  ^dually  so  iM^fy  ti^  cat's 
•cratdung  that  it  will  become  more  and  ame  defoite. 
The  successful  actions  alone  will  be  r.peatcd,  the  un- 
successrul  -ill  drop  out.  Finally  the  adaptation  will 
become  so  perfect  that  die  sight  of  die  closed  door  will 
at  OMe  resnh  in  the  reactioa  of  scratching  the  handle 
and  opoiiag  the  doOT. 

The  young  bird  is  broug^  in  ^  world  in  a 
helpless  condition  as  to  movement  of  co-onlinatios, 
especially  flying  movements.    The  apparatus  far  ffyiiif 
is  undeveloped,  but  it  soon  reaches  its  perfer  =  ada^- 
tioii  thrnigb  activity,  eMrdse,  practice,  that  ioodtfy 


IflBlil  SSI 

bockMKtwvatf  fuactiaik  IW  linl  not  raMm. 
i>«rtheii»i»afa,iripiiiriBMMrfprttobyiiilMlarg, 

»    as  to  make  ^omdoiitly  better  ami  mofe  adipdvt 

tnovemcnts.  The  process  that  akcs  place  is  far  mOR 
simple:  Each  act  of  functior  ng  produces  and  repro- 
ifaces  modifications,  both  .n  stnictu  and  function,  until 
the  apparatas  nod  its  activity  reach  perfect  adaptation. 

total  mcAiient  is  modified  on  aadi  i^roc  ^in  mtif 
a  point  ^  rca  Jird  re  !  ii  her  geom  and  develop- 
mcnt  ceas  >  and  w  u  nty  of  '   ictio      e»rah'  jhed. 

The  saiue  holds  tru.  in  tht  case  le  Id.  The 
child  on  leaming  ro  s  t  is  doing  -  '  clu  sy 
fashion,  tmailes  owr  every  t-mt;  a  mu  be  „  p. 
i  orted  by  pillows  i  K.ep  it  in  w  positioii  and  ite 
to  prevent  it  f  n  bt  in  urt.  e  Kructure  works  im. 
perfectly     T     exe  f        apparatus,  along  with 

Its  further  growth  d  ng  a  .  more  perfect  adapta- 
tioB,  and  lie  chad  inaliy  i  ms  to  maintain  its  equi- 
librium wktn  in  4ie  r^nttme.  Tht  standing  up. 
right  pasi«  ti*©  h  a  sot?  history.  When  the  co- 
on natin;  ap  laratus  f  <bg  begins  to  appear,  it 
wo  at  irst  n  a  ver  ^ard  manner.  The  child 
firr  walks  by  holding  ,onie  objects,  such  as  chairs, 
or  m  waH,  jr  the  hand  o  Us  parent  and  nurse.  When 
hf  rr  ^es  1  S--P  g  by  h  aeclf,  he  is  dmost  frightened, 
3         ^  «c            often  cries. 

1  nee  a  gruv.  h  of  the  walking  appanr  .s  be- 
come^  nw  .  j  mc  feet.  The  child  makes  two 
or  three  s  ps  h^um  ;iy,  stops,  asks  for  help  and  sup- 
port.  Grado^  his  laeivrments  become  more  ceruin, 
and  more  steps  are  taken  until  finally  the  child  learns 
to  walk,  still  imperfectly,  in  the  waddling  fashion 
characteristic  of  young  age.   The  waiting  Tr«mtttn 


J36        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

growt  and  keeps  on  functioning.  The  function  reMU 
on  the  further  growth  making  the  movements  more 
and  more  perfect.  Each  attempt  makes  the  next  one 
easier.  Adaptations  develop  not  only  by  the  mere 
gfowth  of  the  apparatus,  but  abo  by  ImictioiL  Infect 
fHBCtioa  laigely  detemunee  the  growth  of  the  appar- 
atus. 

It  must,  however,  be  pointed  out  that  the  example 
taken  from  baby  life  may  be  used  only  as  an  illustra- 
dmi  of  the  way  the  synthetic  moment  grows  by  func- 
tion or  reprodttcdoo.  The  child's  growth  does  not  e» 
acdy  follow  the  same  lines  as  those  of  the  synthetic 
moment,  since  the  psychic  life  of  man  develops  on  a 
higher  level  belonging  to  a  higher  type  of  moment.  In 
die  efforts  of  the  baby  to  walk  some  germs  of  deliber- 
ation and  refection  may  be  observed,  but  it  is  hardly 
fm^i^le  that  diese  demorts  are  (nrMent  in  die  firtt 
attempts  of  the  cat  to  walk  or  of  the  bird  to  fly.  The  mo- 
ment of  the  synthetic  type  grows  by  simple  modifica- 
dons  of  its  funcdon  brought  about  by  its  rqpealxd  re- 
producdons. 

The  mocificadons,  however,  of  die  moment's  fonc- 
don  are  not  mere  chance  modificadow.  Tlie  ftiMdon, 
is  modified  on  a  definite  line  in  ^  ^recdon  of  more 
perfect  adaptation. 

Reacdons  to  stimuli  coming  from  the  external  en- 
vironment  become  more  defined  undl  a  definite  set  of 
reacdons  is  established.  This  iim^ves  die  telecdye  ac- 
dvity  of  the  moment.  Certain  fit  rencdooa  are  tebeted 
and  assimilated  by  the  moment,  while  others,  unfit  are 
rejected.  This,  however,  is  a  trait  which  is  character- 
isdc  not  only  of  t!ie  synthetic  moment,  but  of  the  mo- 
BMftt-consciousness  in  general. 


CHAPTER  XVI 


THE  SIMPLE  AND  COMPOUND  SYNTHETIC  MOMENT 

A FURTHER  examination  of  the  synthetic 
moment  reveals  two  stages,  a  lower  and  a 


^  clein  haying  only  one  kind  of  tenwry  ele- 
ments and  of  a  net-work  of  mbttdiary  fdadoiis  betoof^ 
ing  to  the  domain  of  the  same  sensory  elements.  The 
animal  may  trace  its  food  or  its  prey  by  the  sense  of 
smell  alone.  This  act  becomes  more  perfect  with  further 
function.  The  modificttions  accumulate  in  the  domain 
of  the  same  MiiM-eleniciir  and  tile  idaptatidMoccar  tt  a 
relatively  simple  onesided  MOMii^iiolor  tppMiCas. 
Modifications  of  such  a  character  occur  phylogeacticany 
in  the  sensory  apparatus  of  the  lower  invertebrates,  such 
as  Crustacea,  arthropodes,  and  possibly  also  in  the  lower 
fomw  of  verfebrttea.   Such  a  phylogenetic  accumula- 
tion in  these  low  types  of  montBH 'm  (omrnd  only  by 
variation  and  natural  selectiofi,  wbik  in  the  caie  of  tile 
synthetic  moment  the  accumulation  is  formed  dnring 
the  life  history  of  the  particular  individual.   The  one 
»  rad^  McqmsiHoH,  the  other  is  individual  experignce, 
Botfc,  howtmr,  may  agree  is  the  gneral  chartctBr  of 
the  mo<fificttioii  effected.  Thi  nodificgiioM  tit  ia  one 
sensory  organ,  and  the  psychic  mnimnrfiMHl  t  cdMbti 
of  similar  sense-elements.   Such  a  stage  of  psychic  ac- 
tivity may  be  termed  simph  McumtMot  tymMc  m- 
m9iii<ontfiomMU, 


II A  f^lilM  ^  fiftt  teewiiiiei  of  tiM  BHBent,  the 

337 


hijVher.   The  moment  may  consist  of  a  nu- 


338       Normsl  md  Akwrmd  Psyehologf 

fint  fmcdoning  of  the  nmple  sentori-motor  apparatui 
u  given  by  phylogenesis,  and  if  «  be  the  modificadon  ef 

fected,  then  the  accumulative  process  may  be  represented 
by  the  powers  of  a;  thus  the  first  will  be  A,  the  nexl 
is  Aui',  the  following  is  Aui\  then  Aui  and  so  on.  Th< 
total  process  to  the  point  of  maturity  may  be  represented 
by  the  following  formula :  A,  A.*',  Aui*,  Am$\  A»a\ .... 
Ka\  A^a'  represents  the  highest  stagvt  of  perfectioii 
reached  by  the  simple  accuniidttive  synthetic  mo- 
ment. 

The  synthetic  moment  may  also  have  a  higher  stage 
wtore  many  different  sensori-motor  elements  are  syn- 
thetized,  the  aocurankthre  uMKitficttions  occur  along 
(fiierent  lines  of  sensory  responses  and  motor  reac- 
tions. The  moment  readies  here  the  highest  form  of 
consciousness  as  mere  perceptual  in  character.  The 
fish  perceives  its  prey  not  only  by  smell,  but  also  by 
sight  along  with  muscular  and  touch  sensations;  all 
of  tktm  go  to  fom  die  percept  of  the  prey  yonder,  ai 
far  as  perception  of  fish  space  is  concemtd. 

The  American  flounder  of  the  Adantic  coast  may  be 
taken  as  an  illustration.  Aldiough  the  flounder  is  per- 
fccdy  quiet,  ahnost  lying  motionless  at  the  bottom  of 
the  tank,  only  occasionally  movmg  his  small  protrud- 
ing eye,  no  sooner  is  sonw  snudl  fly  dirown  into  die 
tank,  than  the  flounder  at  oms  darts  m  duit  ^nctioii, 
and  attacks  its  prey  with  a  snap.  I  wanted  to  find  out 
how  far  visual  perception  is  concerned  in  the  tracing 
of  die  prey,  and  how  far  sense  of  smell  and  touch  are 
anportinl  ia  diis  pardcnlar  ish  at  least.  The  flounder 
was  dspilved  of  its  organs  of  sight,  tad  af^  htving 
been  given  about  twenty-four  hours  time  to  neoftt 
from  dM  tfaott  ol  dM  optndoo,  it  wm  tkmm  im  • 


Thg  Simple  mti  Compomd  SyntluiU  Moment  339 

tank  teeming  with  little  fishes  on  which  it  feeds. 

The  flounder  settled  to  the  bottom,  but  in  about  a  few 
minutes  raised  tCtelf  m  die  attitude  of  attadc,  so  highly 
characteristic  of  thb  species,  either  smelling  the  little 
ones  or  feeling  the  vibrations  made  in  the  water  by  the 
swimming  movements  of  the  litde  fish;  it  made  a  dart 
in  the  direction  of  a  whole  mass  of  them,  but  missed. 
This  has  been  repeated  many  times  over,  the  flounder 
failing  every  time  and  <nily  snapping  water  or  air  bub- 
bles. The  little  folk  socm  beoune  emboldened  and 
avoiding  his  front  they  came  from  behind  pecking  at 
his  blind  eye.  The  flounder  could  not  reach  these  lit- 
tle fellows. 

Moreover,  the  bottom  of  the  tank  where  the 
blind  flounder  was  lying  was  full  of  small  sea«>buM 
which  like  to  walk  on  the  bottmn  with  tfittr  hii^ 
ly  sensitive  leg-feelers.  The  blind  flounder  did  not  at- 
tack them,  althuugh  with  his  eyes  in  good  order,  he 
would  have  instantly  attacked  die  sea-robins.  It  ap- 
pears then  that  the  flounder  tr«cks  its  prey  by  the  sense 
of  si^  mainly,  while  die  odwr  senses  are  fflddntte 
guides.  Still  the  other  senses  seem  to  take  an  uSant 
part  in  tracing  the  prey,  as  the  blind  flounder  was  most 
of  the  time  in  an  attitude  of  attadc.  Evidendy  he  was 
smelling  the  prey  or  feeling  its  movements  all  the  time 
and  was  «ware  of  its  presence,  though  the  senses  with- 
out sight  codd  not  give  ham  the  d^mte  direcdoii  ta 
which  die  prey  was  to  be  found.  In  other  words,  the 
other  senses  awaHr  -nly  the  sensations  of  presence  of 
the  food,  but  do      ^ive  its  direction  and  location. 

It  is  highly  probaule,  then,  as  far  as  we  can  infer  from 
t^  experiment  as  to  the  psychic  state  of  the  fish,  that 
die  laimdfr  (ket  not  1^  ■  qeniuts  pere^t,  i^eii 


340       Normal  and  Abmorwud  Psfchohgy 

many  diferent  aeiwory  ekmeiite  are  conriMaed  is  t 

synthesis  givmg  rise  to  a  weU  defined  motor  reaction 
of  more  or  less  perfect  adaptation.  The  synthetic  mo. 
mcnt,  then,  in  this  particular  species  at  least,  seems  to 
be  of  a  highly  complex  character,  inasmuch  as  many 
different  aeitte^awiit.  «o  to  make  up  its  content. 

5)jmilarly  it  is  affirmed  of  the  sea-robin  that,  if  its  deli, 
cate  Icg-feelers  are  cut  off,  the  fish  is  unable  to  feed.  If 
that  be  true,  then  the  touch  sensation  is  important  here 
aadenters  as  a  determining  element  in  the  moment 
ttoog  with  other  elements  coming  from  other  sense- 
organs.   In  die  dog  smdl  it  mainly  the  determining 
factor,  but  the  functioning  of  odier  tenses  are  reqniike 
to  form  secondary  sensory  elements;  here  too  the  mo- 
mcnt  IS  made  up  of  many  series  of  various  sense-ele- 
meatt.  In  the  bird,  in  the  ape,  in  the  man,  sight  is  the 
dement  m  perception,  but  die  percept  arises  not 
from  visual  elements  alone,  bat  from  a  syndietis  of 
1  multitude  of  elements  coming  from  other  tcniM-. 
gans  the  visual  elements  often  taking  the  lead. 

From  a  purely  biological  standpoint  we  can  under- 
stand  the  importance  of  the  leading  part  played  by  the 
vttnal  elements  in  the  psychic  life  of  the  higher  verte- 
Iwates  and  etpeciaUy  of  that  of  man.    It  b  of  the 
greatest  advantage  in  the  struggle  for  exiMeace  to  de- 
velop a  sense  organ  that  admits  of  the  most  deUcate 
objective  discrimination.    No  other  senses,  not  even 
that  of  heanng,  are  so  free  from  the  general  organic 
•«»«tioii  at  die  tMite  of  sight    Hence  the  sensory 
elements  coming  from  die  tente  organs  odier  dian 
sight  are  confused  and  lack  die  objective  deamtM 
characteristic  of  die  sense  of  sight    The  visual  sense 
turtiier  is  of  die  highest  tentitivity  to  extremely  low 


Thg  StMtpk  mid  Compnmd  SynOMie  Mommig  341 

and  distant  stirauladont  tncfa  at  are  produced  by  ether 
waves.  An  animal  therefore  that  will  by  natural  se- 
lecti<m  have  its  nunsent  amsdoianeM  oripuyzed  romd 
a  nucleus  of  highest  sensitivity  such  as  that  of  viiiial 

sense  elements  will  have  better  chances  to  survive  and 
succeed  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Still,  even 
in  man  the  elements  coming  from  other  sense 
organs  may  broome  jnedominating  in  the  nucleus 
and  give  rise  to  variooi  meirtal  I'^pet,  ntch  at  WddSci, 
modles,  and  so  on.  This  holds  specially  true  of  the 
higher  representative  elements.  A  moment-conscious- 
ness that  has  a  varied  content  of  many  different  sen- 
sory-elements synthedzed  in  one  compound,  accompan- 
ied on  the  nMtor  tide  with  a  complex  of  motor  reac> 
dont  mmy  be  termed  compommd  syntkeHc  w^omtnt-cmh 
sciousness. 

The  compound  sjmthedc  moment-consciousness  is 
characterized  in  its  series  of  accumuladons  in  the  same 
way  as  is  the  simple  synthedc  moment,  the  only  differ- 
ence being  the  omnplexity  of  die  fines  of  aociiimiIa« 
dons.  The  accimralated  tentori-dementi  of  die  wmt 
kind  or  of  the  same  sense-organ  form  primary  com- 
pounds among  themselves  and  secondary  or  double 
and  treble  compounds  with  other  compounded  series  of 
sensory  demfents.  If  V  represents  the  original  pri- 
mary visual  sensory  dement,  T  tactual,  A  ancBtory,  O 
olfactory,  and  M  muscdar  sensory  elements,  then  die 
series  for  the  development  of  the  highly  adapted  A 
aspect  of  the  moment  may  be  represented  by  the  form- 
ula already  given,  in  our  analysis,  namely:  A,  A.a', 
A»a',  A»t*,  Arti*. . . .  A,a".  The  V  aspect  of  the  moment 
simikrly  gives  V,  V.v*,  V*f^  V-/,  V.i-'. . . .  V.V-. 

The  T,  O,  and  M  stries  w!B  give  respscdfdy  the 


34*  Normal  and  Apnormal  Psychology 
foUowing  fonmile; 


T,  T.t,        T^,  T.t*  T.t-  T.f. 

O.  Oo.  Oo',  Oo*,  Oo*  Ok)-  o.o^. 

M,M4n,M4ii',M4ii',M4ii*. . .  .M-m". .  .M^v 

The  process  of  composition  begins  not  at  the  fim 
members  of  the  series,  but  rather  further  on.  Some 
acctnnulations  must  be  made  first  in  each  series  sepa- 
rately before  combimitiofis  of  the  different  series  can 
take  place.  For  nmidicity  take  we  may  poetnkte  that 
the  process  of  composition  of  all  lines  begim  in  each 
alike,  although  this  may  not  be  the  case;  let  us  asrame 
that  such  a  process  begins  in  the  tenth  stage  of  the  ser- 
!«.  Before  that,  say  in  the  third  stage  compositions  may 
be  found  only  on  two  or  three  lines,  rach  as  VivTit' 
still  further  V.vT.t'M.m',  or  V.vT4X>o*M«i*.  The  V 
precedes  in  the  formula  indicating  its  primary  hnport. 
ance  in  the  case  of  the  moment  where  the  visual  sensory 
elements  are  mainly  the  guide  for  sensori-motor  reac- 
twos,  the  visual  sensations  constituting  the  leading  and 
central  elements  of  the  compound.    In  a  moment  of 
the  same  type  but  with  a  differently  rekted  ccotntt  O  or 
A  may  be  the  main  elements  of  the  compound,  ta  ele- 
ment  round  which  other  sense-elements  become  grouped. 
The  formula  may  then  be  OK)T.t*Mtfn*,  or  in  the  case 
where  A  is  predomuiant  AaT.t'M^i*,  etc.   The  syn- 
thetic moment  will  from  its  starting  point,  say  V»vT*t^ 
O.K)"A-a"M«m"  proceed  onward,  reaching  its  height  of 
development  and  adaptation  in  the  compoimd  W 
T»t.O-o.A»a„M"m,.    This  last  stage  of  the  momeni 
has  at  Its  disposal  the  accumulations  of  all  the 
previous  synthetic  moments  both  simple  and  com- 


The  Simple  md  Compotmd  Synthetic  Moment  343 


pound.  The  compound  synthetic  moment  is  the  heir 
of  all  previous  acquisitions  and  accumulations,  and,  as 
such,  may  be  characterized  as  the  compound,  accumuUh 
live,  synthetic  moment. 

Although  the  simple  synthetic  moment  and  the  com- 
pr)un<I  moment  differ  in  character  and  complexity  of 
content,  they  still  agree  in  one  general  trait  character- 
istic of  the  synthetic  moment,  namely,  fixed  synthesis. 
The  series  of  seatory  elementt,  both  piiaiary  and  sec- 
ondary, that  enter  into  the  conemt  of  the  moraait  art 
firmly  combined.  The  elements  of  such  compounds 
cannot  get  disengaged  and  do  not  therefore  exiit  in  ft 
free  state,  they  form  stable  compounds. 

The  fonn  of  reproduction  common  to  all  the 
moments  thus  far  examined  is  that  of  reinstate- 
ment.    The  sensor i-motor  elements  of  the  in««tmiH 
are  reinstated   in  all  their  reality.    The  moment 
in  its  successive  stages  of  reproduction  is  brought 
to  life  by  impressions  coming  from  external  stimuli. 
Primary  and  secondary  sense-elements  enter  into  the 
moment's  conttitadon  whenever  it  reappears.  In  both 
forms  of  the  synthetic  type,  the  moment  with  the  recur, 
rencc  of  the  reproductions,  becomes  enriched  in  sen- 
sory elements,  primary  and  secondary;  but  these  ele- 
ments must  be  present,  and,  from  the  very  nature  of 
the  types  of  momentt  under  connderation,  no  other 
elements  can  poMibly  be  preMttt  The  tenet  in  winch 
the  successive  steps  of  the  moment,  detultory  or  tyfr 
thetic,  manifests  itself  is  composed  entirely,  of  ton. 
sory  elements,  most  or  all  of  which  vary  but  little  fnm 
one  beat  of  die  moment  to  the  other. 

Tlte  face  of  tiM  tSalikt  reia^tement  is  etpedaUr 
daariatiitcMe  ef  ^liimlipij  moMant  Baehrdn. 


344        Normal  and  Abnormsl  Psychology 

stated  momeirt  induced  by  extenud  ttimali  it  tn  exac 
copy  of  its  prcdcccisor.  In  the  synthetic  moment  th 
content  of  two  adjoining  stages  is  a  little  varied,  sdl 
the  sensory  elements  constituting  the  content  of  th( 
preceding  moment  is  reinstated  in  the  succeeding  one 
It  it  true  that  even  die  desultory  moment  it  not  abto 
lutely  imooth  in  itt  courte  of  repetitions  or  rdnstate 
ments.  Interruptions  of  functions  due  to  unfavorabh 
stimuli  often  occur  within  the  series,  interruptions 
which  may  be  brought  about  by  artificial  conditions  anr 
in  which  different  psycho-motor  responses  are  interpo- 
lated, but  diese  responses  do  not  enter  into  the  ccmtem 
of  the  moment  when  the  favorable  conditions  are  re 
stored, — the  responses  do  not  become  habitual.  Thus 
the  rhythmical  pulsations  of  the  vorticella  may  be 
temporarily  arrested  by  the  evaporation  of  the  liquid 
in  whidi  it  is  contained,  but  no  number  of  evaporations 
will  change  the  series  of  rhythmical  pulsations  by  hav< 
ing  stages  of  arrests  interpolated  into  the  series.  Siim< 
larly  it  is  highly  questionable  whether  a  iy,  beetie,  ei 
cockroach  could  contract  any  habits. 

Some  eminent  psychologists  go  to  the  length  of  af- 
firming that  even  the  lowest  representative  animal  life, 
the  protozoa  (possibly  bacteria,  bacilli),  posseM  idea- 
tionnl  and  volitional  processes,  that  the  lower  stages  of 
mental  life  manifest  association,  reprc  ijction,  mero* 
ory.  cognition,  and  recognition.  Other  psychologists 
are  more  moderate,  they  regard  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge  as  adaptation  through  habit,  characteristic 
of  the  lowest  representative  of  animal  life.  That  one 
psychologist  propounds  the  question,  "How  is  it  tliat 
we  or  the  brute  learn  to  do  anything?"  Dow  the  aimt* 
ba  learn  at  all?  What  belongs  to  our  type  of  eo»> 


Tht  Simple  mid  Compound  Synthetic  Moment  345 

sciousness  is  assumed  as  being  true  of  all  types— the 
old  psychological  fallacy.  "Learning,"  habits  are  bio- 
logicti  vanfttions  characteristic  of  the  higher  types  of 
consaontneit  and  are  not  prcMnt  in  the  lower  forms 
of  mental  activity. 

It  is  highly  questionable  whether  the  formation  of 
habits  IS  possible  even  in  the  highest  representatives  of 
the  mvertebrata,  such  as  the  bee  and  the  ant.  The 
ant  IS  probably  largely  guided  by  the  sense  of  smell, 
while  the  bee  it  prompted  in  its  activity  both  by  smell 
and  sight.    The  activities  of  these  anhnals,  though 
highly  complex,  arc  still  fixed  in  their  character  becom- 
ing  manifested  with  the  recurrence  of  definite  sensory 
stimulations.    The  individual  acquires  nothing  by  ex- 
penence  and  forms  no  habits;  everything  is  formed  by 
the  speaes.   Spontaneoot  variation  and  natural  selec- 
tron  are  the  only  agencies  of  the  relatively  high  or- 
ganization and  complex  psychofliotor  life^wtivity  of 
the  higher  types  of  the  synthetic  moment. 

Habit  is  a  character  that  does  not  belong  to  the 
desdtory  moment,  it  comes  only  with  the  birth  of  the 
synthetic  moment  The  feted  character  of  the  desul- 
tory  moment  admitting  of  no  modificationi  predndes 
the  formation  of  any  habits;  the  moment's  reproduction 
"  reinstatement  par  excellence, ^ach  repro- 
dwcd  moment  being  an  exact  copv  of  its  original.  The 

individual  presents  only  the  history  of  the  species.  The 
reproductions  of  the  synthetic  moment  begin  to  show 
the  history  of  the  modification  which  have  appeared  m 
the  course  of  the  moment's  life  activity.  Each  recurrent 
reproAiction  of  the  synthetic  moment  is  an  epitome  of 

n»!hm!l!!f?.'!  ^P'^o"*     't»  ontogenetic 


CHAPTER  XVII 


THE  DESULTORY  TYPE  IN  PATHOLOGICAL  tTATBS. 

A FORM  of  reproduction  antlogout  to  th 
ones  present  in  the  desultory  moment  is  t 
be  found  in  various  psychopathologica 
states.  The  nature  of  reproductions  of  th 
hy^noidic  states  comes  very  near  to  the  simple  form  o 
reinttatemem  characteristic  of  the  demiltory  momeni 
The  main  feature  of  this  pathological  state  is  its  it 
current  sensory  character  isolated  from  die  rest  of  th 
individual's  psychic  life.  Experiences  emerging  ii 
this  state  are  actually  lived  over  again.  The  hypnoidi 
state  is  (ksultory,  it  forms  no  connected  relations  in  it 
various  reproductions,  it  does  not  become  modified  b 
its  many  occurrences,  and  the  first  stage  is  as  rid 
in  psychic  content  as  .  the  last  stage.  The  hyp 
noidic  state  is  relatively  fixed.  Of  course,  between  th^ 
desultory  moment  and  the  hypnoidic  state  there  is  onl^ 
an  analogy  in  the  nature  of  functioning,  otherwise  thi 
^tes  are  actually  cfifferent,  inasmodi  as  they  beloni 
to  altogedier  different  types  of  moments. 

The  nature  of  reinstatement  characteristic  of  the  re 
productions  of  the  synthetic  moment  is  clearly  revealec 
in  the  way  modifications  are  effected  and  non-adaptiv< 
reacti(M»  are  diminated.  Sensory  responses  and  mo 
tor  reactions  that  have  met  with  failure  and  evil  con 
sequences  are  modified  by  degrees,  in  portions  so  tc 
say.  The  law  that  regulates  the  succession  of  the  mod 
ifications  effected  is  the  order  of  the  degree  of  htm 

34« 


rATES. 

It  to  die 

lent  is  to 
hological 
IS  of  the 
:  form  of 
moment, 
it  ht  re- 
St  of  the 
rging  in 
lypnoidic 
)ns  in  its 
dified  by 
at  rich 
he  hyp. 
ween  the 
e  is  only 
■wise  the 
Y  belong 

i  the  re- 
revealed 
adaptive 
and  mo- 
evil  con- 
ns so  to 
■he  mod- 
of  h^m 


The  Dtndtory  Type  in  Pathological  States  347 

consequent  on  the  reactions  to  which  the  sensory  re- 
sponses lead.  If  then  the  most  harmful  reactions  be- 
long to  the  middle  of  the  series  of  motor  reactions 
conttitttting  the  motor  atpect  of  the  moment,  these 
are  modified  by  being  gradually  dropped  out  and  oth- 
ers substituted.  The  rest,  the  more  or  less  indifferent 
reactions  of  the  series  are  gone  through,  although  they 
bear  no  longer  any  relation  to  the  sensori-motor  reac- 
tions  that  have  immediately  preceded  them.  To  an 
external  observer  tuch  reactiont  are  ridiculout  and  un- 
intelligible,  since  they  cannot  be  mderttood  with  nfer- 
ence  to  their  immediate  antecedents;  their  nature  can 
only  be  made  clear  from  the  history  of  the  moment. 

Such  traces  in  the  organization  of  the  synthetic  mo- 
ment are  vestiges  of  previous  useful  functions,  of  a 
series  of  adaptive  reactiont;  they  are  like  nMfiroentary 
organs  in  the  economy  of  the  organitra.  Thus  a  chide 
may  peck  repeatedly  at  his  waste  products  or  at  a  bum- 
ing  match  and  repeatedly  wipe  his  bill ;  finally  a  marked 
modification  is  brought  about  in  its  sensory  responses 
and  reactiont.    When  the  cUck  it  confronted  with 
those  objects,  it  comes  up  to  them,  lookt  at  them,  doet 
not  peck,  but  wipes  its  bill.   To  an  external  obterver 
to  whom  the  history  of  the  chick's  experience  is  un- 
known, the  wiping  of  the  bill  would  have  been  entirely 
unintelligible. 

Rdnttatement  can  be  timtlarly  obterved  in  cases 
where  conditions  have  changed,  but  the  modification 
has  not  yet  been  effected  within  the  content  of  the  mo- 
ment.  Thus  the  story  of  the  actions  of  the  hen  that 
brought  her  brood  of  chicks  to  the  river  and  urged 
A««  to  twira  would  have  appeared  strange,  possibly 
mytteriottt,  if  not  for  our  knowledge  of  the  hen's 


348        Normal  amd  JbuormU  PtfcMogf 

former  experMoce  with  «  brood  of  dnckliogi.  Tl 
mode  of  reproductioii  of  the  tyi^hetk  »~>imtnt  is 

scries  of  successive  phases  of  more  and  more  modififl 
reinstatements  which  can  only  become  intelligible  o 
following  up  more  or  less  closely  the  history  of  tli 
momeirt's  dcvdopme^ 

The  forms  of  retnttatemeiit  characterittic  of  tfa 
synthetic  and  desultory  moments  are  to  be  found  t 
higher  types  of  moments.   When  undergoing  the  pn 
cess  of  dissolution,  secondary  dementia,  the  terminus  o 
chrome  insanity  offers  a  wealth  of  facts  at  our  disposal 
The  mental  ttatet  of  secondary  dementia  are  like  th 
ruins  of  great  castles,  like  fossils  of  former  growth  o 
vegetation  and  animal  life.  The  active  Uvii^  moneal 
are  disintegrated,  decomposed  and  only  some  of  tb 
constituents  are  left  to  function.    These  constituent! 
remnants  of  former  life-activity,  are  simply  reinstated 
One  who  has  not  known  Ae  llistory  of  the  case  wil 
hardly  comprehend  the  acdons  of  the  patient.  Tha 
one  dement  may  keep  on  coveriaf  himself  with  i 
blanket,  or  hiding  himself  into  comers.   He  who  is  tg 
norant  of  the  history  of  the  case  would  regard  the  ac 
tion  as  capricious  and  meaningless,  he  would  hardl] 
guess  from  the  patient's  actions  that  the  ktter  when  in  a 
state  of  chronic  melancholia  labored  under  the  ddo 
sion  that  he  was  made  of  glass,  and  that  people  could 
see  the  actions  of  his  guts.   The  synthetized  and  sys 
tematized  delusion  ittelf  was  swept  away  in  the  genera] 
ruin  and  decomposition,  only  some  remnants  were  left, 
a  few  sensori-motor  elements  remained.  These  elements 
are  now  being  reinstated  in  the  same  fashion  as  the  sail' 
pie  types  of  the  synthetic  and  dcsultor>'  moments.  SoBi- 
larly  it  would  be  hard  to  guess  from  the  frrqncnt  mum- 


Tkt  Dmakun  Typt  h  Ps$kohgiaa  Skoes  349 

bling  of  the  words  'Alexaader/  that  the  dement  in  his 
early  stages  of  mattal  alienation  was  under  the  delusion 
that  he  was  the  deceased  Russian  czar  come  to  Kle.  The 
word  'Alexander'  is  simply  a  chip  of  a  former  highly 
systematized  moment,  the  chip  now  reproducing  itaell 
after  the  simple  fashion  of  the  desultory  moment. 

The  phenomena  of  imperative  concepts,  insistent  or 
fixed  ideas,  ancontnllaUe  iam>uie«  all  grow  and  de- 
velop akmg  the  teaeral  lines  of  die  syadMlic  moawnt. 
They  are  reinstatements  of  portions  of  dissociated  mo- 
ments buried  in  the  subconscious  and  growing  by  the 
process  of  modification  with  each  recurrent  reinrtate- 
ment. 

HyiMKNdal  stirtes  described  by  me  bear  evidence  to 
the  same  truth  of  reinstatement  of  psyduc  ikmnm. 
In  the  hypnoidal  states  fractions  of  dissociated  mo- 
ments present  in  the  subconscious  come  up  like  bubbles 
to  the  surface  of  the  patient's  conscious  iC9s,  burst,  dis- 
appear, and  vanidi  never  to  come  aga»a.  The  frag- 
nwnts  are  reinilnted  chips  of  highly  cr^^.*?  .1  mo- 
ments, now  in  a  state  of  disaggregation.  Titir  hjppnoi- 
dal  chips  sometimes  manifest  themselves  in  th«r  r»> 
production  after  the  mode  of  simple  or  elementary 
desultory  consciousness,  mental  states  appear  and  dis- 
appear, leaving  no  traces  behind  them. 

In  the  i^ienMneMi  of  aMcmiatic  writing,  crY^r^x  gaz- 
ing, shell-hearing  and  so  on,  reinstatement  ot  moments 
in  different  degrees  and  stages  of  organization  takes 
place.  Finally  in  the  phenomena  of  hypnosis  we  meet 
with  similar  conditions,  the  states  are  induced  artifi 
dally  in  the  otherwise  healthy  and  normally  function- 
ii%  in<£vt<iiafity.  Such  are  tbe  pheooncna  of  person- 
«%  msfawoiplisds  and  •!  post  hypattk  or  fcypaoiistw 


350        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychotogy 

gic  states.  In  these  states  moments  are  artificw 
formed  in  the  dissociated  subconscious  moments  wU 
nse  to  the  surface  of  consciousness  with  all  the  ener 
■applied  to  them  by  the  subconscious.  They  reprodu 
and  peipetoftte  thennehret  after  the  mode  of  the  sj 
thetic  moment  antU  their  end  is  achieved,  when  tb 
graduaUy  fade  away,  or,  what  is  stiU  more  often  tl 
case,  vanish  in  the  same  sudden  and  abmpt  w»7  m  tb 
come. 

The  arttfidally  induced  post-hypnotic  or  hypnone 
«ic  States  itttdied  from  the  standpoint  of  the  momen 
consaousness  are  found  to  be  analogous  to  many  ps^ 
chopathic  conditions.  The  main  character  of  thes 
states  is  their  dissociation  and  reproduction,  or  rathe 
reinttatement  on  the  basis  of  lower  types  of  momen 
oomdouineis. 

In  psychopathic  functional  states  not  only  does  dii 
integration  of  content  occur,  but  there  is  also  prewn 
functional  degradation  of  the  type  of  the  moment.  Til 
Ihinction  of  the  moment  reverts  to  lower  types  of  psy 
due  activity,  while  the  content  consists  of  constituent 
fonned  on  higher  lines  of  psychic  Ufe.  Hence  th« 
lack  of  adaptation,  the  conflict  in  psychopathk  ttatei 
between  function  and  content.  It  is  like  the  fomntioi 
of  a  barbaric  society  out  of  die  remnaota  of  a  mmi 
ctvihzation. 

Wemay  then  aft  rm  that  the  characteristic  mode  of 
wpfodaction,  both  of  the  desnteory  and  synthetic  mo- 
ment,  is  reinstatement.  The  dHferoice  between  the 
two  moments  being  diat  while  the  moment  of  thg  iu^ 
ultory  type  reproduces  by  reinstatement  only,  that  of 
the  synthetic  type  reproduces  by  both  rtmUOmm 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

PRESENTATIONS  AND  REPRESENTATIONS 

IN  the  course  of  our  analysis  of  the  lower  types 
®/j»»oment8  it  has  been  shown  that  the  psychic 
elements  entering  into  their  synthetized  content 
occur  not  in  «  free  independent  state,  but  in  fixed 
accumulations  and  stable  compounds,  harinf  reinsti^ 
ment  as  the  mode  of  their  reproduction.  There  is, 
however,  a  higher  type  of  moment  in  which  psychic 
elements  occur  in  a  free  independent  state,  having  ac- 
corcUngly  a  mode  of  reproduction  different  from  that 
of  the  types  we  have  jwt  enmined.  Let  us  see  now 
what  the  nature  of  these  free  elements  is,  how  tliey 
come  to  arise  and  what  is  the  peenfiar  mode  of  their 
reproduction. 

If  we  look  at  die  tree  yonder  and  then  close  our 
eyes,  we  can  represent  to  ourselves  the  tree  in  its  gen- 
era!  outlmes  at  least.  We  see  its  trunk,  its  hranches, 
and  Its  green  foliage.    After  our  friend's  departure 
we  continue  to  see  him  in  our  mind's  eye.    We  live 
over  mentally,  in  our  imagination,  all  our  relations, 
our  n^ual  enjoyments.    We  seem  to  watch  him  act 
tnd  hear  him  talk.   The  representative  elements  can- 
not posKUy  he  identified  with  or  derived  from  afteiw 
images.    For  after  images  are  really  aftersen$M^m 
and  consist  of  sensory  elements.    The  elements  in. 
volved  m  die  state  of  representative  psychic  life  are 
freed  from  all  immediate  coexistence  with  sensory  ele- 
ments, primary  or  secondary;  in  fact,  they  appear 

m 


352        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

when  the  sensory  elements  disappear. 

The  two  sets  of  psychic  elements,  the  preaentativf 
ardrepresentative,  stand  in  inverse  relation  to  ead 
oAer.   When  the  one  is  at  its  maximum  the  other  ii 
«iti  mmmum.  When  sensory  elements  appear  th< 
we  dements  become  faint.   This  faintnese  is  m  pro- 
portion to  the  intensity  of  the  sensory  element   It  ti 
hard  for  us  to  look  at  a  color  and  imagine  it  at  the 
same  tmie;  and  the  more  intense  and  brilliant  the  color 
IS,  the  harder  it  is  for  us  to  have  the  color,  at  die  same 
tmie,  represented.  Look  at  an  object,  say  die  lighted 
lamp,  take  in  well  its  sensory  elements  and  yoo  will 
find  that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  represent  It  to  joar- 
self  at  the  same  time.   Try  hard  to  represent  to  your- 
self  the  object  and  you  will  find  that  its  sensory  ele- 
ments  will  begin  to  vacillate  and  become  faint,  or  less 
vivid.   When  ab«>rbed  in  our  ideas  we  often  do  not 
notice  even  very  iittense  stimuU.  The  two  series  of  d*. 
ments,  the  sensory  or,  presentative,  and  the  free  ones, 
the  representative,  cannot  run  together  without  inter- 
fwing  widi  each  odier,  nay,  without  arresting  each 
omer. 

Representative  elements  bring  with  them  a  new 
fundamental  departure  in  the  mental  activity  of  ibe 

moment,  they  may  keep  up  its  activity  when  flagging, 
may  intensify  it,  but  may  also  deflect  it,  or  distract  it, 
giving  rise  to  another  conflicting  moment.  Thus  on  the 
one  hand  my  continuous  thought  about  a  certain  scien- 
tific  proposition  constituting  the  substance  of  the  pres- 
ent active  moment  may  begin  to  flag,  but  it  b  soon  kept 
up  by  new  observations  and  experiments;  on  the  oAm 
hand,  the  occasional  glance  at  the  morning  newspaper 
may  tend  to  deflect  mental  activity  to  quite  a  differed 


Pwtituuiolu  mtd  RepreseuHgthms  353 

channel  by  awakening  the  activity  of  quite  a  different 
moment-consciousness  conflicting  with  the  tra  i  of 
thottg^  on  ■daMtfic  m^r. 

Presentative  demwit  ^ve  a  permsneacy  and  fta- 
bihty  which  representative  elements  totally  lack;  thtf 
can  be  kept  up  in  their  full  strength  by  keeping  up  the 
same  intensity  of  stimulation,  as  by  maintaining  the  ob- 
ject before  the  particular  sense  organ  that  forms  the 
nucleus  of  tile  percept.  Thus  the  pricking  of  the 
needle  is  perceived  as  long  at  the  iliBiMlatiuii  it  con- 
tinued, and  the  chair  yonder  is  seen  at  long  at  k  it  ki^ 
before  the  eyes.  Representative  elements  on  the  coo- 
trary,  are  extremely  unstable  and  fluctuating,  and  are 
aptly  characterized  as  being  very  much  like  "the  flare 
aad  flicker  of  a  gat  flame  Mown  by  the  wind."  When 
representative  elementt  become  permanent,  itaUe,  tike 
state  of  the  moment  acquires  a  pathological  character 
manifested  in  the  phenomena  of  intiltent  tkoonlMa  and 
nxed  ideas. 

PretentaCive  psychic  elements  are  always  firmly 
bound  up  wkh  an  external  object  and  with  sdmu- 
lations  of  peripheral  sense-organs;  ^  can  never  free 
themselves  from  the  bondage  to  the  emnuA  environ- 
ment.   Not  so  the  representative  elements,  altfaoii^ 
appearing  at  first  in  connection  with  sensory  dements 
J^p^pfeerd  ttiai«Mitions,  diey  finaUy  end  by  freeing 
mmmmirm         ittt  londafi.    The  representative 
elements  invefred  in  ^  rtf^etentation  no€ 
originally  arise  without  some  presentative  elements. 
Once  however,  the  given  representation  has  definitely 
amen  we  may  imagine  the  zebra  without  actually  per- 
it.   In  ^  midtt  of  a  conversation,  or  in  the 
■i^r^  «  •m0m'^*  At         ^  a  t%er,  or  of 


354        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychoiogy 

a  palm  seen  in  some  distant  ooiuitry  may  rise  deari 

and  vividly  before  the  mind's  eye,  and  temporarily  ii 
terrupt  the  course  and  trend  of  our  thought. 

While  I  am  writing  these  lines  a  Heeing  copperhead, 
iwbating  vorticella,  a  fish's  uil,  a  cow's  head  and  a  puf 
ing  steam  engine  have  fladied  across  my  mental  field  an 
gone.  They  may  be  ultimately  traced  to  tome  sensor 
stimulus  and  positive  after  images,  but  these  are  far  ii 
the  background  of  consciousness  and  remain  unnoticed 
K^resentative  elements  come  and  go  in  consciousness 
»«y  »PP«ar  independently  of  aU  other  elements,  the^ 
are  essentially  free  dements.  We  caU  this  coming  am 
going  of  these  independent  elements  the  "free  play  ol 
the  imagination." 

Where  sensory  elements  appear  in  synthetized  com 
Poraids.  or  m  die  precept,  they  cannot  be  separated 
ttiey  are  firmly  bound  together.    It  is  only  in  repre- 
•entation  that  the  corresponding  representative  ele- 
ments  free  thmselves  from  die  bonds  of  union  which 
the  sensory  dements  cannot  throw  ofif.   The  orange 
yonder  is  a  synthetized  compound  of  many  sensory 
elements,  pnmary  and  secondary,  but  as  long  as  they 
remam  Mnaory  the  elements  are  kept  in  union  and  can- 
not  be  dissodated.    Sudi  a  disiodatioo.  however,  is 
fuUy  possible  with  the  representative  dementi  enterw 
iiy  into  the  representation  of  the  orange.  We  can  diink 
of  itt  color,  size,  shape,  wdght,  smdl  and  taste  mm. 
rately. 

The  freedom  ol  dw  rc|>reien«acive  elements  is  dear- 
ly  brought  out  m  die  totalled  free  play  of  the  imagi- 
nation. Sensory  elements  are  synthetized  m  tile  com- 
pound  in  definite  rdations  which  cannot  possibly  be 
•mred  unless  the  stimuU  are  rearranged,  and  inwuiy 


Presentations  and  Representations 


cases  the  sensory  elements  do  not  admit  even  of  that 
procedure.  The  sensory  elements  in  the  perception 
of  a  particular  object,  say  a  house,  have  definite  rela- 
tions  which  caniiot  be  nwdified  without  first  changing 
the  color,  structure,  shape,  size,  of  the  home  and  fear- 
ranging  its  relative  parts.  In  imagination  or  repre> 
sentation,  however,  all  that  is  done  in  less  than  no 
time,  without  in  the  least  interfering  with  the  external 
stimuli. 

Representative  elements  manifest  even  more  free- 
dom. In  many  cases  a  modification  of  certain  relations 

in  the  sensory  elements  cannot  possibly  be  effected,  be- 
cause the  relations  of  the  external  stimuli  constituting 
what  may  be  termed  the  external  object  do  not  admit 
of  a  rearrangement.  Thus  we  cannot  have  the  mouth 
of  the  horse  on  his  back,  horns  growing  out  of  Ins 
sides,  the  mane  on  his  hind  parts  and  the  tail  on  his 
brow.  We  can,  however,  easily  accomplish  such  a  re- 
arrangement  in  our  imagination.  Furthermore,  in  rep- 
resentation psychic  elements  appear  in  combinations  of 
which  sensory  dements  do  not  admit.  Pegasus,  a 
horse  with  wings;  mermaid,  a  being  half  woman  half 
fish ;  centaurus,  a  being  half  man  and  half  horse,  md 
other  combinations  of  the  most  impossible  character,  as 
far  as  sensory  elements  are  concerned,  may  be  formed 
in  representation. 

At  first  representative  elements  are  started  by  sensa- 
tions and  are  thus  far  bound  up  with  them,  hot  they 
gradually  free  themselves  from  it.  Thus  in  a  bi^  ur. 
der  my  close  observation,  the  representative  element 
never  came  unless  the  object  was  present.  If  the  ob- 
ject was  taken  away,  he  soon  forgot  it.  In  the  un- 
ediictted  mind  even  of  a  high  type  of  moment<on- 


356        Normal  and  Abnormd  Psychology 

sdousneas  rcpretcntationi  «r  itiU  bound  up  with  di» 
scntations.  The  gossip  can  keep  on  tdWng  m  loj  m 
the  thought  i,  fixed  on  the  concrete.  Person,  wholtck 
J^tific  conceptual  thought  cannot  grasp  an  abstract 
^wnJ  proposition  wiAout  having  it  first  expressed  in 
concrete  term.,  or  fixed  in  «Mory  pictarc..  The  say. 
age  gets  a  headache  when  his  thought  is  forced  to 
.nTh'"^-  '''"T  /'^presentation.  In  the  imbedle. 
•n  the  Idiot  we  find  the  same  thing  manifested.  They 

^A^i  ^    w  u  ''^"'"'T'  I"  mental 

s^tr^"^  iL?^'''''*^'!  '^"^  *he  higher 

TT.r    "^^^'"^  "^^^y  dementia, 

states  consequent  on  psychic  degeneration,  we  find 

he  same  truth  illustrated.  The  patient's  men- 
talactiyity  faUs  many  stages  nearer  to  the  level  of  pre- 

' "  of  Psychic 

life  that  rq«sent«t,ye  elements  become  free,  inde- 

sodate"d        """^  ^       '"^^  •Mod.ted  and  dis- 

If  looked  at  from  die  standpoint  of  control,  we  find 

2^  •''T^     1?''"^  °"  of  *eir  fixed  rela- 

ttow  m  the  combmations  and  compounds  in  which  they 
enter,  or,  umcontroUokU.  The  compound  with  all  its 
sensory  elements,  primary  and  wcondary,  is  giyc„,  and 
cannot  d.recdy  be  controlled;  it  i.  highty  ^IV^ 
..^  attempts  at  decomposition.  The  combination., 
.r«f  llT'^  M  u  representative  eleZS 

^he  elements  can  be  easily 
^htd  displaced,  rearranged,  easily  dis«>ciated,  and 
new  combinations  formed.  The  mode  of  function  of 
the  representative  element  is  free  assocUHon. 

Even  when  entering  into  the  asMciative  db?  the  ren. 
rewntative  elements  do  not  blend  and  fuie  to  u  aotto 


FrgstmMions  mti  Reprgstnuukms  357 

be  discriminated.    Representative  elements  certainly  do 
not  float  about  without  entering  with  others  into  some 
fonn  of  a«ocitticii»  but  in  the  very  association  and  com- 
bination they  still  manage  to  piewrve  idatively  their 
freedom  and  independence.    The  sensory  eteraoNt  in 
the  compound  are  so  blended  and  fused  that  they  can- 
not  be  discriminated  in  the  compound  without  some  ef- 
fort and  under  special  artificial  conditions.  Oculo-mo- 
tor  sensations,  the  esttmation  of  the  visual  angle,  of  the 
size  of  the  image  thrown  on  the  retuia  are  not  so  very 
evident  m  the  direct  perception  of  the  external  o^et 
Tactual  and  muscular  sensations  are  not  so  very  dear 
in  our  perception  of  space,  nor  are  our  rhythmical,  res- 
piratory and  kinaesthetic  sensations  quite  obvious  in  our 
estimation  of  time.  The  free  associations,  however,  into 
which  representative  elements  enter  give  full  scope  to 
their  components.   The  elements  are  combined  without 
at  the  same  time  losing  their  individuality;  they  remain 
clearly  defined  in  their  nature  and  outlines  in  relation  to 
the  other  elements  with  which  they  form  combinations. 

RepresenUtions,  however,  presuppose  presentativc 
life,  they  constitute  the  intermediate  stages  of  which 
presentations  form  the  termini.   Representations  begin 
^^^nd  xvith  presentations.  At  the  same  time  it  should 
be  clearly  held  in  mind  that  while  representation  refers 
to  presentation,  it  is  by  no  means  true  that  representa- 
tions can  be  analyzed  into  sensory  elements  in  the  same 
way  as  a  living  organism  can  be  analyzed  into  elemeo. 
tary  ocll.«..   The  living  organism  is  made  up,  is  consti- 
tuted  by  elementary  cells;  cells  form  the  organism.  Rep- 
««itttions,  however,  arc  not  formed  out  of  prescnta- 
tive  dementt,  sensory  elements,  sensation  elements.  Sen- 
wry  piocessei  do  i»t  enter  mto  the  make-up  of  a  repre- 


m 


358        Nornud  and  Abmormd  Psychology 

sentation.  Just  at  the  sensation  black  is  not  black,  so  is 
fhc  ^ca  or  representation  of  bJack  not  a 


CHAPTER  XIX 

RfiPK£8£NTATION8  AND  THE  LAWS  OF  THBIK  COMBINA- 
TIONS 

REPRESENTATIVE  elements  fonn  what 
may  be  characterized  as  mental  trains.  The 
elements  of  a  mental  train  are  connected  by 
relations  of  contiguity,  resemblance,  and  con- 
trast.    Association  by  contiguity  depends  on  the  fre- 
quency,  recency  with  which  the  dements  have  been  as- 
sociated, while  resemblance  and  contrast  may  be  r©. 
garded  as  two  or  more  mental  trains  of  representative 
elements  associated  by  contiguity,  crossing  and  inter- 
secting in  a  few  points,  in  other  words  having  some  ele- 
ment in  common.  From  this  standpoint  associations  by 
resemblance  and  contrast  an  often  regarded  as  cases  of 
contiguity  which  is  therefore  considered  as  the  mode  of  ^ 
association  characteristic  of  representative  elements. 
From  another  standpoint,  however,  resemblance  may 
^ually  be  considered  as  fundamental.    It  is  nearer  to 
the  truth  to  regard  both  contiguity  and  resemblance  or 
similarity  as  fundamental  modes  of  association  of  repre- 
sentative elements. 

Association  by  contiguity  may  be  expressed  in  the  fol- 
lowing general  proposition :  Ideas  or  images  which  have 
frequently  followed  one  another  tend  to  recur  in  the 
same  order.  If  a,  b,  c,  i,  e  ht  images  or  ideas  that 
have  frequently  followed  each  other  in  a  ddbite  order 
of  succession,  then  the  tendency  is  that  the  ideas  or  im- 
ages  will  occur  in  the  same  order,  if  the  initial  idea  or 
image  is  awakened.  Thus  if  a,  h,  c,  d,  e,  be  that  order, 

359 


! 

.11 


36o       Normal  and  dbnormU  Psychology 

then  if  «  it  awaken  the  rett,  h,  c,  4,  0,  tend  to  toie 
in  the  tame  order  in  idiich  they  htm  fottowtd  mA  c 

er  previously. 

The  formula  for  association  by  contiguity  nwy 

expressed  as  follows:  a+b+c+d^e-^  

RcprrMiiUUvt  elcmeiitt,  however,  as  we  have  poini 
out  are  derivative,  they  are  fonctionf  of  sensory  ca 
pounds,  and  vary  concomitantly  with  the  wealth  and  d 
ferentiation  of  sensory  life-experience.  Blind  peo| 
have  no  visual  images,  nor  can  deaf  persons  form  a 
idea  of  a  tound.  Although  representative  elements  a 
essentially  different  in  nature  from  sensory  elements  ai 
their  compounds,  still  it  remains  true  that  lenaory  « 
perience  is  the  soil  from  which  the  rich  variety  of  re 
resentative  life  grows  up.  Sensory  elements  and  th< 
compounds  are  prerequisites  of  represenutions  of  the 
combtaation  and  organization. 

The  course  of  atsodative  rebtions  of  representatioi 
may  be  determined  by  the  course  of  sensory  series, 
a  series  of  sensations  and  perceptions  have  frequent 
followed  each  other  pretty  uniformly,  then  their  co 
responding  representations  will  tend  to  recur  in  tl 
tame  unifomi  order.  Let  A,  B,  C,  D,  E. . . .  be  th 
order  of  succession  of  the  semory  series,  then  the  ord« 
of  the  series  of  representations  will  he:  a,  b,  c,  d,t... 
When  sensation  A  with  its  corresponding  repretentatio 
a  are  awakened,  or  if  a  alone  occurs,  thrn  the  rest  of  th 
series  of  representations  tend  to  emerge.  The  formul 
for  association  of  contiguity  may  be  somewhat  modifie 
and  represented  as  fbHowi; 

a  h  c  d  e   Representations 

t  t  t  t  t 

A  B  C  D  E  . . . .  Presentations 


Representations  and  Laws  of  Comkmstums  361 

^bnc+d^e),  or  simpjy  b+(c+d+e) .... 

witli  nocor  and  physical  reactions,  hence  muscular 
movement,  or  rather  khmeHietic  .ensation.  andAeir 
r^p^entations  also  enter  the  drde  of  the  ^oci^S^' 
mZ'  J't  representations  gives  rise  to  move 

Zf  '°  Anaesthetic  sen«|. 

scri^'  turn  may  either  give  rise  to  another 

educed  a         -  ^'•^  Miociationism.  who 

reduced  al  association  to  contiguity,  ttatet  hit  doctrine 
of  association  in  the  following  general  propositi^ 
If  aj^  jensation  A,  idea  B  or  muscular  motion  C,  be 

last^^  .1    ■    I  motion  F,  it  will  at 

d  Z       -i    !:™P^\ hekmtpng  to  the  sen«ition 
D,  the  very  idea  E  or  the  very  muscular  motion  F." 

.h.  T!"*       ^?  similarity  we  find  that 

Ae  relations  of  the  elements  are  somewhat  moTc^J. 

o  Tdeas  ant^^  <«««««t  trains 

of  Ideas  and  images,  there  win  be  a  tendency  for  them  to 

c^oss  and  intersect  at  many  points.  T^cour^, 

rion  n?  ^^"^  '".^•t  particular  form  of  awocia- 
t  on  of  reprejentatnre  efcment.  known  as  assodatiorby 
similanty  and  contrasts.  ^ 
I^et  *  f ,  e,  f,  be  one  series  and  let  p,h.t  r  m 
another  senes,  r,  k,  I,  „,  a  third  series  and  'v 
J^cj.^«ne,  and  soon.  The  course  of  asso;iatron\' 
«ead  of  nmnmg  along  one  line  of  habitual  a.«,dati« 


(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  3) 


A   APPLIED  IIVHGE  Inc 


1653  East  Main  Street 

Rochester,  New  York       14609  USA 

(716)  402  -0300-Phorw 

(716)  288  -  5989  -  rox 


36a        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 


determined  by  contiguity  will  tend  to  run  on  new  lin 
The  course  may  be  represented  as  follows : 
a, — b, — c, — d, — e, — f 
i 

P» — b, — g, — r, — m 

4 

q,— r,— k,— 1, — n 

s, — ^1, — — y, — z 
Ixt  each  series  be  represented  by  a  row  of  squai 

formed  into  a  rectangle  and  let  each  crossing  series 
representd  by  a  similar  rectangle  intersecting  the  pi 
ceding  one  at  right  angles,  then  the  course  of  assoc 
Hon  by  similarity  may  be  diagrammatically  represent 
as  follows: 


p 

TT 

b 

c 

S 

f 

k 

1 

n 

> 

m 

7 

X 

z 

The  course  of  the  mental  train  of  ideas  is  changed  ai 
deflected  along  lines  which  are  otherwise  unhabitual  f 
the  particular  mental  train.  In  atsoctatton  by  timtltri 
the  mental  train  ever  cornucatea  along  new  Unes. 


Representations  and  Laws  of  CombtHations  363 

Association  by  similarity  may  be  expressed  in  the  gen- 
eral proposition:  like  states  often  follow  each  other. 
What  that  likeness  consists  in  we  have  already  seen, — 
It  is  some  common  characters,  some  representative  ele- 
ments which  two  or  more  crossing  trains  of  contiguous 
represoitations  possess  in  common.    The  crosnng  of 
one  train  by  another  at  a  point  where  the  representa- 
tions have  common  features  is  purely  accidental,  as  far 
as  the  crossed  train  is  concerned;  it  is  the  play  of  the 
imagination.  As  an  illustration  of  such  a  crossing  of 
trains  we  may  take  tltt  example  when  cme,  from  a  ser- 
ies of  images  and  ideas  about  the  recent  Americo-Span- 
ish  war,  is  led  to  think  of  the  Anglo-Spanish  war  in  the 
1 6th  Century,  the  common  representation  being  the  de- 
struction of  the  Spanish  fleet;  and  from  the  mental  train 
on  the  Anglo-Spanish  war  to  the  Franco-Prussian  war 
the  common  representatim  being  invMion,  and  from 
this  to  the  Napoleonic  war,  then  to  the  political  aiairs 
of    France,  and    thence,  to  the  peace  conference 
of  European  powers.  The  course  of  the  trains  of  ideas 
is  every  time  deflected  along  new  channels.  The  deflec- 
tion depaids  largely  on  the  complexity  and  number  of 
the  trains  and  their  activity. 

The  relation  of  likeness  is  present  not  <mly  in  trains 
of  representations,  but  also  in  presentations  or  in  what 
is  termed  by  us  psychic  compounds.  Thus  twins  we 
say  look  alike,  so  do  eggs,  so  do  anunals  of  die  same 
species;  a  picture  say  of  a  landscape  looks  like  the  actual 
landscape,  and  a  portrait  or  statue  resemUei  the  orig. 
inal.  In  all  these  examples  the  likeness  is  constitu^  by 
the  sensory  elements  common  to  the  presented  psychic 
compound.  Not  that  the  sensory  elements  are  ex- 
acdy  the  tame;  tnbjectifely  considered,  they  may  be 


3^4       Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

totaUy  diflferent  in  their  psychic  stuff,  in  the  psychic  re 
lationt  that  cluster  about  them,  as  no  two  sensations,  n( 
two  pqrchic  compounds,  are  really  the  same,  as  far  a 
the  mental  state  is  concerned,  but  they  refer  to  the  sum* 
characters  in  the  external  object.  It  is  this  common  ref 
erence  to  the  same  traits  or  characters  in  the  external  ob 
ject  that  constitutes  the  bond  of  association  of  likeness 
in  sensory  element  or  psychic  compound.  On  the  sami 
grounds  may  be  explained  the  likeness  between  the  rep 
rescntations  and  the  psychic  compound,  the  percept, 
which  it  represents. 


CHAPTER  XX 


SEPKBSSNTATION  AND  KSCOGNmON 

IF  from  the  genenl  ocmridentioii  on  die  mo(kt  of 
combinations  or  free  association  characteristic  of 
representations,  we  turn  to  analyse  the  nature  of 
the  moment  with  representative  elements  as  con- 
tent, we  find  that  it  differs  essentially  from  the  synthetic 
and  desultory  moments.  A  dose  inspection  of  the  char- 
acter of  representations  reveals  the  fact  of  its  (Uffer- 
ence  from  presentation-elements.  A  representative 
element  is  neither  of  the  nature  of  the  primary  nor 
of  the  secondary  sensory  elements,  it  differs  from  both 
in  the  character  of  its  psychic  "stuff."  The  difference 
consists  in  the  fact  that  a  representative  eknient  is  not 
cognitive,  but  recogmtive. 

As  far  as  the  cognitive  aspect  is  concerned  the 
chief  characteristic  of  the  synthetic  and  desultory 
moments,  having  sensory  elements  only  as  their 
contoit,  is  the  ^ect  reference  to  the  object,  to  the 
relations  of  the  external  environment,  while  the 
characteristic  feature  of  the  moment,  having  mainly  rep- 
resentative  elements  as  its  constituent,  is  the  indirect  ref- 
■^rence  to  external  relations.  In  other  words,  the  sen- 
sory elemoits  of  the  synthetic  and  desultory  moments 
have  immidkue  cognition,  while  the  representative  ele- 
ments of  the  moment  now  under  consideration  has  Mtf- 
diate  cognition,  or  recognition.  I  see  the  book  lying  on 
my  table,  I  close  my  eyes  and  represent  to  myself  the 
whole  thing  over  again.  As  J  look  out  of  the  window 

36s 


366       Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

I  see  a  house,  a  horse  and  carriage  standing  near  by; 
dose  my  eyes  and  imagine  the  whole  situation  ove 
again.  Wc  say  then,  incorrectly  though,  that  the  repre 
■eatadon  is  a  copy  of  the  piesentatioii.  Evidently  tb 
representation  is  regarded  as  not  being  the  —mf  ts  tb 
presentation  just  as  a  jopy  is  really  not  the  same  at  thi 
original.   The  psychic  elements  of  representation  hav< 
the  function  of  cognizing  again,  or  what  is  more  correct 
to  say  the  function  of  re-cognition  which  constitutes 
the  very  essence  of  representation.   In  representation 
events  are  lived  over  again  withoot  the  actual  recur, 
rence  of  those  experiences.   In  representation  the  mo- 
ment becomes  independent  of  the  present,  it  beomes 
free  from  its  immediate  environment. 

In  order  that  a  representation  be  a  true  "copy"  of 
its  original,  it  must  be  cognized  as  a  "copy,"  that  is,  it 
must  be  cognized  as  something  already  cognized,  in  othp 
er  words,  it  must  be  recognized.   This  function  of  re- 
cognition  is  die  sine  qua  non  of  representation.  The 
"ki***  "P^^*»^"»»  or  idea  of  a  table  is  not  itself  a 
taUe,  aor  is  It  a  syntfaetized  sensory  oomponnd  refer- 
ring to  the  object,  table,  it  is  a  psychic  element  referring 
to  the  sensory  compound  on  its  objective  aspect.  The 
representation  of  die  tabh  does  not  refer  direcdy  to  die 
taWe  as  it  is  the  case  in  dit  sensory  compound,  but  to  die 
taWe  as  ptruhad.  The  image  or  representation  refers 
not  to  die  object  immediately,  tmt  mediately,  to  die  ob- 
ject as  object  of  die  sensory  compound.  Hence  die  ob- 
ject  IS  cognized  over  in  representation,  in  other  words, 
is  recognized. 

This  recognition  may  be  of  a  general  or  of  a  specific 
character.  The  function  of  recognition  in  its  general 
Mpect  is  manifested  in  die  idea.  The  idea  posaesies 


lUfrestu$aiUm  and  RteogmAm  3^ 

this  function  of  feaerftl  reoogutum.  The  idet  *'inan" 

recognizes  its  content  in  a  general  way,  it  refen  to  man 
in  gjeneral,  but  does  not  identify  its  content  with  any 
particular  individual.  I  may  represent  to  myself  an  ob- 
ject recognized  as  a  table,  not  as  any  particular  table, 
and  I  may  abo  represent  this  putiaUar  table  on  which 
I  am  writing.  The  represenudon  I  have  of  my  friend 
John  refers  specifically  to  John  not  to  any  one  ebe.  As 
in  my  imagination  I  scrutinize  thp  features  of  my 
friend's  face,  I  all  along  recognize  that  it  is  my  friend's 
countenance.  Recognition,  general  as  well  as  particu- 
lar, is  involved  in  the  very  fanction  of  lepresentadon. 

In  immediate  perception  itself  there  n  no  recogni- 
tion present.  It  is  not  true  to  fact  to  say  that  in  the 
perception  of  a  horse  we  recognize  the  object  by  per- 
ceiving it  as  horse  and  not  as  anything  else.  The  fact 
that  I  perceive  the  object  as  it  is  depends  entirely  on 
the  sensory  compound  which  has  cognition  as  the  func- 
tion of  its  psychic  character.  The  sensory  component, 
the  percept  horse,  is  the  cognition  of  the  object  "horse." 

Some  psychologists  attempt  to  find  the  origin  of  rec- 
ognition in  the  feeling  of  familiarity.  Familiarity,  how- 
ever, b  not  a  primary  state  out  of  which  recognition  de- 
velops, buf  on  the  contrary  recognition  is  the  primary 
state  and  familiarity  is  derivative  only.  Famifiarity  is 
simply  the  feeling  of  vague,  marginal,  or  subconscious 
recognition.  Of  course,  if  by  the  term  familiarity  is 
meant  not  that  psychic  state  observed  in  die  adult  con- 
sctonsness,  both  abnormal  and  normal,  but  that  primary 
state  of  recognition  out  of  which  more  de&ute  fcoogni- 
tion  develops,  then  it  may  be  admitted  that  familiarity 
is  the  germ  of  recognition,  but  dien  it  is  only  the  giving 
of  a  special  term  "familiarity"  to  an  elementary  focm  of 


368        Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

recognition.  The  definiis  form  of  recognition  devel- 
ops out  of  the  indefinite  form  of  recognition,  re  ogni- 
tion  mntC  be  a  primary  dement  Recognition  then 
it  an  irreducible  mode  of  psychic  activity  characteritdc 
of  representative  mental  life. 

Some  psychologists  regard  familiarity  as  a  pure  'feel- 
ing of  at  homeness'  or  as  FouUlee  puts  it  in  the  decrease 
of  the  inward  shock  of  su  '^e.  This  is  however  to 
put  the  cart  before  the  f  ,e.  It  is  not  the  feeling 
of  familiarity  that  gives  rise  to  recognitioa,  but  tt  ii 
vague,  indistinct,  marginal,  or  subconscious  recognitioo 
that  gives  rise  to  the  feeling  of  familiarity.  When  a 
person,  a  scene,  an  event,  or  situation  familiar, 
the  psychic  state  is  one  of  having  gone  ^arough  the 
same  experience  before.  We  cannot  localize  its  date  in 
our  scheme  of  time  on  which  we  project  our  past  expm- 
ences.  We  have  experienced  the  same  before,  but  we 
ask  ourselves, — ^where  and  when  have  we  seen  that  per- 
son, the  scene  or  the  situation  before?  Often  we  succeed 
in  Ibnning  a  complete  association  with  the  past,  we  lo- 
calize the  given  familiar  experience,  and  thai  complete 
recognition  ensues.  Familiarity  is  incomfkta,  vagtu, 
indefinite  recognition. 

The  peculiar  experience  of  a  present  novel  situation 
as  having  experienced  or  lived  through  the  same  before 
has  been  mystically  referred  to  a  previous  existence,  the 
theory  of  Platonic  reminiscence.  The  exphnation,  how- 
ever, of  this  phenomenon  is  quite  simple,  '"^fmwh 
that  it  can  be  shown  that  in  such  cases  some 
similar  experience  had  been  gone  through  before.  The 
subject  cannot  dose  the  circuit,  so  to  say,  and  effect  a 
connection  with  his  previons  li^  experiences,  he  cannot 
asKxaate  folly  the  present  experience  with  liis  fofm. 


RtfrgsgHkttion  tmd  Rteogmtiom  3^ 


of 


er  experience  and  localize  it  in  lut  pMt  Odwr 
such  familiarity  are  brought  alwiie  by  Mates  of  __ 
tion.  The  patient  perceives,  goes  through  experiencea 
in  one  state  and  vaguely  remembers  them  in  another. 
Such  states  of  familiarity  or  imperfect  recognition  can 
be  found  in  pre-epileptic  states,  in  post-hypnotic  condi- 
tions, in  hypnoidal  twilight  states,  and  other  snboon* 
scious  dissociative  states. 

In  regard  to  this  phenomenon  of  general  familiarity 
almost  amounting  to  recognition  without  attaining  it 
James  makes  the  foikwing  pertinent  remarks  which 
fuUy  bears  out  the  fact  that  recognition  is  primary  and 
is  at  the  basis  of  what  we  term  the  sensr  of  fiunifiarity. 
"There  is  a  curious  experience"  says  .  imes  'VU^ 
everyone  seems  to  have  had—the  feeling*  that  the  pres- 
ent  moment  in  its  completeness  has  been  experienced  be- 
fore—^ were  saying  jost  the  thing,  in  just  this  pUce, 
tc  just  these  people,  etc  This  *mm  of  pfMsinaMe* 
has  been  treated  as  a  great  mystery  and  occasioned  much 

-r  Nation  I  must  confess  that  the  quality  of  my»- 

<  *f""        *  little  strained.  I  have  over  and  over 
*g4ui  m  my  own  case  succeeded  in  resolving  the  phe- 
nomenon mto  a  case  of  memory,  so  mdhi^ict  that  while 
some  past  circumstances  are  presented  agaki,  the  ocbeit 
are  not.   The  dissimilar  portions  of  the  past  do  not 
arise  completely  enough  for  the  date  to  be  identified. 
All  we  get  is  the  present  scene  with  a  general  suggestion 
of  pastness  abont  it"  I  may  say  the  same  thing  in  my 
own  case.  Whenever  I  find  in  myself  the  presence  of 
some  obscure  form  of  familiarity,  I  can  krariatiy  tnci 
it  to  some  vague,  indistinct  memory  of  an  experience 
lived  dirough  some  tune  before.  The  same  holds  tnie 
m  the  case  of  patients,  as  well  as  of  my  experiments  car- 


370       Noma  mi  Akmrmd  Psychology 

tied  out  on  subjects  in  subconscious  Mates,  hypnotic 
ptMtiqrpnodc  hypnoidal,  and  otfaen. 

When  an  oqiericiice  enters  into  a  ninnber  of  ijntemt, 
or  as  James  would  put  it  into  a  number  of  "aettinp," 
then  the  special  character  of  the  "setting"  becomes  con. 
fused  or  even  obliterated.  The  experience  present  calk 
forth  to  nmny  different  systems  or  "settings"  that  the 
recognition  dement  lapses  and  reverts  to  the  psychic 
state  characteristic  of  the  lower  fomw  of  moment  con- 
sciousness, passing  through  the  more  elementary  fbrma 
of  recognition  to  cognition.  When  the  recognitive  mo- 
ment  reproduces  itself  so  diat  it  becomes  habitual  and 
antomatic  it  lalk  in  the  scak  of  psychic  life  and  reverts 
to  the  type  of  a  lower  moment. 

A  psychic  state  which  recurs  under  a  great  number 
of  conditions  and  circumstances  loses  all  special  and 
local  psychic  color,  so  to  say,  and  hence  becomes  de- 
graded in  the  type  of  its  mental  activity.  All 
ordmary  experiences  which  have  been  recognized 
over  and  over  again,  all  sorts  and  conditions  of 
mental  life,  under  different  and  opposite  tendencies,  feel- 
ings and  emotions,  under  various  settings  and  conflicting 
systems  cease  to  be  surrounded  by  a  nimbus  of  pastness 
and  become  cogmtive  in  character.  When  too  often  re- 
peated die  eatperience  becomci  so  mach  worn  by  use,  if 
we  may  use  such  an  expression,  that  it  can  no  kmger  be 
reproduced  voluntarily  in  consciousness.  Thus  a  strange 
face  seen  a  few  times  or  only  once  can  be  clearly  repre- 
■ented,  but  die  faces  of  familiar  people  with  whom  we 
are  in  ooutant  intercoone  can  no  longer  be  clearly  re- 
produced and  represented.  Such  a  reprodnction  can  only 
be  brought  about  by  a  perceptual  state,  or  by  various 
•ubcoudoiit  itMet,  racb  at  dreami»  hyfmim  «  l^p- 


Representation  ami  JUeofm^  371 

noidal  state.  In  such  cues  there  m  [wetent  a  feeling  of 
familiarity  due  to  the  series  of  recognitions  and  oogni* 
tions.  Familiarity  here  is  lapsed  recognition. 

James  brings  it  mt  clearly:  "If  a  phenomenon  is  met 
with,  however,  too  often,  and  widi  too  greet »  rtaktf 
of  contexts,  aldioiigh  its  image  b  retained  and  f^n>> 
duced  with  correspondingly  great  Polity,  it  Uuk  to 
come  up  with  any  one  particular  setting  and  the  projec- 
tion of  it  backwards  to  a  particular  past  date  conse- 
quently doee  not  come  about.  We  recognize  but  do  not 
remember  it — ita  associates  form  too  confuaed  a  dood.** 
In  other  words,  rendition  does  not  reach  its  ftitt  de- 
velopment. There  is  recognition  of  the  phenomenon 
as  such,  but  not  as  having  had  the  experience  in  the 
past.  The  halo  of  pastness  is  gone.  James  quotes 
Spencer  "To  nk  a  man  whether  he  remembers  that  the 
Sim  shines,  that  fire  bums,  that  iron  is  hard,  wodd  be  a 
misuse  of  language.  Evm  the  almost  fortuitous  con- 
nections among  our  experiences  cease  to  be  classed  as 
memories,  when  they  have  become  thoroughly  familiar, 
l^ongli  on  hearing  the  voice  of  some  unseen  person 
slightly  known  to  ns,  we  say  we  recollect  to  whom  the 
voice  belongs,  we  do  not  use  the  same  CJiptesiioa  re- 
specting the  voices  of  those  with  whom  we  live.  The 
meanings  of  words  which  in  childhood  have  to  be  con- 
sciously recalled  seem  in  adult  life  to  be  immediately 
pment. 

"James  then  goes  on  saying*':  **These  are  the 

cases  where  too  many  paths,  leading  to  too  diverse  as- 
sociates, block  each  other's  way,  and  all  that  the  mind 
gets  along  with  its  object  is  a  fringe  of  felt  familiarity 
or  sense  that  there  are  associates.  A  similar  result  comes 
about  when  a  definite  eettmg  m  only  nascendy  aroused. 


37»       Norma  md  Akmmd  Ps^hohgy 

Wt  thai  fed  thtt  we  have  leen  the  object  already.  bi 
when  or  whoe  we  cannot  tay,  though  we  may  aeemi 
oureelvcs  to  be  on  the  brink  of  saying  it  Thatnaacn 
cerebral  excitation  can  affect  consciousness  with  a  so 
of  sense  of  the  imminence  of  that  which  stronger  excita 
tiona  would  make  us  definitely  feel,  is  obvious  froi 

what  happen,  when  we  aeek  to  remember  a  mmie.  ] 
tmgles,  It  trembles  on  the  verge,  but  does  not  come 
Just  such  a  tingling  and  trembling  of  unrecovered  asM 
ciatcs  IS  the  penumbra  of  recognition  that  may  surroun< 
any  experience  and  make  it  seem  familiar,  though  w 
know  not  why/*   In  other  words,  imperfect,  difhise< 
rccogmtion  with  no  spedal  tyMem,  or  setting  to  come  ir 
live  contact  with  and  be  locali^ed  in  a  me4l  series  oi 
an  individual  moment  consciousness  fails  to  give  thai 
mcnta  synthesis  which  is  the  essential  characteristic  of 
tfte  fully  developed  moment-consciousness.  Recognition 
of  an  expenence  lived  through  in  the  past  is  the  basis  of 
what  IS  known  as  the  sense  of  familiarity. 

Perhaps  we  may  refer  to  the  Bergsonian  view  of  rec- 
o^ition,  namely  that  recognition  is  interrelated  with 
and  based  on  special  motor  adaptations.    "Every  per- 
ception  .ays  Bergson  "has  its  organized  motor  accom- 
P««iincnt  the  orduiary  feeling  of  recognition  has  its 
roots  m  the  consciousness  of  this  organiaation."  While 
It  IS  true  that  recognition  deals  with  the  ne  of  object, 
and  with  special  adaptations  to  the  external  environ- 
™»^far  as  such  recognition  is  expressed  in  motor 
J^^wtaenta,  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  this  view  holds 
tro  of  recognition  m  general.   In  the  process  of  rec 
ognition  It  IS  not  the  motor  accompaniment,  it  is  the 
feeling  of  sameness  of  experience,  the  feeling  of  part- 
ness  with  Its  localization  in  a  series  of  "setting."  or  of 


RitprestHtstion  mtd  ReeogniHon  373 

systems  that  go  to  form  the  main  elements. 

I  must  say  that  the  motor  accompaniments  have  been 
too  much  overworked  in  our  psychological  theories.  We 
have  carried  over  into  our  frfiUoscphy,  such  u  pragma- 
tism, and  into  our  psychology  of  recent  yetrt  too  much 
of  the  haste  and  whirl  of  the  exchanf^  and  the  shop. 
F.verythirg  is  motor  and  everything  is  practical.  This  is 
a  reflect  *  n  of  our  present  industrial  age  in  the  domain  of 
the  mind.  Perhaps  it  expresses  well  the  tendency  of  the 
modem  philoM>phical  and  ptycfaological  trend  of  trans- 
muting every  thing  into  motion  when  ptychologisti  de- 
scribe themselves  at  being  "motor  men  00  the  pflycho> 
logical  car." 

Recognition  is  not  motion  at  least  from  a  psycho- 
logical standpoint,  unlets  like  Bergson  we  resort  to 
the  metaphysical,  pan-psychiitic  argument  of  leducing 
motion  to  independent  objective  images  as  constituting 
the  nature  of  external  reality.  Barring  such  metaphysi- 
cal speculations  that,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  have  no 
place  in  psychology  which  must  keep  sti    y  to  the  dif- 
ference between  the  external  and  interna  ,  to  the  oppo- 
sition  of  the  objective  reality  of  the  material  world  and 
of  the  subjective  reality  ^f  die  m  nt^l  world,  diff-'ent 
spheres  of  phenomena  wi.i  .h  should  not  be  reduced  one 
to  the  othor,  we  cannot  help  realizing  the  fact  that  ther« 
is  far  more  of  the  character  of  recognition  in  mental 
states  in  which  the  motor  element  is  msignificant  or  ml, 
such  as  sensations,  ideas,  memories,  thou^^t  leasomag 
and  so  on  than  there  is  in  the  automatic  reflex  reactions 
of  behavior  and  motor  adjustments.  When  we  see  col- 
or green  and  recognize  that  we  have  seen  it  the  day  be- 
fon  we  can  hardly  speak  of  a  mo^r  clement  present  in 
recognttioQ.  When  I  tUdc  of  the  Bergsonlan  theory  of 


9 


374        NcmuU  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

memory,  or  recognition  and  remember  of  my  thinkir 
about  it  the  night  before  and  disagreeing  with  it,  tl 
motor  element  can  only  enter  by  a  great  strain  of  imag 
nation.  If  there  are  any  motor  elements  they  hard 
play  any  significant  part  in  the  proceaa  of  memory  an 
recognition.  We  must  deny  emphaticaUy  the  signii 
cance  and  importance  of  the  motor  element  in  recogn 
tion.  The  essential  element  in  recognition  is  not  ti 
motor,  but  the  psychic  elements. 

Bergson  himself  is  driven  to  take  this  aspect  of  recoj 
nition  when  he  develops  his  theory  of  pure  memory  wit 
n  .  action  in  contradistinction  to  the  memory  which  if 
serts  itself  edgewise  into  the  Hux  of  sensori-motor  adap 
tations.    Bergson    not  without   some  contradictioi 
strongly  contrasts  the  true  pure  memory  with  th( 
memory  image  sharply  inserted  into  the  pUme  of  action 
If  we  grant  Bergson  that  such  pure  unadulterated  mem 
ones  are  present,  memories  free  from  all  motor  reac 
tions,  then  we  must  necessarily  agree  to  the  fact  tha 
remembrance,  recollection,  and  hence  recognition  car 
exist  without  any  motor  accompaniments.    In  othei 
words,  recognition  cannot  be  resolved  into  action,  into 
motor  accompaniments,  into  behavior  and  reactions 
Recognition  is  a  psychic  quale  sui  generis. 

Each  set  of  particular  representative  elements  carries 
along,  as  James  terms  it,  its  special  "setting"  or 
as  I  describe  it  "system."  It  is  this  special  set- 
ting  that  helps  the  process  of  recognition  in  having 
the  particular  experience  projected  in  the  past,  in  having 
it  oriented  among  many  other  systems  of  associations 
and  having  it  localized  in  its  particular  past.  Recogni- 
tion  then  anset  when  the  present  experience  calls  forth 
;ts  speaal  system,  or  setting  in  a  series  of  mental  events. 
1  he  preMttt  expenence  most  dow  with  the  put  ezperi- 


Representation  and  RecopMon  375 

cnce  and  fonii  a  circuit  At  the  same  tone  the  experi- 
ence must  not  be  short^ircuitcd,  becanae  in  such  a  case 
we  have  a  state  of  dissociation.  The  present  experience 
must  form  a  circuit  with  its  system  or  setting  and  with 
the  personality  as  a  whole.  Recognition  thus  requires  « 
special  setting  in  the  complex  web  and  woof  of  the 
present  total  moment  consdoosness  constituting  the  in- 
dividuahty  of  the  subject. 

In  the  higher  forms  of  mental  life  where  self^on- 
saousness  ts  developed,  the  experience  forms  a  live  dr. 
emt,  so  to  say,  with  the  whole  personality.  The  higher 
states  of  recognition  appear  in  the  form  of  the  "I"  con- 
scousness  "It  is  I  who  experienced  aU  that  in  my  past 
It  js  I  who  remembers  that  this  bit  of  experience  hat 
taken  place  m  'my'  experience  some  time  ago."  There 
uthe  my  present  self  thinking  of  the  experience  as  lhad 
through  by  my  past  self. 

In  the  lower  forms  of  recognition  where  the 
self  ,s  not  present,  as  in  the  higher  vertebrates  and 
possibly  ,n  mfants,  there  exists  the  present  cogni- 
hon  of  the  experience  and  the  re-cognition  of  it 
mtte  shape  of  a  vague  memory  that  it  had  been  experi- 
enced before.  The  present  experience  of  an  already  ex- 
penenced  event  floats  m  a  dood  of  pastness.  It  is  this 
psychic  State  of  pastness  in  a  present  experienee  that 
makes  it  felt  to  the  subject  who  experiences  h-^  le. 
current  and  recognitive.  Of  course,  not  every  recurrent 
experience,  even  of  die  higher  types  of  moments  is 
recopiitove.  as  diere  are  psychopadiic  recurrent  statea 
which.  Idee  the  lower  fbnnt  of  momem^owdoaaneii. 
«wir  and  reproduce  themselvet  with  ao  eknuat^ra^ 
ognition  present   We  can,  however,  fully  assert  that 
every  reeognithe  exparience  is  recurrtnt,  RMOgBitioa 
nqurailoniwr  or  past  experience. 


CHAPTER  XXI 


THE  RECOGNITIVB  MOMENT  AND  ITS  UmtODUCnON 

RECOGNITION  is  one  of  the  essential  att^ 
butes  of  representative  life.  The  faintei 
and  most  obscure  representation  requires  tk 
presence  of  recognition  in  the  background 
We  may  say  that  without  recognition  representation  be 
comes  an  impossibility.  Recognition  is  the  function  o 
representative  elements.  Just  as  cognition  is  the  func 
tion  of  sensory,  presentative  elements  so  recognition,  oi 
secondary  cognition  is  the  function  of  representative  ele 
ments.  Now  that  moment  consciousness  which  has  rep 
rcsentative  elements  among  the  constituents  of  its  conteni 
"tk  recognithe  moment-consciousness. 

The  recognitive  moment  is  of  a  higher  type  than  the 
synthetic  moment.  Like  the  synthetic  moment,  mater- 
•al  or  psychic  content  of  the  recognitive  moment  is  » 
similated  m  a  synthetizcd  form;  like  the  synthetic  mo- 
raent,  it  goes  on  reproducing  not  on  the  desultory,  but 
on  the  accumulative  type;  and  moreover,  it  approaches 
more  the  compound,  accumulative  type.  Unlike  the  syn- 
thetic  moment,  the  recognitive  moment  is  possessed  of 
representative  elements  having  recognition  as  their 
function.  ^  Representative  elements  with  their  function 

recognitive  moment,  but 
abwntmdie  other  lower  moments,  make  a  fundamental 
oioereiiee  m  the  nature  of  reproduction. 

The  reproduction  of  the  recognitive  moment  It  to. 
taUy  different  m  chmcter  from  that  of  the  demhon 

376 


RfeogmUhe  Moment  and  Its  Reproduction  377 

and  synthetic  moments.  In  the  desultory  uiA  tvnthetic 
moments  rcproductfon  is  effected  by  means  of  presenta- 
tiire  ekanoits,  and  actual  recurrence  of  former  experi- 

ence  18  indispensable*  in  th»MiAru».:^\  TT 
nf  A*  .       ^  recognitive  moment  nothmg 

of  the  kmd  IS  required.  The  reproduction  of  the  recog! 

nitive  moment  ,s  effected  only  in  representation,  lL 

momem  with  its  sensory  elements  is  not  reproduced  as 

recurrence,  but  only  symbolized,  or  truer  to  say  subsl 

Til  representative 
elements.  Tht  «pres«titive  element,  the  image,  the 
dea  IS  recognized  a.  ftmctionbg  as  a  «,b.dtite  as 
standing  for  the  presence  of  the  actual  experience  of  the 
ongmal  moment  with  its  nuclear  primanr^d  second^ 

ZTz^r^'    Hi^^her  stages^of  the^z::;: 

^n^?^  »nd  the  act  of 

a^r'    k"**''  ^'"^"^       emphasized  in 

another  subsequent  representation.  In  realitj.  however 
both  m  the  Wer  and  higher  forms  of  the  icoS 
momem^,  t*e  fact  of  recognition  belongs  dire^"^^ 
represoitation  itself;  for  as  we  have  pointed  out  reco^ 
nitjon  ,s  an  essential  function  of  representation  ^ 
Just  as  senwry  elements  express,  or  present  the 
qualities  of  the  external  object,  so  do  re^^t 
.ve  elements  mirror  the  psychic  objects  a.^^ 
^ZSaTr  '^^•'-^^^--ybeexp^^^ 
o^fT^  form:  as  presentation  is  to  the  external 
iJTu'u"  the  presented  object 

resentation  an  be  once  more  represents!  and  this  ht£^ 
«  represented  m  its  turn,  each  subsequent  rep«,d«<^ 
r^res^mng^bstituting  and  mirn,ring  le'p^^g 

*       MpnMM  to  nytdf  the  whole  socns»  and 


NamuU  Mnd  Ahn«rmd  Psychology 

may  further  represent  to  myself  the  fact  of  rcp^ 
rinn  ;tself  which  in  its  turn  may  be  once  in«Mre  repreiciitw 
7a^™The  content  of  the  recognitive  moment 
!„  thb  m^e  of  reproduction,  becomes  more  and  more 
mo«  andmore  different  as  it  proceeds  along 
A^f^fne  b"^^^^^^^         and  further  removed  from  Ae 
orfJnal^xp^^^^^^^  moment  with  its  sensory  element.. 
TtheXTprevalent  forms  of  the  recognitive  mo- 
.       nrocerof  reproduction  does  not  proceed  m 
r  way ;  «;r"u:So:rLps  nearer  to  the  lower  ^pes 
tZ  l^tlt  of  the  types  of  the  synthetic  momentSj^ 

in  other  words  it  ^-P~^^^^^^^ 
representation  has  a  direct  reteraice  "  "      '  . 
presented  in  sense^xperience,  and  "^^J^'^^^ 
L  direct  reference  U  n«.«  or  tea  pr«er«d  thtoogh- 

"rhe  recognitive  noment  is  every  time  reproduced  ir 
rep^nS,  and  although  having  li^ 
tative  element,  with  each  successive  "P"^"*- * 
refers  to  the  same  object  as  presented.  The  modifia 
"o^L  occur  in  the  moment  take  V^^^"^'"^ 
remewttativ*  elements.   Adaptations,  mstead  of  ta* 
^nSeV  means  of  change,  in  the  «n»|7  etoenj 
due  to  suc^ssive  modification  eSected  by  At  *rect  « 
fluence  of  ,timuli  from  external  avronmoit,  .«  n» 
feed  from  the  direct  influence  of  external  a.ndm»^^ 
«d  may  be  effected  within  the  repr«entat.ve  elemen 

th"  moment  itself,  without  having  recour«  to  t» 
modifying  inSuence  of  stimuli.  ^ 

We  have  already  ,how«  that  the  « 
of  rep«««t.tive  dement,  i.  A«r  «~^J^^ 

bondaj.  in  '^^"r^rr"'^.-^  ~- 
gory  elements  are  kept;  repreKntativ*  wsnwow 


Recogmtivt  Moment  and  Its  Reproduction  379 

easily  transpoied,  they  can  enter  into  new  free  associa- 
tions without  requiring  special  external  stimuli  to  break 
the  stable  compound.  The  free  associations  of  repre- 
sentative elements  may  be  dissolved  by  other  representa- 
tions. The  stick  lying  near  by  may  be  kicked  away  by 
my  foot,  but  may  alw  be  represented  as  a  support;  it 
may  be  imaged  as  a  means  of  defense  and  attack,  and 
finally  the  representation  may  be  changed  in  another  di- 
rection, the  stick  may  be  used  as  an  instrument  for 
bringing  down  apples  from  a  tree.  Adaptation  » 
effected  within  the  process  of  representation  before  any 
change  are  introduced  into  actual,  prcsentative  life. 

From  a  teleological  standpoint  one  can  reahze  the 
great  gain  in  the  economy  of  life  reactions  by  a  mode 
of  reproduction  independent  of  and  free  from  the  direct 
influence  of  external  stimuli  with  their  consequent  icn- 
sory  responses  and  motor  reactions,  resulting  in  further 
and  further  modifications  of  the  original  moment.  The 
rccognitive  moment  in  its  growth  and  development  by  a 
series  of  internal  representative  modifications  spares  it- 
self  ill  adapted  sensory  responses  and  motor  reactions. 
This  is  an  immense  gain  to  life,  a  great  aid  and  power- 
ful weapon  in  the  struggle  for  existence. 

Reguded  from  this  ttandpotnt  of  modific^iHon  the 
moment-coiiKiousness  may  be  said  to  par  s  dirough  im- 
portant stages  in  the  course  of  its  development.  The 
stage  of  nott-modifiability  of  content,  then  the  stage  of 
modifiability  of  the  sensori-motor  content,  and  finally 
moiUfubiUty  in  representation.  The  ipcctal  unportancc 
of  the  reoognitive  moment  for  the  being  possessing  it  is 
die  greater  freedom  from  the  dominion  of  the  external 
environment.  External  conditions  are  not  so  literally, 
10  slavishly  reflected  in  the  moment.  Changes  may  oc- 


38o       Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

car  in  ■en»ri4notor  leaction.  and  adaptations  due  to 

representations  alone,  without  any  previous  material 
changes  in  the  external  conditions.    The  recognitive 
moment  carries  its  external  world  in  itself,  m  its  rcpr©. 
sentation,  and  by  affecting  changes  there,  may  bring 
about  changes  in  the  enviromnent,  thus  controUmg 
external  conditions,  instead  of  being  controUed  by  Aem. 
Instead  of  being  driven  by  external  forces  mto  bhnd 
obedience,  into  uninteUigent  adaptations,  the  moment  is 
on  the  point,  even  in  its  lowest  forms,  to  acquire  some 
intelligent  character  in  seeing  ahead,  by  living  over  its 
former  experiences  in  the  states  of  representation,  the 
scnsori-motor  reactions  being  accordingly  modified. 

The  reproduction  of  the  recognitive  moment  is  not 
induced  by  external  stimuli  only,  but  mainly  by  the 
course  of  other  representations.  Without  actually  beun 
confronted  with  the  object  the  representation  of  it  ma) 
any  time  arise  in  the  mind  and  call  forth  new  adapto 
tions  to  the  external  environment. 

The  representation  by  which  the  recognitive  momcm 
effects  its  reproduction  is  not  at  all  a  mode  of  reinrtatt 
ment,  partial  or  complete,  a  mode  charactcrirtic  of  tli 
lower  types  of  moments.  What  the  moment  reproduc* 
is  akog^r  different  in  nature  and  content  from  wha 
has  been  experienced,  or  directly  presented.  What  i 
presented  is  sensory  material,  what  is  reproduced  is  in 
agery,  ideal  "stuff."  Imagery,  ideal  stuff  as  it  if,  it  tti 
mirrprs,  substitutes,  represents  the  '•material"  certainl 
of  sensory  experience. 

From  the  very  nature  of  the  moment  and  mode  < 
its  reproduction  the  original  emotional  tone  of  tl 
experience  is  not  reproduced  by  the  recognitive  m 
ment.     The  emotional  tone  like  the  reit  of  tl 


Rnogmiivs  Mommu  md  Its  RsfroAieikm  jti 

psychic  content  is  represented  in  recognitive  repro- 
duction, but  not  actually  reproduced.  The  great 
gain  of  it  from  a  biologicai  ttandpoint  it  momoiteust 
since  the  momeot'a  reactton  can  be  better  adapted  to  the 
changing  conditions  of  its  environment.  The  repre- 
sentative elements  entering  into  the  idea  or  image  of 
an  object  change  from  reproduction  to  reproduction 
jut  they  always  mirror,  refer  to  the  same  sensory  elo" 
meats  and  compounds;  diey  recognize  thdr  object. 

The  recognition  of  an  ob^ct  or  an  event,  however 
vague,  means  some  experience  that  has  been  lived 
through  before.  In  other  words,  the  representation,  al- 
though experienced,  as  a  present  psychic  element,  must 
have  a  glow  of  pasmess  about  it.  RepreseiUation  is  a 
present  exptrUnee  reftrrmg  to  a  past  Uft,  to  an  event 
that  tt  passing  or  that  has  passed  away.  Representa- 
tion widi  Its  functioa  of  recognition  is  a  reference  to  the 
past. 

This  reference  to  the  past  may  range  from  the  in- 
definite to  the  highly  definite  localization  of  ocperience 
referred  to  the  time  past  This  depends  on  the  develp 
opment  of  the  moment,  of  its  pUce  in  the  scale  of  evo- 
lution. The  higher  the  moment  the  more  definite,  the 
lower  the  less  definite  the  localization 's.   The  dog  in 
recognizing  his  master,  Ulysses,  hardly  knew  the  length 
of  time  the  hero  had  been  away  in  his  battkt  ami  wan- 
derings, although  thr  dog  possibly  had  a  dim  feeling  of 
pastness,  revealing  it  by  the  great  joy  manifested  at 
seeing  his  master,  as  if  his  long  delayed  expectations 
have  been  finally  fulfilled.   If  dogs  are  capable  of  rec- 
ognition at  all,  some  vague  feeling  of  pastness  is  pres- 
ent in  the  recognitive  sKMnei^  however  low  it  my 
stand  in  the  scale  of  develqpment 


''I' 


381       Normal  and  Abnormal  Psychology 

In  the  child  we  find  that  the  time  localization 
is  quite  indefinite.  In  very  young  children  the  fu- 
ture and  the  past  such  as  yesterday  and  to-morrow 
have  no  definite  meaning.  Thai  in  children  of  three 
years  that  have  come  under  my  obienratica  the  appre- 
hension  of  the  past  and  future,  such  as  yesterday  and 
to-morrow  is  still  wanting.  When  the  child  is  told  that 
something  took  place,  he  referred  it  to  a  "yesterday"  in- 
definitely localized  in  the  past.  The  day  before,  a  week 
ago,  a  month  ago,  years  past  are  equally  projected  into 
die  y^p»  past  The  same  hokib  tme  of  the  child-sense 
of  the  future.  "When  is  to-morrow?"  is  a  question  I 
have  been  often  asked  by  intelligent  children  of  three, 
four  and  even  five  years  old.  The  child  recognizes  his 
old  friend  after  a  departure  of  several  nuxiths,  hot  he 
localizes  this  event  far  ofi  in  time,  say  '^yesterday." 

The  reference  to  the  past  becomes  more  and  more 
definitely  localized  in  time,  the  higher  the  recognitive 
moment  rises  in  the  scale  of  evolution.  This  process  of 
localization  of  the  recognized' event  in  the  past  depends 
entirely  on  the  tinw-sense  becoming  fully  defimte  wA 
the  more  or  less  greater  perfection  of  the  oonceptna] 
time  scheme.  Thus  savages  and  the  ignorant  classes 
of  even  civilized  societies  have  an  imperfect  form 
of  time  localization.  The  definiteness  of  localiza- 
tion, however,  is  not  of  material  consequence  as  far  as 
our  point  of  yiew  is  concerned.  For  all  we  imow 
Ulysses'  dog,  the  ape  and  the  infant  ha^'e  no  time-local- 
ization at  all,  what  is  enough  to  state  from  our  psycho- 
logical standpoint  is  the  fact  that  recognition  involves 
some  form  of  pasmess  belonging  to  the  implicated  rep- 
resentative element,  a  pastness  which  in  a  hitler  stage 
beeomes  time-lncaliTattwi. 


R$eogmtw4  Momma  mi  tu  Rtfroimlkm  3S3 

Under  the  influence  of  toxic  matter,  of  narcotics,  and 
in  some  forms  of  mental  diseases,  this  time-sense  may 
swell,  thus  giving  rue  to  the  projectioa  of  cipCTimcB  on 
a  larger  acak  of  objective  time.  Snch  statee  uc  to  be 
found  under  the  influence  of  opium  or  cannabis,  also 
in  some  mental  diseases  when  the  padent  claims  that  he 
is  many  centuries  old.  This  function  of  recognition 
with  its  aspect  of  pasmess  is  ceruinly  present  in  the 
passing  rer  /gnidve  nKwnent.  The  process  becomes  more 
complicated  and  also  more  objectified  in  the  higb«r 
types  of  mrnnent-consdottsness.  In  short,  die  recogni- 
tive  moment-amsctousness  in  addition  to  its  reproduc- 
tion involves  some  form  of  awareness  of  its  being  a  re> 
production  by  its  reference  to  a  past  experience.  Be> 
ing  £reed  from  its  bondage  to  the  present  dfcumeniicee» 
living  in  Ae  by-gone  part  ^  reoognidve  moment  gets 
a  |^mq[»s  of  the  not  yet  bom  future  into  whidi  die  free 
rq>resentadve  elements  are  projected. 


CHAPTER  XXII 


THE  SYNTHETIC  lECOGNTTIVE  MMIBirr 

THE  recognitive  moment  in  its  reproductioi 
may  be  arranged  in  *  ieriet.  The  first  lii 
in  the  series  is  the  sensory  elements  or  coi 
pound.  Let  this  be  expressed  by  A  where 
is  the  sensory  experience,  and  let  a  be  the  representatK 
of  the  first  reprodurtion,  the  next  reproduction  may 
represented  by  *  and  the  succeeding  icriea  by 

^  «^   Each  one  of  the  series  refers  directly 

state  A  with  ita  external  object.   Each  of  them  rec< 
nizes  in  the  reproduced  representation  the  represent, 
formerly  perceived  object  of  the  primary  state  A- Ei 
link  in  the  series  makes  easier  the  occurrence  of  the  ■ 
ceedingone.  The  series  forms  a  progression  m  wh 
the  link  further  removed  from  the  beginnmg  differs  t 
certain  degree  from  the  ones  that  preceded  it.  1 
progressive  difference  is  d    to  the  continuous  progr 
sive  modifications  effected  in  each  successive  ^J^J 
occurrence  or  reproduction  of  the  preceding  hnki.  1 
process  is  one  and  continuous,  and  with  the  progresj 
the  series  of  reproductions  each  following  link  beca 
modified,  emerges  with  greater  ease,  while  the  reco 
tion  is  effected  without  any  difficulty.   Each  prev 
recognition  makes  the  next  one  easier. 

In  the  character  of  its  modification  the  lowe'  forr 
the  recognitive  moment  does  not  differ  from  the 
ment  of  the  synthetic  type  of  consciousness.  Like 
synthetic  moment,  the  modifications  are  not  effected 

384 


IT 

txluctions 
fint  link 
s  or  com- 
.  where  A 
esentation 
m  may  be 
y  Oh  Oh  4Ut 
directly  to 
icm  recog- 
spresented, 
te  A.Each 
of  die  tiic- 
n  in  whidi 
differs  to  a 
I  it.  This 
IS  progress- 
link  by  the 
links.  The 
progress  of 
nk  becomes 
the  recogni- 
ch  previous 

wer  form  of 
am  the  mo- 
I.  Like  the 
effected  con- 


Tkt  SymikttU  RtwgmOM  Mommi  3$$ 

sciously  in  the  moment.  The  modificadont  are  cumula- 
tive, without  there  being  direct  awareness  ci  them.  At 
to  awareneaa  of  the  prenooi  rqEnodnctioa  and  icoofpl- 
tion  eadi  momettt  may  be  coniidered  at  itolated  and 
separated.  The  history  of  the  recurrences,  of  the  re- 
production and  recognition  is  not  given  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  recognitive  m(»nent.  As  in  the  synthetic 
moment,  an  external  observer  is  required  who  ahould 
read  off  the  history  of  die  recogpidve  moment  from  the 
final  forma  taken  by  paycho-phyttological  and  aenaori- 
motor  reactions. 

Expressed  in  a  formula  it  may  be  said  that  each  rep- 
resentation, each  reproduction  of  the  recognidve  mo- 
ment, refers  to  the  object  A  of  the  sensory  state  A  which 
may  be  represented  aa  A^.  Symbolically  ivpreaented 
the  relations  of  die  successive  reproduced  representa- 
tions to  the  object  as  presented  in  state  A  and  to  cadi 
other  in  order  of  their  succession  may  be  expressed  by 
the  following  diagram : 


386       Normsl  tmd  JkmtrmU  Ptytkoha 

In  other  words  the  representative  stotes  in  the  seriw 
of  reproduction  aU  refer  to  the  original  experience  A 
and  each  preceding  stttc  modifies  the  succeeding  one, 
but  the  tucceeding  it«te  does  not  indude  consciously  Ae 
picvtout  reproduction  and  recognition.  The  partial  in- 
terwcting  of  the  circles  indicates  that  the  successive 
states  do  not  include  their  predecessors,  but  are  only  m- 
Buenced  and  modified  by  them.  The  state,  however, 
gets  enlarged  the  further  situated  it  b  in  the  progr«» 
tion  of  the  tenet.  Etch  tute  inherits  only  the  modifi- 
cationt  accumulated  by  the  preceding  ones,  but  it  doei 
not  inherit  the  cognition  or  recognition  of  the  sutc 

itself.  . 

In  this  respect  the  series  of  sutes  going  to  make  uj 
the  recognitive  moment  difiert  from  that  of  tynthetu 
type.  The  tyndiettc  moment  reproduces  by  reintute 
ment  with  modifications  accumulated  in  the  course  ol 
the  process  of  rcprodu':tions.  The  recognitive  momen 
on  the  contrary  da  ^  not  reproduce  by  reinsUtement  o 
presentation,  but  by  representation.  The  pnce^ 
tate  need  not  be  actually  repeated,  and  if  tuch  a  wfei 
MOt  it  pretent  it  it  represented. 

Representation  it  effected  by  different  psychic  ele 
ments.  The  same  or  like  elements  need  not  be  repre 
duced  in  the  moment  of  the  recognitive  type.  In  th 
recognitive  moment  of  the  auge  contidered  by  ut  tud 
a  reinttetement  it  altogether  abtent  The  ttates  follow 
ing  each  other  are  different.  Moreover  they  are  isolatec 
disconnected  m  the  series.  The  links  in  the  scries  ref« 
to  the  same  object  as  presented,  but  they  do  not  refer  t 
each  other  in  the  order  of  their  progression,  state  < 
does  not  refer  to  the  state  •  that  preceded  it,  nor  Aw 
d  refer  to     nor    to     and  so  on.  The  seriss  i 


Tkt  Syutl>*tk  RMgnitht  Moment  3B7 
rtatw  of  tht  i*c«tiiidfi  aowHtf  to  the  ittge  «i&r  w 
ridentioii  do,  however,  effect  modification,  m  the  orjr 
of  their  succession,  a'  modifies  a\  a  modifies  a,  a  modU- 
fies  a\  and  so  on  each  preceding  state  modifying  «e 

succeeding  one. 

The  dog  on  seeing  a  petfon  for  the  second 
or  third  time  may  recogniw  the  fnend  of  his  mas- 
ter,  but  he  does  not  remember  that  he  has  recop 
nized  him  already  on  previous  <><^f«»°~-  jTr^^^ 
when  the  baby  sees  a  strange  person  for  the  fiwt  tmie,  it 
may  become  scared  and  begin  to  cry.  Subieqoeiit  repo- 
tition  of  timiUur  experiences  may  reduce  or  on  the  con- 
trary  may  inctea*  the  fear  element,  but  the  baby  learns 
to  Imow  and  recognize  his  man  and  the  psycho-physio- 
logical  and  psycho-motor  reactions  f  oUow  as  soon  as  tfte 
"man"  is  caught  sight  of.   Reproduction  •«J«coiM. 
tion  become  easier,  but  it  it  qae*on^  whether  the 
baby,  like  the  inteUigent  dog,  in  recognizing  the  person, 
it  aware  of  having  recognized  the  person  on  previous 
occanons.  The  dog  and  the  child  are  aware  of  the  per- 
son  and  recognize  him,  but  they  are  not  aware  of  the 
series  of  preceding  recognitions.   A  form  of  moment 
consciousness  with  a  series  of  isolated  reproductions  ana 
recognitions,  hot  wiA  accumulated  modifications  may 
be  termed  the  syntkeHe  McatmnUtive  recogmttve  mo- 
mtnt. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 


THE  SYNTHETIC  MOMENT  OF  SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 

IN  the  higher  stages  of  the  recognidve  moment 
the  states  in  the  series  are  no  longer  isolated.  Each 
succeeding  state  embraces  or  truer  to  say  includes 
and  represents  the  preceding  one.  The  whole  ser- 
ies is  essentially  an  interconnected  one.  The  states  in 
the  series  not  only  refer  to  die  original  experience  of  the 
object  as  presented,  but  also  to  each  other  in  the  order 
of  their  succession.  Let  A  be  the  original  experience  of 
which  A  is  presentative  and  a  is  representative,  then  the 
state  of  the  recognitive  moment  may  be  represented  by 
a^.  State  a  refers  to  tf^,  and  the  succeeding  state  d  re- 
fers not  only  to  o^,  but  also  to  a.  The  same  holds  true  in 
the  case  of  the  other  states, — a  refers  to  and  «*  and 
not  only  to  d  alone  but  also  to  a;  d  refers  once  more  to 
and  also  to  a*,  a',  a,  and  so  on ;  each  succeeding  state 
refers  to  the  original  experience  and  also  to  the  preced- 
ing states  of  recognition.  In  other  words,  each  state  rep- 
resents not  only  the  original  sensory  experience,  but  also 
scmie  though  not  all  of  the  preceding  series  of  represent 
tations.  There  is,  in  short,  awareness  in  the  act  of  rec- 
ognition. The  preceding  state  modifies  the  succeeding 
one,  and  this  latter  is  fully  aware  of  the  former.  This 
awareness  is  present  during  die  very  occurrence  of  eadi 
state  in  die  series. 
The  reproduced  state  in  its  recogiudon  recog- 

388 


The  Synthetic  Moment  of  Self-Consdonsness  3S9 


nizes  tiie  object  u  presetted  to  sense-experience,  recog- 
nizes, or  is  aware  at  least,  diat  it  has  had  some  such 
recognitions  on  previous  occasions,  and  at  the  same  time 
recognizes,  or  is  aware  of  its  present  recognition.  Such 
a  recognitive  moment,  the  highest  of  all  the  moments- 
consciousness,  is  characteristic  of  the  fully  developed 
adult  human  omsciousness  or  of  self-conscioimiess  and 
may  be  termed  the  synthetic  moment  of  self-conscious- 
ness. The  synethetic  moment  of  self-consciousness 
forms  a  series  of  selves — the  present  or  the  percipient 
self,  the  past  or  the  perceived  self  and  the  intermediate 
selves  connecting  the  two  selves  as  termini,  the  whole 
forming  a  series  synthetized  by  the  life  of  die  syndietic 
moment  of  self-consdousness. 

If  we  retain  our  previous  denotation  of  objects  and 
of  the  series  of  recognitive  states  and  denote  the  recog- 
nitive reproduction  by  attaching  the  denotation  of  the 
presented  object  as  index  to  the  state  dien  die  state  may 
be  denoted  by  0^,  the  succeeding  states  in  the  simple  rec- 
ognitive moment  may  be  denoted  by  a*,  at^, 
The  states  in  the  series  of  the  synthetic  mo- 
ment of  self-consciousness  may  then  be  represented  by 
the  following  formula : 


/I*,  ai 


01,     aa,  a*, 


and  so  on  the  last  being  extremely  complicated . . . 

Graphically  the  synthetic  moment  of  self-cmsdons- 
ness  may  be  represented  as  follows : 


All  tlong  our  analytM  of  reproduction  wc  have  »t  the 
same  time  by  implication  discussed  the  various  types  and 
forms  of  what  may  be  conveniently  termed  as  germinal 
memory  in  the  states  of  consciousness  of  the  lower  ani- 
mals.  Memory,  however,  is  not  present  in  the  lower 
types  of  moment-consdoumett.  Memory  really  begins 
with  the  recognitive  moment  and  reaches  its  full  perfec- 
tion in  the  adult  human  consciousness, — in  the  synthetic 
moment  of  self-consciousness.  It  is  only  in  the  moment 
of  se  ^^-consciousness  that  all  the  characteristics  of  mem- 
ory are  to  be  formed,  namely,  rcproductiwi;  not  rein- 
statement, but  reproduction  after  the  kind  of  the  recog- 
nitive moment,  recognition,  definite  localization  in  the, 
past  and  finally  awareness  of  its  ow-  activity,  or  rather 
self-awareness.    Memory  germinf.tes  and  grows  in  the 
recognitive  moment,  and  blossome  in  the  personality- 
moment. 


APPENDIX  I 


C0NSCI0USNBS8 

In  opposition  to  the  metaphysical  view  that  there  ex- 
ists one  consciousness  and  a  separate  content,  James  in 
his  article  "Does  Consciousness  exist?"  flatly  denies  the 
existence  of  sudi  a  consciousness.  He  lays  stress  on  the 
fact  that  such  a  consciousness  is  of  a  purely  hypothetical 
and  speculative  character.  Psychologically  speaking  all 
there  exists  is  thought,  experience,  inSlc  an  abstract  un- 
differentiated consciousness  may  as  well  be  ^  omitted 
from  the  scheme  of  things.  All  we  deal  with  is  mental 
facts.  James  ridicules  the  position  of  those  who  renrd 
consciousness  as  being  independent  of  content:  'To 
consciousness  as  such  nothing  can  happen,  for  timely 
in  itself,  it  is  only  a  witness  of  happenings  in  time,  in 
which  it  pls.ys  no  part"  .  .  .  "Consciousness  as 
such  is  entirely  impersonal — 'self  and  its  activities  be- 
long to  the  content"  .  .  .  James'  view  is  that  in- 
stead of  an  impersonal  consciousness  we  should  substi- 
tute thought  as  a  function  of  knowing  (James's  italics). 
"To  deny  plumply  that  'consciousness'  exists  seems  so 
absurd  on  ttic  face  of  it — for  undeniably  'thou^ts'  do 
exist — ^that  I  fear  some  readers  will  follow  me  no  farth 
er.  Let  me  then  immediately  explain  that  I  mean  oiUy 
to  deny  that  the  word  stands  for  an  entity,  but  to  inntt 
most  emphatically  that  it  does  stand  for  a  function. . . . 
That  function  is  knowing'  (James'  italics). 

We  can  thus  far  agree  with  James.  When  however 
he  begins  to  speculate  on  unitaryr  stuff  and  pure  simpk 
experience  which  is  both  objective  and  subjective  we 


sition  that  there  is  only  one  primal  stuff  or  material  in 
the  world,  a  stuff  of  wnich  everything  is  composed,  and 

39^ 


39» 


ApptniiM  I 


if  we  call  that  stuff  'pure  experience'  dien  knowing  ca 
only  be  explained  as  a  particular  sort  of  relation  towan 
one  another  into  which  portions  of  pure  experience  ms 
enter."  In  this  respect  James  approaches  perilous! 
close  to  Wundtian  Voluntarism  which  he  does  not  f  avo 
It  practically  means  double  barrelled  experience  whic 
on  the  one  hand  is  objective  while  on  the^  other  it  is  sul 
jective.  As  James  puts  it,  the  same  experience  is  countc 
twice  over  in  one  stream  which  is  external  and  the  oth( 
which  is  internal. 

All  objections  urged  against  Voluntarism  may  1 
brought  against  this  view  which  is  really  nothing  bi 
the  voluntarism  of  Wundt  under  a  different  garb.  Vi 
are  not  better  off  by  the  assumption  of  the  same  expei 
ence  participating  in  two  different  streams.  We  do  ni 
understand  the  streams  any  better  by  assuming  diffe 
ences  which  really  amount  to  the  differences  of  matt 
and  mind,  or  of  matter  and  consciousness. 

James  on  the  one  hand  is  too  metaphysical  and  on  tl 
other  hand  he  wishes  to  eliminate  the  inactive,  impassi' 
consciousness  of  the  idealists  and  of  the  Nco-Kantiar 
He  is  metaphysical  in  assuming  a  pure  experience  whii 
is  both  material  and  mental  and  which  in  its  purity 
neither  mental  nor  material.  His  true  psychologic 
sense  tells  him  that  an  inactive,  passive  consciousness 
a  useless,  futile  assumption.  James  draws  a  sharp  diff< 
ice  between  internal  and  external  experience.  "V 
i.iid  that  there  are  some  fires  that  will  always  bum  ttic 
and  always  warm  our  bodies,  and  that  there — are  sor 
waters  that  will  always  put  out  fires  .  .  .  Ment 
fire  is  what  won't  bum  real  sticks;  mental  water  is  wfc 
won't  necessarily  (though  of  course  it  may)  put  o 
even  a  mental  fire.  Mental  knives  may  be  sharp,  but  th 
won't  cut  real  wood  .  .  ."  In  short,  James  hii 
self  strongly  contrasts  the  two  sets  of  experiences.  Tli 
is  all  that  the  psychologist  requires.  The  rest  of  t 
speculation, — the  identification  of  the  two  streanw 
one  unitary,  primitive  stuff-experioice  doet  not  belo 
to  psyciiology  u  a  science. 


The  whole  view  of  James  is  metaphysical,  and  srill 
with  his  dear  psychological  insight  he  cannot  keep 
away  from  psychological  facts.    He  shifts  from  meta- 
physics  to  psychology:  "The  stream  of  thinking"  he 
says,    (which  I  recognize  emphatically  as  a  phenome- 
non) IS  only  a  careless  name  for  what,  when  scmtinized, 
reveals  itself  as  to  consist  chiefly  of  the  stream  of  my 
breathing.  The  'I  think'  which  Kant  said  must  be  able 
lo  accompany  all  my  objects,  is  the  breath  'I  breathe' 
which  actually  does  accompany  them.   There  are  other 
internal  facts  besides  breathing  ( intercephalic  muscular 
adjustments    •    •    .)  and  these  increase  the  assets  of 
consciousness'  so  far  as  the  latter  is  subject  to  imme- 
diate  perception;  but  breath  which  was  ever  the  original 
spirit ,  breath  moving  outwards,  between  the  glottis 
and  the  nostrils,  is,  I  am  persuaded,  the  essence  out  of 
which  philosophers  have  construed  the  entity  known  to 
them  as  consciousness.    That  entity  is  fictitious  while 
thoughts  tn  the  concpete  are  fully  real.  But  thoughts  in 
the  concrete  are  made  of  the  same  stuff  as  things  are." 
(James  italics).    In  this  passage  James  as  usual  dis- 
plays his  great  psychological  introspection  which  is  un- 
tortunately  complicated  with  metaphysical  considera. 
tions. 

Of  course,  even  from  a  purely  psychological  point  of 
view  we  can  hardly  agree  that  sensations  of  respiration 
and  intercephalic,  muscular  adjustments  are  alone  suf- 
ficient as  elements  of  general  consciousness,  for  as  Ri- 
bot  and  others  have  pointed  out  coenaesthettc  sensa- 
tions, sensations  coming  from  muscles,  viscera,  nerves, 
neurones,  peripheral,  central,  and  sympathetic  nervous 
system,  all  enter  as  elements  in  the  synthesis  of  con- 
sciousness. It  may  be  claimed  that  the  sensations  point- 
ed out  by  James  may  be  predominant,  but  this  is  rather 
questionable.  However  the  case  may  be,  the  identifica- 
tion  of  matter  and  mind,  one  being  objective  and  the 
other  subjective  thought  is  an  adventure  into  the  realms 
of  metafriiysics. 
Jamct  diff^f'at^  tN  fir?  that  bwmt  from  tfa« 


S94 


fire  that  does  not  burn,  the  water  dut  is  really  wet 

from  the  water  which  is  aot  wet,  the  motion  that  obeys 
the  laws  ot  mechanics  from  the  motion  that  does  not 
obey  Newton's  laws.  In  order  to  constitute  water  the 
chen  ist  does  not  mix  oxygen  with  his  thought  of  hydro- 
gen; in  order  again  to  constitute  the  idea  of  water  the 
psychologist  does  not  require  tubes,  retorts,  so  many 
volumes  of  gases  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen.  The  chem- 
ist does  not  put  his  ideas  into  his  chemical  compounds 
and  the  psychologist  does  not  subject  his  mental  states 
to  chemical  tests.  It  is  only  in  metaphysics  that  the 
fundamental  difference  of  mental  states  and  physical  ob- 
jects can  be  explained  away  in  one  unitary  experience. 

I  may  add  that  James  himself  realized  die  trum  of  my 
contention,  for  in  a  private  discussion  with  me  he  ac- 
knowledged that  the  view  taken  by  him  was  puiely 
metaphysical,  that  for  the  psychologist  consciousness  is 
as  much  of  a  reality  as  matter,  atoms,  molecule,  ether, 
election,  in  short,  as  some  form  of  material  substance  ii 
reouisite  for  the  physicist. 

Recendy  some  neo-realists  attempted  to  identify  con- 
sciousness with  energy  and  especi&Uy  with  that  form 
of  energy  known  as  potential  .energy.  Now  we  can- 
not possibly  identify  mental  states  and  processes  widi 
physical  forms  of  energy,  whether  kinetic  or  potential. 
Arthur  Gordon  Webster  in  his  "Dynamics"  points  out: 

"Kinedc  enei^  is  of  the  dimennras  the  same  ai 

T» 

those  of  work.  Potential  Energy  is  defined  as  wor'v, 
The  C.G.S.  unit  of  energy  is,  therefore,  the  er^." 
If  mental  states  or  consciousness  be  potential  energy 
of  the  physicist,  the  neo-realist  should  define  it  in 
terms  of  physical  woric.  How  many  ergs  are  there 
in  the  ideas  of  virtue,  goodness,  and  1  .;auty?  Il 
is  clear  that  if  we  use  the  term  energy  in  the 
case  of  mental  states  or  processes,  we  can  do  it  only  in 
a  figurative  way.  Energy  in  psychology  cannot  be  used 
in  die  same  smse  as  the  physicist  uses  the  term  in  the 


owe  of  kinetic  or  potential  ener|^.  One  cannot  take 
the  mass  of  the  idea  and  multiply  it  on  the  square  of  its 

length.  Such  a  procedure  is  meaningless,  it  is  therefore 
idle  to  talk  of  consciousness  as  potential  energy.  2ner. 
gy  IS  used  m  mental  life  as  a  figure  of  speech,  as  an  il- 
lustration  or  substitute  taken  from  physical  life,  but  en- 
ergy and  consciousness  can  not  be  identified.  When  we 
say  that  an  argument  is  clear,  we  do  not  mean  that  there 
are  no  particles  of  dust  in  it,  or  that  we  can  use  it  as  a 
medium  through  which  we  can  see  objects  distinctly;  or 
when  we  say  of  a  stupid  person  that  he  is  dense,  we  do 
not  mean  that  he  has  a  high  specific  gravity.  G>nscious- 
ness  IS  not  physical  energy. 

It  is,  however,  quite  possible  that  the  potential  ener- 
gy-consciousness of  the  neo-realist  is  neither  the  poten^ 
tial  energy  of  the  physicist  nor  the  consciousness  of  the 
psychologist.  In  this  case  we  once  more  deal  with  some 
general  metaphysical  unifying  substratum  akin  to  the 

pure  experience"  of  James  or  to  the  "uniUry  expert^ 
aicc"  of  Wundtian  Voluntarism;  in  other  words,  we 
cteal  here  again  with  metaphysics  and  not  with  science. 
One  cannot  help  agreeing  with  Calkins:  "Of  late  years 
vigorous  attempts  have  been  made  to  eject  the  term 
consciousness  from  our  vocabulary,  but,  in  my  opinion, 
these  efforts,  though  richly  significant,  are  metaphysical, 
not  psychological,  since  all  are  mainly  concerned  to 
overcome  the  dualistic  opposition  of  psychical  to  physi- 
cal-    For  whether  accurate  or  inaccurate,  the  attempt 

>  balance  the  account  of  thought  and  thing,  that  is,  to 
.  stinguish  psychical  from  physical,  is  concerned  with 
problem  of  ultimate  reality,  not  with  the  explana- 
tion and  description  of  observed  facts,  and  is  dierefore 
metaphysical,  not  scientific  in  character." 

While  on  the  one  hand  there  is  danger  that  psychol- 
ogy, dealing  with  mind,  experience,  knowledge,  is  apt  to 
fall  into  epistemological  and  metaphysical  pitfalls,  on 
the  other  hand  there  is  grave  danger  on  the  side  of  phy- 
siologists and  biologists  to  ickntify  psychic  nets 
with  physiological  and  btobgicil  Itcli.   *- 


39« 


students  of  animal  life  have  made  violent  efftm 

of  merging  psychology  into  biology.  There  is  n( 
doubt  that  motor  reactions,  adjustments,  adapts 
tions,  behavior  must  be  taken  into  consideratioi 
in  the  study  of  psychic  facts,  but  motor  manifesta 
tions  are  of  psychological  significance  only  in  so  fa 
as  they  lead  to  an  interpretation  of  the  inner  subjectivi 
facts,  facte  of  consciousness.  This  knowledge  can  onl 
he  given  through  an  introspective  interpretation  of  tli 
facts  of  behavior. 

We  can  fully  realize  the  non-psychological  attitiid( 
when  we  find  writers  like  Watson  who  wish  to  elimi 
nate  ideas  or  kindred  mental  states  from  psychology,  o 
who  like  McDougall  define  psychology  as  a  science  o 
animal  behavior.  The  peristaltic  movements  of  the  in 
testines,  the  action  of  the  heart,  the  lungs  and  the  live 
belong  to  animal  activities  and  still  they  can  hardly  b 
included  under  psychic  activities.  McDougall  think 
that  "psychologists  must  cease  to  be  content  with  thi 
sterile  and  narrow  conception  of  their  science  as  th( 
science  of  consciousness,  and  must  boldy  assert  its  dain 
to  be  the  positive  science  of  the  mind  in  all  its  aspect 
and  modes  of  functioning,  or  I  would  prefer  to  say 
die  positive  science  of  conduct  or  of  behaviour."  Bu 
even  from  McDougall's  standpoint  mere  movements  dt 
not^  constitute  psychological  material,  they  are  psycho 
lofpcal  in  so  far  as  they  are  the  indications  of  some  in 
ner  subjective  experience,  such  as  sensations,  feelings 
emotions,  strivings,  conations.  Now  it  is  just  thes< 
phenomena  that  n>rm  the  subject  matter  of  psychology 
The  psychologist  regards  behavior  as  the  means  for  ai 
introspective  comprehensicm  of  what  that  behavior  ma] 
indicate  subjectively. 

Psychology,  even  from  McDougall's  standpoint,  i 
after  all  the  science  of  the  mind,  the  science  of  con 
sciousness  which  we  can  study  through  an  introspectiv( 
interpretation  of  motor  reactions  or  behavior.  Know 
ing  introspectlvely  what  fear  is  from  our  own  introspec 
tion  and  from  the  observation  of  the  motor  reactions  tb 


AtptnSm  I 


397 


inttinct  of  fear  gives  rise  to  we  can  interpret  similar  re- 
actions or  behavior  in  our  ne^hbor  or  ia  our  lower  km 
in  the  scale  of  evolution. 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  while  on  the  one  hand 
McDougall  and  oAtn  put  motor  reactions,  conduct 
among  psychic  phenomena,  on  the  other  hand  pure  mo- 
tor phenomena  and  physiological  activities  with  but  the 
rudimenti  of  psvchic  life  are  described  **in  terms  of  the 
three  aspects  ot  mental  life  of  all  mental  processes — 
the  cognitive,  the  effective  and  the  conative,'  'terms  which 
are  really  characteristic  of  the  higher  forms  of  mental 
life.  According  to  McDougall  even  "the  lower  ani- 
mals perceive,  feel,  and  act."  This  reminds  one  of 
Binet's  micro-organisms  possessing  perception,  feeling^ 
and  volition. 


APPENDIX  II 


PHYSIOLOGICAL  TRACES 

My  attention  was  called  to  a  very  valuable  pap 
"Further  Studies  in  the  Chemical  Dynamics  of  the  (a 
tral  Nervous  System,"  by  T.  Brailsford  Robertson,  pii 
lished  in  the  "Folio  Neuro-Biologica"  Band  VII,  loi 
Robertson  advances  an  extremely  interesting  hypoma 
baaed  on  his  bio-chemical  researches.  Basing  himM 
on  the  fact  that  "the  performance  of  mental  work  fi 
tially  facilitates  its  further  performance  and  tubi 
quently  depresses  or  fatigues  it,"  he  builds  up  a  f 
reaching  cnemico-physiological  hypothesis  of  the  mi 
phenomena  of  normal  and  abnormal  mentrl  life, 
quote  freely  from  his  paper  as  it  is  of  importance  ai 
highly  stimulating  to  those  who  wish  to  go  into  the  mo 
technical  scientific  details  of  physiological  research 
regard  to  the  phenomena  of  normal  and  abnorm 
mental  fimction. 

"We  meet  therefore  in  the  exercise  of  a  given  inti 
lectual  function  with  two  apparently  contradictory  fact 
Performance  facilitates  die  exercise  of  die  fimcdcm  ai 
it  likewise  depresses  the  exercise  of  the  function.  "V 
note  furthermore  that  the  facilitation  and  depressu 
become  evident  at  different  periods  of  dme,  the  form 
in  the  earlier  and  the  latter  in  the  later  stages  of  p< 
formance.  Now  this  phenomenon  is  not  at  all  limit 
to  the  functions  of  the  central  nervous  system.  It 
displayed  in  a  very  striking  way  by  a  variety  of  oth 
functions,  for  instance  in  the  contraction  of  the  musd 
in  response  to  stimulation,  whether  direct  or  indirei 
The  phase  of  facilitad(»i  is  displayed  inidally  in  the  W4 
known  'staircase  phenomenon'  and  the  phase  of  d 
pression  by  rigidity  and  inability  to  contract  to  sdmi 
m  response  to  sdmuli  which  formerly  evdted 
re^p<mte.  Again,  as  I  have  shown  in  a  serin  of  ooi 

398 


phenomenon  is  displayed  u 
growth  which  initially  undergoes  acceleradoa  and  there 
^TJ.&HJ^  acceleration  and  slowing 

may  afteniate  a  number  of  times  in  the  same  oraaaiim 
producing  what  I  have  termed  *groirth  cicI«.*TE 
type  of  phenomenon  would  appear  very  generally  dis- 
played m  the  performance  of  life^wdvSies.  and  in- 
deed I  am  inclined  to  think  with  Loeb  that  the  self 
conserving  character  of  the  life-process  wiU  ultimately 
wri  tioiJ^'"""^"  "*  phenomena  of  this 

«„ff"  P^  f  (jl«.<>^,:'g''owA  ardes"  is  significant,  inas- 
mudi  as  it  falls  in  Ime  with  the  fundamental  prindple 
of  reserve  energy  devdoped  by  James  and  myself  from 
different  standpomts.  /  "» 

Robertson  assumes  the  presence  of  physiological 
tracea.     if  the  central  nerve  s  system  conditions  tFiete 
phenomena  at  all,  as  we  bdieve  it  does,  then  the  passage 
of  a  stimulus  through  the  central  nervous  system  must 
lead  through  a  changed  condition  wf  di  for  the  sake  of 
forming  a  concrete  image  we  may  term  in  the  language 
employed  bv  Maudslcy,  the  deposition  of  a  trace  or  m 
the  terminology  of  Earner,  the  excavation  of  a  channel 
(Bahnung)  ....   The   dynamic   conception  of 
trace  formation  regards  it  as  being  due  to  a  chemical 
^eratioH  of  ceU-material  along  the  path  of  the  trace/ 
Wchave  seen  that  trace  formation  is  at  first  facilitated 
by  the  process  which  brings  it  about  and  Uter  depressed. 
•    • •  ,  A*  ""t  a  stimulus  passes  over  the  'trace'  more 
readily,  because  it  has  previously  done  so,  but  at  a  later 
stage  It  passes  over  it  lest  and  less  rea^  until  finally  die 
resistance  is  so  great  as  to  almost  inhibit  its  pasnse 
altogedier.  Recalling  this  fact  we  find  ourselves  mapo- 
sition  to  crystallize  our  problem  and  state  it  in  the  fol 
lowing  terms:  'What  is  die  nature  of  a  chemical  imo- 
tion  which  at  first  takes  place  the  more  readily  in  con- 
sequence of  having  previously  taken  place,  but  at  a  later 
stage  IS  u  -bited  by  its  own  progress?'  When  diis  que*- 
tion  u  addressed  to  a  phytkal  cfiiBmiat  he  does  nrt  Kut 


1 


400 


tate  in  replying:  The  reaction  it  either  catenary  (ax 

sists  of  two  reactions  the  second  of  which  uses  up  tl 
product  of  the  first)  or  it  is  autocatalytic,  i.  e.  one  of  tl 
product!  of  the  reaction  accelerates  the  reaction.'  A 
other  chemical  reactions  are  known  to  the  experience  < 
the  chemist  winch  display  at  any  stage  positive  acceUr 
tion.*' 

The  various  experimental  works  carried  out  by  Ro 
ertson  lead  him  to  the  rejection  of  catenary  reactioi 
and  to  the  assumption  of  autocatalysis.  Basmg  himM 
on  this  hypothesis  of  autocatalysis  Robertson  goes  on  i 
explain  from  a  purely  chemicho-physiological  standpoii 
the  phenomena  of  memory,  of  amnesia,  of  hypnotia  ai 
of  allied  phenomena. 

"Adopting  the  wtirking  hypothesis  outlined  abov 
we  perceive  that  the  canalisation  hypothesis  of  Exni 
can  now  be  expressed  in  a  much  more  definite  and  co 
Crete  form.  Each  inomiing  stimulus  carves  oat  Uat  i 
self  in  the  central  nervous  system  or  deepens  a  pre-e 
isting  channel  in  the  central  nervous  system,  but  tl 
diannel  is  not  a  trough  formed  by  the  physical  displac 
ment  of  particles,  it  is  a  chemical  channel,  •?  thread  ( 
trace  of  the  autocatalyst  of  central  nervous  activities, 
thread  which  need  not  iMcessarily  be  supposed  to  I 
more  than  a  few  times  the  diameter  of  'the  spiiere  < 
molecular  influence'  in  width.  This  deposit  necessari 
follows  faithfully  the  path  pursued  by  the  original  ii 
pulse  and  permits  succeeding  impulses  to  pass  over  tl 
same  patli  more  readily  by  virtue  of  its  presence.  It 
possessed  of  course  of  a  deiinite  spatial  location,  bi 
and  this  is  a  very  important  point,  if  by  any  chance 
should  be  obliterated  or  destroyed  it  Is  not  irreplaceafa 
even  if  the  continuity  of  the  original  path  be  forever  i 
temipted.  For  it  is  only  one  of  a  conceivably  enormo 
number  of  paths  which  might  be  traversed  by  a  stimul 
in  its  passage  from  one  extremity  of  the  original  pai 
to  die  other.  Furthermore,  the  trace  is  capable  of  b 
ing  traversed  by  other  subsequent  or  performed  trac 
in  as  many  different  ways  as  the  axons  suul  gjua^oa  od 


401 


of  die  central  nervous  system  interconimiiiiicate,  that  is, 
i*  ^'{f  ^o^*«dgc  exinidi,  in  a  oamber  of  ways 
Ankf         VnstaaX  porpoaea  may  be  ngaidad  aa  » 

"It  must  always  be  remembered  that  the  trace  conKSti 
ot  a  deposit  of  an  autocatalyst  which  we  arc  obviously 
compeUed  to  assume  is  an  autocatalyst  for  the 
proiMgation  of  tfff  impulses.  It  foUows,  therefore,  that 
It  a  taint  trace  runs  into,  that  is  to  say,  traveraea  or  in- 
tersects a  well-marked  trace,  there  wiU  be  a  tendency  for 
Oie  impulse  forming  or  following  the  faint  trace  to  be 
deflected  completely  at  or  in  a  great  part  into  the  well 
marked  trace.  Indeed  if  the  intersecting  trace  be  suf- 
ficiently well  marked  and  formed  subtrauently  to  the 
faint  trace,  we  can  see  how  impulses  now  arriving  by  way 
ot  the  faint  trace  would  become  so  largely  deHected  into 
toe  new  well  marked  trace  as  to  leave  the  parts  of  the 
famt  trace  remote  from  the  point  of  intersection  almost 
untraversed  by  any  impulses  at  all.  Instances  of  the 
mentol  correlates  of  these  physiconAemical  phaaomena 
abound  m  our  daily  psychic  life." 

In  our  next  book  on  "Sjrmptomatology**  we  shaU  re- 
fer  to  Robertson's  application  of  his  theory  to  the  vari- 
ous phenomena  of  hypnosis,  multiple  |.  rsonality,  am- 
nesia and  various  forms  of  dissociation.  I  wish  here  to 
call  attention  to  Robertson's  valuable  paper  and  pobt 
out  his  relation  to  the  hvpothesis  of  unconscious  cere- 
bration on  the  one  hand  and  to  my  psycho-biological 
doctrines  of  the  moment-consciousness  on  the  other. 

Robertson  fuUjr  realizes  the  shortcomings  and  crude- 
nns  of  the  physiological  theories  advanced  by  many 
physiologists  to  the  effects  of  crowding  out  mental  phi 
nomena  or  consciousness,  the  very  phenomena  which  the 
physiological  theories  were  constructed  to  explain  phy- 
siologically or  rather  to  follow  out  physiologically  step 
by  step.  As  I  have  insisted  in  this  volume  a  physiolog- 
ical correlative  must  be  postulated  for  all  phenomena  of 
consciousness.  This  however  is  far  from  denying  the 
mantal  facta  dteraaalm  and  tiHia  bdoglaft  with  iiplif. 


siological  hypothesis  instead  of  the  facts  themselv 
for  which  this  hypothesis  was  a>iistructed.  When 
physiologist  or  biologist  constructs  a  physiological  h 
pothesis  as  a  correlative  of  consciousness  he  is  so  carri< 
away  widi  it  diat  he  soon  forgets  the  purpose  of  d 
hypothesis  and  proceeds  to  deny  the  main  facts.  From 
purely  scientific  standpoint  we  must  postulate  that  eat 
and  every  act  of  experience,  of  consciousness  has  a  ph 
siological  correlative,  a  point  on  which  I  have  laid  spe 
ial  stress.  The  reasoning  of  a  Newton,  Aristotle,  ai 
Plato  as  well  as  the  moral  thoughts  and  feelings  of  pi' 
phets  and  saints  have  their  physiological  correlative 
This  however  would  not  mean  that  all  those  experienc 
of  genius,  intellectual  and  moral,  are  unconscious  cei 
bratimis  devoid  of  all  conscious  awareness.  Under  su( 
conditions  it  is  best  to  stick  to  the  facts  and  regard  tl 
physiological  hypothesis  as  a  pretty  speculation  whi( 
may  do  more  harm  than  good,  inasmuch  as  it  distnu 
the  attention  from  the  facts  at  issue. 

What  I  claim  is  that  a  good  deal,  if  not  the  most  i 
what  is  described  as  subconscious,  is  essentially  of  tl 
same  inner,  subjective  experience  of  what  we  c^erwi 
describe  as  conscious  awareness,  inasmuch  as  introsp< 
tive  experience,  both  direct  and  indirect,  given  by  imm 
diate  experience  and  by  memory,  as  well  as  by  reactio 
and  behavior  are  the  same  as  found  in  fully  conscio 
states.  If  we  deny  awareness  to  subconscious  manifest 
tions,  such  as  hyimosis  and  allied  states,  we  should  al 
call  in  question  the  awareness  of  all  other  similar  stat( 
It  goes  without  saying  as  I  have  pointed  that  hypnoi 
and  allied  states  being  phenomena  of  consciousness  mi 
have  a  physiological  correlative,  but  it  is  still  to  1 
proven  that  in  such  states  there  is  only  a  physiologic 
process  without  any  conscious  accompaniment.  We  m; 
as  well  claim  that  the  Iliad,  Hamlet,  the  Principia,  d 
Parthenon,  Venus  de  Milo  and  other  creations  of  geni 
are  the  result  of  physiological  processes.  In  a  certa 
tense  the  daim  is  true,  there  is  a  phjrsiologicai  oorrd 
tive  to  the  highest  niglit  of  geBiut,  but  it  it  mi 


JfptwAi  11  403 

ifestly  absurd  to  omit  the  conscious  elements  that  go  to 
constitute  the  very  essense  of  what  we  regard  as  genius. 

Conscious  and  subconscious  dK .  iuTTiena  have  alike  phy- 
siological correlatives  and  ')cth  of  thf:iu  are  character- 
ized by  consciousness,  ai^iircness,  and  feeling.  The 
subconscious  is  a  conscious  m:,  an  oth  r-eonsdousness, 
a  consciousness  other  than  J»e  ujual  personal  conscious- 
ness. 

Robertson  is  fully  aware  not  only  of  the  crude  at- 
tempts of  what  he  terms  static  physiological  theories, 
but  also  of  the  fallacy  of  denying  consciousness  and  in- 
stalling in  its  place  physiological  currents,  traces,  and 
deposits.  "It  must  be  admitted"  he  says,  "that  the 
sporadic  attempts  which  have  been  made  from  time  to 
time  by  biologists  to  advance  interpretations  of  the  phy- 
sical correlates  of  psychic  phenomena  have  seldom  been 
either  well  judged  or  attended  by  any  measure  of  suc- 
cess." In  another  place  he  says ;  "The  static  conception 
as  that  developed  by  Munk  and  Ziehen,  regards  the 
'trace'  as  some  structural  modification,  some  physical  al- 
teration, an  alteration  in  other  words  in  the  distribution 
of  cell-matter  in  space.  I  have  elsewhere  dwelt  rtdier 
at  length  upon  the  more  manifest  objections  to  this 
pint  of  view,  at  least  in  the  crude  form  in  which  it  has 
itherto  been  presmted.  It  would  require  each  idea, 
mental  image  and  conception  to  be  very  strictly  local- 
ized. Such  a  localization  of  ideas  has,  of  course,  never 
been  demonstrated.** 

The  "trace"  is  conceived  by  Robrrtson  in  (hmMiuc 
terms.  This  dynamic  "trace,"  the  correlative  of  mem- 
ory, conscious  and  subconscious,  is  more  or  less  per- 
manent, because  "the  persistence  of  memories  proves 
that  the  'trace,'  whatever  it  may  be  it  ndMr  pei^ 
manent  and  only  very  slowly  fades  away.** 

Robertson  fully  realizes  die  importance  of  die  sub- 
conscious for  the  conscious  activity.  "The  phenomena  of 
subconscious  memory  reveal  clearly  that  memories  may 
penitt  from  childhood  to  advanced  maturity  without 
mterm9diat«  •elf'COiitcioat  recollection  to  nmfote^  the 


404  Apptn£x  11 


trace.  Occasional  subconsdous  recollection  cannot  o 
course  be  ruled  out,  but  it  must  be  rare  in  many  casei 
tor  otherwise,  as  Sidis  has  pointed  out,  our  entire  mer 
tal  hfe  would  be  occupied  in  recollecting." 

In  speaking  of  the  static  physiological  theories  Rot 
ertson  says:    Sidis  proceeds  to  dispose  of  all  thes 
tiieones  collectively  on  the  ground  that  a  mere  modi 
hcation  left  behind  as  a  trace  cannot  possibly  explain 
memory,  recollection,  the  fact  of  referring  a  particula 
bit  of  experience  to  an  experience  felt  before."  Robert 
son  fullv  sees  the  function  of  the  physiological  theoriei 
as  correlatives  of  conscious  states,  not  as  substitutes.  H< 
realizes  fully  that  the  function  of  a  good  physiologica 
theory  of  the  physiological  correlatives  of  conscioui 
states  IS  not  the  ruling  out  of  the  subjective  phenomena 
which  after  all  form  the  real  material  of  investigation 
He  assumes  the  presence  of  consciousness  as  a  datum  tc 
which  he  wishes  to  find  a  physiological  correlative, 
buch  criticism  he  goes  on  to  say  "is  perfectly  sound,  ii 
these  theones  are  seriously  advanced  as  'explanations' 
(rather  as  substitutes  as  I  wculd  say  considering  the  hy- 
pothesis  of  the  subconscious  advanced  recently  by  some 
writers  on  the  subject)  of  the  subjective  experience  of 
memory.   A  subjective  experience  of  recollection  can  no 
more  be  identified  with  a  physical  modification  of  a 
nerve  elenient  than  the  subjective  experience  of  a  given 
color  can  be  identified  with  a  particular  wave  length  of 
light.    But  I  submit  that  regarding  memory  from  an 
objective  standpoint  as  a  pure  objective  fact  (modifica- 
tion  of  the  present  as  a  result  of  previous  reactions  to 
stimuh)  It  demands  objective  interpretation  with  pre- 
cisdy  the  same  force  as  any  other  objective  fact." 

That  memory  has  physiological  correlatives  we  must 
regard  as  one  of  the  fundamental  assumptions  of  psy- 
chology,  both  normal  and  abnormal.  What  I  protest 
against  is  the  metaphysical  "Unconscious"  which  claims 
to  take  the  place  of  subjective  facts.  The  Unconscious 
(with  a  capital  U)  as  formulated  by  Carpenter,  Ziehen 
and  by  other  modern  writers,  under  the  belief  and  pa». 


Append  II 

sibly  with  Ae  good  intention  of  being  more  scientific,  in- 
troduces Hartmanian  metaphysics  of  the  marvels  of 
the  Unconscious  into  psychic  life.     We  must  re- 
member  once   for  all   tHt   "deposits  of  images 
in  memory  ganglion  cells,"  "unconscious  disposi- 
tjons,      neurograms"  and  other  kinds  of  figura- 
hve  representations,  are  in  the  last  resort  figura- 
tive  images  which  may  help  to  picture  the  possibility 
of  physiological  correlatives  of  psychic  states,  but  they 
cannot,  from  their  very  nature,  replace  the  real  facts,  the 
facts  of  consciousness    As  soon  as  such  claim  is  made 
by  the  Unconscious"  it  must  be  declared  to  be  what  it 
really  is,  namely  a  speculative  hypothesis  of  certain 
mental  phenomena  which  alone  constitute  the  real  facts. 

Ferhaps  it  is  m  place  to  add  a  few  words  as  to  the 
hypothesis  of  autocatalysis  in  relation  to  what  Robert- 
son  disoisses  as  Sidis'  hypothesis  of  neuron  disaggre- 
gation  Robertson  thinks  that  the  theory  of  neuron  dis- 
aggregation stated  from  the  standpo?  :  of  neuron 
retraction  should  be  abandoned.  It  seems  to  me 
however,  that  the  theory  of  neuron  disaggre- 
gation or  of  systemic  neuron  disaggregation  does 
not  depend  on  the  theory  of  neuron  retraction.  The 
latter  IS  provisional.  Systems  of  functioning  neurons 
may  be  thrown  out  of  association  due  to  chanzes  of 
thetr  thresholds.  This  rise  and  fall  of  threshold  devel- 
oped  m  my  Multiple  Personality  puts  the  hypothesis  of 
neuron  disaggregation  on  a  more  solid  and  more  certain 
physiological  basis. 

In  fact  the  rise  and  fall  of  thresholds  of  neuron 
systems  may  be  very  well  stated  in  Robertson's 
own  hypothesis  of  autocatalysis.  The  theory  of 
the  rise  and  fall  of  thresholds  is  based  on  a  scries  of 
known  physiological  and  psychological  facts.  It  is 
quite  iXMsible  that  the  rise  and  fall  of  thresholds  which 
gives  nse  to  neuron  disaggregations  with  its  accompany- 
ing phenomena  of  dissociation  are  ultimately  due  to 
change!  in  the  formation  of  systems  of  autocatalytic 
pfo^iets.   Should  the  latter  hyp^hestt  be  proven  I 


4o6 


ApptnSu  // 


th'  k  the  theory  of  neuron  disaggregation  would  rest  oi 
a  are  chemico-physiological  basis. 

The  theory  of  neuron  disaggregation  may  wel 
be  stated  in  Robertson's  theory  of  autocatalysi 
correlative  with  psychic  phenomena.  In  fact,  Rob 
ertson  himself  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  his  theor 
does  not  fundamentally  clash  with  mine,  the  two  ma^ 
in  fact  be  in  full  accord.  "Abandonment  of  the  poshi 
late  o  neuron  disaggregation,"  (nther  neuron  retrac 
tion)  Robertson  concludes  his  paper,  "does  not  in  thi 
least  involve,  however,  rejection  of  the  really  essentia 
features  of  Sidis'  hypodiesis  of  'moment  consdousiMSS. 
My  hypothesis  does  not  traverse  the  hypothesis  of  Sidis 
it  merely  supplements  it  and  renders  necessanr  a  read 
justment  of  me  physiological  equivalents  of  his  termi 
nology.  From  Sidis'  point  of  view  the  full  wakina  con 
sciousness  may  be  likened  to  a  pyramid  having  for  it 
base  a  greater  or  smaller  number  of  'moments  conscious 
ness.*  From  my  point  of  view  it  may  be  likened  to  i 
comp'icated  textile  fabric  built  up  out  of  the  psydiica 
correlates  of  a  greater  or  smaller  number  of  mtercon 
nected  traces.  It  is  obvious  that  for  the  purpose  ol 
purely  psychological  analysis  the  two  hypotheses  are  al 
most  completely  interchangeable;  but  for  Sidis*  'mo 
ments  consdoumeM*  we  must  read  not  'neurones,*  ba 
'traces,'  'channels,'  or  'deposits  of  autocatalyst.' " 

The  criticism  passed  on  Robertson's  theory  that  i 
fails  to  account  for  omservation  of  memory  is  unjusti 
fied.  Robertson's  theory  is  fidly  adepts  to  explaii 
conservation  of  OMmoriei. 


INDEX 


Abnormal,  47,  48 

moment,  283 

psychology,  119,  122,  203, 
330 

type,  45,  47,  48 
Absence  of  controlling  agency, 

394 

Absolute  moment,  23 

desultory    moment,  230, 
240 

Accidental  processes,  96 
variations,  96,  98 

Accumulative  m(Mnent,  248 
moment,  simple,  241 

Acquired  charKters,  319,  330 

Activity,  105 

change  of,  26 
mental,  79.  97 >  186 
mental,  of  moment,  387, 
288,  290,  293 

Adaptation,  88 

Aesthetic,  18 

Affect,  44 

Affection,  44 

Affective  state,  134 

Agency,  abaence  of  contndling, 

294 

Aggregate,  moment,  248,  254, 

255.  257,  294.  3il»  314 
threshold  of,  304 
Amnesia,  46,  284,  288,  389, 
390,  391,  32s 
post-hypnotic,  303,  306 
Amorphous  life,  334 

psychosis,  334 
Aniooal  life,  38 

^a  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  ^IM^fl^^^S^^^AI^B^^^feAA 

AUBBCJUUnDCT  01  COaKMNNBM, 

9ff  9« 


Aphasia,  46 

Arc,  reflex,  12 
Aspect,  social,  37 

ideological,  90,  91,  95 
Assimilation  by  moment,  373, 

273,  375.  277.  282,  283, 

284 

Assimilation,   power  of,  375, 

277.  284 
Association,  condguitjr  oi,  359, 

361 

contrast,  359,  361 
immediate,  210,  212 
indissoluble,  268 
mediate,  209 
by  resemblance,  359,  361 
by  similarity,  363 
AMumption,  16,  69,  70^  a03. 
206 

Attention,  process  of,  99 
Attributes,  sensory,  160,  163 
Automatic,  recognitive  moment, 
370 

Automatism,  186, 193, 249^  371, 
285 

pqrdKdt^QT,  190 

Baldwin,  164,  166,  167,  168, 

169,  172 
Behavior,  119 

hypothesis,  43 
Behaviorist,  views  of,  43 
Bergson,  119,  I39i  140.  I4ti 

303,  304.  372.  373>  374 
Biological  activity,  30a, 

303 

proceM,  87,  9O1  91*  9h 
9S>  96.  138 


4o8 


Index 


Biosis,  39 

Bnin  currents,  190 

currents,   localization  of, 
24 

Biichner,  57 

Cabanis,  57 
Qiusal  necessity,  85 
Causation,  efficient,  88,  92 
final,  88 

principle  of  efficient,  91 

purpose,  88 
Cause,  die,  lOi 
Censor,  101 

Central  elements,  134,  135 

experience,  235,  236 
Cerebration,  unconscious,  175, 
176,  177,  178,  180,  183. 

184 
Chance,  100 

thought,  99 
Chemo  taxis,  130 
Co-conscious,  the,  207 
Coefficient,  ideational,  165,  170 

memory,  166 

of  reality,  166,  168 

of  representation,  165 

sensory,  165,  170 
Coexistent,  80,  no 
Cognition,  immediate,  365 

mediate,  365 

Omiplexes,  mental  suppressed, 

198,  199.  aoo,  203 
Compound,  perceptual,  151 
psychic,  133 

i^tlietic    moment,    241  > 

337.  341.  343 

qmtlietic   mcKnent,  accu- 
mulative, 341*  343 
Conditional  reflexes,  all 

stimulus,  211 


CooKUMisness,  13,  15,  19,  a< 

23,  24,  30,  31,  32,  3: 
41.  42,  59,  60,  62,  7] 
79,  82,  83,  98.  106,  105 
108,  III,  112,  113,  13^ 
136,  184,  188,  189,  I9( 
206,  229,  230,  231,  99. 
296 

antediamber  of,  97 
content  of,  186 
desultory,  256,  257,  32; 

323 
double,  290 
figured,  152 

focus  of,  258,  259,  275 

280,  281 
moment,   214,  229,  23a 

233,  234,  235 
passive,  194 
selective,  96 
Omstellation  of  monoents,  254 

Oxitent,  49,  231 

mental,  49,  194,  195,  231 
•of  the  precept,  132 
psychic,  46 

Content  of  consdenoe,  14,  ij 
186 

Contiguity  of  association,  359 
Continuity,  mental,  287,  293 
principles  of,  82,  83,  86 

96 

Contrast,  assodation  of,  359 
361 

CtMitroUing  agenqr,  absence  of 
294 

Corporeal  individual,  37 
Criterion  of  perceptive  truth 
165 

Crms  section  of  moment,  236 

Cumulation,  process  of,  263 
Currents,  brain,  190 


Index 


409 


Darwin,  47,  90 
Data  of  science,  15 

Day  reveries,  99 
Degeneration,  mental,  296 

process  of,  313,  315 
Delusion,  the,  283,  284 
Descartes,  42,  186 
Desire,  109 

Desultory  moment,  239,  243, 

323,  327.  329,  343,  344. 

345,  346,  347»  348,  34ft 

365,  377 
Desulteiy  nKWient  of  consdous- 

ness,  256,  257,  322,  323 
Desultory  moment  of  self-con- 

sdousneas,  345 
Desultoiy  moment,  teamen^ 

324 

Desultory  type,  346 
Disaggregation,  308,  309 
mental,  310,  313 
of  moments,  308 
of  moments,  law  of,  309, 

311,313 
of    moments,  process  of, 
296 

Diseases,  functiomd,  75,  76 

mental,  3",  314 
psychopathic,  271,  284 
Dissociated  moment,  330 
Dissodation,  76,  150,  153,  158, 
159,  163,  186,  188,  189, 
197,  216,  217,  223,  230, 
271,  284,  295,  308,  369, 
375 

Dissolution,  process  of,  314 
Disturbance,  psychc^athic,  296 
Doctrine,  ^tnodstie,  64 
Dominant  moment,  284 
Double  consciousness,  290 
I^'ewns,  99,  307 


PFoamogenesis,  217 

<rf  dissociation,  295,  303, 
304 

Ebbinghaus,  49 

Effident  causation,  pxiadpU  of, 
91 

Elements  of  affective  state,  134, 

137 

central,  134,  135 
freedom  of,  354,  355 
nuclei,    127,    131,  13a, 

135,  136 
of  objective  state  pranaijr, 

137 

sensory,  primary,  137,  319 

sensory,    secondaiy,  137, 
„     .  138,  145,  319 
Emotion,  44 
Emotional  states,  113 

tones,  134 
Energy,  ao,  21,  79,  80,  ia8, 
216,  218,  las,  335 

Idneric,  20 

nervous,  318 

neuron,  218 

principle  of  subconsdous, 

270,  277 
reserve,   219,   220,  221, 

322,  223,  224,  235,  336 
Epilepqr,  equivalent  of,  ai8 
idiopathic,  202 
psydiic,   317,   318,  391, 

295 

Epistemology,  27,  30,  no,  1 18 
Equivalent  of  epHtpgy,  318 
Errors,  99 

Essence  of  peroq>t,  13a  '< 

Ethics,  18 

Evolution,  47,  91, 354,  a75i  aSy 


410 


^xpetknce,  inunedtite,  69,  70 
mednte,  70 

unitoiy,  57,  68,  69 
Ewernal  reality,  26,  130,  164, 

Faculty  hypothesis,  358 
Faith,  retlm  of,  196 
Falladous  percept,  141 
Fallacy,  21,  24,  35,  190 

psychologkad,    33,  113, 

"4,  »i7,  laa,  ia5, 171, 

34b 

psychologist's,  229 
Familiarity,  367,  368,  369,  371, 

Family  moment,  Z74 
Fatigue,  303 

Fechner,  59,  298,  300,  301 
Figured  consciousness,  i<a 
Finality,  83,  88,  89 
principle  of,  83 
Focus  of  consciousness,  358, 350. 

.  279,  280,  281 
Food  instincts,  310,  311 
Forgetfulness,  303 
Free  assodation,  356,  357 
aggregate,  304,  305 
Function  of  moment,  360,  365, 
290,  394,  327,  336 
of  percq>t,  128 
of  substitution,  162,  163 
periodicity  of,  317,  318 
Functional  diseases,  75,  76 

psychosis,  154,  163,  192, 
304 


Galtm,  97 

Gap,  mental,  293 

classification  of,  393 
P^ic,  387,  388,  390^ 
»9h  39a,  393 


CSeneric  recognition,  343,  34 

Genms,  99 
Gewnetry,  11,  14 
Growth  of  momn^  360^  36 
363 

Gueaw,  method  of,  380 

Habit,  314,  312,  319,  345 
HaUuanations,  27,  141, 

146,  149,  153,  154,  15, 

„  »58,  164.  165.  17" 

Hartley,  125,  361 

Hwbert,  199,  200 

Hij^i  type  moment,  230,  351 

Hobbs,  136 

Hoffding,  170,  30S,  307 
Hume,  125 
Hypnj^gic,  39 
Hypnoidal  state,  99,  212,  279, 
280,  282,  291,  325,  349 
Hypnoidic  state,  346 
Hypnoidization,  282 
Hypnosis,  46,  84,  176,  177, 
179.  188,  371,  379,  3B0, 
285,  387,  390^  391,  305, 
349 

Hypnotic  individuality,  189 

faculty,  358 
Hypothesis,  301,  202 
faculty,  358 
materialistic,  57 
psychological,  73 
psycho-physiological,  73 
^iritualistic,  51,  53 
tranmnrion,  59,  f , 

Ideas,  44,  66,  97,  1x4, 115,  sifi, 
"7,  120,  134,  135,  135, 
138,  141,  14a,  147,  164, 
.190,  230^  242,  360b  361 

pamful,  2Q3 

203 


Indtx 


!«»«■»,  43,  122,  123.  125,  135, 
138,  139,  140,  141,  14a, 

^tV  '1^'  '65, 
166,  169,  170,  171,  17a, 

204,  230,  361 
memoiy,  166 
object,  204 
subjective,  204 
substitution  by,  162,  163 
Immediate  assodation,  aio,  aia 

experience,  69 
Imperative  concepts,  349 

impulses,  295 
Impulses,  imperative,  395 
uncontrollable,  349 
Increase  of  sensation,  300,  302 
Indissoluble  assodation,  m6 
Individual,  89,  90 
corporeal,  37 
Individuality,  psychic,  231 
Inhibition,  214,  215,  216,  aig, 
T  .  "3,3a5 
Insistent  ideas,  170 
Instinctive  reactiwi,  268,  269 
Instincts,  309,  310 
food,  310,  311 
periodic,  217 
»«,  310,  311 
sodal,  310,  311 
Intellect,  realms  of,  196 
Intensity,  160,  161,  162,  163 

of  stimulation,  297 
Intermediate  Imb,  ao8,  aog. 
210 

mental  links,  212 
Internal  realitjr,  171 
Introspection,  44,  192 
Investigation,  methods  of,  49 
Irradiation,  146,  15a,  153,  304 

James,  William,  59,  laa,  15a, 

200,  270,  374 

Kmetic  energy,  ao 


411 


KflIpe,  lao 

Ladd,  5a 
Lamark,  91 

L«w  of  degpnenition,  313,  315 
of  disaggregation,  309, 311, 
312 

of  thresholds,  215 

»     'y*^'*.  297,  298 
Life,  87 

amorphous,  324 

animal,  38 

mental,  100,  101 

moral,  310,  311,  312 

personal,  310,  311,  31a 

processes,  87 

psychic,  24,  230,  231 
Likeness,  relatioa  of,  363 
Logic,  18,  22 

Low  trpn  of  moment,  250, 251, 
asa,  353, 257, 285,  a86 


Mach,  102 
Maimon,  187 
Mania,  314 
Material  nature,  19 
Materialistic  typothesis,  57 
Matter,  20,  34,  57,  204 
Medianics,  15,  20 
Mechanism,  d^ition  of,  90 
Mediate  assodation,  309 

experience,  70 
Melancholia,  311,  314 
Meltzer,  223 

Memory,  46,  49,  139,  140,  182, 

m,  19a,  203, 289, 290, 
374, 390 

image,  166 
Mental  activity,  79,  97 

cwnplexes,  suppressed,  198, 

199,  200,  203 
content,  194,  195 
271.  287 


9 


4ia 


Mental  contmuity,236,  249, 253 
degeneration,  286 
disaggregation,  310,  313 
diseases,  311,  314 
energjr,  ai 
Sap>  293 
life,  100,  loi 
movement,  278 
process,  16,  80,  87 
purpose,  315 
selection,  162 
state,  37 

synthesis,  53,  54,  294 

synthesis,  principles  of,  114 

system,  162,  213,  214 
Metophysics,  15,  22,  23,  29,  3P, 

57.  no,  118 
Method  of  biology,  50 

of  content,  46 

of  function,  / 

of  guesses,  280 

of  psychology,  50 
Mill,  J.  S.,  120,  202 
Mind,  24,  33 

Modification  of  mom»vtt,  26a, 

318,  334,  337 
Moleschott,  57 
Moment  absolute,  239 

i^lute  desultory,  230, 
240 

aggregate,  254,  255,  257, 
294,  304,  305,  307,  3", 
314 

assimilation  by,  272,  273, 
375,  276,  277,  28a,  a83, 
284 

assimilative  power  of,  275, 

277,  284 
compound  synthetic,  241 
consciousness,    66,  116, 

214,  229,  232,  233,  234, 

235,  236,  249,  260,  265, 

271,  27a,  a75,  377 


Moment,  cross  section  of,  2 
cumulative,  240,  387 
desultory,  239,  243, 

327,  329.  344,  346. 
desultory  of  self-consci 

ness,  245 
disaggregation,  295, 
dominant,  284 
family,  274 
forces,  259 

function  of,  360,  337,  ' 
336 

generic,  recognitive,  : 

244 

low  forms  of,  257,  258 
percept,  a6o,  277 
perceptual,  237,  260,  27 
purpose  of,  260 
recognitive,     241,  2 

244,  376,  377,  378,  3 

381,  382,  383,  384,  3 

386,  388,  389 
recognitive    of  self-c 

sdousness,  345 
recurrent,  324 
reflex,  239,  240,  317,  3: 

322 

representative,  381,  386 
reproductive,    264,  2( 

317,  318 
self-consciousness,  388,  3I 

390 

sensitivity  of,  266 

simple,  accumulative,  24 

single,  synthetic,  337,  33I 

specific,   recognitive,  a^ 
243,  244,  245 

stage,  260,  277 

structure  of,  237 

synthetic,  240,  241,  326 
327.  329,  330,  331,  33 
336,  337.  33*^,  341,  34 
343,  344.  345.  346,  34 


Index 


413 


Moment,  synthetic,  348,  ita 
376.  384,  386,  388 
^thetic    compound  ac- 
cumulative, 341,  343 
S3mthetic  of  self-conscious- 
ness, 245 
threshold,  214,  216,  aao, 

397,  308 
type  of,  239,  253 
Moments,  abnormal,  283 
constellation  of,  254,255 
inter-relation  of,  294 
organization  of,  254 
subconscious,  277,  279 
submerged,  259 
Multiple  personality,  290 
Multiplicity,  115,  116 
Mysticism,  197 


Narcosis,  312 

Natural  selection,  96,  201,  221, 
aa5,  273,  307,  309.  319. 
329,  337,  341.  345 

ixature  of  thmgs,  204 

Necessity,  causal,  85 
principal,  85 

Nervous  energy,  218,  219,  220 

Neurasthenia,  223,  226 

Neuron  aggregate,  218 

Neurosis,  24,  39,  78 

Normal,  the,  45,  47,  48 

Normal  p^chology,  200 

Nudd  elements,  127,  131,  135, 
136 

Object,  community  of,  a7 
Objective  images,  204 

time,  244 
Ontogenesis,   249,   252,  256, 
257.  268,  285,  310,  331 
Untogenetic  series,  13 
Organic  unity,  90,  91,  263 
Organism,  de^ition  of,  90 


Ovenctjoot  295 

Pain,  ao2,  203 
Painful  ideas,  203 
Parallelism,  64,  78 
Paranoia,  283 
Pathological  states,  346 
Pathology,  74,  103 
Pavlow,  210,  an,  aia,  371 
Pearson,  103 

Percept,  89,  126,  128,  130,  131, 
133,  135,  137,  138,  144, 
H9,  150,  159,  165,  171, 
172,  174,  276 
Perception,  content  of,  13a 
essence  of,  132 
function  of,  138 
structure  of,  127 
theory  of,  119 
Percq)tual  compoond,  151 
moment,  2" / 
synthesis,  150 
Periodicity  of  function,  21S 
Personality,  28,  192,  375 
Persons,  27,  28 
Pflefer,  302,  303 
Philosophy,  i6,  22 
Phylogenesis,  249,  a5a,  309, 
329,  331,  338 
object,  29,  30 
Ph)rsical  phenomena,  a6 
process,  84,  85 
series,  78,  87 
universe,  29 
Physiology,  86 
Hato,  170,  175 
Pleasurable  ideas,  203 
Post-hypnotic  amnesia,  305 

suggestion,  217 
Postulate,  16,  17,  22,  23,  30, 
67,  82,  106,  no,  nr, 
iia 

of  93fdio!og]r,  67,  68,  106 


414 


Precept,  sodal,  a6 
Presentations,  351,  336 
^esentative  elements,  352,353 
Primary  elements  oi  objective 

state,  137 
Princ^le  of  continuity,  83,  86 
<^  effideat  CMMtion,  91 

9a 

of  finality,  83 

of  finiteness,  83 
of  necessity,  85,  86 
of  reserve  energy,  219 
Processes,  accidental,  96 
accumulative,  263 
biological,  87,  91 
mental,  16,  80,  87 
psychic,  26,  84,  85,  87, 
107 

psychological,  96 
Psychastfaenta,  233,  236 
P^chic  compound,  133 

content,  49,  231 

epilepqr,  218,  292 

gm>>  287,  290,  291 

modification,  265 

object,  29,  30 

phenomena,  26 

postulate,  106 

process,  24,  25,  26,  76, 
82,  83.  84,  85,  87,  105, 
"2,  135 

series,  78 

state,  31 
Psychiatry,  74 

Pycho-biological  element,  319 
P^rdwlogical  fallacy,  35,  171, 
172 

hypothesis,  73 
laws,  16 
methods,  50 
processes,  26 
Psychology,  13,  14,  16,  17,  18, 
19,  20,  ai,  30,  31,  3a. 


^Vchology,  36,  37,  39,  40 
57,  61,  69,  71,  72, 
86,  92,  106,  107, 
iii>  lia,  117 
abnormal,  119,  laa, 
230 

automatism,  190 

sources  of,  40 
Psychopathic,  diseases,  84,  2 

disturbance,  296 

maladies,  311 

state,  350 
Psychcpathology,  75,  175,  a 
Psydio-physical  relation,  loj 
P^dio-plqrsiological  hypMhi 
73 

relation,  109 
Piflrchosis,  24,  39,  78,  324 

functional,  163 
Purpose,  38,  90,  91,  95, 

100,  135,  313 
Purposive  life,  38 

R«"ct>oii,  37.  128,  130,  I 
-  188,  213,  260,  261,  21 
263,  2f<,  267,  268,  21 
270,  271,  272,  273,  2 
375.  294,  3J4.  315.  3; 
336,  338,  34i>  34a. 
347 

RwUty,  23,  33 

external,   130,   164,  U 
171,  172,  174,  182,  1 

Keoogmtion,  182,  183,  242,  2^ 
265,  363,  366,  367,  3( 
369.  371,  37a,  373,  35 

375.  376,  377,  382,  3J 
384.  385,  386,  387,  38 
389 

Recognitive,  dement,  ifo 

moment,  241,  324,  37 

376,  378,  380 
moment,  threshold,  246 


Index 


Recurrent  moment,  324 
Reductive,  the,  217 
Reflex  arc,  12 

moment,  239,  317,  321 
Keflexes,  255,  256,  257 

unconditional,  an 
Reinsutement.  343,  344,  3^5, 

3^-0.  347.  349.  350,  351, 
390 

Relation,  psycho-physical,  109 
P^'cho-physiological,  109 
type  of,  II,  12,  13 

Representation,  160,  165,  351, 

353.  356,  359,  361,  36  ^ 
law  of,  359 

Reproduction,  239,  240,  241, 
318,  323,  324.  325.  326. 
327.  328,  343,  346,  350^ 
351,  376,  377,  378,  380, 
384,  385.  386,  387,  390 
Kcproductive  moment,  364 
Reserve  energy,  aig,  aai,  aa3, 
226 

principles  of,  aig 
Ribot,  182,  288 
Rise  of  threshold,  213,  315,  aai, 

«46,  a99,  303 
Routine  of  expenenoe,  104 


415 


Savadsky,  211 
Science,  11,  13,  16,  ai 

S«»ndary  cr»psciousness,  181 
Sdection.  pi?  jpje 

Selective  ccMMcioittaeM,  96 

Self,  175 

Self-consdousness,  175,  176, 
305,  ao6.  ao8,  229,  231, 
232,  375,  388,  389 

Self-cosmic,  197 

Sdf-piwervation,  315 


S«wtM»,  a<^  138,  140^ 

'48,  149,  151,  160,  163, 
164,  166,  169,  171,  ,73 
centrally  exdted,  121 
njotor  duracter  of,  141 
thiethold  of,   298,  399, 

301,  302 
unit  of,  399,  301 
Sense  of  realttf,  173,  174 

of  perceptual  truth,  165 
Sensitivity,  condition  of,  313 
Sensory  coeflident,  165,  176 
Sensory  dements,  primary,  137 
^njents,  secondary,  137. 
138.145  ^ 
sequence,  causal,  105 
""wwHe,  101,  no 
necessary,  105,  no 
Series,  physiod,  78,  87 
psydric,  7« 

Simflarity,  361,  363,  363 
association  of,  363 

1\!!^%T^^''  337 

bleep  83,  84,  99,  106 
boaidiQr,  173 

Somnambufim,  287,  390,  391 
Soul,  52 

hypothesis,  55,  56,  57 
ooul-consaousness,  194,  195 
Sources  of  psychology,  40 
Spedfic,    recognitive  moment. 

243 
opencer,  133 
Spinoza,  laa 
SpinoBistic  doctrine,  64 
Spontaneous  variation,  95,  a43 
Stage,  moment,  360,  377 
States,  pathological,  346 
psychic,  31 
.  psychopathic.  350 
Stunulation,  308,  909 


4i6 


Index 


Stimulus  dureshold,  214,  298 
Structure  of  moment,  237 
Subconsdousnest,  84,  175,  i84t 
185,  186,  191,  193,  194. 
195.  196,  197.  198,  204, 
205,  206,  207,  208,  212, 
217,  276,  277,  278,  279, 
280,  281,  aSa,  296,  349> 
350 

Subject,  the,  231,  235 
Suggestion,  hypnotic,  176 

post-hsrpnotic,  176 
Sully,  120 

Suppression,  theory  of,  203 

Synaesthesia,  ija 

Syndiesis,  92,  116,  117,  133, 

152,  214,  218,  233.  2351 

a63,  275 
mental,  17,  53,  113 
Synthetic  moment,  240,  326, 

327.  339,  33a,  350*  365, 

387.  388 
mnnent  onnpound,  337, 

341,  343 
moment  of  self-consdous- 
neas,  245 
Syndwtk  Qfpe  of  ooncknnnas, 
381 

Synthetic  unity,  116,  330 
System,  mental,  163,  ais,  314 

Taine,  120 
Teleology,  92,  93,  95 
Theory  of  suppression,  203 
Things,  27 
Thoughts,  34,  35,  42 
Thrediold,  54,  213,  315,  331, 
223 

aggregate,  304 
^Bue,  303 
moment,  216,  297 
of   sensation,   298,  299, 
301,  303 


Thieshold,  rise  of,  213, 215, 221, 

246,  299,  303 
stimulus,  214,  298,  304 
tiieoiy  of,  175 

Time,  objective,  244 

Transmission  hypothesis,  59,  61 

Tropism,  130,  187 

Type,  abnormal,  45,  47,  48 
moment,  253 
relation,  11,  13, 13 
qmthetic,  381 

Unconditional  reflexes,  31 1 

stimulus,  211 
Unconscious,  the,  185,  198,  199, 

202,  205,  207,  212 
phonation,  155,  156,  157, 

158 

Uniformity,  no.  III 
Unit  of  sensation,  299,  301 
Unitary  experioice,  57 
UniQr,  qmthetic,  116 

Vari«tion,  319,  337 

accidental,  96,  98 
^[KMitaneous,  95,  96 

Views  of  behaviorist,  43 

Vividness,  160,  161,  163 

Vivisection,  48 

Volition,  83,  230 

Voluntarism,  67 

Voluntarutic  sdiool,  64 

Watson,  42,  43,  44 
Weber,  298 

Weber-Fechner  law,  300 
Willers,  28 

World  of  appredation,  196 

description,  196 
Wundt,  209 

HAm^  176 


